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1. INTRODUCTION
F. Giuffrida and K. Ligeti
1. BACKGROUND
The European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) is a main actor in the domain of the protection 
of the Union’s financial interests (PIF).1 Among other tasks, OLAF carries out 
administrative investigations on matters affecting the Union budget either within EU 
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies (‘internal investigations’) or in the Member 
States and third countries (‘external investigations’). At the end of its investigations, 
OLAF draws up a report in accordance with the rules laid down in Article 11 of 
Regulation 883/2013.2 The admissibility of such reports as evidence in national 
proceedings, especially criminal ones, is crucial for the effective protection of EU 
financial interests. According to Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, OLAF final 
reports shall constitute admissible evidence in national administrative or judicial 
proceedings ‘in the same way and under the same conditions as administrative reports 
drawn up by national administrative inspectors’.3 OLAF reports shall also be subject to 
the same evaluation rules as those applicable to national administrative reports and shall 
have the same evidentiary value as such reports.4 Like Article 8(3) of Regulation 2185/96 
on reports drafted at the end of OLAF on-the-spot checks and inspections,5 Article 11(2) 
of the OLAF Regulation enshrines therefore an assimilation rule: OLAF final reports 
shall be treated in the same way as national reports by administrative inspectors. 
Such an assimilation rule, however, poses problems. First, it can apply only if 
there is, at the national level, an administrative authority with a mandate and powers that 
can be considered ‘equivalent’ to those of OLAF. Finding such an ‘equivalent’ authority 
may not always be a straightforward task. Second, national rules and practices on the 
admissibility of administrative reports in criminal proceedings vary across Member 
States, in this way hampering a coherent judicial follow-up to OLAF investigations 
conducted in them. Third, national judicial authorities, once they have received OLAF 
reports, sometimes end up repeating the investigative activities already performed by the 
1 PIF stands for ‘protection des intérêts financiers’. 
2 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [2013] 
OJ L 248/1 (hereinafter also ‘OLAF Regulation’). 
3 Art 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013.  
4 ibid. 
5 Council Regulation (EURATOM, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks 
and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial 
interests against fraud and other irregularities [1996] OJ L 292/2. 
2 F. GiuFFrida and K. LiGeti
Office in order to obtain admissible evidence. The duplication of investigative activities 
is nonetheless contentious from different perspectives. It violates the principle of 
procedural economy, as human and technical resources are deployed twice to obtain the 
same result. It prolongs the elapsed time since the commission of the alleged crimes, with 
the consequence that there are higher risks of their becoming statute-barred before any 
decision on the merits can be taken. At the same time, persons under OLAF investigation 
would undergo the ordeal of an investigation for a second time. Finally, the element of 
surprise that is needed for some investigative activities – eg, inspections and searches – 
is lost when suspects are already aware of investigations concerning them.6  
Already in 2011, the Commission noted that the ‘results of EU administrative 
investigations frequently remain unused by national criminal courts’.7 According to an 
OLAF study of Member States’ follow-up to OLAF’s judicial recommendations issued 
between 1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015, 169 out of 317 recommendations were 
dismissed, 94 of them on grounds of ‘insufficient evidence’.8 OLAF reported that 
Member States’ authorities repeatedly take the view that Article 11(2) of Regulation 
883/2013 ‘is not always a sufficient legal basis to allow Member States’ judicial 
authorities to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial’,9 so that national authorities often 
‘perform investigation activities again in order to acquire admissible evidence’.10  
As the Commission acknowledged in May 2018 when tabling the proposal for an 
amendment of Regulation 883/2013, the recent OLAF Regulation’s evaluation revealed 
that the rules on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national judicial 
proceedings turned out to be ‘the most important factor affecting the follow-up to OLAF 
recommendations’.11 The Commission thus suggests abolishing the assimilation clause 
for national administrative proceedings, as well as ‘judicial proceedings of a non-criminal 
nature before national courts’.12 In these cases, the admissibility of OLAF reports would 
be subject only to the simple verification of their authenticity. Nothing would change, 
however, for criminal proceedings. In April 2019, the European Parliament instead 
suggested that the assimilation principle should no longer apply to criminal proceedings 
either and that OLAF reports should ‘constitute admissible evidence in judicial 
proceedings’,13 including criminal ones, upon simple verification of their authenticity. 
6 Katalin Ligeti, ‘The Protection of the Procedural Rights of Persons Concerned by OLAF Administrative 
Investigations and the Admissibility of OLAF Final Reports as Criminal Evidence’ (Study for the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control 2017) 27–28. 
7 Commission, ‘On the protection of the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law and by 
administrative investigations. An integrated policy to safeguard taxpayers’ money’ COM(2011) 293 final, 
26 May 2011, 8.  
8 OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up to OLAF’s Judicial Recommendations Issued between 1 
January 2008 and 31 December 2015’, Ref Ares(2017)461597 – 27/01/2017 (2017) 1.  
9 ibid 2.  
10 ibid.  
11 Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ COM(2018) 338 final, 
23 May 2018, 5.  
12 ibid, Art 1(10)(b).  
13 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
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The fate of this proposed amendment is uncertain at the time of writing. In addition, it is 
not even clear whether a rule such as that envisaged by the Parliament would truly change 
the status quo, as it would apply in a context where there is no harmonisation of national 
rules on national criminal proceedings. 
The admissibility of OLAF final reports in criminal proceedings, therefore, will 
arguably remain problematic in the future, and not even the establishment of the European 
Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO)14 will alleviate all concerns about the coherence and 
effectiveness of PIF enforcement. OLAF will still be able to conduct investigations 
entailing a potential criminal law follow-up vis-à-vis PIF cases beyond the EPPO’s 
competence, including those concerning Member States that do not participate in the 
EPPO enhanced cooperation.15 
The issues connected with the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence should 
also be assessed within the broader landscape of EU law enforcement. OLAF is not the 
only EU administrative authority that may forward reports and evidence to national 
authorities with a view to a punitive follow-up. Transmission of evidence with an ‘EU 
origin’ can also occur in European Central Bank (ECB) frameworks regarding the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM),16 the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA) regarding the supervision of trade repositories,17 and the European 
Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP).18  
In 2016 and 2017, Utrecht University led two EU co-funded research projects that 
proved the relevance of comparing OLAF’s legal framework with the ECB, ESMA and 
DG COMP with respect to investigatory powers and exchange of information between 
these entities and national enforcement authorities.19 The present project ADCRIM 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations (COM(2018)0338 – C8-
0214/2018 – 2018/0170(COD))’, amendment 85. 
14 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s office (‘the EPPO’) [2017] OJ L 28/1. 
15 Namely, Denmark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Poland, and Sweden. It seems however that 
Sweden will soon join the other 22 Member States that already participate in the EPPO enhanced 
cooperation (<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/oettinger/blog/sweden-open-
join-european-public-prosecutors-office_en> accessed 4 June 2019).  
16 According to Art 136 (‘Evidence of facts potentially giving rise to a criminal offence’) of Regulation 
(EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework for 
cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national 
competent authorities and with national designated authorities [2014] OJ L 141/1, ‘Where, in carrying out 
its tasks under the SSM Regulation, the ECB has reason to suspect that a criminal offence may have been 
committed, it shall request the relevant NCA [national competent authorities] to refer the matter to the 
appropriate authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution…’. 
17 ‘ESMA shall refer matters for criminal prosecution to the relevant national authorities where, in carrying 
out its duties … it finds that there are serious indications of the possible existence of facts liable to constitute 
criminal offences …’ (Art 64(8) of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L201/1). 
18 Art 12 of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 concerns the exchange of 
information between DG COMP and national competition authorities, and the use of such information.  
19 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: 
Improving OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement 
Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017); Michele Simonato, Michiel Luchtman and John 
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(‘Admissibility of OLAF final reports as evidence in criminal proceedings’) aims to 
complement these two studies by delving further into issues raised by the admissibility of 
evidence collected by EU law enforcement authorities, and especially OLAF, in national 
criminal proceedings. 
 
2. AIM AND SCOPE OF THE RESEARCH 
ADCRIM is a comparative study involving seven EU Member States: France, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.20 It aims to 
analyse national provisions and case law on the admissibility of evidence and reports 
drawn up by administrative authorities in punitive administrative and criminal 
proceedings, with a focus on the latter. This review of national legislation, case law, and 
practices led to identifying some obstacles and limits to the admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence in national proceedings. Along the lines of the previous two Hercule 
III studies,21 the seven countries have been chosen because of their ideal geographical 
distribution and their different approaches to the interplay between criminal and 
administrative law.22 Among these seven Member States, there are common law and civil 
law systems, as well as adversarial and inquisitorial criminal justice systems.  
The analysis of national administrative and criminal justice systems also assessed 
whether and to what extent OLAF can learn lessons from the other three above-mentioned 
EU law enforcement authorities. Following up on the findings of the two previous 
Hercule III studies led by Utrecht University, ADCRIM inquired whether the issue of the 
admissibility of evidence would also benefit from a comparison between OLAF, the ECB, 
ESMA, and DG COMP.  
Finally, drawing on the seven national reports, as well as two ‘transversal’ reports 
that deal with the relationship between admissibility of evidence and fundamental rights	
and	the transmission of evidence from the EU to the national level, recommendations to 
strengthen the admissibility of OLAF reports in national criminal proceedings have been 
put forward. This has been done taking into account the competing interests in the field, 
namely the need to ensure adequate and effective protection both of the EU budget and, 
at the same time, procedural safeguards and fundamental rights under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  
 A few clarifications on the scope of the research are appropriate. First, for the 
purpose of this study, ‘punitive administrative proceedings’ refers to national proceedings 
for applying administrative sanctions, and more precisely fines,23 that would qualify as 
having a criminal nature according to the so-called Engel criteria established by the 
																																								 																				
Vervaele (eds), Exchange of Information with EU and National Enforcement Authorities: Improving OLAF 
Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht 
University 2018). 
20 The United Kingdom is still part of the EU at the time of writing. Any reference to the UK should be 
understood as referring to the English and Welsh legal system. 
21 See n 19 above.  
22 See Michiel Luchtman, ‘Introduction’ in Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 19) 4.  
23 The scope of the administrative facet of this study will therefore be limited to proceedings leading to the 
imposition of administrative fines and not include other possible sanctions, unless otherwise specified.  
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European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),24 which the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) has recently endorsed.25 Throughout this study, the reference to ‘punitive 
administrative proceedings’ thus encompasses proceedings before administrative 
authorities but not before administrative courts, unless otherwise specified. References to 
‘punitive proceedings’ shall instead be understood as referring to both punitive 
administrative and criminal proceedings. 
Second, the scope of the comparison between OLAF, ESMA, the ECB, and DG 
COMP is limited to the ‘vertical’ dimension of admissibility, ie admissibility of evidence 
collected by these EU bodies and forwarded to national authorities for punitive 
administrative or criminal follow-up. ADCRIM does not address the horizontal transfer 
of evidence under the frameworks for mutual legal assistance and mutual administrative 
assistance. 
Third, the working definition of ‘admissible evidence’ is relevant evidence that 
may be shared with administrative sanctioning authorities or criminal courts and that may 
contribute to findings of fact in criminal or punitive administrative proceedings. The 
study group acknowledged that this project focuses on ‘evidence’ rather than on 
‘intelligence’ or ‘information’, which instead refer to pieces of information that, as such, 
could not contribute to findings of fact in domestic punitive proceedings. As the dividing 
line between the two notions is blurred, some contributions within ADCRIM refer, when 
needed, to the exchange of information between EU law enforcement entities and national 
authorities. The second Hercule III project focused much more intensely on such 
exchanges of information.26 
Finally, the study refers to ‘OLAF-collected evidence’ and ‘OLAF reports’ mostly 
interchangeably, unless otherwise specified. The former concept seems however broader 
than the latter. In laying down the above-mentioned assimilation rule, Article 11(2) of 
Regulation 883/2013 refers to OLAF ‘reports’. These reports are complex legal products 
that can be accompanied by other relevant documents (such as records of the interviews 
performed according to Article 9 of the OLAF Regulation, reports of the on-the-spot 
checks or of digital forensics operations, etc). The term ‘OLAF-collected evidence’, 
which the Commission also uses in its recent Proposal for the reform of Regulation 
883/2013,27 includes therefore both OLAF final reports and these items of evidence.  
3. METHODOLOGY AND PLAN OF THE STUDY
Coordinated by the University of Luxembourg and carried out by an international team 
of experts from seven European universities,28 the ADCRIM project lasted between 1 
April 2018 and 31 March 2019. Building on background research carried out by the 
University of Luxembourg staff, a questionnaire was prepared to guide national 
24 See Engel and Others v The Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 
(ECtHR, 8 June 1976). 
25 See, for instance, Case C-489/10 Bonda, EU:C:2012:319.  
26 Simonato, Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 19).  
27 COM(2018) 338 final, 5 and 11. 
28 See Annex II for further details.  
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rapporteurs in the analysis of the relevant national rules and procedures. Included in 
Annex I to this study, the questionnaire was discussed and amended during the project’s 
first meeting, which took place in Luxembourg on 5 and 6 June 2018 and was attended 
by one OLAF representative.  
The questionnaire was divided into five parts: i) general framework on the 
collection and admissibility of evidence in national proceedings; ii) admissibility of 
OLAF-collected evidence in national punitive administrative proceedings; iii) 
admissibility of evidence collected by the ECB, ESMA, and DG COMP in national 
punitive administrative proceedings; iv) admissibility of evidence collected by national 
and EU law enforcement authorities in national criminal proceedings; and v) focus on the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national criminal proceedings. In addition 
to desk research, national rapporteurs interviewed,	when needed, national experts and 
practitioners to gain a better understanding of problems and practices connected with the 
admissibility of OLAF reports in domestic procedures.  
A draft version of the national reports was discussed during the project’s second 
meeting, which the University of Luxembourg hosted on 28 February and 1 March 2019. 
Two representatives from OLAF were present at this meeting, during which the study 
group’s members also discussed the preliminary findings of the comparative report as 
well as of the two ‘transversal’ reports on ‘EU Administrative Investigations and the Use 
of Their Results as Evidence in National Punitive Proceedings’ and ‘Lawful and Fair Use 
of Evidence from a European Human Rights Perspective’.  
The final text of the two transversal reports is to be found, respectively, in chapters 
2 and 3 of this study, while chapters 4–10 include the seven national reports (France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom). 
Chapter 11 offers a comparative analysis that draws upon the national and transversal 
reports. On the basis of such reports, and the comparative one as well, policy 
recommendations to strengthen the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national 
criminal proceedings have been formulated in chapter 12.  
All reports use the OSCOLA referencing system.29 The members of the study 
group, as well as OLAF staff who were involved in ADCRIM either by attending one of 
the meetings or accepting to be interviewed in the framework of the project, are listed in 
Annex II. The study was finalised in June 2019. 
29 The current edition of the OSCOLA guidelines (2012), which the authors have followed with a few 
deviations, can be found at <www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/oscola_4th_edn_hart_2012.pdf> accessed 
4 June 2019.  
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2. EU ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS AND                               
THE USE OF THEIR RESULTS AS EVIDENCE IN                                             
NATIONAL PUNITIVE PROCEEDINGS 
M. Luchtman, A. Karagianni and K. Bovend’Eerdt 
  
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In cases of combination of punitive and non-punitive investigations, the respective 
procedural frameworks and safeguards for individuals and economic actors will often 
vary, sometimes considerably. This situation is problematic, because these individuals 
are then confronted with multiple proceedings – conducted in parallel or consecutively – 
in which their legal position is different (and, consequently, so is the protection offered 
by fundamental rights), but the information that they are requested or ordered to provide 
is the same and likely to be transferred from one set of proceedings to another, and back 
again. Sometimes, the same authorities may be involved. In the specific context of the 
European Union, where procedures are a composite of national and EU elements and 
the legal systems are far from aligned, the determination of one’s legal position and 
effectuation of his or her rights brings yet another significant complication to one’s 
legal position.  
This chapter deals with the role and place of the relevant fundamental rights at 
the interface of the EU procedures and their follow-up as evidence in punitive 
proceedings at the national level. We do not aim to provide yet another analysis of the 
case law of the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts on all of the aforementioned 
safeguards, but will focus mainly on how this case law is to be applied in the vertical 
setting where materials that have been gathered or processed by EU authorities are 
consequently used as, for instance, intelligence, starting information or evidence in 
national punitive proceedings of an administrative or criminal law nature. Our focus in 
this chapter will be on how the EU legal order guides these processes of vertical 
interaction between the EU and the national level. Note, moreover, that these processes 
are certainly not only vertical interactions. The EU-wide mandate of the authorities 
easily ‘covers up’ the fact that information may be obtained under the procedural rules 
of other Member States. How to deal with such diverging standards, with the interface 
from non-punitive to punitive, and with the assessment of ‘foreign’ or ‘alien’ evidence 
in national punitive proceedings then become issues which are very difficult, if not 
impossible to separate. 
We will start our analysis with an overview of the main problems and the 
dominant principles for dealing with the use of evidence in a composite, vertical setting 
(sections 2 and 3). The relevant legal provisions will subsequently be introduced in the 
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relevant sections on, particularly, the European Commission’s Directorate General for 
Competition (DG COMP) (section 4), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) framework (section 5), and OLAF (section 6). As no 
relevant materials on the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
framework could be found, we have disregarded this authority for this report. 
 
2. EUROPE’S SHARED LEGAL ORDER AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE: 
THREE TYPES OF PROBLEMS 
In the previous two Hercule III studies, we have repeatedly noted that the EU-wide 
mandate of authorities such as OLAF, ECB, DG Comp or ESMA does not 
automatically imply that there is also a common European legislative framework with 
regard to the gathering, transferring or use as evidence of information, nor does this 
mandate bring it about that EU authorities operate without the help of their national 
partners. On the contrary; at some stage, the European and national legal frameworks 
need to connect again, particularly where investigations conducted at EU level end up in 
criminal proceedings at national level. While this necessity is particularly important for 
OLAF, it is also relevant for ECB or DG Comp. 
This complicated legal framework raises a number of questions. Can we for 
instance use as evidence materials which have been lawfully obtained in one jurisdiction 
as evidence in another, even when those materials could not have been (lawfully) 
obtained in the latter jurisdiction? Or are national courts allowed to disregard such 
materials under EU law? And to what extent do punitive proceedings at the national 
level ‘forecast their shadow’ over non-punitive investigative acts at the EU level, or vice 
versa? By which (fundamental right) standards are national courts to assess (if at all) 
materials that have been gathered and transferred by the EU level under a different 
framework and that are now introduced as evidence in national punitive proceedings?  
The potential problems for the use of materials obtained by or under the auspices 
of EU authorities, in punitive proceedings at the national level are hard to overlook. We 
have identified at the least three categories of problems.  
 
2.1 Diverging standards I: From the non-punitive to the punitive  
It is well-known that the punitive limb of Article 6 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) – and its corresponding provisions in Articles 47 and 48 of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR) – can affect preceding or parallel proceedings of 
a non-punitive nature. Conversely, the use of results from non-punitive administrative 
proceedings can render later punitive proceedings unfair.1 In the famous Saunders 
judgment, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recognised on the one hand, 
that complex modern-day societies are in need of mechanisms that occasionally force 
individuals to keep or produce documents or information for law enforcement purposes. 
It would unduly hamper the effective regulation in the public interest of complex 
financial and commercial activities to stipulate that such preparatory investigations 
                                                
1 Imbrioscia v Switzerland App no 13972/88 (ECtHR, 24 November 1993), para 36. 
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should be subject to all the guarantees of Article 6 ECHR, such as the right to silence or 
access to a lawyer. On the other hand, however, such investigations should never render 
later trial proceedings unfair. The key issue, according to the Court, is to assess the use 
to which evidence obtained under compulsion is put in the course of the criminal trial.2 
This has to be done on a case-by-case basis, taking account of all circumstances of the 
case.3 In the Saunders case, the ECtHR consequently established that extensive use was 
made of (7 out of 9 lengthy) interviews of Mr Saunders in the criminal case against him 
by the prosecution. In consequence, Mr Saunders may have felt compelled to make 
statements at trial, despite his right to remain silent. Consequently, there was a breach of 
Article 6 ECHR. 
Other famous cases deal with non-punitive and punitive proceedings running in 
parallel. The Strasbourg Court accepted that the possibility of a punitive sanction may 
have an impact on administrative proceedings which are not in and of themselves of a 
punitive nature. Both the cases of Marttinen and Chambaz show that the Court, for the 
application of the criminal limb of Article 6 ECHR in non-punitive proceedings, 
attaches great importance to the (material, personal, temporal and, we might add, 
territorial) links that exist between the different types of proceedings. Essentially, this 
means that where these proceedings are linked, legislators (or, where these remain 
silent, courts) essentially have two choices: to avoid a violation of the principle, they 
must either take away the element of (significant) compulsion in the non-punitive 
proceedings, which is what happened in Switzerland,4 and is more or less also what we 
see in OLAF investigations (Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013). Or, as an alternative, 
they restrict the use of the materials obtained under compulsion for punitive purposes. 
There are signs that the ECtHR does also accept the latter construction,5 though there 
remain many questions to be answered in that regard.  
In Chambaz, these findings follow upon the Court’s observation that, in 
Switzerland, the non-punitive and punitive tax proceedings were ‘closely interlinked’ 
(‘suffisamment liées’) – in fact almost identical – due to the applicable procedural 
frameworks, the authorities involved and the nature of the information sought. In these 
circumstances, the Court may consider comprehensively, from the point of view of 
Article 6 of the Convention, a set of proceedings if they are sufficiently interlinked for 
reasons relating either to the facts of the case, or to the manner in which they are 
conducted by the national authorities. Then, Article 6 of the Convention will thus be 
applicable where one of the proceedings at issue concerns a criminal charge and the 
others are sufficiently related to it.6  
2 Saunders v United Kingdom App no 19187/91 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996), para 71. 
3 ibid, para 69.  
4 See Art 183 of the Bundesgesetz über die direkte Bundessteuer (Federal Act on Direct Federal 
Taxation); Art 57a of the Bundesgesetz vom 14. Dezember 1990 über die Harmonisierung der direkten 
Steuern der Kantone und Gemeinden (Federal Act of 14 December 1990 on the Harmonisation of Direct 
Taxation at Cantonal and Communal Levels).  
5 See the references in Marttinen v Finland App no 19235/03 (ECtHR, 21 April 2009), paras 34 and 75, 
as well as Van Weerelt v the Netherlands App no 784/14 (ECtHR, 16 June 2015) (admissibility). 
6 Chambaz v Switzerland App no 11663/04 (ECtHR, 5 April 2012), para 43. 
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Obviously, the criterion of being sufficiently interlinked also raises all sorts of 
interesting questions in the many interplays between EU and national proceedings, as 
has become apparent from the 2017 and 2018 Hercule reports. One of the challenges for 
any EU system intervening with the national laws of evidence will be to offer guidance 
on this complicated issue. As will become apparent below, this issue is far from fully 
addressed yet. Because there are so many legal orders involved, a common European 
approach is particularly difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, it would appear to be vital for 
any system of law enforcement at the interface of punitive and non-punitive law 
enforcement.  
 
2.2 Diverging standards II: From one legal order to another  
In addition to the challenge just mentioned, a complication arises where EU law and 
national laws set different standards with respect to the protection of defence rights and 
procedural safeguards. One example follows again from the privilege against self-
incrimination, as the Strasbourg Court seems to accord that principle a wider scope than 
the Luxembourg Court.7 The latter court recognized in Orkem only a limited privilege 
against self-incrimination whose rationale should be sought in the general principle of 
Union law of respecting the rights of defence and the presumption of innocence.8 
Former Regulation 17/62 did not accord an undertaking under investigation any  
right to evade the investigation on the ground that the results thereof might provide 
evidence of an infringement by it of the competition rules. On the contrary, it imposes 
on the undertaking an obligation to cooperate actively, which implies that it must make 
available to the Commission all information relating to the subject-matter of the 
investigation.9  
The CJEU held that the Commission may compel an undertaking to provide all the 
necessary information, but may not compel an undertaking to provide it with 
information that involves the admission on its part of the existence of an infringement 
which it is incumbent upon the Commission to prove.10 It is generally assumed that both 
Courts apply different standards and that the reason for this is that the narrower scope of 
the privilege in competition law relates to the fact that the entities under investigation 
are legal persons, and/or to the fact that DG COMP has no real power to summon 
persons for questioning.11 This is generally different for the cases dealt with by the 
Strasbourg Court. 
                                                
7 cf Bo Vesterdorf, ‘Legal Professional Privilege and the Privilege against Self- Incrimination in EC Law: 
Recent Developments and Current Issues’ (2004) 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1179; Stijn 
Lamberigts, The Privilege against Self-Incrimination of Corporations (dissertation, University of 
Luxembourg 2017).  
8 Case 374/87 Orkem v Commission, EU:C:1989:387, para 33. 
9 ibid, para 27. 
10 ibid, para 35. 
11 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele, ‘Comparison of the Legal Frameworks’ in Michiel Luchtman 
and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: Improving OLAF’s 
Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement Authorities 
(ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017) 245–259. We wrote: ‘Art. 19 Reg. 1/2003 is limited to 
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Be this as it may, the foregoing may bring about systemic flaws in the protection 
of the principle at the interface of legal orders. First of all, it is likely – particularly for 
cases that end up before the criminal courts – that these courts will apply the Strasbourg 
standards, certainly after the coming into effect of Directive 2016/343 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be 
present at the trial in criminal proceedings.12 Article 7 of that Directive stipulates that 
Member States shall – in line with the Strasbourg case law13 – not only ensure that 
suspects and accused persons have the right to remain silent in relation to the criminal 
offence that they are suspected or accused of having committed, but also that suspects 
and accused persons have the right not to incriminate themselves. This stands in 
contrast to the protection offered under the OLAF legal framework, which applies the 
Orkem-rule. Secondly, national standards may be higher than the Strasbourg or EU 
standards, for instance where they provide for the additional protection of certain 
categories of documents. 
We therefore face the complication of how to deal with safeguards that are 
designed to protect the same or equivalent legal interests, yet are constructed and 
interpreted differently in various legal orders. As we have said, this is not only a 
‘vertical’ issue (EU-national). Because of the EU-wide mandate of the four authorities 
of this study, horizontal divergences automatically become a part of the problem. The 
rationale for such a wide territorial mandate is after all to overcome the difficulties that 
territorial boundaries cause for law enforcement. Their design inherently brings to the 
fore the question of the extent to which materials that have been lawfully gathered in 
one jurisdiction can be used as evidence in another.  
Similar issues arise, incidentally, with respect to the legal professional privilege 
and, most likely, other defence rights. In our previous study we have repeatedly pointed 
to the differences between the many legal orders involved on the treatment of in-house 
lawyers.14 The right to privacy provides another illustration of the problem. Whereas 
some jurisdictions require a judicial authorisation to conduct an investigative measure – 
an on-site inspection, for instance – this requirement may not have to be met in 
situations of consent, whereas Arts 20 and 21 deal with “explanations of facts or documents relating to 
the subject matter and purpose of the inspections”’ (ibid 259). 
12 Directive (EU) 2016/343 of the European Parliament and the Council of 9 March 2016 on the 
strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial 
in criminal proceedings [2016] OJ L 65/1; Art 9(2) of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 883/2013 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by 
the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council and Council Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 [2013] OJ L 248/1 
(hereinafter: ‘Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom’).  
13 cf recitals 11 and 27 of Directive (EU) 2016/343. The latter recital reads:  
The right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself imply that competent authorities 
should not compel suspects or accused persons to provide information if those persons do not wish to 
do so. In order to determine whether the right to remain silent or the right not to incriminate oneself 
has been violated, the interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights of the right to a fair trial 
under the ECHR should be taken into account. 
14 Luchtman and Vervaele, ‘Comparison of the Legal Frameworks’ (n 11); Rob Widdershoven and Paul 
Craig, ‘Pertinent Issues of Judicial Accountability in EU Shared Enforcement’ in Mira Scholten and 
Michiel Luchtman (eds), Law Enforcement by EU Authorities (Edward Elgar 2017) 338–339.  
dMinistrative investigations 
12 M. LuchtMan, a. Karagianni and K. Bovend’eerdt 2. EU adMinistrative investigations 13
 
 
another.15 Procedural safeguards protecting arbitrary interferences with the right to 
privacy therefore are another example of the problems defined in the above.  
 
2.3 Diverging standards III: From the administrative law sphere to the criminal 
A third complication that can arise in the complex setting of OLAF investigations 
relates to the differences that exist between ‘criminal’ vs ‘administrative’ types of 
investigative measures. It will usually be the case that the use of compulsion is available 
only for non-punitive, mostly administrative investigations.16 Conversely, the more 
severe types of investigative measures are usually available only for criminal 
investigations. This applies, for instance, to the interception of telecommunications or 
powers of search and seizure. In the OLAF setting, some of its partners at the national 
level can indeed use powers of criminal investigation for OLAF related purposes. To 
what extent, then, can the results of such investigations – channelled through OLAF – 
be used as evidence in another jurisdiction? Again, this problem becomes very difficult 
to isolate from the issue that was discussed in the preceding sub-section. It does, 
however, merit some additional reflection, as we will repeatedly come back to the 
relevant cases in the following sections. 
Cooperation between administrative and criminal law authorities involves 
almost by definition cooperation between authorities with different tasks and sets of 
competences. This induces a certain risk of forum shopping and U-turns. The issue was 
put on the table before the EU Court of Justice in WebMindLicenses.17 The facts of the 
aforementioned case of WebMindLicences18 involved an alleged VAT fraud scheme, 
investigated in parallel by both the Hungarian tax, as well as the judicial authorities. 
The question arose as to whether the tax authorities could make use of the recordings of 
telecommunications and seized emails in the criminal proceedings. They did not have 
comparable investigative powers themselves; the materials were gathered by judicial 
authorities. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) established that both 
types of proceedings fall within the scope of EU law. EU law, however, does not 
preclude administrative procedures from using evidence obtained in the context of a 
parallel criminal procedure that has not yet been concluded, provided that the rights 
guaranteed by EU law, especially by the Charter, are observed.  
The Court consequently recognises that the gathering, transferring19 and 
subsequent use of the data all constitute separate interferences with Article 7 CFR and 
need justifications. Should questions arise as to the legality of the gathering or 
transmission of the materials, then there are some specific duties and responsibilities of 
                                                
15 Luchtman and Vervaele, ‘Comparison of the Legal Frameworks’ (previous n); Widdershoven and 
Craig (previous n) 341–344.  
16 In that case, the problem more or less coincides with the situation we discussed in section 2.1. 
17 Case C‑ 419/14 WebMindLicences, EU:C:2015:832.  
18 ibid.  
19 Interestingly, the Court held that there was no need to ‘examine whether transmission of the evidence 
by the department responsible for the criminal investigation and the gathering thereof by the department 
conducting the administrative procedure with a view to its use interfere with the right, guaranteed by 
Article 8 of the Charter, to the protection of personal data’ (ibid, para 78).  
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the courts in the administrative VAT-proceedings. The national court which reviews the 
legality of the decision founded on such evidence must verify, first, whether the 
interception of telecommunications and seizure of emails were means of investigation 
provided for by law and were necessary in the context of the criminal procedure and, 
secondly, whether the use by the tax authorities of the evidence obtained by those 
means was also authorised by law, and was necessary. Furthermore, that court must 
verify whether, in accordance with the general principle of observance of the rights of 
the defence, the taxable person had the opportunity, in the context of the administrative 
procedure, of gaining access to that evidence and of being heard concerning it. Finally, 
if the national court finds that the taxable person did not have that opportunity or that 
that evidence was obtained in the context of the criminal procedure, or used in the 
context of the administrative procedure, in breach of Article 7 of the Charter, it must [!] 
disregard that evidence and annul that decision if, as a result, the latter has no basis. 
That evidence must also be disregarded if the national court is not empowered to check 
that it was obtained in the context of the criminal procedure in accordance with EU law 
or cannot at least satisfy itself, on the basis of a review already carried out by a criminal 
court in an inter partes procedure, that it was obtained in accordance with EU law. 
These standards appear to be (much) higher than the standards of the Strasbourg Court, 
which holds that breaches of the right to privacy (Article 8 ECHR) do not necessarily 
render a trial unfair. We come back to this below (section 3.3). 
3. THE EU FRAMEWORK FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE
3.1 An overview of the general EU principles 
The foregoing illustrates that the transfer from the non-punitive to the punitive and/or 
from the criminal to the administrative in a composite setting like that of OLAF, DG 
COMP, ECB is a complicated issue, even when there are no indications of irregularities 
that may have taken place in the process of the gathering or the transfer of materials 
from the EU to the national level. Before we delve into the specific provisions – found 
in the respective regulations of DG COMP, ECB (SSM) and OLAF – this section aims 
to provide an oversight of the constitutional framework within which these provisions 
were established. We will not limit ourselves to the vertical interactions from the EU to 
the national level, but also pay attention to the reverse situation, as well as, briefly and 
where relevant, the mutual horizontal relationships between the EU Member States and 
their authorities. The goal is to establish which principles guarantee the respect for 
fundamental rights, as interpreted by the ECtHR and the CJEU, at the interface of 
different legal orders.  
The law on evidence will, when EU law is silent, fall under the general 
rule/principle of national procedural autonomy. Where specific rules of EU law – 
indicating what to do with evidence from other jurisdictions in punitive proceedings – 
are absent, the matter is left to the national law, with only a limited number of 
limitations following from the case law of the CJEU. First of all, the Rewe requirements 
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apply.20 Procedural conditions governing the action with an EU dimension may 
certainly not be less favourable than those relating to similar actions of a domestic 
nature (equivalence), nor may they render such actions ineffective, ie virtually 
impossible or excessively difficult (effectiveness). 
In addition to the Rewe requirements, the Charter imposes limitations on the use 
and assessment of materials that were obtained and transferred by DG COMP, ECB or 
OLAF. The Court of Justice, in its seminal Melloni decision, has interpreted Article 53 
CFR as meaning that the application of national standards of protection of fundamental 
rights must not compromise the level of protection provided for by the Charter or the 
primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.21  
Moreover, a number of EU rules and principles govern the horizontal and 
vertical relationships between the different legal orders. The CJEU stated in its advice 
on the accession of the EU to the ECHR that ‘the founding treaties of the EU, unlike 
ordinary international treaties, established a new legal order, possessing its own 
institutions, for the benefit of which the Member States thereof have limited their 
sovereign rights, in ever wider fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only those 
States but also their nationals’.22 As a new kind of legal order, the EU has its own 
constitutional framework and founding principles, consisting of, particularly, the 
principle of conferral of powers, the primacy and the direct effect of EU law, the 
principles of sincere cooperation and of mutual trust, and a judicial system intended to 
ensure consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of EU law, in which national 
courts and the Court of Justice jointly ensure the full application of EU law in all 
Member States.23  
This legal structure is based, according to the CJEU in its Opinion 2/13, on the 
fundamental premise that each Member State shares with all the other Member States, 
and recognizes that it does so, a set of common values on which the EU is founded, as 
stated in Article 2 TEU. These values include the respect for fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the Charter. However, the autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the 
laws of the Member States and in relation to international law requires that the 
interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured within the framework of the 
structure and objectives of the EU. Among these objectives (Article 3 TEU) are the free 
movement of goods, services, capital and persons, citizenship of the Union, the area of 
freedom, security and justice, and competition policy. Those provisions are structured in 
such a way as to contribute — each within its specific field and with its own particular 
characteristics — to the implementation of the process of integration that is the raison 
d’être of the EU itself.24 
On this basis, the Court held that: 
20 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
EU:C:1976:188. See also Case C‑ 310/16 Dzivev, EU:C:2019:30, para 30. 
21 Case C‑ 399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, para 60.  
22 Opinion 2/13 Accession of the Union to the ECHR, EU:C:2014:2454, para 157. 
23 ibid, para 176. See also Case C-216/18 PPU LM, EU:C:2018:586. 
24 Opinion 2/13 Accession of the Union to the ECHR, para 171. 
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[T]he principle of mutual trust between the Member States is of fundamental 
importance in EU law, given that it allows an area without internal borders to be created 
and maintained. That principle requires, particularly [but, apparently, not exclusively] 
with regard to the area of freedom, security and justice, each of those States, save in 
exceptional circumstances, to consider all the other Member States to be complying 
with EU law and particularly with the fundamental rights recognised by EU law …25  
That implies that, 
[W]hen implementing EU law, the Member States may, under EU law, be required to 
presume that fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so 
that not only may they not demand a higher level of national protection of fundamental 
rights from another Member State than that provided by EU law, but, save in 
exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other Member State has actually, in 
a specific case, observed the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.26  
In essence, the Court has thus paved the way for a twofold legal rule, ie a rule of 
recognition of equivalence and a (horizontal) rule of non-inquiry, defining – save for 
exceptional circumstances – the division of labour between the national courts, while 
ensuring the full judicial protection in the implementation of EU law. In that setting, the 
EU Charter guarantees a minimum level of protection whenever national authorities 
implement EU law (cf Melloni).  
The question is to what extent this twofold rule functions without specific rules 
implementing the framework for cooperation. The rule has clearly been implemented in 
the framework for the European Arrest Warrant and, presumably, other instruments 
implementing the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions in the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. Yet it is doubtful that it can also exist in a vertical 
setting without such a legislative supporting framework. Legal acts appear necessary to 
ensure that the cooperating parties both act in the implementation of EU law and, by 
consequence, under the application of the Charter, as well as to define the precise scope 
of the duties of cooperation. The foregoing suggests that, as a principle, mutual trust – 
based on the common standards of the CFR – will likewise define the vertical 
relationships between the EU and its Member States, particularly when fundamental 
right standards diverge, but also that mutual trust does not automatically take the shape 
of a legal rule. That point is relevant when the question comes up as to how to deal with 
diverging standards, but also as to how to assess materials that have been obtained in 
and transferred by another jurisdiction and are now used as evidence in national 
punitive proceedings.  
How do the aforementioned principles of mutual trust, equivalence and 
effectiveness and the Melloni standard relate to each other in the framework of the laws 
of evidence? There can be no doubt that, in principle, the origin of materials that are 
used as evidence in punitive proceedings can never do away with the obligation of the 
                                                
25 ibid, para 191 (emphasis added). 
26 ibid, para 192; Case C-216/18 PPU LM, para 58. 
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forum state to guard the fairness of the proceedings as a whole.27 But what does that 
mean precisely, particularly when related to materials coming from other jurisdictions? 
For one, courts (or other authorities) may be called upon to respond to allegations of 
irregularities or unfairness, which is the subject of another transversal report to this 
study. More relevant for this chapter is that courts may also be confronted with the issue 
of diverging standards with respect to procedural safeguards or defence rights – ie 
standards from other jurisdictions that are higher or lower – or with the question of how 
to deal with the interface from the non-punitive to the punitive.  
Whereas the Rewe requirements are particularly relevant in cases where EU law 
is silent and national laws must be referred to and, by consequence, appear to be 
relevant particularly where the law of evidence is subjected to strict legal rules of 
national procedure (section 3.5), the other rights and principles – the Charter, the 
(recognition of) equivalence, mutual trust and non-inquiry – are particularly relevant for 
systems that are, in principle, open to EU materials as evidence in punitive proceedings. 
In such cases, further conditions to the use of those materials may still follow from EU 
rules or from the principles that were just discussed, as well as from the Charter, as we 
will see below (sections 3.2–3.4). In the following, we aim to identify those conditions 
and we will try to establish the added value of specific EU rules on the admissibility of 
evidence. 
 
3.2 The added value of specific EU rules I: Defence rights, procedural safeguards 
and the recognition of equivalence 
Where EU law regulates the transfer of information from the EU to the national level, or 
its use at the national level, the principle of procedural autonomy plays a smaller role. 
Such provisions are found, first of all, in the area of competition, in particular in the 
applicable rules on the exchange of information, duties of secrecy and purpose 
limitation. There is case law from the ECJ, under the regime of Regulation 17/62, 
connecting the duties of secrecy and purpose limitation to the rights of defence of the 
undertakings. Those rights, which must be respected in the preliminary investigation 
procedure, require, on the one hand, that, when the request for information is made by 
the EU Commission, undertakings be informed of the purposes pursued and of the legal 
basis of the request and, on the other, that the information thus obtained should not 
subsequently be used as evidence outside the legal context in which the request was 
                                                
27 See already Echeverri Rodriguez v the Netherlands App no 43286/98 (ECtHR, 27 June 2000):  
Insofar as the applicant complains that the Court of Appeal refused to take oral evidence from the 
USA Assistant Attorney Ms D. as she could have clarified issues in relation to the investigation 
carried out in the USA, the Court considers that the Convention does not preclude reliance, at the 
investigating stage, on information obtained by the investigating authorities from sources such as 
foreign criminal investigations. Nevertheless, the subsequent use of such information can raise issues 
under the Convention where there are reasons to assume that in this foreign investigation defence 
rights guaranteed in the Convention have been disrespected. However, the applicant has not 
substantiated in any way that such reasons existed in the instant case.  
A similar position is taken by AG Kokott in Case C-469/15 P FSL and Others v Commission, Opinion of 
AG Kokott, EU:C:2016:884.  
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made (at the national level, by its national partners or others).28 Nor can the 
Commission use information for purposes other than those indicated in the decision of 
the EU Commission ordering the investigation.29 Otherwise, the rights of the defence of 
the undertakings would be seriously endangered.30  
This case law thus connects the gathering of information to its later use. The 
obtained information is not readily available for other purposes. The Court explicitly 
held that the foregoing is not at odds with the principle of loyal cooperation, but 
protects the rights of the defence. However, the information can provide circumstantial 
evidence which may, if necessary, be taken into account to justify the initiation of a 
national procedure.31 Such information must then remain internal to those authorities 
and may be used only to decide whether or not it is appropriate to initiate a subsequent 
national procedure.32 It may be deduced from the foregoing that the requirement of 
purpose limitation does not protect the privilege against self-incrimination (as it deals 
with information that can be obtained by the Commission), but rather the duty to state 
reasons, so that undertakings know for what purposes the information they provide may 
be used.33 
The combined principles of purpose limitation and the respect for a common, 
minimum set of defence rights (as currently defined by the Charter) paved the way for 
the later Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003, introducing a ‘hard and fast rule’ of mutual 
admissibility of evidence, regardless of the differences between legal systems.34 It is 
based on the principles of mutual trust and (recognition of) equivalence. Not only does 
this provision do away with the issue of diverging standards,35 but it also ‘breaks open’ 
any national evidentiary system; ‘foreign’ materials need to be accepted, under the 
conditions provided for in the article. In the third place, provisions such as Article 12 of 
Regulation 1/2003 ensure that evidentiary laws come within the scope of the Charter 
and the jurisdiction of the CJEU. As a matter of fact, the existence of EU legislation 
provides the latter court with the arguments to limit the principle of procedural 
autonomy. 
We also find such provisions in the OLAF legal framework. Article 11(2) of 
Regulation 883/2013 also introduces such a rule of recognition of equivalence, yet it 
does so – unlike Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 – under a twofold condition: (lawfully) 
obtained materials must be accepted, no matter where they were obtained, but only if 
28 cf Case C-67/91 Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca 
Privada and Others (Spanish Banks), EU:C:1992:330, paras 35–36. 
29 Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v Commission, EU:C:1989:379, para 17. 
30 ibid, para 18. 
31 Case C-469/15 P FSL and Others v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 39. See also Case 85/87 
Dow Benelux v Commission, paras 18 and 19.  
32 Case C-469/15 P FSL and Others v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, paras 39 and 42. 
33 cf Renato Nazzini, Concurrent Proceedings in Competition Law. Procedure, Evidence and Remedies 
(Oxford University Press 2004) 212–213. 
34 See infra section 4.3.1. Cf Nazzini (previous n) 209. 
35 cf Wouter Wils, ‘Power of Investigation, Procedural Rights and Guarantees’ in Abel Mateus and Teresa 
Moreira (eds), Competition Law and Economics (Edward Elgar 2007).  
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national law recognises that the same goes for the reports of a comparable, ‘benchmark’ 
authority at the national level and only with respect to OLAF reports. 
Though the added value of rules on the admissibility of evidence is thus clear, it 
is important to point out that such rules basically tackle only one of the three problems 
identified in the above, ie the transfer of evidence from one jurisdiction to another. In 
order to work on the basis of equivalence, the proceedings in the involved jurisdictions 
need to be more or less comparable in terms of goals, powers, procedures, safeguards 
and remedies. That is why Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 adds that information 
exchanged can only be used in evidence ‘in respect of the subject-matter for which it 
was collected by the transmitting authority’36 or why Article 11(2) of Regulation 
883/2013 introduces the national administrative inspector as ‘benchmark’.37 This also 
explains why such limitations are lacking in the EPPO regulation (Article 37 of 
Regulation 2017/1939). EPPO gathered evidence is, by its very definition, considered to 
be gathered in accordance with equivalent (criminal law) standards. This inherent 
limitation of the admissibility rules has to be kept in mind and a caveat follows from it: 
working on the assumption that materials have been gathered in jurisdictions with 
equivalent standards does not necessarily tackle the other problems we have identified. 
These are the transfer from the non-punitive to the punitive and from the administrative 
to the criminal. Working on the basis of equivalence may even prevent the clear 
perception of those problems, thereby aggravating them. We come back to this in 
section 3.6 and in our conclusions. 
3.3 The added value of specific EU rules II: Towards a legal rule of non-inquiry? 
Admissibility rules provide for an adequate method of dealing with evidence from other 
jurisdictions, provided they are based on a sufficiently level playing field and take due 
account of the transfer from the non-punitive to the punitive, as well as from the 
administrative law sphere to the criminal. But there seems to be yet another condition 
for the proper application of admissibility rules: such rules seem to build upon the 
assumption that the materials were transferred and obtained lawfully by the other 
jurisdiction.38 Here, we touch upon the issue of mutual trust and its relationship to the 
admissibility rules. Obviously, admissibility rules can only function on the premise of a 
high level of mutual trust. But do such rules also entail a legal rule of non-inquiry, in 
which national courts are no longer required or even prevented from assessing the 
lawfulness of investigative actions that took place in other jurisdictions? Or does the 
principle of mutual trust, in turn, set bars to the full application of the admissibility 
rules, particularly where the lawfulness of the respective investigative measures has not 
(yet) been ascertained? 
There is currently no clear and coherent answer to these questions, implying that 
all relevant national and EU legal orders must find their own way. Specific case law is 
not yet available. Some indications of an answer may nonetheless be found in FSL 
36 infra section 4.3. 
37 infra section 6.3 
38 cf infra section 4.3.2. 
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Holdings,39 a case which reflects a situation more or less the reverse of the one at hand 
in this report (ie transfers from the national to the EU level). In FSL, the Commission 
received information from the Italian Guardia di Finanza. The information – personal 
notes from an employee of the undertaking under investigation, found during a search in 
his home – was obtained during criminal investigations for tax fraud and subsequently 
transferred to the Commission on account of suspected violations of Articles 101/102 
TFEU. The undertakings under investigations argued before the EU Courts, after having 
been sanctioned by the Commission, that the use of the materials by the Commission 
violated their defence rights, however, without being very specific as to which rights 
and why precisely. They moreover argued that Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 
prohibited such an exchange of information.  
In her Opinion, Advocate General (AG) Kokott starts by explaining that in EU 
competition law, the prevailing principle as regards the probative value of given items 
of evidence is that of the unfettered evaluation of evidence. Therefore, the only relevant 
criterion for the purpose of assessing evidence is its credibility.40 However, that 
principled position does not amount to a hard rule of mutual trust and blind acceptance 
of materials. A reliance on particular items of evidence to demonstrate infringements of 
Articles 101/102 TFEU can still be precluded by prohibitions on the use of evidence, 
yet only in exceptional cases. Such prohibitions may be based on the fact that evidence 
was obtained in breach of essential procedural requirements, intended to protect the 
individuals concerned, or on the fact that evidence is to be used for an unlawful 
purpose.41  
As regards the first situation, according to the AG, in cases where the evidence 
comes from the national authorities, the lawfulness of the gathering of evidence by 
national authorities and the transmission to the Commission of information is in 
principle governed by national law. The EU judicature has no jurisdiction to rule on the 
lawfulness, as a matter of national law, of a measure adopted by a national authority.42 
However, the Commission or the EU Courts may not knowingly rely on evidence which 
was quite clearly obtained in breach of essential procedural requirements at the national 
level.  
According to the AG, fundamental principles of EU law such as, in particular, 
the right to good administration and the right to a fair trial require that the EU 
institutions undertake at least a summary examination in the light of all the 
circumstances of the particular case that are known to them. That is why the 
Commission must ensure that, according to all the indications available to it, the 
evidence in question was neither unlawfully gathered by the national authorities nor 
unlawfully forwarded to it. Also, the General Court must check the evidence against 
those criteria where complaints that the latter were not satisfied are raised in the 
                                                
39 Case C-469/15 P FSL and Others v Commission, EU:C:2017:308.  
40 Case C-469/15 P FSL and Others v Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, para 33. 
41 ibid, para 34.  
42 ibid, para 36. 
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proceedings at first instance.43 The Court itself is less clear in its reasoning, but does 
eventually seem to support the approach taken by its Advocate-General.44  
Eventually, both the Court and its AG found in FSL Holdings that the Italian 
courts did not establish any problems with respect to the gathering and the transfer of 
the materials to the EU level. Hence, there was no reason to deal with the issue any 
further. The interesting issues to be resolved, however, are what would happen in cases 
where remedies at the national level were not available, not used, or used and violations 
had been established, but the information had nonetheless been transferred to the EU 
level. Under a full rule of mutual trust, as in the EU mutual recognition instruments, the 
EU Courts would not even have been allowed – save in exceptional cases, to be 
specified further – to even check whether the relevant national jurisdiction did actually, 
in a specific case, observe the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.45 Yet under the 
line of reasoning proposed by AG Kokott, such a check is not precluded; to the 
contrary, to protect Articles 41 and 47 CFR, such a test is required, although it is a 
marginal one. It is to be done on the basis of the indications already available to the 
Commission/Court and in subsidiarity to the competent courts of the transferring 
jurisdiction.  
The facts of the FSL case took place outside the scope of the European 
Competition Network (ECN); the case dealt with a transfer by the Italian financial 
police to DG COMP. Would the outcome have been different, had the transfer taken 
place within the ECN, for instance by a national competition authority (NCA) to DG 
COMP? This may be so, though it is not certain. The argument would then be that the 
specific EU rules not only entail a rule of (recognition of) equivalence, but also a rule of 
non-inquiry. That implies that the marginal test as advocated by AG Kokott may not be 
necessary or even allowed. It could even be argued that the mere existence of a remedy 
in the state of gathering or transfer – a mandatory requirement on the basis of Article 47 
CFR – already prevents the forum state from applying such a test.  
In fact, the latter is the position of the Dutch Supreme Court in cases of 
international criminal law cooperation. This court has effectively introduced the rule 
that Dutch criminal courts do not have to be concerned with questions relating to Article 
8 ECHR or the application of foreign laws, when these issues cannot be related to 
actions that have been executed under the responsibility of Dutch authorities, yet have 
been conducted on the territory of other ECHR Signatory States.46 The latter 
circumstance guarantees a minimum standard of fundamental rights protection and the 
availability of remedies in those states (as does the Charter, of course). The Supreme 
Court added to this that it follows from the case law of the ECtHR that a breach of 
Article 8 ECHR (including the related procedural safeguards) does not require that legal 
consequences are given to such a breach in the criminal proceedings, provided that the 
                                                
43 ibid, paras 37–38. 
44 Case C-469/15 P FSL and Others v Commission, paras 33–34. 
45 Opinion 2/13 Accession of the Union to the ECHR, discussed in section 3.1. 
46 HR 5 October 2010, NL:HR:2010:BL5629. 
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fairness of such proceedings is guaranteed. There is some – though not yet conclusive – 
evidence that Dutch courts use the same approach in the vertical OLAF setting.47 
Therefore, in answer to the questions raised at the beginning of this section, we 
argue that admissibility rules are indeed capable of bringing about a rule of non-inquiry, 
but it is a conditional one. It can only apply to situations where no substantiated 
indications of irregularities exist. Such a rule entails that forum courts need not – in fact, 
may not, save for exceptional circumstances – test the lawfulness of the gathering and 
transfer of materials, used as evidence in punitive proceedings, when the available 
remedies were used but the gathering/transfer of the materials were considered to be 
lawful by the appropriate courts. It may even imply a further step, ie that the same holds 
for a situation where the remedies in the transferring jurisdiction were available, but 
were not used. However, such a rule of non-inquiry cannot, in our opinion, be construed 
in cases where irregularities were in fact established by the courts of the transmitting 
jurisdiction, or where remedies were not available. Such a rule could then, for instance, 
prevent the courts of the adjudicating forum from giving a proper answer to the question 
of how to deal with the consequences of such irregularities.  
In light of the foregoing, two final observations need to be made. First of all, 
both the cases of WebMindLicences and the FSL Holdings suggest that the Luxembourg 
approach towards the appreciation of unlawfully obtained evidence in criminal 
proceedings is different from that of ‘Strasbourg’ (and, in its wake, the Dutch Supreme 
Court). The latter court has held that violations of the right to privacy do not necessarily 
render a trial unfair, not even when these violations concern the use of intrusive 
techniques, such as covert listening devices without a legal basis,48 the unlawful 
surveillance of telecommunications, or a search without a legal basis.49 After all, a 
violation of Article 8 ECHR does not necessarily amount to a violation of Article 6 
ECHR. Yet for ‘Luxembourg’, serious violations of procedural safeguards do seem to 
have an impact on, particularly, Articles 41 CFR (good administration) and 47 CFR 
(fair trial). If correct, the argument is, presumably, that proceedings in which the 
investigative or prosecutorial bodies can afford not to follow the ‘rules of the game’ 
cannot be considered ‘fair’, nor can one maintain that such a situation is in line with the 
principles of a good administration. At any rate, there seems to exist a difference of 
opinion between the Courts as to the interpretation of what constitute violations of 
‘essential procedural requirements’, related to the right to privacy, and their impact on a 
later use as evidence. That also suggests that the courts of the forum state may have a 
bigger responsibility for dealing with unlawfully obtained evidence from other 
jurisdictions than follows from the Strasbourg case law.  
In the second place, it needs to be remembered that national courts are not 
competent to review the actions of EU authorities, whereas EU remedies – actions for 
                                                
47 Michiel Luchtman and Martin Wasmeier, ‘The Political and Judicial Accountability of OLAF’ in 
Scholten and Luchtman (eds) (n 14) 241–243.  
48 See Khan v the United Kingdom App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000); Bykov v Russia App no 
4378/02 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009).  
49 cf Kalnéniené v Belgium App no 40233/07 (ECtHR, 31 January 2017).  
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annulment, at least50 – may not be available against EU investigative acts and transfers 
of information. Does that affect the functioning of any rule of non-inquiry? That is the 
subject matter of the next section. 
 
3.4 Foto-Frost and the validity of EU investigative actions 
To our knowledge, there has been very little debate so far on what standards national 
courts should use when taking into account the materials of EU authorities in punitive 
procedures and, by consequence, potentially assessing the actions of EU authorities in 
light of for instance Articles 41, 47 or 48 CFR. Here, we touch upon the doctrine of 
Foto-Frost and the EU system of legal protection. In the vertical relationships between 
the EU and its Member States, national courts have no jurisdiction themselves to 
declare that acts of Community (now, Union) institutions are invalid.51 This case law 
does not prevent national courts from assessing the actions of EU authorities, as does 
the rule of non-inquiry, but it prevents national courts from invalidating those actions. 
This is because diverging or even conflicting national rulings as to the validity of 
Community (Union) acts may not put in jeopardy the very unity of the Community 
(Union) legal order and may not detract from the fundamental requirement of legal 
certainty. Foto-Frost thus protects the necessary coherence of the system of judicial 
protection established by the Treaty.52  
How does this case law relate to the admissibility of EU evidence in national 
proceedings? Can national courts use such materials, when there are indications of 
irregularities? Indeed, that conclusion does not appear to be at odds with Foto-Frost, in 
which a court does consider the actions of an EU authority – the gathering or transfer of 
materials – valid and in accordance with EU rules.53 The Court held in Foto-Frost, after 
all, that  
nothing, however, prevents national courts from considering the validity of a 
Community act and, if they consider that the grounds put forward before them by the 
parties in support of invalidity are unfounded, rejecting them, concluding that the 
measure is completely valid. In the latter case, after all, they are not calling into 
question the existence of the Community measure.54  
The question, however, is what to do when courts consider to use the materials obtained 
from EU authorities, but have doubts as to the legality of the latter’s actions. An 
interesting proposal is made in this respect by Widdershoven and Craig, suggesting that 
it may not be necessary to refer a case to the CJEU to prevent a sanction from being 
imposed when the validity of a European authority is in doubt; in the absence of specific 
                                                
50 See Katalin Ligeti and Gavin Robinson, ‘Transversal Report on Judicial Protection’ in Luchtman and 
Vervaele (eds) (n 11). 
51 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, EU:C:1987:452; see also Case T-48/16 Sigma 
Orionis v Commission, EU:T:2018:245, paras 58–71. 
52 Case C-314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, paras 14 and 15. 
53 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
para 14. 
54 ibid. 
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EU provisions, ‘national courts are free not to use the materials, as the question of 
whether an [EU investigation] offers a sufficient, reliable and lawful basis for imposing 
a national sanction is primarily a matter of national evidentiary law, including the rules 
on the gathering of evidence by using investigatory competences’.55 
But what about the situation where national courts do want to use the 
information and have doubts as to their lawful gathering or transfer? In those instances, 
the first issue is whether assessing the legality of the actions at EU level is allowed 
under EU law. Strictly speaking, such an assessment does not invalidate the actions of 
EU authorities, as the assessment is made in light of a later use as evidence in punitive 
proceedings and an exclusion of the materials does not per se invalidate the actions of 
the EU authorities. However, in light of the rationales of Foto-Frost – protecting the 
unity and coherence of the EU legal order – diverging or conflicting national decisions 
on the matter may also be regarded as an unwelcome situation.  
Assuming that national courts are thus indeed precluded from making such an 
assessment, the next question, then, is what are the respective responsibilities of the 
different EU and national courts involved. The cases of WebMindLicenses and FSL 
Holdings may once again be illustrative here. Should there be issues with respect to the 
lawfulness of the collection and subsequent transfer of materials at the EU level in the 
light of, for instance, Article 7 CFR or Article 47 CFR and, therefore, indications of 
violations of essential procedural requirements, then those cases imply that national 
courts either ask for an assessment of the lawfulness of the actions of EU authorities via 
a preliminary reference or disregard those materials in their assessment of the case. 
Incidentally, should they do the latter, then the Rewe requirements may alternatively 
step in; the application and enforcement of EU law is not to be made virtually 
impossible or excessively difficult. 
 
3.5 In the absence of EU law: Effectiveness, the Charter and procedural autonomy 
In the foregoing, we have discussed the added value of specific EU rules on the 
admissibility of evidence. But sometimes such rules are absent. It may also be – as is 
the case with Article 11 of Regulation 883/2013 – that their scope does not extend far 
beyond Rewe. What would happen in cases where the relevant EU provisions are not in 
play and the issue of the higher standards of the forum state is brought up? Does a 
presumption of (recognition of) equivalence then still apply? Such a situation may 
occur, for instance, where materials have been lawfully gathered in another EU state, 
under the auspices of an EU authority, but where the applicable standards (for the 
gathering or transferring of the materials) are lower than those of the forum state.  
We submit that, to give effect to the Rewe principles of effectiveness – and 
possibly equivalence – national courts in such a situation would in principle not be 
                                                
55 Widdershoven and Craig (n 14) 349 (emphasis added). This position seems to be confirmed in Case T-
48/16, Sigma Orionis v Commission, para 76: ‘In answer to those arguments, it should be observed that ... 
OLAF’s report continues to be lawful in the EU legal order in so far as it has not been invalidated by the 
EU judicature, without prejudice to any decisions that might be taken by the national authorities or courts 
concerning the use that can be made of such a report in proceedings under national law’. 
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allowed to exclude such materials as evidence, at least not only for that specific reason. 
That position is founded on the principles of mutual trust and recognition of 
equivalence, which are in turn based on the applicability of the Charter, as interpreted 
by the CJEU.56 Indeed, this study confirms that most national courts are indeed open to 
materials from other jurisdictions and will break down the chain of information into 
separate, isolated steps, from the gathering, to the processing, to the transfer, to its use 
as evidence. Each of those individual steps will then, as far as personal data are 
concerned, have to meet the requirements of the Charter.57 Yet as long as all of these 
steps have been taken lawfully, there appears to be no problem with the use of these 
materials as evidence in punitive proceedings. That also means, incidentally, that the 
problem of forum shopping will de lege lata most likely not be heard by national courts.  
There are two (possible) exceptions to this. Where national courts do exclude the 
use of such materials as evidence in punitive proceedings, this may be because of 
certain national statutory or even constitutional standards, for instance aiming to prevent 
silver-platter situations and thus protecting the right to privacy.58 National law may also 
be said to require a repetition of procedural steps to protect the rights of defence in 
criminal proceedings. Assuming that such provisions are also applied in procedures that 
are outside the scope of EU law, such as direct taxes (equivalence), could those national 
standards then be called upon to assess – and even exclude – the EU materials as 
evidence in punitive proceedings?  
Recent case law of the CJEU shows an increasing preparedness to balance its 
intention to uphold the principles of EU law, including the principle of effectiveness 
and the Charter standards,59 with the concerns of national courts that they may be 
required to lower their national standards because of that. For example, the CJEU has 
accepted in Taricco II, dealing with the rules on statutory limitation in light of the 
Italian legality principle, that the national courts were not obliged to disapply the Italian 
constitutional standards, even if compliance with the obligation allowed a national 
situation incompatible with EU law to be remedied.60 An important argument for that 
position was that, despite the fact that the actions of the national authorities come within 
the scope of EU law, the protection of the financial interests of the Union by the 
enactment of criminal penalties falls within the shared competence of the Union and the 
Member States within the meaning of Article 4(2) TFEU. By consequence, and because 
the relevant provisions were not (then) harmonised by the EU legislature, the Italian 
                                                
56 supra n 23. 
57 See also Michiel Luchtman, Michele Simonato and John Vervaele, ‘Comparative Analysis’ in Michele 
Simonato, Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Exchange of Information with EU and National 
Enforcement Authorities: Improving OLAF Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU 
Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2018) 165–166. 
58 Silver platter situations involve the circumvention of national safeguards by requesting help from other 
jurisdictions, or by using the results of their investigations. On this topic, see Sabine Gless, 
Beweisrechtsgrundsätze einer Grenzüberschreitenden Strafverfolgung (Nomos 2006) 168–171; Michiel 
Luchtman, European Cooperation between Financial Supervisory Authorities, Tax Authorities and 
Judicial Authorities (Intersentia 2008) 150–151. 
59 supra n 24. 
60 Case C-42/17 MAS, MB (Taricco II), EU:C:2017:936.  
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Republic was free to provide that in its legal system the rules on limitation, like the 
rules on the definition of offences and the determination of penalties, form part of 
substantive criminal law, and are thereby, like those rules, subject to the principle that 
offences and penalties must be defined by law.61  
Without referring to (or excluding) any shared competence in the area of the law 
on evidence, the Court held in Dzivev – concerning the consequences of an unlawful 
interception of telecommunications – that it is for the national legislature to ensure that 
the procedural rules applicable to the prosecution of offences affecting the financial 
interests of the European Union, are not only designed in such a way that there arises, 
for reasons inherent in those rules, no systemic risk that acts that may be categorised as 
such offences may go unpunished, but also to ensure that the fundamental rights of the 
accused persons – as defined by the Charter – are protected.62 The latter means that the 
requirements derived from the principle of legality and the rule of law must be 
followed. Moreover, as the interception of telecommunications amounts to an 
interference with the right to a private life, such an interference is allowed only if it is 
provided for by law. Where the interception of telecommunications was authorised by a 
court which did not have the necessary jurisdiction, that interception must be regarded 
as not being in accordance with the law (Article 52(1) CFR). A national provision 
which obliges courts to exclude the materials obtained on the basis of such an unlawful 
interception reflects those EU requirements to protect fundamental rights. In such cases, 
it follows that EU law cannot require a national court to disapply such a procedural rule, 
even if the use of that (unlawfully gathered) evidence could increase the effectiveness of 
criminal prosecutions enabling national authorities, in some cases, to penalise non-
compliance with EU law.63 
Of course, Dzivev dealt with unlawfully obtained evidence. The point raised here 
is related, yet different; it addresses the question of whether national laws – with the 
purpose of protecting procedural safeguards or defence rights and in the absence of 
specific EU law – may block the use of EU materials as evidence. The Court’s 
reasoning in Dzivev fits perfectly within the narrative of EU law. At first sight, it 
confirms our previous observation on the Court’s handling of unlawful interferences 
with the right to privacy (supra section 3.3). We are not entirely sure, however, that the 
Court wanted to express, at the least not with this specific judgement, that a mandatory 
exclusion of evidence in cases like these necessarily follows from EU law. If not, the 
Court’s narrative cannot do away with the fact that its reasoning – specifically the parts 
on the need to protect the CFR standards – in fact ‘covered up’ the fact that the national 
laws at stake were, of course, the result of a series of national policy choices and that 
the Court apparently did not wish to exercise any review of the proportionality of these 
legislative choices or to balance them against the principle of proportionality under 
Article 52 CFR. The result of this approach was, however, that the EU principle of 
                                                
61 ibid. Another expression of that same development can be read in Case C-524/15 Menci, 
EU:C:2018:197; Michiel Luchtman, ‘The ECJ’s Recent Case Law on Ne Bis in Idem: Implications for 
Law Enforcement in a Shared Legal Order’ (2018) 5 Common Market Law Review 1717.  
62 cf Case C‑ 310/16 Dzivev, para 31. 
63 ibid, paras 35–39. 
dMinistrative investigations 
26 M. LuchtMan, a. Karagianni and K. Bovend’eerdt 2. EU adMinistrative investigations 27
 
 
effectiveness was strongly mitigated. This begs the question – left open by the Court – 
to what extent the EU also has the competence to intervene in evidentiary affairs and if 
so, on which legal basis.64 It is an important question in light of the current revision of 
Regulation 883/2013. 
The second exception mentioned above concerns the fact that where limitations 
to the use of materials as evidence in punitive proceedings relate to the respect for the 
rights of defendants, the Charter (and, occasionally, secondary legislation) obviously 
require national courts to take account of those standards, also in cases where specific 
EU rules are absent. The most prominent example of such a situation would be the 
privilege against self-incrimination and the consequent prohibition of the use of (oral) 
statements that were obtained under compulsion by EU authorities. In fact, this also 
follows (for criminal proceedings sensu stricto) from Article 7 of Directive 2016/343 of 
9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of innocence 
and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings. As indicated, that 
provision not only stipulates that Member States shall ensure that suspects and accused 
persons have the right to remain silent in relation to the criminal offence that they are 
suspected or accused of having committed, but also that suspects and accused persons 
have the right not to incriminate themselves. Obviously, the exercise of the right not to 
incriminate oneself shall not prevent the competent authorities from gathering evidence 
which may be lawfully obtained through the use of legal powers of compulsion and 
which has an existence independent of the will of the suspects or accused persons. 
 
3.6 Interim conclusions 
We deduce from the foregoing that the rights of the defence, as defined by the Charter, 
mean that national courts cannot close their eyes to investigative acts that have occurred 
outside their territories, when the obtained materials are consequently used as evidence. 
The principles of mutual trust and non-inquiry, for instance, do not dissolve the 
responsibility of (EU and national) authorities to guarantee fair proceedings, in which 
defence rights – nemo tenetur or legal professional privilege for instance – are 
respected. Our analysis does however point to the conclusion that – as long as there are 
no indications of irregularities – a presumption of mutual trust and equivalence, based 
on a common set of fundamental rights, does in fact exist.65 This facilitates the use of 
evidence in composite proceedings. In such cases, however, the question remains to 
what extent national courts can still apply their own higher standards, particularly when 
these follow from authoritative legal sources (section 3.5). 
On this basis, EU law can facilitate the inter-operability of materials as evidence 
by turning these presumptions into hard and fast rules of recognition of equivalence and 
(a conditional) rule of non-inquiry and may thus even force authorities and courts to act 
                                                
64 ibid. The precise legal basis for such shared competences (if existent) is a hotly debated topic. If that 
basis is Article 82 TFEU, it applies only to criminal law sensu stricto. That begs the question of whether 
Article 325 TFEU can also serve as a legal basis, at least for non-criminal (including punitive) 
procedures. The CJEU is not clear on the matter. 
65 cf supra n 25. 
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upon the basis of mutual trust and to disregard any differences with the standards of the 
forum state. Rules on the admissibility of evidence therefore have at the least three 
functions. They prevent discussions on the issue of diverging standards and may be 
perceived as rules of non-inquiry,66 but they also ‘break open’ national evidentiary 
systems; ‘foreign’ materials need to be accepted, under the conditions provided for in 
the article. In the third place, such provisions make sure that evidentiary laws come 
within the scope of the Charter and the jurisdiction of the CJEU.   
However, it is also important to emphasize that such rules rest upon the 
assumption of a lawful gathering and transfer of materials from one jurisdiction to 
another, and do not necessarily cover the other two problems, identified at the beginning 
of this section – the transfer from the non-punitive to the punitive stages and from the 
administrative law sphere to the criminal. The presumption of equivalence – and the 
legal rules based upon it – carry the inherent risk of concealing certain problems with 
respect to the transfer of materials from one set of proceedings to another. The best 
example of this follows from the privilege against self-incrimination which in the 
setting of this report is by its very definition applied at the interface of multiple legal 
orders. In fact, situations as in Martinnen or Chambaz also lend themselves for 
application in the framework of this study and its predecessors.67 The question may 
arise, for instance, to what extent a duty to cooperate in national (or EU) proceedings 
continues to exist where individuals or companies cannot reasonably exclude the 
possibility that the materials requested will be used for punitive purposes at the EU (or 
national) level, so that the procedures may be qualified as ‘closely interlinked’ 
(‘suffisamment liées’). To what extent, then, would the privilege against self-
incrimination in punitive proceedings at EU level, forecast its shadow over the non-
punitive proceedings at the national level in which the information was collected under 
compulsion? 
Where punitive proceedings do cast their shadows over preceding or parallel 
non-punitive proceedings (because they run in parallel, into the same facts, or because 
the initiation of proceedings at EU level leaves persons with no other option than to 
assume that punitive procedures at the national level will follow), we submit that the 
element of compulsion has to be removed in the latter type of proceedings – which is 
what has been done for OLAF through Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013, but only for its 
own investigations – or that restrictions in the latter use, such as are applicable in 
punitive proceedings, are accepted, as is the case in competition law.68 If not, those 
materials cannot be used at all in punitive proceedings (at the national or, for that 
matter, EU level). We cannot find any reason not to apply these principles to the 
complex legal setting of the investigations of this study. 
Moreover, even where a connection between the EU level and national 
procedure was not reasonably foreseeable at the time when the materials were 
                                                
66 cf Wils (n 35). 
67 supra section 2.1. 
68 We will come back to this in section 7. 
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obtained,69 we submit that national procedures must be willing to disregard as evidence 
in punitive proceedings all of the materials that were obtained through compulsion, if 
their existence is dependent on the will of the accused. In our opinion, the standards to 
be used here are those of ‘Strasbourg’ (and we believe these are wider than those of 
Luxembourg).70 The proceedings, after all, are national proceedings. In that case, the 
application of the Strasbourg standard follows from the Charter (Article 52 (1) CFR). 
For criminal procedures sensu stricto, it moreover follows from Article 7 of Directive 
2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the presumption of 
innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal proceedings.71 That 
provision not only stipulates that Member States shall not only ensure that suspects and 
accused persons have the right to remain silent in relation to the criminal offence that 
they are suspected or accused of having committed, but also that suspects and accused 
persons have the right not to incriminate themselves. Obviously, the exercise of the 
right not to incriminate oneself shall not prevent the competent authorities from 
gathering evidence which may be lawfully obtained through the use of legal powers of 
compulsion and which has an existence independent of the will of the suspects or 
accused persons. 
 
4. DG COMP 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) is 
responsible for the enforcement of EU competition law.72 The focus, in line with the 
previous two reports, is on the enforcement of a) Article 101 TFEU, which prohibits 
agreements between competitors having as their object or effect the distortion of EU 
competition law (cartel prohibition); b) Article 102 TFEU, which prohibits abuses of a 
dominant position. DG COMP attaches significant importance to the enforcement of the 
abovementioned provisions. Only in 2017, the fines imposed on economic undertakings 
amounted to approximately €1.95 billion.73 
DG COMP enforces Articles 101 and 102 TFEU together with its national 
counterparts, ie the national competition authorities of the EU Member States (NCAs). 
DG COMP and NCAs have formed a network, the European Competition Network 
(ECN).74 The ECN lacks legal personality, it can rather be seen as a forum for 
cooperation; ECN authorities meet on a regular basis, they exchange best practices and 
                                                
69 This situation is relevant for OLAF investigations (as follow-up at the national level is by no means 
obligatory), particularly for materials other than OLAF reports. 
70 Section 2.2. 
71 Directive (EU) 2016/343.  
72 For the purposes of this report, the terms ‘DG COMP’ and ‘EU Commission’ are used interchangeably.  
73 European Commission, DG COMP, ‘Annual Activity Report’ (2017) 19 
<https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/file_import/comp_aar_2017_final.pdf> accessed 20 April 2019.  
74 See inter alia on the ECN, David Gerber, ‘The Evolution of a European Competition Law Network’ in 
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann (ed), European Competition Law Annual 2002: Constructing the EU Network of 
Competition Authorities (Hart 2004). 
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information, allocate cases, coordinate investigations and share evidence.75 We are 
particularly interested in the sharing of evidence aspect of the ECN, as well as the 
provisions that enable DG COMP to share evidence with authorities other than ECN 
members. Even though the investigative powers of DG COMP were extensively 
discussed in the first Hercule report, it is worth mentioning that in December 2018 the 
European Parliament and the Council adopted an EU Directive,76 which aims inter alia 
at laying down a minimum set of common investigative and decision-making powers 
amongst NCAs, for the effective enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. For 
instance, all NCAs should have the power to enter private premises in accordance with 
national law.77 Evidentiary matters are also covered. We will discuss the relevant 
provision pertaining to the admissibility of evidence in the sections below.  
We proceed in the following way. First, we discuss the rationale of having in 
place a rule on the admissibility of evidence. Second, we focus on the regime governing 
the use of ECN gathered information as evidence by other ECN authorities and by 
national courts. In addition, we assess whether national law enforcement authorities 
other than NCAs may use in evidence ECN gathered information, as well as the 
inverted situation, namely whether DG COMP can admit and use in evidence 
information transmitted by national authorities, which are not DG COMP’s national 
counterparts. The aforementioned analysis focuses on three issues: first, we are 
particularly interested in how the system of EU competition law enforcement78 deals 
with the question of how materials gathered in other jurisdictions are to be assessed by 
the receiving authority, second, how the system deals with issues of diverging standards 
and finally, whether the system foresees the possibility of parallel or consecutive 
proceedings at the EU and national levels.  
 
4.2 The rationale of having in place a rule on the admissibility of evidence 
The existence of rules on the admissibility of ECN collected evidence can be explained 
by the institutional design of EU competition law enforcement, which is shared in 
nature.79 This has not always been the case. The enforcement of EU competition law 
underwent a modernisation process.80 In view of the subject matter of this report, it 
suffices to refer to the fact that prior to 2004 the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 
                                                
75 European Commission, DG COMP, ‘European Competition Network’ 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/more_details.html> accessed 20 April 2019. 
76 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to 
empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure 
the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L 11/3.  
77 Recital 34 and Art 7(2) of Directive (EU) 2019/1. 
78 For the purposes of this report, the term ‘EU competition law enforcement’ means the enforcement of 
Arts 101 and 102 TFEU. We do not take into account the whole corpus of EU competition rules, which 
consist of state aid, merger control, etc.  
79 See inter alia, Katalin Cseres and Annalies Outhuijse, ‘Parallel Enforcement and Accountability: The 
Case of EU Competition Law’ in Scholten and Luchtman (eds) (n 14). 
80 See inter alia Damien Gerardin, ‘Competition between Rules and Rules of Competition: A Legal and 
Economic Analysis of the Proposed Modernization of the Enforcement of EC Competition Law’ (2002) 9 
Columbia Journal of European Law 1; David Gerber, ‘Two Forms of Modernization in European 
Competition Law’ (2007) 31 Fordham International Law Journal 1235. 
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TFEU was centralised, in the sense that those rules were enforced vertically by the 
European Commission itself.81 NCAs had a marginal role to play in that system, as did 
national courts. As a result, as posited by the CJEU in the Spanish Banks case,82 NCAs 
could not rely on information transmitted to them by DG COMP and use it as evidence 
to justify a sanctioning decision. Such information ought to remain internal to the 
national authorities and could be used only as circumstantial evidence for deciding 
whether or not to initiate a national procedure.83 Because it transpired that such a 
centralized scheme hampered effective application of EU competition rules by NCAs 
and national courts, while also imposing a significant burden on the EU Commission, 
which could not focus on investigating only the most serious of infringements,84 the 
previous system was abolished and replaced by a decentralised system of parallel 
enforcement.85 In this new system, all ECN authorities are in parallel responsible for 
enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Due to the fact that the responsibility for 
enforcing EU competition law is now shared between DG COMP and NCAs, it 
logically follows that ECN authorities must be enabled to exchange information and use 
it in evidence. The cornerstone of the modernised system of EU competition law 
enforcement is Regulation 1/2003 which inter alia lays down rules for the exchange of 
information within the network, as well as the admissibility and use of ECN collected 
evidence by other ECN members for the purposes of enforcing Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU. This regime, as well as its rationales are explored below.  
 
4.3 How the legal framework of EU competition law enforcement deals with 
diverging standards 
We firstly discuss the EU legal provisions that enable authorities involved in EU 
competition law enforcement to exchange information and use it in evidence for 
enforcing Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Thereafter, we discuss the rules and principles 
that have been put in place to deal with the issue of diverging standards that we put 
forward at the beginning of our report.  
 
4.3.1 The regime of evidence sharing between the authorities involved in the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU 
Regulation 1/2003 lays down rules that facilitate unfettered exchange of information 
between the members of the ECN, as well as its admissibility and use in evidence. The 
ability to have a free flow of information between the network’s authorities seems to be 
a necessity when a case has been re-allocated from one authority to another or when 
                                                
81 Council Regulation No 17 of 6 February 1962, First Regulation implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the 
Treaty [1962] OJ Spec Ed 87.  
82 Case C-67/91 Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca 
Privada and Others (Spanish Banks). 
83 ibid, para 42. 
84 Recital 3 of Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 (hereinafter ‘Regulation 
1/2003’). 
85 See inter alia Cseres and Outhuijse (n 79). 
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ECN members work in parallel or when ECN members assist one another in collecting 
information.86 It shall be mentioned at the outset that it has been questioned whether the 
system introduced by Regulation 1/2003 truly respects rights of defence.87 This section 
however is only concerned with providing a synopsis of how the composite issues that 
are of interest to this project and to OLAF are dealt with in the specific system of EU 
competition law enforcement. 
Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 is concerned with the exchange and use of 
information vertically, ie between the EU Commission and NCAs and horizontally, ie 
between and among different NCAs.88 Specifically, pursuant to Article 12(1) of 
Regulation 1/2003,89 the EU Commission and NCAs shall have the power to provide 
one another with any matter of fact or law including confidential information and use it 
in evidence for the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Presumably, the 
rationale underpinning this provision is the need to overcome potential hurdles that 
could be posed by diverging national procedural standards. In this respect, Article 12(1) 
of Regulation 1/2003 must be read in conjunction with Recital 16, which states that the 
exchange of information between the ECN members and its use in evidence should be 
allowed ‘notwithstanding any national provision to the contrary’.90 Finally, it is worth 
referring to the provision contained in the recent Directive 2019/1, which is concerned 
with the admissibility of ECN gathered evidence before national competition 
authorities. Member States must ensure that the types of proof that are admissible as 
evidence before an NCA include documents, oral statements, electronic messages, 
recordings and all other objects containing information, irrespective of the form it takes 
and the medium on which information is stored.91 Therefore, not only does this 
Directive harmonise investigative powers, it also harmonises the admissibility of 
evidence gathered on the basis of those powers.  
Exchange of information, its admissibility and use in evidence does not take 
place only between ECN authorities. Since the entry into force of Regulation 1/2003, 
national courts are competent to apply Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty.92 National 
courts can therefore apply EU competition provisions in claims between private parties, 
but also in relation to appeals lodged against NCAs’ decisions.93 The relationship 
between DG COMP and national courts is regulated by Article 15 of Regulation 1/2003, 
                                                
86 Christopher Kerse and Nicholas Khan, EC Antitrust Procedure (5th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2005) 266. 
87 See inter alia Daniel Reichelt, ‘To What Extent Does the Co-operation within the European 
Competition Network Protect the Rights of Undertakings?’ (2005) 42 Common Market Law Review 745; 
Denis Waelbroeck, ‘Twelve Feet All Dangling Down and Six Necks Exceeding Long. The EU Network 
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88 Commission notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ C 101/43, 
para 27. 
89 Art 12(1) of Regulation 1/2003. 
90 Recital 16 of Regulation 1/2003. 
91 Art 32 of Directive (EU) 2019/1. 
92 Recital 7 of Regulation 1/2003.  
93 On the role of national judicial authorities in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, see Louis 
Ortiz Blanco and Konstatin Jörgens, ‘The Role of National Judicial Authorities’ in Luis Ortiz Blanco 
(ed), EU Competition Procedure (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2013). 
dMinistrative investigations 
32 M. LuchtMan, a. Karagianni and K. Bovend’eerdt 2. EU adMinistrative investigations 33
 
 
which states inter alia that national courts may ask DG COMP to transmit to them 
information or its opinion on questions concerning the application of EU competition 
rules.94 Article 15 does not specify which national courts in particular, it simply refers 
to national courts ‘in proceedings for the application of Article 101 and 102 TFEU’.95 
That being said, administrative, criminal and civil courts arguably fall within the scope 
of the provision, as long as they have been entrusted – as a matter of national law – with 
the application of EU competition provisions. The EU Commission may – on its own 
initiative – submit written or oral observations to national courts.96 It is clear that since 
national courts are competent to enforce Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, there should be a 
mechanism allowing them to obtain DG COMP collected evidence. A limitation to the 
general rule that DG COMP can transmit information to national courts is the case of 
information voluntarily submitted by a leniency applicant, without the consent of the 
applicant.97 Finally, reference should be made to the Otto Postbank case,98 where the 
District Court of Amsterdam had asked the CJEU whether in national civil proceedings 
a national court is required to apply the Orkem principle of nemo tenetur, which 
provides that an undertaking is not obliged to answer questions if by providing such 
answers this would involve an admission that competition rules had been infringed.99 
The CJEU responded that the national court is not obliged to do so, that the application 
of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU by national authorities is governed by national 
procedural rules and that it is ‘a matter for national law to define the appropriate 
procedural rules in order to guarantee the rights of the defence of the persons concerned. 
Such guarantees may differ from those which apply in Community proceedings’.100 In 
enforcing EU competition law, national courts remain thus free to apply national 
procedural safeguards. 
So far we have discussed the possibilities of evidence sharing between ECN 
authorities and between DG COMP and national courts. What about authorities other 
than the national counterparts of DG COMP and the national courts? Does the legal 
framework leave the door open for those authorities to potentially gain access to ECN 
collected information, as is for instance the case in the SSM/ECB legal framework?101 
Regulation 1/2003 does not explicitly govern exchange of information and subsequent 
use of such information in evidence by ‘other’ authorities. Nevertheless, according to 
Article 28(2) of Regulation 1/2003, ‘the Commission and the competition authorities of 
the Member States, their officials, servants and other persons working under the 
supervision of these authorities as well as officials and civil servants of other authorities 
                                                
94 Art 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003. 
95 Art 15 of Regulation 1/2003.  
96 Art 15(2) of Regulation 1/2003. 
97 Commission Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and the courts of the EU Member 
States in the application of Articles 81 and 82 EC (2004/C 101/04) [2004] OJ C101/54, para 26.  
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99 ibid, para 8. 
100 ibid, para 14. 
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framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central 
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of the Member States’ must not disclose information acquired or exchanged by them, 
covered by the obligation of professional secrecy.102 As can be seen, the 
abovementioned legal provision also refers to ‘officials and civil servants of other 
authorities of the Member States’, without however further specifying what these 
‘other’ authorities and officials are. This raises the question of whether Article 28(2) of 
Regulation 1/2003 presupposes that – in certain Member States – NCAs are often 
enabled or even obliged to disclose information to other national authorities, for 
instance public prosecution services.103 Should that be the case, seeing that information 
acquired through requests for information, interviews, inspections, sectoral 
investigations and mandated investigations must be used only for the purposes for 
which it was acquired,104 we are of the opinion that potential disclosure of such 
information to ‘other’ authorities should only be used as intelligence or ‘circumstantial 
evidence’ to initiate a new procedure.105 
 
4.3.2 Dealing with diverging standards: Purpose limitation and presumption of 
equivalent protection of legal persons’ defence rights  
How does Regulation 1/2003 deal with diverging standards? Article 12(2) of the 
Regulation requires that exchanged information shall be used by the ECN members 
only for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and only ‘in respect of the 
subject matter for which it was collected by the transmitting authority’.106 Obviously, 
this provision is a codification of the Dow Benelux case,107 whereby the CJEU had 
crystallised the principle of purpose limitation, by explaining that information obtained 
during DG COMP investigations must not be used for purposes other than those 
indicated in the decision of the EU Commission ordering the investigation.108 
According to the CJEU, the raison d’être of a purpose limitation is to safeguard the 
rights of the defence of the undertakings, as ‘those rights would be seriously endangered 
if the Commission could rely on evidence against undertakings which was obtained 
during an investigation but was not related to the subject-matter or purpose thereof’.109  
In addition, Recital 16 of Regulation 1/2003 articulates a presumption of 
equivalent protection of defence rights across the EU, by specifying that ‘the rights of 
defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as 
sufficiently equivalent’.110 The Recital refers specifically to ‘undertakings’, therefore 
this presumption applies only to legal persons. An equivalence rule clearly facilitates 
the use of ECN gathered information as evidence by all 29 members of the ECN. In the 
absence of equivalence, problems stemming from the diverging standards of defence 
                                                
102 Art 28(2) of Regulation 1/2003.  
103 See, eg, District Court Rotterdam 9, June 2005. 
104 Art 28(1) of Regulation 1/2003. 
105 Case C-67/91 Dirección General de Defensa de la Competencia v Asociación Española de Banca 
Privada and Others (Spanish Banks), para 39. 
106 Art 12(2) of Regulation 1/2003.  
107 Case 85/87 Dow Benelux v Commission. 
108 ibid, para 17. 
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rights across the 28 Member States would arguably arise, since not all national laws 
protect defence rights in the same manner; legal professional privilege is a typical 
example in this respect.111 Finally, it is important to note that, according to the ECN 
notice, the question of whether information was gathered in a legal manner by the 
transmitting authority is governed on the basis of the law applicable to the transmitting 
authority: ‘when transmitting information, the transmitting authority may inform the 
receiving authority whether the gathering of the information was contested or could still 
be contested’.112 It therefore follows that the equivalence rule covers only lawfully 
obtained evidence.  
 
4.3.3 Dealing with diverging standards of defence rights of natural persons 
The provisions discussed thus far concerned the admissibility and use as evidence of 
information collected by ECN authorities by other ECN authorities or by national 
courts, for the purpose of enforcing EU competition law vis-à-vis economic 
undertakings, thus, vis-à-vis legal persons. What about natural persons and their 
defence rights, particularly in light of the fact that certain Member States have 
criminalised violations of competition law provisions?113 While Recital 16 lays down 
the above discussed presumption, ie that undertakings enjoy sufficiently equivalent 
protection of their defence rights in the different Member States, when it comes to 
natural persons, the picture is altered and this presumption does not fully apply. With 
regard to natural persons, Recital 16 of Regulation 1/2003 states that they ‘may be 
subject to substantially different types of sanctions across the various systems’ and as a 
result, it is necessary to ensure that information can only be used in evidence if it has 
been collected ‘in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of 
defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving 
authority’.114 Indeed, given that natural persons can – depending on the laws of the 
Member State at issue – be subjected to criminal liability and as a corollary be faced 
with criminal sanctions, including custodial sanctions, Regulation 1/2003 takes stock of 
those differences and specifies the circumstances under which ECN exchanged 
information can be used in evidence to impose sanctions on natural persons. According 
to Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003, using ECN collected evidence to impose 
sanctions on natural persons is possible only if: 
a) The law of the transmitting authority foresees sanctions of a similar kind in 
relation to an infringement of Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU. According to 
Böse,115 the assumption underlying this provision is again that imposing 
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sanctions of a similar kind is tantamount to a similar level of protection of 
defence rights.  
b) In the absence of similar kind of sanctions, the information has been 
collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of 
defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the 
receiving authority. Therefore, equivalence is in this case assessed on an ad hoc 
basis. In any case, according to Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003, ECN 
exchanged information cannot be used by the receiving authority for imposing 
custodial sanctions.116 As follows from the Spanish Banks case, NCAs are 
certainly not expected to undergo ‘acute amnesia’.117 Such information would 
serve as circumstantial evidence to justify the initiation of a national procedure. 
 
4.4 Parallel and consecutive proceedings  
Parallel and consecutive EU administrative proceedings and national punitive 
proceedings are a real possibility. Firstly, national competition law can be applied in 
parallel to EU competition law.118 Secondly, court proceedings may run in parallel to an 
EU Commission investigation or follow up on a Commission decision. What is more, 
seeing that the same acts or facts that run afoul of the cartel or abuse of dominance 
prohibitions could simultaneously constitute criminal offences, for instance bribery, 
forgery etc, the likelihood of a national parallel or consecutive (criminal) procedure is 
real, even more so because certain national provisions foresee the possibility or the 
obligation of the national competition authority to transmit information to public 
prosecution services and other criminal justice authorities.119 
Concerning the possibility of using ECN gathered information as evidence for 
the parallel application of national competition law in the same case, the situation is 
governed by Article 12(2) of Regulation 1/2003. According to that provision, ECN 
exchanged information can be used for the application of national competition law, in 
parallel to EU competition law, insofar as national proceedings do not lead to a different 
outcome.120 It follows that the use as evidence of ECN exchanged information for the 
application of national competition law is possible only with regard a) to the same case, 
b) in parallel to EU law and c) if the outcome would be the same. It appears that those 
three requirements should be met cumulatively. However, nowhere is the term ‘different 
outcome’ defined more precisely.121 
As regards the occurrence of consecutive or parallel proceedings in DG COMP 
and a national court, the framework governs the issue in the following way: when 
national courts reach a decision before the EU Commission, they must ‘avoid giving 
                                                
116 Art 12(3)(b) of Regulation 1/2003.  
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decisions which would conflict with a decision contemplated by the Commission in 
proceedings it has initiated’.122 If, on the other hand, DG COMP has reached a decision 
before the national court, the latter must not take a decision conflicting with the EU 
Commission’s decision.123 This stipulation is on par with the Rewe principle.  
Lastly, concerning the occurrence of consecutive or parallel proceedings in DG 
COMP and other national authorities for purposes outside the scope of EU or national 
competition law, such as tax related matters, the answer is to be found in the FSL 
Holdings case. As discussed in section 3.3, the FSL Holdings case dealt with 
transmission of information by the Italian tax and finance police to DG COMP. The 
CJEU asserted that the lawfulness of the transmission to the EU Commission of 
information obtained in application of national criminal law is a question governed by 
national law.124 Endorsing the Advocate General’s opinion, the Court furthermore 
advocated that ‘Article 12 of Regulation No 1/2003 pursues the specific objective of 
simplifying and encouraging cooperation between the authorities within the European 
Competition Network by facilitating the exchange of information’ and that this does not 
give expression to any general rule that precludes DG COMP from using in evidence 
information transmitted by national authorities other than its national counterparts ‘on 
the sole ground that that information was obtained for other purposes’.125 What can 
therefore be deduced from this case is that DG COMP is not prohibited from using in 
evidence (or for initiating an investigation on the basis of) information fortuitously 
transmitted to it by a national, non ECN, authority. If national law permits the 
transmission, then DG COMP may rely on such information. 
 
5. ECB 
 
5.1 Introduction 
In November 2014, the European Central Bank assumed the role of the exclusive 
prudential supervisor of credit institutions established in the euro area Member 
States.126 While responsibility rests with the ECB, the enforcement of prudential 
banking legislation is shared between the ECB and its national counterparts (NCAs),127 
which together form the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM). While the ECB is 
responsible for the supervision of the most significant credit institutions in the euro 
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area, NCAs assist the ECB in the implementation of its exclusive tasks,128 by carrying 
out the day-to-day supervision of the less significant banks.129 For executing its tasks, 
the ECB gathers a plethora of information at recurring intervals and on an ad hoc 
basis.130 Given that the EU institution has been vested with direct monitoring, 
investigating and sanctioning powers,131 it becomes evident that its information position 
is particularly strong. Gathered information may subsequently be transmitted to the 
national level for punitive administrative or even criminal follow up. Given that 
irregularities in banking activities often give rise to criminal responses, a situation of 
parallel proceedings, involving the ECB conducting prudential supervision on the one 
hand and national criminal law enforcement authorities conducting a criminal 
investigation on the other hand, is not purely theoretical. After all, the ECB is only 
responsible for specific prudential supervisory tasks. Criminal law falls outside the 
scope of the ECB’s supervision.132 At the same time, according to Articles 53 and 54 of 
the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV),133 the national transpositions of which 
the ECB has to apply, while persons who work for the ECB and NCAs are under a duty 
of professional secrecy,134 this is without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law.135 
This provision seems to allow for the ECB and NCAs transmitting information to 
criminal justice actors.  
We proceed in the following way. Firstly, we discuss the two distinct 
mechanisms through which the EU authority transmits information to the national level. 
Next, we discuss the issue of parallel proceedings, ie a national criminal investigative 
authority conducting an investigation and requesting ECB held information.136 
Subsequently, we delve into the question of how the EU legal framework regulates – if 
at all – the admissibility of ECB transmitted information as evidence in national 
proceedings. Does the EU legal framework provide for any specific rules as to how a 
national authority – be it a national counterpart of the ECB’s or another national 
authority – is to assess materials collected in another jurisdiction? How does the ECB 
legal framework deal with diverging standards? Last but not least, to what extent is the 
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legal position of a person subjected to parallel or consecutive EU non-punitive and 
national punitive proceedings safeguarded? 
 
5.2 Follow up by the ECB’s national counterparts 
The ECB is endowed with direct sanctioning powers,137 but only as far as legal persons 
are concerned and only in relation to breaches whose legal bases are to be found on 
directly applicable EU Regulations.138 Additionally, the ECB is empowered to impose 
direct sanctions in case of a breach of an ECB Regulation or decision.139 In all other 
cases, that is, for the imposition of sanctions vis-à-vis natural persons and for breaches 
of national law transposing EU Directives, the ECB cannot impose sanctions suo motu. 
It is however empowered to request an NCA to open sanctioning proceedings. 
Obviously, the NCA which is then responsible for follow up should have at its disposal 
the relevant information on the basis of which the ECB’s suspicion was triggered. 
Despite the general obligation of professional secrecy,140 the ECB and the NCAs, both 
vertically and horizontally, are enabled to exchange information with each other.141 
Such information may only be used for specific purposes, inter alia to impose 
penalties.142 This provision thus constitutes a purpose limitation, similar to the one 
found in the DG COMP legal framework. However, as already mentioned, the 
confidentiality of the information acquired by supervisors is ‘without prejudice to cases 
covered by criminal law’.143 In any case, the ECB is enabled to transmit information to 
its national counterparts for the opening of sanctioning proceedings.144 
Such sanctioning proceedings are a typical example of a composite procedure. 
The information is gathered by the organisational structures of the ECB, to a large 
extent through the use of investigative powers which have their basis in EU law. The 
collected information is subsequently transmitted to an NCA and the latter opens a 
sanctioning proceeding. However, the national counterpart enjoys discretion145 in 
deciding whether a sanction should be imposed or not and the procedure is governed by 
national procedural law. The ECB legal framework does not contain any additional 
rules, such as the presumption of equivalent protection of defence rights, as is the case 
with DG COMP. Therefore, no EU guidance is provided as to how the 19 NCAs are to 
assess materials gathered in another jurisdiction. In addition, it is worth noting that 
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while NCAs are empowered to impose punitive and – depending on the law of the 
Member State at issue – also criminal sanctions for breaches of prudential legislation,146 
the ECB framework is silent on such issues as the admissibility of ECB collected 
information as evidence and its use by NCAs for the imposition of punitive or criminal 
sanctions vis-a-vis natural persons. By contrast, DG COMP explicitly regulates this by 
stating that ECN gathered information cannot be used by the receiving authority to 
impose custodial sanctions.147 It therefore appears that the defence rights of natural 
persons are somewhat lost of sight in the ECB framework.  
 
5.3 Punitive follow up by national criminal investigative authorities  
Another way through which ECB gathered information can end up in national punitive 
proceedings, but this time the national authority involved would not be the national 
counterpart of the ECB, but presumably a criminal law enforcement authority, is 
through Article 136 of the SSM Framework Regulation. According to this provision, 
which is entitled ‘evidence of facts potentially giving rise to a criminal offence’, when 
the ECB in carrying out its tasks under the SSM Regulation, comes across information 
which raises a suspicion that a criminal offence may have been committed, it shall 
request the relevant NCA to refer the matter to the relevant national authorities for 
investigation and possible criminal prosecution in accordance with national law.148 
From the wording of this provision, we can see that no purpose limitation is foreseen; in 
essence, any information raising a suspicion that a criminal offence may have been 
committed, irrespectively of where and why it has been gathered, can potentially end up 
in the hands of national criminal law enforcement authorities. The admissibility of ECB 
transmitted information as evidence in national proceedings is thus not regulated at the 
EU level, but is left to national law. In addition, the Saunders type of problem – but 
now in a composite setting – is not dealt with, therefore the persons concerned are under 
a duty to cooperate at the EU level, but may be subjected to punitive proceedings at the 
national level, on the basis of information gathered precisely because they were under a 
duty to cooperate with the ECB. The issue of diverging national standards is not taken 
into account either, as there is no similar rule on the presumption of equivalent 
protection of defence rights, which is used in the EU competition law enforcement 
setting.  
 
5.4 Parallel proceedings at the EU and national levels 
As we explained above, the ECB’s tasks are only of a prudential, supervisory nature. 
Criminal activities, such as money laundering and terrorist financing are explicitly 
excluded from the scope of the ECB’s mandate. However, it is not inconceivable that 
the same facts could give rise to both breaches of prudential requirements and to 
criminal investigations at the national level; in fact, such examples did occur in the 
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aftermath of the financial crisis.149 For instance, the same facts could give rise both to a 
violation of a prudential nature at the EU level and to money laundering at the national 
level. While the ECB is investigating in the context of its mandate and the supervised 
persons are under a duty to cooperate and disclose information, national criminal 
investigative authorities may meanwhile request from the ECB the disclosure of 
relevant information. The relationship between the ECB and national criminal justice 
authorities is governed by Decision EU/2016/1162 on the disclosure of confidential 
information in the context of criminal investigations.150 We have discussed the content 
of this Decision in the previous study.151 In light of the present study, it is important to 
reiterate that, in principle, the ECB would transmit information requested by a national 
criminal justice authority, if there is an express obligation to disclose the requested 
information under EU or national law or the transmission would not jeopardise the 
accomplishment of the ECB’s tasks and the interests of the Union.152 Besides this 
decision, it follows from the Zwartveld case153 that EU institutions are under a duty of 
sincere cooperation with the judicial authorities of the Member States and they must at 
any rate justify a refusal to produce documents to a national judicial authority on 
legitimate grounds.154  
The aforementioned situation resembles the Martinnen and Chambaz cases we 
discussed previously (supra section 2.1), but now in a vertical, composite setting. Two 
sets of investigations are running in parallel, based on different procedural frameworks. 
Can the (legal or natural) person subjected to the ECB investigation exclude a later use 
of ECB gathered evidence in punitive proceedings? The answer seems to be in the 
negative, as the EU legal framework does not regulate this issue, neither are there any 
rules in effect which coordinate the two sets of investigations and ensure the inter-
systemic application of the safeguards. Is the ECB or a national authority expected to 
stop its investigation if a second investigation is running in parallel? Or should we a 
priori accept that the effectiveness of composite EU law enforcement sometimes leads 
to a mitigation of fundamental rights standards? 
 
6. OLAF 
 
6.1 Introduction  
Article 11 of Regulation 883/2013 stipulates that on the completion of an investigation 
OLAF draws up a report which gives an account of the legal basis for the investigation, 
the procedural steps followed, the facts established and their preliminary classification 
in law, the estimated financial impact of the facts established, the respect of the 
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procedural guarantees and the conclusions of the investigation. This report is to be 
accompanied by recommendations which specify whether or not – amongst other sorts 
of follow-up – punitive action ought to be taken by the national competent authorities of 
the Member State concerned.155 In drawing up an investigation report OLAF is to take 
account of the national law of the Member State concerned. Investigation reports, again 
according to Regulation 883/2013, shall constitute admissible evidence also in punitive 
proceedings of the Member State in which their use proves necessary, in the same way 
and under the same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national 
administrative inspectors. Reports are to be subject to the same evaluation rules and 
have identical evidentiary value as national administrative reports.156 
The rules in Regulation 883/2013 that govern the admissibility of OLAF reports 
in national punitive proceedings raise a host of questions. Why is there such a rule in the 
first place, particularly when other authorities – notably the ECB – lack such a rule 
(sections 4 and 5)? Following up on the first question, why this rule? Why did the 
European Parliament and the Council opt for a rule of assimilation rather than another 
mechanism such as a purpose-limit, to govern the transmission of evidence from the 
European to the Member State level in the application of Union competition law (see 
section 3)? How does the current rule on the admissibility of evidence grapple with the 
issues identified in section 1? Does it provide guidelines on how a national authority is 
to assess materials gathered in another jurisdiction? Does it anticipate the existence of 
diverging standards? Does it provide a means to safeguard the legal position of a person 
subject to parallel or consecutive EU administrative and national punitive 
investigations? Does the OLAF legal framework exercise foresight and proffer 
mechanisms – in particular those of an evidentiary nature – that (attempt to) resolve the 
issues, or does it relegate the resolution of such problems to the national sphere? And 
lastly, will the proposed amendment to the OLAF Regulation bring about a change in 
the workings of these mechanisms?  
The concern of this section is solely the admissibility of evidence in national 
punitive proceedings. Not considered is the admissibility of OLAF evidence in 
proceedings other than those of a punitive nature, such as recovery measures or 
administrative follow-up. It does not discuss the admissibility of evidence collected by 
national authorities in EU proceedings, as happens, for instance, in EU staff 
investigations (ie, national to EU level). Neither do we examine in great detail the 
horizontal transfer of evidence, however interesting, to other EU authorities as is 
foreseen in, for example, the EPPO Regulation and the proposal amending the OLAF 
Regulation.157  
                                                
155 Art 11(1) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. 
156 Art 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. 
157 Art 101 of Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of 
the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) [2017] OJ L 283/1, and Art 12e of the 
Commission’s ‘Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ COM(2018) 338 
final, 23 May 2018.  
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Lastly, we acknowledge that this report focuses mostly on the role of the OLAF 
investigation report. By paying attention solely to the report and its admissibility as 
evidence in national punitive proceedings after completion of its investigation one could 
lose sight of the fact that OLAF continuously interacts with the competent national 
authorities, primarily by means of transmission of information (not evidence per se), 
prior to and during an investigation.158 Because the information transferred does not 
form part of the OLAF investigation report, the assimilation obligation laid down in 
Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom does not apply (but see section 6.3). 
This in and by itself of course does not mean that such information is not admissible in 
national (punitive) proceedings. Rather, it means that the determination of the status and 
use this information in national proceedings, in the absence of EU legislation on the 
matter, is within the purview of Member States’ procedural autonomy, subject to the 
Rewe requirements of equivalence and effectiveness.159 In addition, such information 
can, where a national investigation has not yet been started, prompt national authorities 
to do so. 
 
6.2 The reason for a rule on the admissibility of evidence in OLAF’s legal 
framework 
The existence of a rule on the admissibility of evidence in the OLAF legal framework 
can be explained by the shared enforcement design of the protection of the Union’s 
financial interests and OLAF’s position and role therein. OLAF is an investigative 
body, which means that its central function is to gather information with the aim of 
establishing the existence of fraud, corruption or any other irregularities in any areas of 
                                                
158 Where OLAF, before an investigation or in case it decides not to open an investigation, handles 
information which suggests illegal activities that affect the financial interests of the Union, OLAF may – 
and if it concerns an internal investigation must – inform the competent authorities of the Member States 
concerned (whichever these might be) for action to be taken in accordance with their respective national 
laws (see Arts 3(6), 4(8), 5(5) and 5(6) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom). In case of an external 
investigation, the competent authorities must ensure that appropriate action is taken and must, on request, 
inform OLAF of the results thereof (Arts 3(5) and 5(6) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom). If it 
concerns information related to an internal investigation, the competent authorities may – in accordance 
with national law – decide to take action they deem suitable. The competent authorities must inform 
OLAF if they decide on any such action (Art 4(8) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom). The information 
transferred prior to opening an investigation does not concern facts established as a result of investigative 
acts (eg, interview and/or inspections) as such acts can only take place after the opening of an 
investigation. Likewise, the information transmitted cannot concern data retrieved from EU agencies or 
databases as OLAF only has access to such information during an investigation (Arts 3(5) and 4(2) of 
Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom). During an external investigation, OLAF may transmit information to 
the competent authorities to enable them to take appropriate (enforcement) action in accordance with 
national law. If OLAF is conducting an internal investigation, it must transmit information concerning 
facts which fall within the jurisdiction of a national judicial authority (Arts 12(1) and (2) of Regulation 
883/2013/EU, Euratom). The transfer in the course of an investigation can concern information obtained 
by means of OLAF’s investigative powers or information procured from EU databases and institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies (Arts 3(5) and 4(2) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom). 
159 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
para 5. 
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Union activity whenever its financial interests are affected.160 OLAF’s legal framework 
does not empower it to prosecute or impose punitive sanctions – or any sanctions for 
that matter – on an investigated economic operator after it has established an act or 
omission harmful to the Union’s financial interests that would warrant such action: 
OLAF conducts merely administrative investigations.161 Rather, once OLAF completes 
an investigation, it transmits its investigation report to the competent national authority, 
which holds exclusive competence over prosecution and sanctioning. Together with the 
report, the buck for subsequent punition is passed to the national level.162 Both OLAF 
and the national competent authorities therefore have their respective tasks to fulfil in 
the protecting the Union budget.163 To bridge the divide between, on the one hand, the 
gathering of materials under administrative investigations and the use thereof in 
criminal proceedings and, on the other hand, to span the rift from EU investigations to 
national follow-up – which the OLAF legal framework explicitly anticipates,164 the 
OLAF Regulation provides for a rule on the admissibility of evidence.165  
 
6.3 The logic of OLAF’s rule on the admissibility of evidence 
Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 encapsulates an assimilation obligation, requiring 
national administrative reports and OLAF investigation reports to be treated in like 
manner with regard to their admissibility, their evaluation and their evidentiary value in 
national punitive proceedings.166 On paper, the rule laid down in Article 11(2) provides 
a seemingly simple instruction on how a competent national authority is to assess 
materials gathered by OLAF (in another jurisdiction) in punitive proceedings: treat the 
OLAF investigation report as you would treat a national administrative report from a 
national administrative inspector, subject it to the same evaluation rules and grant it 
equivalent evidentiary status. However, the obligation incumbent on the competent 
national authority to treat OLAF final reports as equivalent to national administrative 
reports is premised on the presumption that such equivalence exists or, in any case, has 
been designated by national law. Which authority is considered to be equivalent to 
OLAF and, consequently, to which national administrative report the competent 
                                                
160 Art 1(1) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom; Art 8(1) of ‘Guidelines on Investigations Procedures 
for OLAF Staff (Ref Ares (2013)3077837’ (hereinafter ‘GIP 2013’).  
161 Michele Simonato, ‘OLAF Investigations in a Multi-Level System. Legal Obstacles to Effective 
Enforcement’ [2016] eucrim 136, 137; Justyna Łacny, Lech Paprzycki and Eleonora Zielińska, ‘The 
System of Vertical Cooperation in Administrative Investigation Cases’ in Ligeti (ed) (n 115) 814. The 
authors read OLAF’s circumscribed powers in light of the principle of conferral: ‘Competences not 
conferred upon the EU in the Treaties remain with the Member States, and neither the Commission within 
which OLAF operates, nor OLAF itself, were attributed with competence for criminal investigations that 
could be exercised during OLAF’s investigations’. 
162 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele, ‘European Agencies for Criminal Justice and Shared 
Enforcement (Eurojust and the European Public Prosecutor’s Office)’ (2014) 10 Utrecht Law Review 132, 
132. That is not to say, however, that OLAF has no further role to fulfil. As Art 24 of the GIP 2013 
demonstrates, OLAF has an important monitoring role to fulfil by following the progress of the 
implementation of recommendations by the competent authorities. 
163 See Art 325(1) TFEU and the CJEU’s interpretation thereof in Case C-42/17 MAS, MB, para 43. 
164 Recitals (28) and (29) and Arts 5(1) and 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. 
165 See above-mentioned Art 11 of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. 
166 Art 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom.  
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national authority is to assimilate the OLAF report to, is not dealt with by EU law but is 
a matter left to the national law. A more pressing issue is when national law has not 
appointed an equivalent national administrative authority as being equivalent. In the 
latter case, how is a national authority to assess the OLAF investigation report? 
Likewise, what is the competent national authority to do if national law does not allow 
for the admissibility of administrative reports in criminal procedures? 
The assimilation rule has been subject to criticism from academic circles,167 
from EU institutions,168 and from OLAF itself.169 There are a number of recurring issues 
that can be distilled. The first is that, as stated in the paragraph above, the rule of 
assimilation presupposes the existence of a comparable national administrative 
authority: ‘if there is no such actor at national level, the assimilation provision will 
remain an empty box leading to the potential inadmissibility of the OLAF final 
report’.170 The second is that, in certain Member States, where national procedures are 
not followed to the letter or where information obtained in the process of an 
administrative investigation is as such not admissible in punitive proceedings, 
investigations must be duplicated. This, in turn, is prejudicial to procedural economy 
and the rights of the person under investigation.171 The third main strand of criticism 
holds that the assimilation rule conserves national discrepancies.172 As harmonisation of 
the law of evidence is largely absent,173 it is largely left to Member State discretion to 
decide on, for instance, what should be the applicable evidential standards and whether 
or not administrative evidence should constitute admissible evidence in punitive 
                                                
167 See for instance Jan Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office 
(OLAF). An Analysis with a Look Forward to a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Europa Law 
Publishing 2011) 122–123; Katalin Ligeti and Michele Simonato, ‘Multidisciplinary Investigations into 
Offences against the Financial Interests of the EU: A Quest for an Integrated Enforcement Concept’ in 
Francesca Galli and Anne Weyembergh (eds), Do Labels still Matter? Blurring Boundaries between 
Administrative and Criminal Law. The Influence of the EU (Éditions de l’Université de Bruxelles 2014). 
168 Most recently the study carried out by Katalin Ligeti and Angelo Marletta for the European 
Parliament: Katalin Ligeti and Angelo Marletta, ‘The Protection of the Procedural Rights of Persons 
Concerned by OLAF Administrative Investigations and the Admissibility of OLAF Final Reports as 
Criminal Evidence’ (Study for the European Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control 2017) 24–26. 
See also ECORYS, ‘Study on the Impact of Strengthening of Administrative and Criminal Law 
Procedural Rules for the Protection of the EU Financial Interests’ (JUST/A4/2011/EVAL/01 Final Report 
2013) 28–29, 39. 
169 Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document Implementation of the Article 325 by the 
Member States in 2009 accompanying document to the “Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: Protection of the Financial Interests of the Communities – fight against fraud 
annual report 2009”’ SEC(2010) 897 and indirectly also OLAF, ‘The OLAF Report 2013’ (2014) 22. 
170 Ligeti and Marletta (n 168) 25. 
171 Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the document “Communication from 
the Commission on the protection of the financial interests of the European Union by criminal law and by 
administrative investigations. An integrated policy to safeguard taxpayers’ money”’ SEC(2011) 621; 
ECORYS (n 168) 28; OLAF, ‘The OLAF Report 2013’ 22ff; Ligeti and Marletta (n 168) 25; Ligeti and 
Simonato (n 167) 92. 
172 ECORYS (n 168) 39; Ligeti and Marletta (n 170) 25. 
173 John Spencer, ‘The Green Paper on Obtaining Evidence from One Member State to Another and 
Securing its Admissibility: The Reaction of One British Lawyer’ (2010) 5 Zeitschrift für Internationale 
Strafrechtsdogmatik 602, 604; Luchtman and Vervaele, ‘European Agencies for Criminal Justice’ (n 162) 
147. 
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proceedings. The obligation to assimilate OLAF investigation reports therefore does 
nothing to change the ‘variable geometry’.  
The arguments lodged against the assimilation rule are concerned primarily with 
the consequent repercussions for the effective follow-up to OLAF investigations by 
rendering the admissibility of its reports arduous and sometimes even impossible. While 
these criticisms ring true, they beg a further question: if the assimilation rule hinders the 
effective follow-up to OLAF investigations, what can explain its design? This question 
requires an understanding of the rule’s rationale. Appreciating its logic, in turn, 
demands not only that we pay attention to the admissibility and use of OLAF 
investigation reports, but also that we take into account the nature of this report, its 
constituents, and particularly the way in which it was gathered. 
The OLAF investigation report is the end-product or fruit of an investigation. 
The findings contained in the report, and the recommendations accompanying it, are the 
result of investigative activities carried out by OLAF in order to gather information to 
establish the existence of administrative irregularities, criminal acts, and/or serious 
misconduct by EU officials in all areas of Union activity whenever its financial interests 
are affected. However, there is, as was established in the 2017 study on OLAF’s 
investigatory powers, no coherent framework governing the way in which investigative 
powers are used to gather information of illegal activity with the EU budget.174 The 
information in an OLAF report can be the outcome of investigative acts carried out 
under the lead and responsibility of national authorities on the basis of domestic law;175 
acts under the lead of OLAF but on the basis of a mix of both Union and national law; 
and operations undertaken by OLAF solely on the basis of EU law.176 Which law 
applies – national, European or both – and, in turn, the type of authorities with whom 
OLAF cooperates, the scope, content and enforceability of their powers, and the scope 
and content of the procedural safeguards they are to take into account depend on 
whether OLAF carries out an internal or external investigation (or combines the two of 
them), the jurisdiction in which an investigation is conducted,177 and the particular 
policy field in which OLAF acts (VAT, customs duties, agriculture, etc). 
On completion of an investigation OLAF draws up an investigation report and, 
where it deems this necessary, forwards it to the competent national authority for the 
initiation of the recommended punitive proceedings in which the report is to be used.178 
The national authority in question faces information gathered, as is apparent from the 
above, by possibly numerous authorities acting and cooperating with each other in 
                                                
174 See Michiel Luchtman, ‘Introduction’ in Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 11) 2, and Luchtman and 
Vervaele, ‘Comparison of the Legal Frameworks’ (n 11) 247–253.  
175 For instance when OLAF conducts investigations in the area of customs on the basis of sectoral 
legislation, ie, Arts 18 and 4–8 of Regulation 515/97/EC on mutual assistance between the administrative 
authorities of the Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the 
correct application of the law on customs and agricultural matters [1997] OJ L 82/1. 
176 Luchtman and Vervaele, ‘Comparison of the Legal Frameworks’ (n 11) 247–253. 
177 This is particularly salient in case of an external investigation. 
178 The decision to start punitive follow-up proceedings is a national decision. OLAF recommendations 
do not entail an obligation to start proceedings or to start a specific type of proceedings (administrative, 
criminal, etc).  
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different constellations and acting in accordance with their own (different) standards. 
What does the assimilation obligation demand of this national authority?  
First, it requires of the authority that – notwithstanding the divergent EU and 
national standards according to which evidence is gathered (the nature of the authorities, 
their powers and their enforceability, and the safeguards which they must abide) – for 
purposes of using this information in national punitive proceedings such divergences are 
to be discounted, on the condition that there is an equivalent administrative authority 
whose reports are admissible in punitive proceedings. One rationale of the assimilation 
obligation therefore is to accommodate the diverging standards between national and 
European law in the absence of a common EU code of procedure on which OLAF can 
base its investigations by stipulating that materials gathered by OLAF ought to be 
treated in the same way as materials gathered by comparable national authorities.  
Second, it requires of the national authority in question that with regard to the 
use of materials obtained under an administrative head in punitive proceedings, Member 
State authorities should treat procedures that aim to protect the Union’s financial 
interests in the same way as those which aim to protect their own national (financial) 
interests.179  
Underlying the assimilation obligation is therefore a twofold expression of the 
principle of equivalence: where national punitive proceedings permit the use of 
evidence obtained by means of administrative law in purely national cases, such 
permission should be extended on equal terms – even though standards do differ – to 
materials gathered under EU administrative investigations.  
What then is the added value of the assimilation rule laid down in Regulation 
883/2013, Euratom over the Rewe principle of equivalence? In our understanding the 
assimilation obligation offers more guidance. It ‘routes’ or ‘directs’ the status of the 
OLAF report under national law. Article 11(2) states, in essence, that it has the status of 
a national administrative report with the concomitant evidentiary status (without further 
specifying what the status of an administrative report is to be under national law, or 
whether it is admissible in punitive proceedings, or how it is to be evaluated in such 
proceedings). If we compare this to information transferred prior to or during an OLAF 
investigation (see section 6.1), this channelling function becomes clear. While such 
information is subject to the Rewe requirement of equivalence and, as a result, is to be 
treated in the same way as national information of a similar nature, the principle of 
equivalence does not – unlike Article 11(2) – specify the status of such information 
under national law and in national proceedings. Equivalence in that respect can result in 
that information having numerous statuses under national law (eg, information that can 
instigate a national proceeding).  
Another relevant question, related to the remarks above, is why opt for an 
assimilation obligation instead of, for instance, a purpose limitation, as is the case for 
the ECN? The answer to this question lies, at least in part, in the context in which the 
                                                
179 We can clearly derive this from Art 325(2) TFEU, which states that Member States shall take the same 
measures to counter fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union as they take to counter fraud 
affecting their own financial interests.  
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authorities operate. European competition law is enforced in parallel by both DG 
COMP and the national competition authorities within the closed confines of the ECN, 
established and governed solely by EU law (see section 4).180 Within this closed 
network, the missions, status and powers of the NCAs and DG COMP are aligned. As a 
result, a purpose limitation can function to safeguard defence rights by prohibiting – 
within the network – the use of information gathered by administrative means for 
punitive purposes.  
In contrast to the ECN, OLAF is not embedded in a delineated or closed 
network.181 Given the wide range of cooperation situations that may arise, there are 
numerous authorities which could potentially be classified – by national law – as 
‘competent’ for purposes of cooperating with OLAF.182 Depending on the specific field 
and jurisdiction in which OLAF investigates, it cooperates with customs authorities, tax 
authorities, anti-fraud coordination services (AFCOS), to name but a few. The status of 
these authorities (judicial or administrative), the powers which they have at their 
disposal, and the safeguards which they must respect, are not harmonised and depend on 
national law.183 Considering these particularities of the OLAF enforcement context, 
imposing a purpose limitation would necessarily have a debilitating effect on OLAF’s 
ability to effectively conduct investigations into illegal activity with the EU budget and, 
consequently, its ability to protect the Union’s financial interests.  
 
6.4 From gathering by EU administrative investigations to use in national punitive 
proceedings: Regulation of consecutive and parallel proceedings in OLAF’s 
legal framework 
Parallel and consecutive EU (administrative) and national (punitive) proceedings are a 
real possibility in the context of OLAF investigations. Both internal and external 
administrative investigations can lead to – as a result of the forwarding of an OLAF 
investigation report to the competent national authorities – consecutive punitive 
proceedings at the national level.184 In case of an internal investigation, OLAF will only 
transmit a report to national judicial authorities in case the report reveals the existence 
of facts which could give rise to criminal proceedings stricto sensu (ie, excluding 
punitive administrative proceedings).185  
While national punitive proceedings can take place after administrative 
investigations by OLAF, this is not a necessity. OLAF does not have an investigative 
monopoly. OLAF investigations do not affect a Member State’s ability to initiate 
punitive proceedings or conduct its own investigations (punitive or otherwise). This is a 
result of the shared burdens to be carried by the Union, in particular OLAF, and the 
Member States in the protection of the Union’s financial interests. The OLAF legal 
                                                
180 Luchtman, Simonato and Vervaele, ‘Comparative Analysis’ (n 57) 168. 
181 Karagianni, Scholten and Simonato (n 151) 8. 
182 ibid 13. 
183 OLAF, ‘The OLAF Report 2015’ (2016) 22.  
184 Art 11(3) and (5) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. This rule is mirrored in Art 8(3) of Regulation 
2185/96/Euratom, EC. 
185 Art 11(5) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. 
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framework does not accord priority to OLAF investigations over national investigations 
(or vice-versa) nor does it regulate the occurrence of EU-national investigations. Rules 
on the concurrence of EU administrative and national administrative or criminal 
investigations are to be found in national law.186 Parallel investigations by both OLAF 
and the Member State authorities are therefore not excluded.187  
The OLAF legal framework regulates the occurrence of consecutive and parallel 
investigations in two principle ways to prevent a later trial from being unfair (see 
section 2.2). The first is to take out the element of compulsion in OLAF’s 
administrative investigations. When OLAF wishes to interview a witness or a person 
concerned during an external investigation, it can invite the person it wishes to 
interview, but lacks the enforcement mechanisms – sanctions for instance – to subpoena 
or force persons to show up and/or speak truthfully. In other situations OLAF can, albeit 
through national authorities, exercise compulsion. For instance, when OLAF takes 
statements in the context of on-the-spot inspections, depending on national law, 
compulsion can be exercised and duties to cooperate can be enforced. The situation is 
different yet again in internal investigations. EU officials and other servants are under 
an obligation to cooperate when interviewed by OLAF in the context of an internal 
investigation.188 Disciplinary measures for non-cooperation can be imposed by a 
disciplinary board of the respective institution, body, office or agency (IBOA) in 
accordance with the Staff Regulations. Such sanctions range from a written warning to, 
for severe misconduct, removal from post.189 In internal investigations the OLAF legal 
framework, albeit indirectly, exercises a certain degree of compulsion on EU officials 
and staff.  
The second way in which Regulation 883/2013 regulates the occurrence and 
parallel proceedings is to provide for a number of safeguards which aim to elevate the 
level of protection to that of judicial investigations so as to facilitate the later use of 
material gathered by OLAF in national punitive proceedings (or in the phrasing used in 
the previous section: to bridge the divide between the gathering of materials under 
administrative investigations and the use thereof in criminal proceedings). 
An example is the inclusion of the privilege against self-incrimination in Article 
9 of Regulation 883/2013. The privilege contained therein affords protection to both 
persons concerned and witnesses. Many questions with regard to the privilege remain 
unanswered however. With regard to the material scope, the OLAF Regulation is silent. 
It is unclear whether the privilege constitutes an absolute right to remain silent during 
                                                
186 See for instance Joske Graat, ‘The Netherlands’ in Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 11), para 4.2.3. 
187 Art 2(4) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. 
188 Art 4(7) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom; Art 16(2) of ‘Guidelines on Digital Forensic 
Procedures for OLAF Staff’ (2016).  
189 Art 9 of Regulation 31/EEC, 11/EAEC Laying down the Staff Regulations of Officials and the 
Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of the European Economic Community and the European 
Atomic Energy Community [1962] OJ 45/1385, Annex IX. Other sanctions include a reprimand, 
deferment of advancement to a higher step, relegation in step, temporary downgrading, downgrading in 
the same function group, classification in a lower function group, removal from post and, where 
appropriate, reduction pro tempore of a pension or withholding, for a fixed period, of an amount from an 
invalidity allowance. 
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an interview. Though OLAF cannot compel a person concerned or witness to provide 
answers that involve an admission of an illegal activity (a limit of OLAF’s own 
enforcement capabilities), can OLAF draw adverse inferences from an interviewees’ 
silence during an interview? It is also unclear what information is covered by the 
privilege. Does it cover evidence that exists independently of the will of the person 
concerned or the witness? 
Another example is the right to be assisted by a person of choice.190 During both 
interviews and on-the-spot inspections a person concerned has the right to be assisted by 
a person of choice, in most cases a lawyer. Here too, questions arise with regard to the 
scope of this right. The personal scope of the right seems to be limited to persons 
concerned only: do witnesses not enjoy the same protection? Also, the OLAF 
Regulation does not specify the temporal dimension of the right (eg, when assistance 
may be provided or whether assistance can be given for the whole duration of the 
interview) or the material dimension (eg, what is the exact role of the assisting person?). 
In addition to these questions a more general, and perhaps more critical, remark 
with regard to harmonisation of defence rights and safeguards in the OLAF legal 
framework is in order. As stated above, harmonisation of certain safeguards and rights 
seeks to smooth the transition from the gathering of materials by OLAF in 
administrative investigations to the use of these materials in national punitive 
proceedings. The current approach is lacking and fragmented in two respects. First, 
while indeed certain rights and safeguards are provided for (most notably, access to a 
lawyer and, albeit limited in scope, the privilege against self-incrimination) other 
defence rights which aim to render punitive proceedings fair, such as protection of the 
legal professional privilege, are conspicuous by their absence. Second, and more 
importantly, the harmonised defence rights apply only in cases in which OLAF 
conducts investigations on the basis of its cross-sectoral framework (ie, Regulation 
883/2013, Euratom and Regulation 2185/96/Euratom, EC). In case OLAF decides to 
conduct investigations on the basis of sectoral legislation, such as in the area of customs 
where investigations are based on Regulation 515/97/EC, the presence and scope of any 
of the rights and safeguards mentioned above is completely dependent on national law 
as such investigations are conducted by means of mutual administrative assistance. 
Taking on board more or more comprehensive safeguards and/or rights by means of 
harmonisation in OLAF’s cross-sectoral framework will not solve the second issue.  
 
6.5 Proposed Amendment to the OLAF Regulation 
In its evaluation of Regulation 883/2013 carried out between 2015 and 2017 the 
Commission noted a number of shortcomings related to the effectiveness of OLAF’s 
investigative function.191 One of the Commission’s findings was that the current rule on 
                                                
190 Art 9(2) of Regulation 883/2013/EU, Euratom. Of course, when a witness becomes a person 
concerned, the former witness does have the right to be assisted. 
191 Commission Report, ‘Evaluation of Regulation 883/2013’ COM(2017) 589 final, 2 October 2017, 3–
5; Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Evaluation of the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 
dMinistrative investigations 
50 M. LuchtMan, a. Karagianni and K. Bovend’eerdt 2. EU adMinistrative investigations 51
 
 
the admissibility of evidence hampers the effectiveness of its activities.192 Many of the 
criticisms pointed out above in section 6.3 were reiterated by the Commission.193 To 
enhance the effectiveness of OLAF investigations the Commission proposed to amend 
the current OLAF legal framework governing its investigation in May 2018.194  
The proposed amendment, if passed, would not change the way in which 
Regulation 883/2013 reaches out to national authorities and provides guidelines for how 
to assess materials gathered in another jurisdiction. Nor does it provide for different 
means to deal with the issue of diverging standards or to safeguard the legal position of 
a person subject to parallel or consecutive investigations. The proposal distinguishes 
between criminal and non-criminal follow-up. On the one hand, the rule which lays 
down the assimilation obligation will remain applicable to OLAF reports and 
recommendations in cases of national criminal proceedings. As national law on the use 
of reports by administrative inspectors in criminal proceedings varies, the Commission 
deems it appropriate that conditions of national law should apply. With respect to the 
current rule of assimilation, no changes are therefore expected. On the other hand, the 
Commission introduces a principle of admissibility of OLAF reports in administrative 
proceedings and in judicial proceedings of an administrative, civil, and commercial 
nature in the Member States. In these cases, admissibility should only be subject to a 
simple verification of authenticity.195 In addition, the proposal does not intend to further 
facilitate punitive follow-up through harmonisation of the procedural safeguards studied 
in this report.196 
The 2019 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution of the Committee 
on Budgetary Control (CONT), if passed, would relegate the issues set out above 
completely to the national level. The CONT amendment reads as follows: upon simple 
verification of their authenticity, reports drawn up on that basis shall constitute 
admissible evidence in judicial proceedings before national courts and in administrative 
proceedings in the Member States. The power of the national courts to freely assess the 
evidence shall not be affected by this Regulation.197 
                                                                                                                                          
883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)’ SWD(2017) 
332 final, 2 October 2017, 13–28. 
192 COM(2017) 589 final 4; SWD(2017) 332 final 18–22. 
193 SWD(2017) 332 final 20–21. 
194 COM(2018) 338 final; European Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Assessment accompanying 
the document Proposal for a regulation of amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ SWD(2018) 251, 23 
May 2018. 
195 Art 11(2) of COM(2018) 338 final. For the rationale, see COM(2018) 338 final 11; SWD(2018) 251 
final 27. 
196 The Commission states that ‘the evaluation has not shown a need to revise the existing provisions’ 
(COM(2018) 338 final 7–8). 
197 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation amending 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness 
of OLAF investigations (COM(2018)0338 – C8-0214/2018 – 2018/0170(COD)), amendments 57 and 58. 
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The Resolution provides for a single rule for both punitive and non-punitive 
follow-up and does away with the current assimilation rule. As a result, OLAF 
investigation reports will be admissible in punitive proceedings. The Resolution thereby 
provides an answer to some of the long-held critiques against the assimilation rule (see 
section 6.3). No longer is there a need to find an equivalent national administrative 
authority as OLAF reports are evidence in national proceedings per se, regardless of the 
existence and status of a comparable national administrative authority. Also national 
laws which do not allow for administrative evidence in punitive proceedings have to 
admit administrative OLAF reports as evidence in punitive follow-up. Furthermore, the 
Resolution circumnavigates national laws which render inadmissible OLAF reports 
where national law is not followed verbatim.  
The changes in the OLAF rules on evidence are accompanied by strengthening 
the legal position of the person subject to investigation. This is done through opening up 
the action to annul the investigation report transmitted to the national authorities198 on 
the grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential procedural requirement, 
infringement of the Treaties (including the CFR) or misuse of power.199 In addition, the 
Resolution provides for the establishment of a controller for procedural guarantees. If 
established, any person concerned by an OLAF investigation is entitled to lodge a 
complaint with regard to OLAF’s compliance with the procedural guarantees set out in 
its legal framework. Upon receipt of the complaint, the controller informs OLAF and 
gives it the possibility to resolve the issue internally within 15 working days. 
Afterwards, the controller issues a recommendation on the complaint which OLAF must 
follow, save in duly justified cases in which OLAF may deviate from said 
recommendation.200 The Resolution does not aim to (further) approximate much-needed 
safeguards, such as the legal professional privilege or the privilege against self-
incrimination, in the OLAF cross-sectoral legal framework.201 
While the Resolution manages to resolve some of the criticisms lodged against 
the current evidence regime, particularly the need to find an equivalent national 
administrative partner, it does not – nor does it purport to – solve all the problems that 
plague the admissibility of OLAF reports in national punitive proceedings. The 
Resolution would ensure the admissibility of OLAF reports, upon simple verification, in 
punitive proceedings, but does not alter the fact that the use of this evidence (ie, 
applicable evidentiary standards, rules on evaluation, etc) and the power of the national 
court to freely assess this evidence is still governed by national law. While this is 
certainly a step forward as the admissibility of OLAF reports is no longer subject to 28 
national laws, in making this step the CONT Committee also sets aside some of the 
upsides of the assimilation obligation currently provided for in Article 11(2) of 
Regulation 883/2013. This rule, as demonstrated in section 6.3, ‘routes’ or ‘directs’ the 
                                                
198 Or to institutions, offices, bodies or agencies for that matter. 
199 Draft European Parliament Legislative Resolution on the proposal for a regulation amending 
Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 (n 197), amendment 65. 
200 ibid, amendment 52. 
201 The Resolution does provide for a right to access to the file, a right not considered in this study (ibid, 
amendment 51). 
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status of the OLAF report under national law. It requires that an OLAF report has the 
status of administrative report drawn up by national inspectors and has the same 
evidentiary value. If the Resolution passes, the OLAF legal framework is no longer a 
guiding hand with regard to the status of OLAF reports in national punitive 
proceedings. Under such a regime, it is quite possible that national courts – while still 
bound by the principles of equivalence and effectiveness – accord to OLAF reports 
various statuses (not necessarily that of ‘administrative report’), under national law. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
We have provided an analysis of the legal provisions of DG COMP, ECB and OLAF 
dealing with the admissibility of ELEA (European law enforcement authorities) 
collected information as evidence in national punitive proceedings, and have dealt with 
three issues in particular: (i) how to deal with the fact that national and European Courts 
may apply different standards for defence rights and procedural safeguards, as well as 
how to deal with the effectuation of those rights and safeguards at the interfaces of (ii) 
non-punitive and punitive enforcement and (iii) administrative law and criminal law 
enforcement. 
The EU Courts and legislature attempt to fill in the gaps that inherently exist in 
EU composite procedures by developing general principles and legal rules such as 
principles of mutual trust and presumption of equivalent protection of defence rights 
across the EU Member States, which in turn are based on, inter alia, a shared system of 
values, including common standards for fundamental rights (Article 2 TEU).202 These 
presumptions allow for the introduction of hard and fast rules, such as the instruments 
for judicial cooperation in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, but also for rules 
on the mutual admissibility of evidence. Indeed, we have seen some – but not too many 
– examples of how EU law facilitates the inter-operability of materials as evidence by 
turning the aforementioned presumptions into legal rules. We have also seen how such 
rules may consequently force authorities and courts to disregard any differences with 
the standards of the forum state. 
It is thus clear what the added value of admissibility rules is. They are necessary 
to break open national laws, to define the content and scope of the legal rules of non-
inquiry and (recognition of) equivalence and to bring evidentiary laws within the scope 
of the Charter. With specific rules of EU law present, the Court of Justice will be 
offered more possibilities to ensure the coherence and consistency of the European legal 
order. In turn, such rules will force national courts (and legislators) to align their 
systems with these principles. Yet despite their clear added value, we only see these 
rules in the frameworks of OLAF and DG Comp, not ECB. Moreover, their scope is 
often limited. 
We have seen that DG COMP enforces Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty in a 
network structure (ECN), that is, in a ‘closed circle’, which comprises ECN authorities 
and national courts of the EU Member States that are competent to enforce EU 
                                                
202 cf supra n 25. 
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competition law provisions. Competition authorities can freely exchange information 
and use it as evidence; the umbrella Regulation 1/2003 lays down a purpose limitation, 
which essentially aims at ensuring that, should an authority use in evidence ECN 
transmitted information, the duty to state reasons will be respected. The mechanism 
through which the DG COMP legal framework attempts to deal with the problem of 
vertically divergent standards is the equivalence rule, which entails that defence rights 
of legal persons in the various Member States are presumed to be sufficiently 
equivalent. The equivalence rule however applies only in relation to lawfully obtained 
evidence. As far as the use of ECN transmitted information for imposing sanctions on 
natural persons is concerned, the legal framework lays down the following blanket ban: 
the receiving competition authority is precluded from using such information to impose 
custodial sanctions on individuals. ECN transmitted information may only serve as 
intelligence. National competition authorities are not precluded from disclosing 
information to criminal justice authorities, if such an obligation exists under their 
national law. Nevertheless, the latter must at any rate initiate their own investigation.  
What, then, can one learn from OLAF and the system of EU competition law 
enforcement? The following points can be made in this regard. First of all, it is clear 
that the enforcement landscape for DG COMP is different from that of OLAF. First, 
investigative powers, safeguards and defence rights are much more aligned in 
competition law – via harmonisation (voluntary or mandatory)203 – than in the OLAF 
setting. Second, the goals for which the exchanged materials may be used show a 
significantly higher degree of coherence; at any rate, they do not have to tackle the 
complicated interface between administrative and criminal models of law enforcement. 
Third, the EU Regulation spells out that ECN gathered evidence cannot be used for the 
imposition of custodial sanctions. All of that provides for a strong basis for a full rule of 
equivalence. However, it is also an approach which is not very likely to succeed in the 
OLAF setting. In the latter setting, unlike for DG COMP, admissibility rules – and the 
system in which they function – need to bridge all three problems of divergence; not 
only the bridge from one legal order to another, but also, possibly, the ones from non-
punitive to punitive and from administrative to criminal. Moreover, a criticism to the 
approach in competition law and certainly prudential supervision, is that those models 
seem to have a blind eye for the criminal law elements of composite enforcement. To 
respect the rights of the defence, all criminal investigations arguably have to start from 
scratch. The question is whether this provision imperatively follows from Articles 47 
and 48 of the Charter. 
The need for a framework for the admissibility of evidence is particularly 
important for OLAF. It stems from OLAF’s position in the shared enforcement design 
in the protection of the financial interests of the Union. By looking at the rationale of 
the rule, we found that OLAF currently deals with the divergent standards and the 
interface between administrative and punitive proceedings by means of a combination 
of an equivalence and assimilation rule. Article 11 of Regulation 883/2013, as said, 
aims to bridge all three categories of divergence, identified in section 2. The 
                                                
203 See, recently, Directive (EU) 2019/1. 
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assimilation rule requires that a national authority, notwithstanding the divergent EU 
and national standards according to which evidence is gathered, is to treat materials 
gathered by OLAF in the same fashion as materials gathered by comparable national 
authorities. Furthermore, it demands that with regard to the use of materials obtained 
under an administrative law framework in punitive proceedings, Member State 
authorities should treat EU procedures in the same way as national procedures. The 
rules of equivalence and, arguably, non-inquiry that also follow from Article 11, are 
consequently made dependent on the presence of a national ‘benchmark’ partner.  
To ease the admissibility of EU administrative materials in national punitive 
proceedings, a number of defence rights and safeguards have been harmonized in the 
OLAF legal framework. There is much to be said for this approach. Framed in the 
words of the Strasbourg Court the question remains, however, to what extent OLAF 
investigations and national follow-up procedures can be considered to be ‘sufficiently 
interlinked’. Were that indeed the case, the mere possibility of a punitive follow-up at 
national level would force the EU legislator (or the national courts)204 either to take 
away the element of compulsion in OLAF investigations, or to guarantee that its results 
may not be used in punitive proceedings. Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013 chooses the 
former approach. In fact, we submit that the existence of these safeguards already 
tackles much of the problems that are now covered by the assimilation rule of Article 
11. That implies that on the one hand, as is the case in the reform proposals – partially 
in the Commission proposal, completely in the Resolution of the CONT Committee – 
the assimilation rule may be abandoned,205 yet on the other hand, there is still a need to 
harmonise the safeguards also outside the specific context of Article 9 and extend its 
safeguards beyond OLAF’s cross-sectoral legal framework. Moreover, such 
harmonization of safeguards needs to include a number of defence rights that have 
currently not been included. Due to their relationship with the nemo tenetur principle, 
the rights of access to a lawyer and legal professional privilege would be prime 
candidates.  
Article 9, as it stands now, also has its pitfalls, of course. After all, why apply 
criminal law standards in investigations that will not necessarily end up in punitive 
procedures? Why accord persons concerned rights that other citizens do not have? An 
alternative to the approach currently chosen could be to work with a limited 
harmonisation of laws at the national level. Instead of guaranteeing persons concerned a 
set of rights which may unduly hamper the investigations, there is also the option of a 
limitation of the use that can be made of OLAF reports in a national punitive follow-up. 
Such a rule (which, incidentally, would also need a cross-sectoral implementation) 
                                                
204 It appears to us that a remedy at EU level may not be available. The OLAF investigations may, in and 
of themselves, be executed in a fully lawful way. It is the (potential) use at national level that makes the 
procedures unfair.  
205 Which also has, as a side effect as shown in section 6.5 when discussing the CONT Committee, that – 
while OLAF reports are admissible – the surrender of the assimilation obligation also results in a situation 
in which the status of OLAF reports under national law becomes unclear. By cutting the cord with 
national law through the assimilation rule, the OLAF report is thereby no longer equated to national 
administrative reports, whatever their value might be. 
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would, in our view, also be sufficient to remove the assimilation rule from Article 11 of 
Regulation 883/2013. As indicated in the above, the standards to be used here are the 
ones of ‘Strasbourg’ (and we believe these are wider than those of Luxembourg).206. 
The proceedings, after all, are national proceedings. In that case, the application of the 
Strasbourg standard follows from the Charter (Article 52(1) CFR). Article 7 of 
Directive 2016/343 of 9 March 2016 on the strengthening of certain aspects of the 
presumption of innocence and of the right to be present at the trial in criminal 
proceedings is not sufficiently precise in that respect.207  
One final remark remains. Some reports of the current Hercule III study show 
that a repetition of procedural steps – particularly in criminal proceedings – is often 
justified with a reference to the rights of defence. In many cases, however, it remains 
unclear what rights are meant specifically. In the above, we have paid attention 
particularly to the privilege against self-incrimination and its related safeguards. There 
are more, particularly the rights of access to the file and the right to be heard. Yet in the 
broader discussion of a revision of the OLAF framework that must interfere with 
national evidentiary laws, there is also a task for the national legal orders to indicate and 
specify which other rights they have in mind, so that the rights of defence – as important 
as they may be – do not become a blank cheque for national courts to ward-off OLAF-
reports and its investigatory results in national proceedings.  
 
                                                
206 Section 2.2. 
207 Directive (EU) 2016/343. 
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3. LAWFUL AND FAIR USE OF EVIDENCE FROM A          
EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE 
J.A.E. Vervaele 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION – THE GATHERING AND USE OF EVIDENCE IN A 
TRANSNATIONAL SETTING 
Writing a thematic report on the admissibility of evidence within the framework of a 
comparative study on the ‘Admissibility of OLAF final Reports as Evidence in Criminal 
Proceedings’, which analyses the topic from a horizontal comparative perspective with 
the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP), the 
European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), and the European Central Bank 
(ECB), but also looks at the judicial follow-up of OLAF evidence in national punitive 
administrative and criminal proceedings, is like opening several Pandora’s boxes.  
What is legal evidence and when is that evidence admissible in punitive 
proceedings sound like very straightforward questions. These questions are also 
extremely important, as they deal at the same time with effective enforcement and due 
process in the EU. Nevertheless, the road towards the eventual answers is not very well 
paved and lacks good signs. To turn this around, what makes evidence illegal as such, 
based on the invalidity of the act producing it? When is it not apt for use as evidence in 
punitive proceedings leading to exclusion? Whom and what does the nullity of the act or 
the exclusion of the evidence aim to protect? Finally, do the questions and answers vary 
if we apply them to a transnational investigation and/or prosecution at a horizontal level 
between countries or vertically with the involvement of EU agencies?  
The transnational dimension of this topic was already reflected in the resolutions 
of the Sixteenth International Congress of Penal Law of the AIDP (Association 
Internationale de Droit Pénal) in Budapest in 1999, dealing with the topic of ‘The 
Criminal Justice System Facing the Challenge of Organized Crime’, especially in Section 
IV on international criminal law, under the leadership of General Rapporteur Bert Swart.1 
Under headings D (new rules on judicial cooperation) and E (new rules concerning the 
legal position of individuals in international criminal law) the resolutions mostly deal 
with the equality of arms between the prosecution and defence when gathering evidence 
and the transnational application of procedural safeguards and defence rights. In 
resolution D2 on the collection of evidence, the application of the lex fori of the requesting 
state in the requested state is accepted, as long as this is not incompatible with the 
																																								 																				
1 See Association Internationale de Droit Pénal (AIDP), ‘Resolutions of the AIDP (1926–2014)’ (2015) 86 
International Review of Penal Law 243, 398–404 <www.penal.org/sites/default/files/RIDP86%201-
2%202015%20EN.pdf> accessed 18 April 2019.  
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fundamental principles recognised in the requested state and the basic rights of the 
defendants. This means that the transnational application of foreign rules of evidence is 
subject to the fundamental rights and defence rights of the executing state. Resolutions 
E3 and E5 strengthen the legal position of individuals in internal criminal proceedings by 
providing that: 
3. The minimum rights of an individual involved in international criminal proceedings in 
the requesting state should include the right to obtain evidence abroad and the right to be 
informed about the exchange of evidence in his case. … 
5. Conviction may not be based on evidence that has been obtained in violation of the 
human rights of the defendant.  
Resolution 5 certainly contains a strong exclusion rule in cases where the sole or decisive 
evidence has been obtained in violation of the human rights of the defendant. Which 
human rights are at stake are not mentioned, however. Being resolutions of a worldwide 
organisation, they do not of course take into account the specific modalities of a regional 
integration model such as the EU. Moreover, since 1999 there has been increased 
transnational gathering and use of evidence both in a horizontal setting between the 
enforcement authorities of Member States and in a vertical setting between EU and 
national authorities.  
If we apply the questions mentioned above to OLAF, then, of course, we do have 
to start from the complex setting in which OLAF is exchanging information,2 
investigating3 and forwarding final reports of this investigation to be followed up by the 
competent national and European authorities, and ask what the status of this OLAF 
evidence is at the time of assessing its admissibility as well as at the time of assessing its 
evidentiary value. It is also important that OLAF proceedings cannot be qualified as such 
as punitive proceedings in the sense of the ‘criminal charge’ concept of Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), as OLAF has no sanctioning powers at 
all. However the follow-up to OLAF investigations and OLAF-reports can lead to use of 
OLAF-evidence in national punitive proceedings in administrative and criminal 
enforcement cases. However, this is very clearly not a clear-cut top-down setting in which 
European OLAF evidence is used in national proceedings. In our research on 
‘Investigatory powers and procedural safeguards’4 we have elaborated different models 
for interaction between the EU and the national level. In light of our common goal of 
seeking ways to improve the legal framework of OLAF for gathering evidence, three 
factors are key in determining the relevant models for interaction and in the imputation 
of investigative acts to the legal orders of the EU or the national authorities: 
																																								 																				
2 Michele Simonato, Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Exchange of Information with EU and 
National Enforcement Authorities: Improving OLAF Legislative Framework through a Comparison with 
Other EU Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2018). 
3 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: Improving 
OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement Authorities 
(ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017).  
4 ibid. 
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1. The issue of which authority is the acting authority, ie the authority that 
performs the investigative acts. Is this the EU authority itself or its national 
partner?  
2. The issue of whether the national partner becomes (functionally) a part of the 
EU organisation or whether assistance is provided to the EU authority by the 
national partner as a representative/part of its national administration (on behalf 
of the EU authority or in its own name).  
3. The issue of who instructs the national partners: are instructions provided by 
the EU authority or through the national lines/chains of command? 
On the basis of the aforementioned three factors, we have discerned the following types 
of interaction between the EU and national authorities:  
- Autonomous investigations by OLAF inspectors (internal and/or external); 
- Mixed investigations; 
- Mandated investigations; 
- Mutual assistance. 
The way in which evidence is gathered and transferred depends to a great extent on which 
investigative model is used. Nevertheless, all OLAF models resulting in external 
investigative acts do involve interaction with the national legal order. Even for external 
autonomous investigations the EU legal OLAF framework regularly refers to the 
applicable national law.  
If we then ask what makes OLAF evidence illegal as such, based on the invalidity 
of the act producing it, or when OLAF evidence is not apt for use as evidence in punitive 
proceedings leading to exclusion, or whom and what the nullity of the act or the exclusion 
of the evidence aim to protect, to a large extent the answers will not be provided by EU 
law but by the applicable national law. When OLAF evidence is presented as admissible 
evidence in punitive proceedings, then assessing the lawfulness and fairness of this OLAF 
evidence will depend on  
1/ the applicable law for the competent authority and investigative act;  
2/ the applicable procedural safeguards;  
3/ purpose limitations on its transfer and use; and  
4/ the applicable fundamental rights (Constitutional, ECHR and the Charter for 
Fundamental Rights of the Union (CFR)).  
As we can see, the domestic influence on these factors is very substantial, certainly when 
it comes to the assessment of the admissibility and potential evidentiary value of OLAF-
related evidence. This is the reason why in this special report on the admissibility of 
unlawful evidence and the unfair use of evidence we need a conceptual approach starting 
from the domestic level. We have to understand, first, the rationale behind the national 
legal traditions concerning unlawful evidence and nullity/exclusion (section 2). Then we 
have to assess how and to what extent the EU has recognised the necessity of common 
standards and common rules for evidence and its unlawfulness in the Member States and 
has taken steps towards harmonisation (section 3). From the outcome of sections 2 and 3, 
58 J.a.e. vervaeLe 3. LawfuL and fair use of evidence 59
in section 4 we can map the problem in a transnational setting, such as in the EU Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), both from the perspective of effective enforcement 
and due process.  
This latter dimension triggers the fundamental rights dimension. In this area both 
the national and EU level have to comply with the minimum protection provided by the 
ECHR and related equivalent rights under the CFR. In section 5 we will assess when 
breaches of fundamental rights can lead to the nullity of evidence as such or to the 
exclusion of evidence because of a violation of the fairness of the proceedings. Once we 
have all of these elements on the table, we can then apply them to the OLAF setting of 
evidence gathering and the use of evidence (section 6) and analyse the applicable law, the 
applicable legal safeguards, purpose limitation on its use and the applicable fundamental 
rights standards. In section 7 we will then make some final concluding observations.  
 
2. RATIONALE OF THE ADMISSIBILITY AND THE NULLITY/EXCLUSION OF 
EVIDENCE  
Investigations into illegal conduct, be it of an administrative or criminal nature, can suffer 
from failures or errors in law or in fact. Even in a single jurisdiction this can lead to 
problems with the admissibility of the evidence gathered. This admissibility is however 
not only related to problems of illegally obtained evidence. Indeed, the rules on the 
gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters differ extensively from one Member 
State to another and this difference is not limited to the common law-civil law divide.5 
Some Member States have closed prescribed systems of admissible evidence, while 
others have open systems based on the discretion of the judiciary. Common law, for 
instance, was traditionally indifferent as to how evidence was gathered, as long as it was 
reliable and probative. Some Member States have very strict rules on the nullity of 
unlawful evidence, even for minor legal errors that do not harm the interests of the 
defence. In some of these states the exclusion of evidence as fruits of the poisonous tree 
is even a constitutional norm, although the case law of the Constitutional Courts has 
softened this concept by bringing in links with the right of the defence (the so-called 
Schutznorm). Other Member States have very flexible rules on the admissibility of 
evidence, even in cases involving violations of due process rules. The moment at which 
evidence is assessed also varies from one Member State to another. Some countries 
provide for specific pre-trial procedures to check and assess the legality of evidence, 
while others do not. The latter, mostly common law countries, use exclusionary rules. 
The former, mostly civil law countries, exclude evidence on the basis of an assessment 
of the validity of the investigative acts, also called ‘purge des nullités’.6  This means that 
during the pre-trial phase there will be an assessment of the validity of the investigative 
																																								 																				
5 The British Law Society, ‘Study of the Laws of Evidence in Criminal Proceedings throughout the 
European Union’ (Study for the European Commission’s Directorate General for Justice and Home Affairs 
2004). 
6 Benoît Chabert and Pierre-Olivier Sur, ‘Le Point en Matière de Nullités de Procédure Pénale au Fil des 
Cent Dernières Décisions de la Chambre d’Accusation de Paris’ (15 November 1997) Gazette du Palais 
1473. 
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acts and the legality of the obtained evidence. This assessment is mostly done by a 
court/chamber or the judge of liberty/examining magistrate. In some countries this 
assessment depends on the use of remedies by the interested parties; in others the 
assessment is a mandatory exercise before prosecution and bringing the case to 
judgement.  
Already from the terminology we see that the rationale behind the assessment of 
unlawful evidence and related consequences might differ from country to country. In all 
legal systems the conceptual framework of evidence is related to the finality of the 
punitive process, based on the formal and substantive truth sustained by evidence/proof 
that does respect due process. This therefore includes the legality of the proceedings from 
the start of the pre-trial investigations and respect for fundamental rights and procedural 
guarantees during the proceedings. However, in the case of unlawful evidence, the 
approach and the consequences are very different from one legal order to another, 
depending on what and whom the various legal orders aim to protect by the exclusion or 
nullity of the evidence, and on the reasons for that protection. 
From comparative studies7 on the topic we can define groups of countries, 
depending on the rationale of the protection. Countries like the USA, which is the 
champion of the doctrine of the fruits of the poisonous tree (although this has been 
strongly reduced by case law),8 mainly aim at deterring unlawful police conduct (a 
deterrence approach). The exclusion of evidence is a tool to guide law enforcement on 
the right path. Countries like France,9 Italy,10 Spain,11 Colombia, etc aim to protect the 
rights of suspects. So this exclusion or nullity is strictly related to the infringement of 
fundamental or substantial rights (the vindication of rights approach). Within that group 
some countries, like Spain, also directly relate it to the presumption of innocence.12 Many 
																																								 																				
7 Stephen C Thaman, ‘Fruits of the Poisonous Tree in Comparative Law’ (2010) 16 Southwestern Journal 
of International Law 333; Christopher Slobogin, ‘A Comparative Perspective on the Exclusionary Rule in 
Search and Seizure Cases’ (9 April 2013) Vanderbilt Public Law Research Paper No 13–21 
<https://ssrn.com/abstract=2247746> accessed 25 June 2019; Stefano Ruggeri (eds), Transnational 
Evidence and Multicultural Inquiries in Europe. Developments in EU Legislation and New Challenges for 
Human Rights-Oriented Criminal Investigations in Cross-border Cases (Springer 2014).  
8 See, already in 1968, Robert M Pitler, ‘The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized’ (1968) 
56 California Law Review 579; Joseph G Casaccio, ‘Illegally Acquired Information, Consent Searches, and 
Tainted Fruit’ (1987) 87 Columbia Law Review 842.   
9 Mireille Delmas-Marty, Procès Pénal et Droits de l’Homme (Presses universitaires de France 1992); 
Pierre Bolze, Le Droit à la Preuve Contraire en Procédure Pénale (Droit, Université Nancy 2 2010) 
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Vial and Olivier Leclerc, Droit de la Preuve (Presses universitaires de France 2015); Jacques Pradel, 
Procédure Pénale (19th edn, Cujas 2017).  
10 Paolo Tonini, Manuale di Procedura Penale (16th edn, Giuffrè 2015). 
11 Vicente Carlos Guzmán Fluja, Anticipación y Preconstitución de la Prueba en el Proceso Penal (Tirant 
Monografías 2006) 377; Juan Luis Gómez Colomer (ed), Prueba y Proceso Penal.	Análisis Especial de la 
Prueba Prohibida en el Sistema Español y en el Derecho Comparado (Tirant lo Blanch 2008); Victor 
Moreno Catena and Valentin Cortés Domínguez, Derecho Procesal Penal (4th edn, Tirant lo Blanch 2010); 
María Isabel González Cano, La Prueba en el Proceso Penal (Valencia Tirant Tratados 2017). 
12 Teresa Armenta Deu, La Prueba Ilícita (Un Estudio Comparado) (Pons 2011) and Andrea Planchadell 
Gargallo, La Prueba Prohibida: Evolución Jurisprudencial (Thomson Reuters-Aranzadi 2014).  
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countries, like Canada, the UK,13 and Germany,14 use a so-called systemic integrity model 
with a balancing approach (the judicial integrity approach). This means that they only 
apply the exclusion of evidence for significant violations of important rights and only in 
cases where the dismissal of the charges will not significantly undermine the state’s 
interest in convicting those who have committed serious crimes. For instance, in Germany 
the Constitutional Court does limit the exclusion of evidence (Fernwirkung des 
Beweisverbots)15 by relating it to protected persons (Rechtskreistheorie) and the aim of 
the protection (Schutzzwecklehre).  
The determining factors for exclusion or nullity are – depending on the group – 
the deterrent effect, the impact of the exclusion or admission for the reputation of the 
punitive justice system, the seriousness of the offence and the importance of the evidence 
for successful prosecution, the investigator’s potential awareness of the illegality and of 
alternative methods for obtaining the evidence and the nature of the right that has been 
violated. 
Finally, the doctrine of the exclusion or nullity of evidence is also related to the 
architecture of the punitive justice system. In an adversarial system such as in England 
and Wales, each party collects its evidence and the evidence is presented at the oral trial 
only. The exclusion of evidence is mainly aimed at preventing the judges – who have a 
passive role when assessing the merits of the case – from knowing this evidence at all. In 
a semi-inquisitorial system, like in France, Germany, the Netherlands or Belgium, the 
judiciary is actively involved in the pre-trial investigation and prosecution and has an 
active role. A great deal of the evidence produced during the pre-trial setting will also be 
presented in a written form at the trial, without further cross-examination, etc. As to the 
legality of the pre-trial investigative acts, before the file is forwarded to the trial court, 
the situation where decisive elements of the evidence at trial are based on unlawful pre-
trial judicial decisions (like, for instance, a search warrant or an order to intercept 
telecommunications) must be avoided. In other words, the exclusion is in the light of the 
trial setting, the nullity is aimed at sound legal acts during all stages. Under the nullity 
approach, when investigative action violates certain specified statutory rules, and when it 
prejudices the interests of the accused, the action is declared void and its evidentiary result 
may not be used. 
In all systems the exclusion or nullity has become less absolute over the years. 
Nullities have been divided into absolute nullities or relative nullities or into nullities and 
irregularities. The relative ones are not sufficiently serious to exclude the evidence from 
the file. The irregularities are those that can still be repaired in due time, for instance by 
providing the right authorisation or calling in the defence for a pre-trial hearing, etc. Also 
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine has been softened by making exceptions based on 
																																								 																				
13 Richard May and Steven Powles, Criminal Evidence (Criminal Practice) (Sweet & Maxwell 2004) and 
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a causal link with the suspect, good faith of the agent, inevitable discovery, the legal aim 
protected by the offence, etc.16 Just to give an example: on the basis of the illegal 
interception of communications, law enforcement officers obtain a legal search warrant 
against a person who was already a suspect and under surveillance. The search results in 
the discovery of quantities of hard drugs. In the softened version of the fruit of the 
poisoned tree, the illegal interception is a neutral act that no longer prejudices the legality 
of the search.  
Our approach and explanation above are based on a strict domestic approach to 
the role of evidence, the admissibility of evidence and its eventual exclusion.17 In the EU 
context, however, we have to deal not only with this dimension but also with the 
horizontal and vertical dimension. This means that evidence can be gathered in EU 
country A and assessed as to its admissibility in country B, or that evidence can be 
gathered by country A and used by a European enforcement agency, or gathered by a 
European enforcement agency and used by it or gathered by a European enforcement 
agency and used by a national enforcement agency for follow-up action (definitely the 
OLAF scenario). So we have to test the EU dimension of the already complex topic of 
the admissibility of evidence and the nullity or exclusion thereof.  
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF (CROSS-BORDER) EVIDENCE IN THE EU: LEGISLATIVE 
INITIATIVES  
The differences in the gathering of evidence, the use of evidence and the related 
admissibility and nullity or exclusion of evidence can lead, in the cross-border gathering 
and cross-border use of evidence, to situations of unlawful or illegal evidence or the unfair 
use of evidence, meaning a violation of due process and fair trial under Article 6 ECHR 
and Articles 47 and 48 CFR. Unlawful evidence and the unfair use of evidence seems to 
be one of the great taboos in European criminal justice. It has been greatly neglected by 
all cooperation instruments, be they instruments of mutual legal assistance or mutual 
recognition.  
The European Commission tackled the problem for the first time in its 2001 Green 
Paper on the European Public Prosecutor.18 Under section 6.3.4 thereof the Commission 
explicitly dealt with the law of evidence, tackling both the admissibility of evidence and 
the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence. The Commission was very much aware 
of the fact that ‘a simple reference to national law is by definition incapable of settling 
the question of the admissibility of evidence in a European investigation and prosecution 
area’ and that  
The rules of evidence, being based on a set of comparable principles, are still too different 
in matters of detail for the European Public Prosecutor to be able to take them as a basis 
																																								 																				
16 See Thaman (n 7).  
17 For an analysis of the topic at the international criminal courts, see Michele Caianiello, Ammissione della 
Prova e Contraddittorio nelle Giurisdizioni Penali Internazionali (Giappichelli 2008).  
18 European Commission, ‘Green Paper on criminal-law protection of the financial interests of the 
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… Neither unification in the form of a complete code on the admissibility of evidence, 
nor a simple reference to national law but mutual admissibility of evidence is the most 
realistic and satisfactory solution here.  
Under 6.3.4.2 the Commission explicitly included the exclusion of unlawfully obtained 
evidence, as this is ‘the prior condition for any mutual admissibility of evidence’. The 
rules governing exclusion would be, in the view of the Commission, those of the Member 
State in which the evidence was obtained, meaning that the forum court has to apply 
foreign law. As for the validity of evidence (its credibility in the eyes of the court), this 
will obviously be within the discretion of the courts themselves, on the basis of the 
applicable national law. 
It is interesting that the Commission also elaborated upon the admissibility of 
evidence obtained in the course of a Community administrative procedure when that is to 
be used in a criminal trial. In this case the Commission applies the Saunders doctrine, 
meaning that this should be conditional on compliance during the administrative 
investigation – if there are grounds for believing that there is a suspicion of a criminal 
offence – with the defence rights and procedural safeguards under a criminal procedure. 
The guidance in the Green Paper has not really led to innovative solutions for the EPPO. 
In the Commission Proposal of 201319 the following is stated in Section 5 on the 
admissibility of evidence, although in only one article:  
Article 30. Admissibility of evidence  
1. Evidence presented by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office to the trial court, where 
the court considers that its admission would not adversely affect the fairness of the 
procedure or the rights of defence as enshrined in Articles 47 and 48 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, shall be admitted in the trial without any 
validation or similar legal process even if the national law of the Member State where the 
court is located provides for different rules on the collection or presentation of such 
evidence.  
2. Once the evidence is admitted, the competence of national courts to assess freely the 
evidence presented by the European Public Prosecutor’s Office at trial shall not be 
affected. 
From this Article and recital 32 it becomes clear that the approach is strictly limited to 
avoiding inadmissibility based on different evidence standards in the Member States. The 
trial court cannot exclude evidence presented by the EPPO as inadmissible on the ground 
that the conditions and rules for gathering that type of evidence are different under the 
national law that is applicable to it. In other words, this article does not really harmonise 
the rules on evidence and neither does it contain standards for the exclusion of unlawfully 
obtained evidence. Quite the opposite, Article 30 contains an inclusionary rule. The only 
European threshold at the stage of assessing the admissibility by the forum court is that 
the EPPO must have respected the procedural safeguards and the defence rights under 
Articles 47 and 48 CFR. Per Article 52(3) CFR the content of this protection must comply 
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with the minimum thresholds developed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) case law under Article 6 ECHR. The meaning of this remains very unclear, 
however, as the proceedings as a whole must be fair, which means that unlawfully 
obtained evidence in the locus state can still be admissible in the forum court if the 
proceedings as a whole (including the trial stage) do meet the fairness criterion. In other 
words, the minimum thresholds under Article 6 ECHR neither lead to standards for 
admissible evidence, nor to standards for the exclusion of evidence. This will be further 
elaborated upon in this contribution under point 4 in the text.20 The EU could raise this 
minimum threshold, but it has not done so in the EPPO Regulation.21  
In the approved EPPO Regulation,22 the article on evidence has been rephrased as 
follows:  
Article 37. Evidence  
Evidence presented by the prosecutors of the EPPO or the defendant to a court shall not 
be denied admission on the mere ground that the evidence was gathered in another 
Member State or in accordance with the law of another Member State.  
The power of the trial court to freely assess the evidence presented by the defendant or 
the prosecutors of the EPPO shall not be affected by this Regulation.  
Basically it retains the same focus as the proposed Article 30, but also extends it to 
evidence presented by the defendant. From recital 80 we can derive that not only Article 
6 TEU, the CFR and the ECHR apply, but that fundamental rights based on Member 
States’ Constitutions also apply. And even more importantly:  
In line with those principles, and in respecting the different legal systems and traditions 
of the Member States as provided for in Article 67(1) TFEU, nothing in this Regulation 
may be interpreted as prohibiting the courts from applying the fundamental principles of 
national law on fairness of the procedure that they apply in their national systems, 
including in common law systems.23  
This means that national standards on (un)lawful evidence can be applied, which means 
that the protective standard – compared to the ECHR standard – can be increased, but can 
also be made more flexible under the ‘fairness of the proceedings as a whole’ doctrine of 
the ECtHR. The result is, of course, that there is not and will not be any level playing 
field for the admissibility of evidence between Member States, even in the context of 
EPPO proceedings. There is a system of free flow of evidence, based on the inclusionary 
																																								 																				
20 See infra, section 4. 
21 András Csúri, ‘Grenzüberschreitende Ermittlungen. Bemerkungen zur Europäischen 
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23 Second part of recital 80 of the EPPO Regulation.  
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rule of Article 37, that only can be rebutted if the ‘fairness of the proceedings as a whole’ 
is at stake.   
It is also interesting that recital 81 stresses that, taking into account the mandatory 
prosecution, the investigations of the EPPO should as a rule lead to prosecution in the 
competent national courts in cases where there is sufficient evidence and no legal ground 
bars prosecution. In other words, the EPPO is called upon to avoid jurisdictions where 
higher thresholds for the admissibility of evidence could lead to unsuccessful 
prosecutions.  
It is easy to conclude that Article 37 of the EPPO Regulation certainly does not 
set a standard for the admissibility and exclusion of evidence. It does not lead to any 
harmonisation as to who can gather the evidence (the competent authorities), under which 
conditions they can gather the evidence, or what should happen with unlawful or unfair 
evidence. The approach in Article 37 is limited to a non-discrimination clause, in the 
sense that the national courts cannot make a distinction between EPPO evidence gathered 
by the European Delegated Prosecutors in their own domestic legal order and EPPO 
evidence gathered by the European Delegated Prosecutor in other jurisdictions. However, 
we must not forget that in many countries the gathering of criminal evidence will in 
practice be done by law enforcement authorities, such as the police or specialised 
(administrative or judicial) agencies. The unlawfulness of this evidence can thus be 
directly related to their conduct, but they are not mentioned at all in the EPPO Regulation.  
Outside the framework of the EPPO the European Commission already attempted 
to pave the way for a legislative initiative by issuing the 2009 ‘Green Paper on obtaining 
evidence in criminal matters and transferring it from one Member State to another with 
the aim of securing its admissibility’.24 The Commission was very aware of the fact that 
the rules on cross-border evidence gathering, as laid down in the European Evidence 
Warrant of 2005 ‘only approach the issue of admissibility of evidence in an indirect 
manner as they do not set any common standards for gathering evidence’.25 There is 
therefore a risk that the existing rules on obtaining evidence in criminal matters will only 
function effectively between Member States with similar national standards for gathering 
evidence. As set out in the 2009 Communication entitled ‘An area of freedom, security 
and justice serving the citizen’, the best solution to this problem would seem to lie in the 
adoption of common standards for gathering evidence in criminal matters.26 The 
Commission is therefore advocating additional rules on the admissibility of evidence.27 
However, the Green Paper was so poorly elaborated that it did not lead to any added value 
or substantial support from the Member States and resulted in no further action from the 
Commission.  
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty does however offer new perspectives for legislative 
action, as Article 82(2)(a) TFEU provides for an explicit legal basis for approximation in 
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the field by referring to the mutual admissibility of evidence between Member States. 
Although the approximation is in theory limited to minimum rules in order to facilitate 
the mutual recognition of judicial decisions,28 it has become clear from the use of Article 
82(2)(b-c) TFEU by the legislator that this approximation is in fact the harmonisation of 
domestic criminal procedure (so not limited to mutual recognition instruments) in order 
to facilitate potential mutual recognition. The harmonisation is not strictly limited to 
minimum harmonisation but to minimum rules, meaning that which is necessary for 
facilitating and enhancing mutual recognition between the Member States. The new and 
interesting potential of Article 82(2)(a) TFEU, both for the harmonisation of obtaining 
evidence (and thus of criminal investigative tools) with a view to the admissibility of 
evidence, has however not been used at all. Neither the Commission, nor the Member 
States have triggered any legislative proposal, leaving Article 82(2)(a) TFEU dormant, 
and a legislative failure thus remains in place.  
In the case of OLAF-related investigations in the area of the protection of the 
financial interests (PIF) of the EU we also have to ask the question whether Article 325 
TFEU is not imposing obligations on the rules on evidence and the exclusionary rules at 
the national level. This question was recently referred to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) for a preliminary ruling by a specialised criminal court in 
Bulgaria.29 Mr Dzivev and other persons are accused of leading a criminal gang that has 
committed VAT fraud. In order to gather evidence of their involvement, 
telecommunications were intercepted. However, some of those recordings were ordered 
by a court which apparently did not have jurisdiction to make such an order. Furthermore, 
some requests for the orders were not properly reasoned by the prosecutor. Under 
Bulgarian law, the evidence thus gathered is unlawful and cannot be used in criminal 
proceedings against the accused. As it concerns crucial key evidence in this case, this 
would lead to an acquittal and thus impunity. Advocate General Bobek delivered his 
conclusion on the 25th of July 2018 and rephrased the main question as follows: 
Do Article 325(1) TFEU, Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) of the PFI Convention and Articles 
206, 250 and 273 of the VAT Directive, interpreted in the light of the Charter, preclude 
the application of national provisions on admissibility of evidence, under which evidence 
obtained unlawfully must be disregarded, given the specific circumstances of the main 
proceedings?30 
For the Advocate General it is important, as a point of departure, that the rules on evidence 
have not been harmonised by EU law and that Member States have therefore retained 
discretion in shaping their own rules. However, rules on evidence have an impact on guilt 
																																								 																				
28 According to the prevailing opinion in doctrine, Art 82(2)(a) TFEU only constitutes a legal basis for a 
partial harmonisation of criminal procedure laws (or in this case the law of evidence) by means of minimum 
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and punishment, in this case concerning VAT fraud, and thus fall within the application 
of EU law. The result is that Member States must comply with the dual requirement of 
equivalence and effectiveness, but also with the CFR. The latter means that any non-
application of the national rule on the exclusion of evidence could only be prospective 
and could not apply to ongoing cases. The AG came to the conclusion that this case is not 
an illustration of a systemic risk of impunity and that, for that reason,  
Article 325(1) TFEU, Article 1(1) and Article 2(1) of the Convention on the Protection 
of the European Communities’ financial interests, and Article 206, Article 250(1) and 
Article 273 of Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common 
system of value added tax, interpreted in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union, do not preclude national legislation, such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings, that prohibits the use of evidence obtained in breach of national law, 
such as that acquired by means of interceptions of telecommunications authorised by a 
court which did not have jurisdiction to do so.31 
In its judgment of 17 January 2019,32 the CJEU faithfully followed the reasoning of the 
AG by insisting on the fact that the obligation to ensure the effective collection of the 
European Union’s resources does not absolve national courts of the necessary observance 
of the principle of legality and the rule of law which is one of the primary values on which 
the European Union is founded, as is indicated in Article 2 TEU (para 34). For that reason 
EU law cannot require that a national court must not apply such a procedural rule, even 
if the use of that evidence gathered unlawfully could increase the effectiveness of criminal 
prosecutions and even in situations in which that evidence alone is capable of proving 
that the offences in question have been committed (paras 39–40). In other words, Article 
325 TFEU cannot be used as the legal base for introducing a balancing test between EU 
effectiveness and applicable legal safeguards in case of unlawful evidence.  
 
4. MAPPING THE PROBLEM FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF EFFECTIVE 
ENFORCEMENT AND DUE PROCESS 
Specialised studies have illustrated to what extent the lack of harmonisation on the 
gathering of evidence does lead to problems concerning the admissibility of evidence. In 
their study on the EU cross-border gathering and use of evidence in criminal matters, 
Vermeulen and others (eds)33 first assess the domestic rules on unlawfully obtained 
evidence and their legal consequences, making a distinction between three types of 
scenarios: rules that sanction unlawfully obtained evidence with absolute nullity, with 
relative nullity, depending upon the impact of the unlawfulness or irregularity for the 
reliability of the information/evidence, or rules that state that the use of the 
information/evidence as evidence would violate the right to a fair trial. The conclusion of 
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this first assessment is that the domestic regimes attribute a variety of consequences to 
unlawfully obtained evidence. Whereas some Member States apply absolute nullity 
others do not necessarily exclude it even under relative nullity. This variety and the lack 
of harmonisation can of course hamper the mutual admissibility of evidence.  
Secondly, the study examines whether Member States have specific rules on 
unlawfully obtained evidence in foreign countries. Some Member States do not have any 
specific rules at all, while others do but do not make a distinction between EU Member 
States and non-EU states. The Member States with specific rules have very different 
approaches, however. Some are stricter concerning foreign evidence compared to 
domestic evidence, while others are more lenient and only apply the comity rule (in the 
sense of admissibility without any further inquiry, based on respecting the sovereignty of 
the partner state, mutual trust or simply the factual impossibility of checking legality in 
the foreign legal order). Vermeulen and others conclude that the fact that a significant 
number of Member States do not presently take into account where unlawfully obtained 
evidence was obtained when determining its validity, is certainly a sign of the possibility 
of a future complete mutual admissibility of evidence, and attribution of the same value 
to any kind of evidence, regardless of where in the EU it was obtained. Vermeulen and 
others also conclude that under a future system of mutual admissibility of evidence the 
rules governing exclusion can and should be those of the Member State in which the 
evidence was obtained.  
I find that both conclusions are too straightforward and not convincing. First of 
all, the conclusions do not sufficiently take into account the very different consequences 
under domestic law for sanctioning the gathering and use of unlawful evidence, ranging 
from absolute nullity to very lenient exclusion rules. Second, Member States still want to 
be able to refuse admissibility if the gathering of the evidence is contrary to their 
fundamental principles of law, especially when they are mandatory constitutional rules. 
Third, Member States cannot simply rely on the lawfulness of the evidence in the foreign 
jurisdiction, if the cross-border use of evidence would lead to an unfair trial under Article 
6 ECHR and/or Articles 47/48 CFR. In my opinion, it will be impossible to establish the 
mutual admissibility of evidence and the free movement thereof without elaborating 
common standards, taking into account the minimum requirements of applicable human 
rights law under the ECHR/CFR.  
This was also the approach taken in the 2000 study on ‘The Implementation of the 
Corpus Juris in the Member States’.34 Article 32 of the Corpus Juris 200035 partially 
harmonises the gathering of evidence and the tools for producing legal evidence, 
complementary to the admissible evidence under the national law in force in the Member 
States of the court of judgment (forum regit actum). For instance, Article 32 explicitly 
stipulates that pre-existing documents that the accused has been required to produce in a 
preliminary administrative investigation are admissible evidence in criminal proceedings. 
Article 33 of the Corpus Juris 2000 specifically deals with the ‘exclusion of evidence 
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35 ibid 209. 
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illegally obtained’.36 Article 33(1) stipulates that evidence must be excluded if it violates 
fundamental rights enshrined in the ECHR or if it violates rules included in Articles 31 
and 32 of the Corpus Juris 2000. The latter essentially means a violation of the 
presumption of innocence or a violation of human rights standards, such as for instance 
the right to remain silent. The exclusion is however only mandatory if the admission of 
evidence would undermine the fairness of the proceedings, meaning that the legally 
protected interests of the accused person (Schutznorm) must be at stake. Article 33(2) 
deals with the applicable law in order to determinate whether the evidence has been 
obtained legally or not. The point of departure is the law of the country where the evidence 
was obtained. This means that the law of the country of the forum is not applicable. 
However, the forum must exclude the evidence if it would contravene the fairness of the 
proceedings, as enshrined in the ECHR.  
From this overview it becomes clear that the admissibility of evidence and the 
exclusion of unlawful or unfair evidence is a real problem in the EU that can undermine 
the effectiveness of proceedings, due process and mutual trust between the enforcement 
authorities. We must not forget that as long there is no specific instrument on the mutual 
admissibility of evidence, the rules on the lawfulness of evidence are a matter for national 
law and the Courts of the European Union have no jurisdiction in this respect.37 However, 
if the evidence is used at the European level, be it by the EPPO or by EU enforcement 
agencies in punitive proceedings, the EU authorities may not  
knowingly rely on evidence which was quite clearly obtained in breach of essential 
procedural requirements. Fundamental principles of EU law such as, in particular, the 
right to good administration (Article 41(1) of the CFR) and the right to a fair trial (Article 
47(1) CFR) require that the EU institutions undertake at least a summary examination in 
the light of all circumstances of the particular case that are known to them.38  
This can of course have consequences for the admissibility of evidence: ‘In the 
administrative proceedings, therefore, the Commission must ensure that according to all 
the indications available to it, the evidence in question was neither unlawfully gathered 
by the national authorities nor unlawfully forwarded to it’.39 
The problem is moreover not limited to evidence gathered in the setting of a 
criminal investigation. More and more administrative enforcement agencies, both at the 
national level40 and the European level, increasingly gather evidence with a (criminal) 
punitive aim. In national systems with double-track enforcement (administrative and 
criminal) and in combined European-national enforcement the evidence obtained through 
an administrative investigation can become key evidence in criminal matters or vice 
																																								 																				
36 ibid. 
37 See Case C-469/15 P FSL Holdings NV and Others v European Commission, EU:C: 2017:308, para 32, 
and Case C-407/04 P Dalmine v Commission, EU:C:2007:53, para 62.  
38 Case C-469/15 P FSL Holdings NV and Others v European Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott, 
EU:C:2016:884, para 37.  
39 ibid, para 38.  
40 See, for instance, Renzo Orlandi, Atti e Informazioni della Autorità Amministrativa nel Processo Penale. 
Contributo allo Studio delle Prove Extracostituite (Giuffrè 1992).  
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versa. Obviously this can also lead to questions concerning unlawful evidence in 
transnational punitive proceedings, be it of a horizontal and/or vertical nature. In fully-
fledged European punitive proceedings, like the ones of ECB, ESMA or DG COMP, 
European authorities/courts will have to assess the lawfulness of the evidence of national 
origin, but ‘given that there is no legislation at EU level governing the concept of proof, 
any type of evidence admissible under the procedural law of the Member States in similar 
proceedings is in principle admissible’.41 As for unlawful evidence, the EU Courts can 
‘draw inspiration from the law of the Member States. However, that does not mean that 
it is bound to apply the law of the Member State with the strictest rules on the evaluation 
of evidence, particularly because both national legal systems and EU law are deemed to 
incorporate the safeguards enshrined in the ECHR’.42  
However, reviewing the lawfulness of contested evidence does not relieve the 
institutions of their obligation to respect the fundamental rights of the applicants. It is 
clear from settled case law that respect for fundamental rights is a condition for the 
lawfulness of EU acts and that measures that are incompatible with respect for 
fundamental rights are not acceptable in the European Union.43 It is at this level where 
the CFR/ECHR dimension comes into play. Later on,44 we will further elaborate on this 
and demonstrate to what extent unlawfully obtained evidence can or cannot be used in 
punitive proceedings. In other words, the fruits of the poisonous tree do not apply as such.  
The CFR/ECHR dimension also applies in national cases where EU law applies.45 
A good illustration of this is to be found in WebMindLicenses,46 in which confidential 
evidence had been obtained after an unduly authorised, and thus illegal, criminal tapping 
of telephone conversations and search and seizure of e-mails had been used in 
administrative punitive VAT proceedings that are governed by Article 325 TFEU.  
Considering the lack of legislative standards in the EU for the gathering of 
evidence, the use of evidence and the exclusion of evidence, the question arises to what 
extent we can derive common standards from the ECtHR and the EU courts’ case law and 
whether these praetorian standards can be used as input for future legislative 
harmonisation.   
																																								 																				
41 Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV v European Commission, EU:T:2016:455, para 43, with reference to the 
judgment of 23 March 2000, in the Joined Cases C-310/98 Met-Trans and Sagpol and C-406/98 Sagpol SC 
Transport, EU:C:2000:154, para 29. 
42 Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV v European Commission, para 78.  
43 ibid, paras 45–46.  
44 See section 5. 
45 Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2012:340. 
46 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám 
Főigazgatóság, EU:C:2015:832. See further the analysis in section 5.2.  
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5. HUMAN RIGHTS CASE LAW ON EVIDENCE AND ITS EXCLUSION IN PUNITIVE 
PROCEEDINGS: COMMON STANDARDS? 
 
5.1 ECtHR and its general approach 
Evidence or proof is not mentioned as a topic in the ECHR, not even under the concept 
of ‘fairness’ under Article 6 ECHR. The point of departure is that the admissibility of 
evidence in criminal matters47 (including the exclusion of unlawful evidence) is a matter 
that is dealt with by domestic jurisdiction.48 The ECtHR neither deals with evidential 
errors of fact nor errors of law.49 So it is not so astonishing that leading handbooks on the 
ECtHR and the ECtHR ‘Guide on Article 6 ECHR/Right to a fair trial/criminal limb’50 
do not contain specific rubrics on evidence or the exclusion of evidence.  
Evidentiary issues do however play an essential role in assessing the fairness of 
proceedings under Article 6 ECHR. For assessing the fairness of the proceedings the 
essential feature is that all evidence must be presented at a public hearing that allows for 
an adversarial procedure in which the submitted evidence can be challenged by the 
parties.51 As the ECtHR assesses the fairness of the proceedings as a whole, meaning 
from the opening of the judicial investigation until the final sentencing, this adversarial 
character can be materialised at different stages in these proceedings. In other words, it is 
perfectly compatible with the ECHR to have an adversarial hearing on evidentiary issues 
in the pre-trial setting and a written presentation thereof at the trial setting. Indirect 
evidence and hearsay evidence at trial are therefore not by definition a violation of the 
fair trial concept.52 By this approach the ECtHR has been able to develop an osmosis 
between the common law procedure (focusing on an oral defence by the parties at the trial 
setting) and the civil law procedure (focusing on truth finding by the judicial authorities). 
The ECHR and the ECtHR case law do not contain specific rules on unlawfully 
obtained evidence either, as the ECHR does not prescribe legal means for the gathering 
of evidence. The way in which criminal evidence is gathered is also the exclusive domain 
of domestic jurisdictions. This means that the use of unlawfully obtained evidence is not 
a violation of the ECHR as such. As regards the question of whether, in a criminal context, 
evidence that has been obtained unlawfully deprives the accused of a fair trial and 
infringes Article 6 of the ECHR, the ECtHR has held: 
While the [ECHR] guarantees, under Article 6, the right to a fair trial, it does not lay down 
any rules on the admissibility of evidence as such, which is therefore primarily a matter 
																																								 																				
47 Defined in an autonomous way by the ECtHR, meaning including all punitive proceedings. See Engel 
and Others v The Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 June 
1976). 
48 Van Mechelen and Others v the Netherlands Apps nos 21363/93, 21364/93, 21427/93 and 22056/93 
(ECtHR, 23 April 1997), para 50, and Hümmer v Germany App no 29881/07 (ECtHR, 19 July 2012).  
49 See, for example, Bykov v Russia App no 4378/02 (ECtHR, 10 March 2009), para 88, and Gäfgen v 
Germany App	no	22978/05 (ECtHR, 1 June 2010), para 162. 
50 ‘Guide on Article 6 ECHR/Right to a fair trial/criminal limb’ (2018) 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Guide_Art_6_criminal_ENG.pdf> accessed 21 April 2019. 
51 See, for example, Kostovski v The Netherlands App no 11454/85 (ECtHR, 20 November 1989). 
52 See, for example, Bricmont v Belgium App no 10857/84 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989).  
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for national law. The Court therefore cannot exclude that evidence gathered in breach of 
national law may be admissible … The Court also recalls that it has already had occasion 
to find that the use of an illegal recording, moreover as the only item of evidence, does 
not, in itself, conflict with the principles of fairness laid down in Article 6[(1) of the 
ECHR], even where that evidence was obtained in breach of the requirements of the 
[ECHR], particularly those set out in Article 8 …53  
Even if the way in which evidence has been obtained constitutes a breach of privacy or 
the protection of the home under Article 8 ECHR, due to, for instance, the lack of a clear 
and foreseeable legal basis or to disproportionality with the protected aim in a democratic 
society, this does not automatically mean that this unlawful evidence has to be excluded 
from the criminal proceedings.54 Neither does the ECHR prescribe any sanctions for the 
use of unlawful evidence, such as, for instance, exclusion (the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine), the inadmissibility of the prosecution or the mitigation of the criminal 
sanctioning.  
Nevertheless, evidence obtained in breach of some human rights have to be 
excluded on that ground. Typical examples are evidence obtained by means of torture or 
inhuman treatment. This evidence has to be excluded to protect the integrity of the trial 
process and, ultimately, the rule of law itself.55 In certain cases, however, the Court will 
only impose an exclusion if the evidence obtained in breach of Article 3 ECHR had an 
impact on the defendant’s conviction or sentence.56 Besides evidence gathered by way of 
torture and inhuman treatment (absolute human rights), there are other violations of 
relative human rights that are so serious that the ECtHR considers that they lead to a 
flagrant denial of justice, which means leading to a trial which is manifestly contrary to 
the provisions of Article 6 ECHR or the principles embodied therein.57 Which forms of 
unfairness can amount to a flagrant denial of justice? Typical examples are evidence 
obtained by entrapment and incitement and in which there is no indication that the offence 
would have been committed without the intervention of law enforcement authorities,58 
evidence based on confessions that have been made without the assistance of a lawyer 
and which are used as key evidence without further legal assistance being given to the 
accused,59 serious violations of the right to remain silent60 or of the right to cross-
																																								 																				
53 Popescu v Romania Apps nos 49234/99 and 71525/01 (ECtHR, 26 April 2007), para 106. 
54 See, for example, Khan v the United Kingdom App no 35394/97 (ECtHR, 12 May 2000).  
55 Gäfgen v Germany (n 49), paras 98–99; Othman (Abu Qatada) v the United Kingdom App no 8139/09 
(ECtHR, 17 January 2012); El Haski v Belgium	App no 649/08 (ECtHR, 25 September 2012); Al Nashiri v 
Poland App no 28761/11 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014), paras 565–569; Husayn (Abu Zubaydah) v Poland App 
no 7511/13 (ECtHR, 24 July 2014), paras 555–561.  
56 Khan v the United Kingdom (n 54), paras 35 and 37. See also Gäfgen v Germany (n 49), para 104; in this 
case the evidence in dispute had not been necessary for determining the sentence for the accused, therefore 
his trial as a whole was considered to have been fair. 
57 Sejdovic v Italy App no 56581/00 (ECtHR, 1 March 2006), para 84; Stoichkov v Bulgaria App no 9808/02 
(ECtHR, 24 March 2005), para 56; Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain App no 12747/87 (ECtHR, 26 
June 1992), para 110. 
58 Teixeira de Castro v Portugal App no	25829/94 (ECtHR, 9 June 1998), paras 38–39. 
59 Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 27 November 2008). 
60 Allan v the United Kingdom App no 48539/99 (ECtHR, 5 November 2002). 
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examination.61 In these cases the violation leads automatically, just as in the fruit of the 
poisonous tree doctrine, to a violation of Article 6 and therefore the exclusion of the 
evidence. The consequences of the exclusion of evidence in punitive proceedings depend 
on the availability of other forms of key evidence.  
Besides these exceptional cases, there is no strict doctrine of the fruit of the 
poisonous tree embodied in Article 6 ECHR.62 Nevertheless, the ECtHR underlines that 
the concept of ‘fair proceedings as a whole’ may entail specific requirements with respect 
to evidence. However, if we apply this to, for instance, the defence right to the cross-
examination of witnesses,63 as provided for in Article 6(3)(d) ECHR, it is not easy to 
identify general rules or principles in the case law of the ECtHR on the admissibility of 
witness evidence without any cross-examination, as the Court does not examine Article 
6(3)(d) ECHR separately but jointly with the right to a fair procedure (Article 6(1) 
ECHR). The assessment of the fairness of the proceedings will depend a great deal on the 
concrete facts of the case,64 especially the restriction of rights under Article 6 ECHR, the 
counterbalancing factors to compensate the restriction, the way in which the evidence has 
been obtained (the reliability of the evidence), the way in which the evidence is used (for 
instance, as the sole and decisive evidence or not) and the possibilities for the defence to 
assess the relationship between the reliability and legality of the evidence. In Schenk v 
Switzerland the ECtHR stated that:  
consideration should be given as to whether the use of an unlawfully obtained recording 
as evidence deprived the applicant of a fair trial and whether the rights of the defence 
were respected, particularly by determining whether the applicant was able to challenge 
the authenticity and use of that recording. It also considered the question whether the 
recording at issue was the only item of evidence relied on in support of the conviction.65 
5.2 EU Courts and the admissibility of evidence 
Unless EU law contains specific provisions on the law of evidence – as in competition 
Regulation 1/200366 – it falls under the general rule of national procedural autonomy. 
Contrary to the ECtHR, the EU Courts do not have a general approach to standards of 
evidence, the admissibility of evidence or its exclusion. This does however not mean that 
Member States have full freedom when applying EU law. Under the Rewe requirements67 
Member States must provide for equivalent and effective protection. So Member States 
																																								 																				
61 Vidgen v the Netherlands App no 29353/06 (ECtHR, 10 July 2012). 
62 Maria CD Embregts, ‘Uitsluitsel over Bewijsuitsluiting. Een Onderzoek naar de Toelaatbaarheid van 
Onrechtmatig Verkregen Bewijs in het Strafrecht, het Civiele Recht en het Bestuursrecht’ (2003) PhD 
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63 Lorena Bachmaier Winter, ‘Transnational Criminal Proceedings, Witness Evidence and Confrontation: 
Lessons from the ECtHR’s Case Law’ (2013) 9 Utrecht Law Review 127.  
64 A good illustration of this assessment exercise can be found in Al-Khawaja and Tahery v the United 
Kingdom Apps nos 26766/05 and 22228/06 (ECtHR, 15 December 2011).  
65 Schenk v Switzerland App no	10862/84 (ECtHR, 12 July 1988), para 48. 
66 Art 12 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1.  
67 Case 33/76 Rewe-Zentralfinanz eG and Rewe-Zentral AG v Landwirtschaftskammer für das Saarland, 
EU:C:1976:188. 
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must have remedies available to be able to give effect to EU law just as effect is given to 
national law and must ensure that these remedies for breaches of EU law can be obtained 
at national level without undue burden.  
However, through Article 52(3) CFR the EU authorities and the EU Courts do 
have to apply the minimum standards of the ECHR when evidentiary issues are at stake 
in cases where EU law does apply. Secondly, where EU authorities have full jurisdiction 
to enforce and adjudicate, including the imposition of punitive sanctions, other EU 
general principles, such as the right to good governance, also come into play. Finally, the 
Court of Justice has interpreted Article 53 CFR as meaning that the application of national 
standards of protection of fundamental rights must not compromise the level of protection 
provided for by the Charter or the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law.68 Below I 
have selected a couple of emblematic cases to show how the EU Courts deal with 
evidentiary issues.  
 
Case T-54/14, Goldfish BV v European Commission 
In this case the company Goldfish contested a decision by DG COMP/European 
Commission69 stating that companies that were active in the North Sea grey shrimp 
sector had participated in various agreements and concerted practices and had exchanged 
sensitive information, resulting in an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. The decision 
was based on a variety of sources of evidence, which, however, included a number of 
audio recordings of telephone conversations and related handwritten notes of telephone 
conversations made by a private person (in this case one of the applicant’s competitors) 
in which two competitors had exchanged sensitive commercial information, including on 
price setting. The applicant argued that the notes accompanying the secret recordings of 
the telephone conversations on which the Commission relied in the contested decision 
were extremely unreliable, with the result that their use as evidence in that decision also 
infringed Article 101 TFEU and Article 2 of Regulation 1/2003. The General Court 
therefore had to assess the lawfulness of using secret recordings of telephone 
conversations and related notes as evidence of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU.  
The European Commission recalled that those recordings had been made in the 
Netherlands where they did not constitute a criminal offence; that even if private parties 
had obtained such evidence unlawfully, the Commission would not be prevented from 
using it in view of the case law of the EU Courts and the ECtHR; that neither the 
Commission nor the national authorities were responsible for the recordings; and that the 
undertaking where they were found had no interest in providing such incriminating 
evidence to the Commission. In contrast the applicant claimed that, first, secretly 
recording telephone conversations was an offence in several Member States and, 
consequently, amounted to unlawful proof of an infringement of Article 101 TFEU; 
secondly, the use of secret recordings of telephone conversations as evidence could not 
																																								 																				
68 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, EU:C:2013:107, para 60. 
69 For a general overview of evidentiary issues in EU competition law, see Fernando Castillo de la Torre 
and Eric Gippini Fournier, Evidence, Proof and Judicial Review in the EU Competition Law (Edward Elgar 
2017).  
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be justified under the case law of the ECtHR; thirdly, such use could not be justified under 
the Court’s case law either; and fourthly, Dutch law does not permit the use of secret 
recordings of telephone conversations in the context of competition law.  
The General Court commenced its reasoning by recalling a couple of principles. 
First, lawfully obtained evidence cannot be contested before the Court and the only 
relevant criterion for the purpose of assessing the probative value of evidence lawfully 
obtained relates to its credibility.70 Secondly, given that there is no legislation at the EU 
level governing the concept of proof, any type of evidence that is admissible under the 
procedural law of the Member States in similar proceedings is in principle admissible.71 
However, there might be reasons to exclude some evidence from the file, for instance if 
there are serious doubts about the credibility of the piece of evidence, the nature of the 
evidence, or the way in which it has been obtained. This had occurred for instance in its 
judgment of 17 December 1981, Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling KG and Others v 
Council and Commission.72 The Court nevertheless underlined that such an exclusion is 
not automatic and the EU Courts have, on occasion, agreed to consider documents which 
had not been shown to have been obtained by proper means. The Court here referred to 
its judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission.73 The non-exclusion of 
evidence in this case was however in favour of the applicants and the General Court 
decided that the effective judicial protection/remedy for the applicants and their defence 
rights prevailed above the possible unlawfulness of the documents, even if they violate 
the human rights of certain persons. Thirdly, the General Court underlined in Goldfish 
that:  
45      It should also be noted that reviewing the lawfulness of contested evidence does 
not relieve the institutions of their obligation to respect the fundamental rights of the 
applicants.  
46      It is clear from settled case-law that respect for fundamental rights is a condition of 
the lawfulness of EU acts and that measures incompatible with respect for fundamental 
rights are not acceptable in the European Union.74  
The General Court clearly stated in paras 47–48 that EU law cannot, as a consequence, 
accept evidence obtained in complete disregard of the procedure laid down for gathering 
it and designed to protect the fundamental rights of interested persons. The use of that 
procedure must therefore be regarded as an essential procedural requirement within the 
meaning of the legality review under Article 263(2) TFEU and the CFR. Through Article 
																																								 																				
70 Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV v European Commission, para 42, with reference to Joint Cases C-239/11 P, 
C-489/11 P and C-498/11 P Siemens v Commission, EU:C:2013:866, para 128.  
71 Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV v European Commission, para 43, with reference to Case C-310/98 Met-Trans 
and Sagpol, EU:C:1999:599, and Case C-406/98 Sagpol SC Transport, EU:C:2000:154, para 29. 
72 Joined cases 197 to 200, 243, 245 and 247/80 Ludwigshafener Walzmühle Erling and Others v Council 
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73 Case T-48/05 Franchet and Byk v Commission, EU:T:2008:257, para 78. For a further analysis, see 
section 6. 
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52(3) CFR the General Court included the relevant standards and reasoning under the 
right to respect for private and family life (Article 8 ECHR) and an effective remedy 
before an independent and impartial tribunal (Article 6 ECHR). The Court also recalled 
that the use of an illegal recording, moreover as the only item of evidence, did not in itself 
conflict with the principle of fairness.75 Whether the use of unlawfully obtained evidence 
does deprive the applicant of a fair trial and the related defence rights depends on the 
ability of the defence to challenge the authenticity and use of the evidence and whether 
the evidence was the only and decisive item of evidence in support of liability.76 
The evidence had been lawfully obtained by the Commission during an inspection, 
the legality of which was not at stake. This means that such evidence is, in principle, 
admissible in an investigation into a breach of competition law. However, the question 
which arose in the case in question was whether the evidence that had been lawfully 
collected by the Commission could be used by it even though it was originally obtained 
by a third party, possibly in an unlawful manner, for example in breach of the right to 
respect for the private life of the person who was the subject of the disputed recordings. 
In this case the applicant had had ample opportunity to check the source and content of 
the evidence, what is more, this evidence was not the sole piece of evidence. The Court 
was also not impressed by the references to national law and it underlined the fact that 
the Commission’s assessment of the evidence in competition disputes is governed by EU 
law.77 The EU judicature can draw inspiration from the law of the Member States, 
however, this does not mean that it is bound to apply the law of the Member State with 
the strictest rules on the evaluation of evidence, particularly because both national legal 
systems and EU law are deemed to incorporate the safeguards enshrined in the ECHR. 
Otherwise, the use of rules or legal concepts in national law and deriving from the 
legislation of a Member State would adversely affect the unity of EU law.78 The 
Commission had not committed any illegality by using the disputed telephone recordings 
to establish an infringement of Article 101 TFEU. As we can see from the reasoning the 
General Court was using the Schenk standards from the ECtHR to assess the fairness of 
the EU proceedings in these punitive competition proceedings.  
 
Case C-419/14, WebMindLicenses Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és 
Vám Főigazgatóság 
In this case the question was whether, in the case of parallel proceedings, the use of 
evidence obtained by judicial authorities through the tapping of telecommunications and 
the seizure of emails by tax authorities was consistent with fundamental rights, in 
particular Article 8(2) ECHR, Articles 7, 8, 41, 47, 48, 51(1), and 52(2) of the Charter, 
the rights of the defence, and the right to good administration. In this case EU law did 
apply, as it concerned a VAT debt procedure.  
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The AG followed the ECtHR’s reasoning under Article 8 ECHR (provided by 
law/legitimate aim/necessary in a democratic society).79 The tapping of 
telecommunications had been authorised by an examining magistrate and was thus 
provided for by law. However, the seizure of the emails lacked the necessary prior 
authorisation. But WebMindLicences, although it was not aware of the criminal evidence 
and the transfer, had had the opportunity to be heard by the Hungarian tax authorities in 
relation to the evidence in question before their decision and had also had the opportunity 
to appeal against it. The AG only discussed this reasoning but referred to the national 
courts for its application to this case.  
For the CJEU the starting point was indeed the lawfulness under national law. 
Secondly, the fundamental rights guaranteed in the legal order of the European Union are 
applicable in all situations governed by EU law.80 Fundamental rights can only be limited 
if this is provided for by law and if, when observing the principle of proportionality, this 
is necessary and genuinely meets the objectives of the general interest recognised by the 
EU. As for examining the necessity of the investigative measures, in the absence of prior 
judicial authorisation a strict legal framework for, and strict limits on, such seizure are 
required if individuals are to be protected from the authorities arbitrarily interfering with 
the rights guaranteed under Article 7 CFR.81 Thus, such a seizure can only be compatible 
with Article 7 CFR if domestic legislation and practice afford adequate and effective 
safeguards against any abuse and arbitrariness.82 The CJEU stated in para 78 that it is 
incumbent upon the referring court to examine whether the absence of a prior judicial 
warrant was, to a certain extent, counterbalanced by the person concerned by the seizure 
having the availability of an ex post factum judicial review relating to both the legality 
and necessity of the seizure, a review which must be effective in the particular 
circumstances of the case in question.83 
It must also be examined whether that use of the evidence satisfies the 
requirements set out in Article 52(1) of the Charter. Besides legality, legitimate aim, and 
proportionality, the CJEU strongly insisted on the right to an effective judicial remedy, 
guaranteed by Article 47 of the Charter.  In order for the judicial review to be effective, 
the court reviewing the legality of a decision implementing EU law must be able to verify 
whether the evidence on which that decision is founded has been obtained and used in 
breach of the rights guaranteed by EU law and especially by the Charter. The CJEU came 
to the conclusion that the transfer of the evidence was as such not precluded under EU 
law, provided that obtaining that evidence in the context of the criminal procedure and its 
use in the context of the administrative procedure do not infringe the rights guaranteed 
by EU law. The CJEU thus concluded in para 91 that: 
																																								 																				
79 Case C‑ 419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám 
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by virtue of Articles 7, 47 and 52(1) of the Charter it is incumbent upon the national court 
which reviews the legality of the decision founded on such evidence adjusting VAT to verify, 
first, whether the interception of telecommunications and seizure of emails were means of 
investigation provided for by law and were necessary in the context of the criminal procedure 
and, secondly, whether the use by the tax authorities of the evidence obtained by those means 
was also authorised by law and necessary. It is incumbent upon that court, furthermore, to 
verify whether, in accordance with the general principle of observance of the rights of the 
defence, the taxable person had the opportunity, in the context of the administrative 
procedure, of gaining access to that evidence and of being heard concerning it. If the national 
court finds that the taxable person did not have that opportunity or that that evidence was 
obtained in the context of the criminal procedure, or used in the context of the administrative 
procedure, in breach of Article 7 of the Charter, it must disregard that evidence and annul 
that decision if, as a result, the latter has no basis. That evidence must also be disregarded if 
the national court is not empowered to check that it was obtained in the context of the criminal 
procedure in accordance with EU law or cannot at least satisfy itself, on the basis of a review 
already carried out by a criminal court in an inter partes procedure, that it was obtained in 
accordance with EU law. (emphasis added)  
This conclusion contains very clear instructions on the exclusion of evidence if the 
necessary standards of the rights of defence and an effective judicial remedy are not 
complied with. 
 
Case C-469/15 P, FSL Holdings and Others v European Commission 
Also in this case evidence – personal notes – gathered by the Italian finance police during 
a search as part of national criminal investigations into tax offences and their transfer to 
and use by the European Commission in a competition procedure against a southern 
European banana cartel were at stake. The starting point for the AG was that the existence 
of an antitrust offence can be demonstrated by any appropriate evidence.84 There is no 
general principle in EU law to the effect that competition authorities may only rely on 
certain forms of evidence or only take into account evidence from certain sources. The 
AG further underlined in para 34 that:  
Reliance on particular items of evidence to demonstrate infringements of Article 101 
TFEU or 102 TFEU is only exceptionally precluded by prohibitions on the use of 
evidence. Such prohibitions may be based on the fact that evidence was obtained in breach 
of essential procedural requirements intended to protect the individuals concerned or on 
the fact that evidence is to be used for an unlawful purpose. 
Although the lawfulness of the gathering and transfer of evidence is governed by national 
law, the Commission may not knowingly rely on evidence which was quite clearly 
obtained in breach of essential procedural requirements. Fundamental principles of EU 
law such as, in particular, the right to good administration (Article 41(1) CFR) and the 
right to a fair trial (Article 47(1) CFR) require that the EU institutions undertake at least 
a summary examination in the light of all the circumstances of the particular case that are 
																																								 																				
84 Case C-469/15 P, FSL Holdings and Others v European Commission, Opinion of AG Kokott. 
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known to them.85 In this case the gathering of the evidence was lawful under Italian law 
and its transfer was duly authorised by the competent Italian prosecutor’s office. As for 
the use of the evidence for an unlawful purpose, the AG rejected this reasoning as there 
is no specific legal basis for this purpose limitation – meaning that only evidence obtained 
in competition proceedings could be used – in competition law. The CJEU completely 
followed the reasoning and conclusion of the AG.  
 
Interim conclusion 
From this analysis of the case law of the ECtHR and the EU Courts it is very obvious that 
they have not developed common standards for the gathering of evidence (the type of 
evidence), the admissibility of the evidence, or the exclusion or nullity of evidence. 
Nevertheless, certain forms of evidence gathering do infringe upon human rights and the 
essence of justice to such a serious extent that they automatically lead to the exclusion of 
evidence or the invalidity of the act. In other cases, both the unlawfulness and the 
unfairness of the gathering and use of evidence (the lack of rights of defence or effective 
judicial remedies) can lead to a situation in which the use of that evidence infringes upon 
the ‘fairness of the proceedings as a whole’. This means that in certain situations unlawful 
evidence can be admissible evidence in punitive proceedings, even if that evidence is 
inculpatory for the suspect or the person concerned.  
Looking back at the rationale of the concept of the admissibility of evidence, we 
can state that the ECtHR and the EU Courts mostly use a systemic integrity model with a 
balancing approach (the judicial integrity approach). This means that they only resort to 
the exclusion of evidence for serious violations of important rights and only in cases 
where the dismissal of the charges will not significantly undermine the justice interest in 
convicting those who have committed serious crimes. Exceptions are however based on 
a nullity approach for evidence based on violations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR and some 
serious unlawful acts under EU law.  
 
6. OLAF PROCEEDINGS AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE AS WELL AS THE 
EXCLUSION AND NULLITY OF EVIDENCE 
At this stage, we can apply the legal framework elaborated under sections 3–5 to the 
OLAF setting of evidence gathering and the use of evidence and then analyse what it 
means from the perspective of the applicable law, the applicable legal safeguards and the 
purpose limitation on the use of that evidence in the light of the applicable fundamental 
rights standards. 
In doing this we must by definition take into account the particular setting of 
OLAF investigations and the use of OLAF evidence. Our analysis of the information 
exchange and the use of investigative powers by OLAF has shown OLAF’s dependence 
on the national legal framework.86 This means that the applicable law and the applicable 
procedural safeguards are to a large extent determined by domestic law. This does not 
																																								 																				
85 ibid, para 37.  
86 See Simonato, Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 2); Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 3).  
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mean that the EU legal framework has no legal impact. It certainly does have an impact 
when it comes to the procedural safeguards contained in Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013 
that applies to all OLAF investigations.87  
When it comes to the use of evidence obtained by OLAF, the OLAF setting is of 
a particular nature since the admissibility of OLAF evidence in punitive proceedings will 
always be assessed by the national authorities/courts. This is of course very different from 
proceedings by ECB, ESMA or DG COMP as the results of their investigations will 
generally be used in EU punitive proceedings, meaning that these results will be used as 
evidence at the EU level and will be subject to the remedies/control of the EU Courts. 
Even when, in the case of serious infringements that can lead to criminal liability, ECB, 
ESMA or DG COMP may have the obligation to notify the competent national judicial 
authorities, the EU regulations do not contain any specific reference to the status of 
ECB/ESMA or DG COMP evidence as to its admissibility or evidentiary value in national 
punitive proceedings. This is very different in the OLAF setting as OLAF Regulation 
883/2013 governs the link between OLAF investigations and any (judicial) follow-up 
action at the national level. The purpose relation is thus explicitly regulated by EU law. 
The OLAF report is a document that contains statements and recommendations based on 
evidence gathered by OLAF investigations. The status of the OLAF report is nevertheless 
somewhat unclear. Thanks to the case law of the CJEU we do know that the transfer of 
the report to the national competent authorities does not change the legal situation of the 
person concerned and cannot for this reason be challenged as such before the CJEU: 
S’agissant, en particulier, des actes de l’OLAF et, plus spécifiquement, d’une décision de 
transmission d’informations, la Commission relève à juste titre que la Cour et le Tribunal 
ont jugé qu’une telle décision ne saurait être considérée comme un acte faisant grief, dès 
lors qu’elle ne modifie pas de façon caractérisée la situation juridique de l’intéressé, les 
autorités judiciaires nationales demeurant libres, conformément à l’article 10, 
paragraphe 2, du règlement n° 1073/1999, d’apprécier dans le cadre de leurs pouvoirs 
propres le contenu et la portée desdites informations et, partant, les suites qu’il convient 
d’y donner (ordonnance du 19 avril 2005, Tillack/Commission, point 23 supra, points 32 
et 34; ordonnance du 15 octobre 2004, Tillack/Commission, point 23 supra, points 43 et 
44, et arrêt Tillack/Commission, point 23 supra, point 70).88 
																																								 																				
87 Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Council 
Regulation (Euratom) No 1074/1999 [2013] OJ L 248/1. 
88 Case T-261/09 P Violetti v Commission, EU:T:2010:215, para 47. The decision is not available in English 
but the above-mentioned excerpt can be translated as follows: ‘As regards, in particular, OLAF acts and, 
more specifically, a decision on the transmission of information, the Commission rightly points out that the 
Court and the Tribunal have held that such a decision cannot be considered to be an act having adverse 
effect, since it does not bring about a distinct change in the applicant’s legal position, the national judicial 
authorities remaining free, in accordance with Article 10 (2) of Regulation No 1073/1999, in the context of 
their own powers, to assess the content and significance of that information and, thus, the action to be taken 
if necessary (order of 19 April 2005, Tillack v Commission, paragraph 23 above, paragraphs 32 and 34, 
order of 15 October 2004, Tillack v Commission, paragraph 23 above, paragraphs 43 and 44, and judgment 
Tillack v Commission, paragraph 23 above, paragraph 70)’ (author’s translation).  
80 J.a.e. vervaeLe 3. LawfuL and fair use of evidence 81
This ruling has not been affected by the new Regulation 883/2013 as recitals 30–31 
clearly establish:  
In cases where the Director-General transmits to the judicial authorities of the Member 
State concerned information obtained by the Office in the course of internal 
investigations, that transmission of information should be without prejudice to subsequent 
classification in law by the national judicial authority as to whether investigative 
proceedings are required. It is for the competent authorities of the Member States or the 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, as the case may be, to decide what action should 
be taken on completed investigations on the basis of the final investigation reports drawn 
up by the Office. 
In the recent order in Case T-289/16,89 the EU General Court clearly reaffirmed its 
position:  
19 … the first subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides first of 
all that, on completion of an investigation by OLAF, a report is to be drawn up, under the 
authority of the Director-General, which gives an account of, among other things, the 
procedural steps followed, the facts established and their preliminary classification in law, 
the estimated financial impact of the facts established and the conclusions of the 
investigation. The second subparagraph of Article 11(1) of Regulation No 883/2013 also 
states that ‘[t]he report shall be accompanied by recommendations of the Director-
General on whether or not action should be taken’, and Article 11(2) of that regulation 
states that reports constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings 
of the Member State in which their use proves necessary, in the same way and under the 
same conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors, 
that they are subject to the same evaluation rules as those applicable to such 
administrative reports, and that they have the same evidentiary value as such reports. 
Article 11(3) of the regulation then provides that reports and recommendations drawn up 
following an external investigation are to be sent to the competent authorities of the 
Member States concerned and, if necessary, to the competent Commission services. 
Finally, Article 11(6) of Regulation No 883/2013 provides that, at OLAF’s request, the 
competent authorities of the Member States concerned must, in due time, send to OLAF 
information on ‘action taken, if any’ on recommendations transmitted as a result of an 
external investigation. 20 It is apparent from the provisions of Article 11(2) of Regulation 
No 883/2013 that OLAF reports merely constitute evidence that may be used in national 
administrative or judicial proceedings, that they are to be evaluated according to the rules 
on evidence in national law, and that they have the evidentiary value provided for in 
national law. They are therefore not measures which, under Regulation No 883/2013, 
adversely affect, as such, the persons referred to in them. 
Nevertheless, EU civil servants, as persons concerned in OLAF investigations, reports 
and follow-up actions do have a specific and better position, as they can challenge several 
OLAF decisions before the EU Courts, including for non-contractual liability. Other 
persons concerned will have to challenge the gathering of OLAF evidence and the use of 
that evidence in their respective national jurisdictions using the – non-harmonised – 
																																								 																				
89 Case T-289/1 Inox Mare Srl v Commission, EU:T:2017:414.  
82 J.a.e. vervaeLe 3. LawfuL and fair use of evidence 83
remedies that are available, which might differ substantially from one Member State to 
another.  
The EU and OLAF are and must be very conscious of the consequences of its 
reports as the evidence contained therein cannot only be admissible evidence but also key 
evidence for punitive enforcement in the Member States. This is the reason why Article 
11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 contains not only instructions on the way in which the 
reports and recommendations should be elaborated upon, but also on the admissibility of 
the evidence and its evidentiary value:  
In drawing up such reports and recommendations, account shall be taken of the national 
law of the Member State concerned. Reports drawn up on that basis shall constitute 
admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings of the Member State in 
which their use proves necessary, in the same way and under the same conditions as 
administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. They shall be 
subject to the same evaluation rules as those applicable to administrative reports drawn 
up by national administrative inspectors and shall have the same evidentiary value as such 
reports. (emphasis added) 
Article 11(2) is based on an assimilation rule between equivalent authorities under the 
EU and national legal orders and the legal consequences of their acts as evidence in the 
domestic setting. This is quite different from Article 37 of the EPPO Regulation that we 
mentioned in section 2: 
1. Evidence presented by the prosecutors of the EPPO or the defendant to a court shall 
not be denied admission on the mere ground that the evidence was gathered in another 
Member State or in accordance with the law of another Member State.  
2. The power of the trial court to freely assess the evidence presented by the defendant or 
the prosecutors of the EPPO shall not be affected by this Regulation. 
The EPPO provision has been shaped in the form of a non-discrimination clause, in the 
sense that the national courts cannot make a distinction between EPPO evidence gathered 
by the European Delegated Prosecutor in their own domestic legal order and EPPO 
evidence gathered by the European Delegated Prosecutor in other jurisdictions. From the 
wording it is unclear whether OLAF evidence, even that which has been gathered at the 
request of EPPO (based on Article 101(3) of the EPPO Regulation), will have the same 
status as evidence gathered by the delegated EPPO prosecutor, as OLAF is not a judicial 
but an administrative authority.  
The outcome of OLAF investigations in the form of the eventual OLAF report, 
with the evidence being included, can qualify as direct, sole and decisive evidence if 
evidence gathered by similar or equivalent national administrative enforcement agencies 
has the same status based on assimilation. It may instead be the case that OLAF evidence 
does not qualify at all as direct evidence and can only amount to preliminary information 
for a judicial investigation, depending on the legal provisions on the transfer of 
administrative evidence into judicial evidence in the domestic legal order. In reality there 
are very substantial differences between the legal orders of the Member States. Some of 
82 J.a.e. vervaeLe 3. LawfuL and fair use of evidence 83
them refuse to recognise that OLAF evidence has any evidentiary value. Some of them 
simply apply the national rules that are applicable to national administrative agencies, 
while a minority have introduced special features for OLAF evidence and also accept that 
OLAF can provide evidence or be heard as a victim in criminal trials. This is very 
different from EPPO evidence which is directly admissible evidence in all cases. 
If OLAF forwards evidence to the national competent authorities, it must assess 
the lawful status of its own investigation and the outcome in the form of potential 
evidence for national procedural follow-up actions. In Article 11(1) of Regulation 
883/2013 it is clearly stated that that report shall give an account of the legal basis for the 
investigation, the procedural steps followed, the facts established and their preliminary 
classification in law, the estimated financial impact of the facts established, the respect 
given to the procedural guarantees in accordance with Article 9 and the conclusions of 
the investigation. This therefore means that OLAF has to assess the legality, quality and 
reliability of its investigations and the related evidence, also in the light of the applicable 
safeguards and fundamental rights when this evidence is included in the report, and when 
elaborating recommendations for (judicial) follow-up action. Depending upon the type of 
investigation (autonomous, mixed, mandated, or based on the model of mutual legal 
assistance) the assessment will contain a different mix of European and national 
applicable law. This also means that the potential causes of and the reasons for the 
unlawful acts and the related nullity/exclusion of evidence can have their background at 
the EU level, the national level or a combination thereof. OLAF’s assessment based on 
Article 11(1) can also be considered as a first filter (‘purge des nullités’), before 
forwarding the report to the national competent authorities. The use of the reports as 
evidence in punitive proceedings by the national authorities will and must lead to a second 
filter when these authorities have to assess the admissibility of OLAF evidence in the 
light of national law and in the light of mandatory EU law (based on the primacy of the 
OLAF Regulation).  
We have selected a couple of OLAF-related cases to show how the EU Courts and 
the national courts generally deal with OLAF evidence and also to demonstrate the 
complexity of the issues in question. We will start with a couple of internal investigations 
by OLAF and then move on to external investigations in France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands. 
 
Judgment of 8 July 2008, Franchet and Byk v Commission, T-48/05 
The applicants, Mr Yves Franchet and Mr Daniel Byk, were, respectively, the former 
Director-General of and the former Director of Eurostat (the Statistical Office of the 
European Communities). A number of Eurostat internal audits revealed possible 
irregularities in its financial management. Consequently, OLAF initiated a number of 
investigations. OLAF forwarded files relating to the investigation to the Luxembourg and 
French judicial authorities. In their claim for compensation under non-contractual 
liability, the applicants made use of certain documents by OLAF’s Supervisory 
Committee because they contained alleged errors in the OLAF investigation. The 
Commission considered that these documents were internal documents that were not 
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intended to be made public and that had been obtained by the applicants by unlawful 
means. The fact that the applicants produced an affidavit stating that they had not 
removed, or stolen, or intercepted any internal document produced by the secretariat of 
OLAF’s Supervisory Committee, which the Commission had never accused them of 
doing, was not sufficient to demonstrate that they had obtained the documents lawfully. 
The applicants submitted that if, in a file such as that in the present case, in which 
compensation for damage was sought, it would not be possible to comment on or to have 
access to documents which actually prove the errors committed by OLAF and by the 
Commission, which are essential elements for the purpose of establishing liability, it is 
clear that there would be a serious and actual breach of respect for the rights of the defence 
and effective judicial protection.  
It is interesting that the General Court related the unlawfulness to breaches of 
fundamental rights and the consequences for admissibility:  
74      It must be observed that neither the fact that the documents in question may be 
confidential nor the fact that they may have been obtained unlawfully precludes their 
remaining in the file. 
75      There is no provision that expressly prohibits evidence obtained unlawfully, for 
example in breach of fundamental rights, from being taken into account. 
In para 79 the General Court considered that, on balancing the interests to be protected, 
it might be necessary to consider whether particular circumstances, such as the decisive 
nature of the production of the document for the purposes of reviewing the lawfulness of 
the procedure leading to the adoption of the contested measure90 or of establishing the 
existence of a misuse of powers,91 constituted grounds for not withdrawing a document. 
On that basis the Court decided that those documents were necessary for the purpose of 
appraising OLAF’s conduct in the investigations relating to Eurostat and therefore had to 
remain in the file. In other words, the effective judicial protection of and the remedy for 
the applicants and their defence rights prevailed even if they violated the human rights of 
certain other persons.  
The same approach was taken by the EU General Court in case T-562/12.92 In this 
case a version of the opinion of the OLAF Supervisory Committee relating to the case 
had been leaked and published. The Commission wanted this document to be removed 
from the case file, since it had been obtained by unlawful means. The EU Court reiterated 
in para 47 that: 
neither the fact that the documents in question may be confidential nor the fact that they 
may have been obtained unlawfully precludes their remaining in the case-file. First, there 
is no provision that expressly prohibits evidence obtained unlawfully from being taken 
into account (judgments of 8 July 2008 in Franchet and Byk v Commission, T-48/05, 
ECR, EU:T:2008:257, paragraphs 74 and 75, and 24 March 2011 in Dover v Parliament, 
T-149/09, EU:T:2011:119, paragraph 61). Second, the Court of Justice has not ruled out 
																																								 																				
90 With reference to Case T-192/99 Dunnett and Others v EIB, EU:T:2001:72, paras 33–34.  
91 With reference to Case T-280/94 Lopes v Court of Justice, EU:T:1996:28, para 59. 
92 Case C‑ 394/15 P John Dalli v Commission, EU:C:2016:262. 
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the possibility that even internal documents may, in certain cases, lawfully be placed on 
the case-file (orders of 19 March 1985 in Tordeur and Others, 232/84, paragraph 8, and 
15 October 1986 in LAISA v Council, 31/86, paragraph 5). 
The EU Court did not exclude the documents from the file as they had not been obtained 
illegally by the applicant and were material to his defence.  
We did not find cases in which the EU courts have allowed unlawful OLAF 
evidence to be submitted as inculpatory evidence (à charge), but from the general 
reasoning of the EU Courts under section 5.2 supra it cannot be excluded that this could 
occur, as long as the fairness of the proceedings as a whole is guaranteed. 
 
Tendering fraud and related active and passive corruption in France and Belgium 
The French Supreme Court93 has had to deal with the nullity of an OLAF final report (and 
annexes) that had been determined by the Indictment Chamber at the Court of Appeal in 
Versailles.94 Based upon information from OLAF, the French judicial authorities started 
a judicial investigation, headed by an investigating magistrate, into an EU fraud case 
(tendering fraud and active and passive corruption). The investigating magistrate 
requested OLAF inspectors to join the judicial investigations as experts. The judicial 
investigations included searches and seizures at the premises of several suspects in 
France. OLAF inspectors were also requested by the French judicial authorities to assist 
in the analysis of the seized digital data. The legal basis for the participation of the OLAF 
inspectors was Article 77-1-1 of the French Penal Code of Procedure:  
Le procureur de la République ou, sur autorisation de celui-ci, l’officier de police 
judiciaire, peut, par tout moyen, requérir de toute personne, de tout établissement ou 
organisme privé ou public ou de toute administration publique qui sont susceptibles de 
détenir des informations intéressant l’enquête … de lui remettre ces informations ….95 
Unfortunately this was a legal error and their participation should have been based on 
Article 77-1, as the OLAF inspectors had participated in a judicial investigation: ‘S’il y a 
lieu de procéder à des constatations ou à des examens techniques ou scientifiques, le 
procureur de la République ou, sur autorisation de celui-ci, l’officier de police judiciaire, 
a recours à toutes personnes qualifiées’.96 
This also resulted in a violation of Article 166 of the French Code of Criminal 
Procedure that regulates the status of judicial experts. For that reason the pre-trial 
chamber determined that the report and all the related annexes had to be nullified because 
																																								 																				
93 Court of Cassation, Criminal division, FR:CCASS:2016:CR05486, public hearing (Audience publique) 
of Wednesday 9 November 2016, No de pourvoi: 16-83602. 
94 Dated 3 May 2016, unpublished.  
95 ‘The public prosecutor or, upon authorisation of the latter, the judicial police officer, may, by any means, 
require any person, any institution or private or public body or any public administration that may hold 
information relevant to the investigation … to share this information with him or her …’ (author’s 
translation). 
96 ‘If it is necessary to carry out observations or technical or scientific examinations, the public prosecutor 
or, upon authorisation of the public prosecutor, the judicial police officer, shall resort to all qualified 
persons’ (author’s translation). 
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of a violation of the fairness of the proceedings, as stipulated in Article 6 ECHR, while 
Article 174 of the French Code of Penal Procedure stipulates: ‘Il est interdit de tirer des 
actes et des pièces ou parties d’actes ou de pièces annulés aucun renseignement contre 
les parties, à peine de poursuites disciplinaires pour les avocats et les magistrats’.97 
At the Supreme Court, the European Commission, as a civil party, contended that 
national courts do not have jurisdiction to annul an OLAF report, being a European act, 
and that the jurisdiction to do so is exclusively reserved for the CJEU and that the primacy 
of EU law sets aside the national provisions. The Supreme Court did not follow this 
reasoning at all and concluded that the report and its annexes were the result of annulled 
acts under French criminal procedure and thus also had to be annulled in order to 
guarantee a fair criminal procedure. The French Supreme Court had already reached such 
a decision in a judgement in 2015,98 in which it also made a very clear distinction between 
the nullity of the OLAF reports as such – not a matter of criminal jurisdiction – and the 
nullity of the OLAF evidence when used in criminal proceedings: 
Attendu que, pour dire n’y avoir lieu de faire droit à la demande de nullité des rapports 
établis par l’OLAF et des actes subséquents, prise de ce que les investigations réalisées 
par l’Office avaient porté atteinte au droit à un procès équitable, au principe de loyauté 
des preuves et aux droits de la défense, l’arrêt relève que ces pièces issues d’une enquête 
de nature administrative ne sont pas susceptibles d’annulation par une juridiction pénale 
française au titre des articles 170 et 171 du code de procédure pénale ; que les juges 
ajoutent qu’il résulte de l’examen des procès-verbaux dressés par les enquêteurs de 
l’OLAF que ceux-ci se sont entourés de garanties procédurales et ont procédé à des 
notifications de droits, qui ne sont pas contraires aux dispositions conventionnelles 
invoquées, sont conformes aux textes communautaires régissant cet organisme et 
compatibles avec les dispositions de procédure pénale de droit interne ; qu’ils précisent 
que l’ordinateur portable de M. X ..., qui fait grief de ce que celui-ci a été exploité sans 
son consentement et hors sa présence, a été placé sous scellé fermé à titre conservatoire 
pour les besoins de l’enquête administrative et qu’il incombe à l’instruction préparatoire, 
soumise à la contradiction des parties, d’évaluer la valeur des indices ainsi recueillis ; 
qu’enfin, ils soulignent qu’ils seront amenés à se prononcer, par un arrêt distinct, dans 
le cadre d’un appel formé par M. X ... contre une ordonnance de refus d’acte d’instruction 
complémentaire portant sur l’ordinateur portable, sur un éventuel vice dans le recueil 
des données informatiques;  
Attendu que, si c’est à tort que la cour d’appel énonce que les juridictions françaises sont 
incompétentes pour connaître de la régularité des actes d’enquête effectués par l’OLAF, 
organisme administratif indépendant créé par la Commission européenne et habilité à 
procéder à des investigations en matière de lutte contre la fraude aux intérêts financiers 
de l’Union européenne, un tel acte versé dans une procédure pénale suivie en France 
pouvant être annulé, afin de garantir un contrôle juridictionnel effectif, s’il est établi qu’il 
a été accompli en violation des droits fondamentaux, l’arrêt n’encourt néanmoins pas la 
																																								 																				
97 ‘It is forbidden to extract from annulled acts and documents or parts of annulled acts or documents any 
information against the parties, under penalty of disciplinary proceedings for lawyers and magistrates’ 
(author’s translation).  
98 Court of Cassation, Criminal Division, 9 December 2015, no 15-82300.  
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censure dès lors que les juges ont écarté, par des motifs que le moyen ne critique pas, les 
griefs allégués par M. X …99 
It is interesting that the former file that led to the Supreme Court decision in 2016 also 
had a transnational dimension, as elements of this OLAF report were also used in parallel 
judicial procedures against the same suspects in Belgium. However, a specific Belgian 
statute regulates the transnational use of illegal evidence and this explicitly applies to 
Europol, Eurojust and OLAF:100 
CHAPITRE V. – De l’utilisation d’éléments de preuve recueillis à l’étranger. Article 13. 
Ne peuvent être utilisés dans le cadre d’une procédure menée en Belgique, les éléments 
de preuve: 1° recueillis irrégulièrement à l’étranger, lorsque l'irrégularité: - découle, 
selon le droit de l’Etat dans lequel l’élément de preuve a été recueilli, de la violation 
d’une règle de forme prescrite à peine de nullité; - entache la fiabilité de la preuve; 2° 
ou dont l’utilisation viole le droit à un procès équitable.101 
After an adversarial procedure between the Commission (as a civil party) and the suspects 
before the Brussels first instance court,102 the court decided that the French decisions were 
final decisions with a res judicata status on the admissibility of OLAF evidence based on 
																																								 																				
99 ‘Whereas, to find there is no reason to grant the application for the invalidity of the reports drawn up by 
OLAF and the subsequent acts, the fact that the investigations carried out by the Office had infringed the 
right to a fair trial, the principle of fairness of evidence and the rights of the defence, the judgment notes 
that these documents from an investigation of an administrative nature are not subject to annulment by a 
French criminal court under Articles 170 and 171 of the Code of Criminal Procedure; that the judges add 
that it follows from the examination of the minutes (procès-verbaux) drawn up by OLAF investigators that 
they complied with procedural guarantees and proceeded to notifications of rights, which are not contrary 
to the invoked provisions of the Convention, and are in conformity with the Community texts governing 
that body and compatible with the provisions of domestic criminal procedure; that they specify that the 
notebook of Mr X ..., who complains that it was used without his consent and out of his presence, was 
placed under seal as a precaution for the needs of the administrative inquiry and it is incumbent upon the 
preparatory investigation, subject to an adversarial procedure between the parties, to assess the value of the 
pieces of evidence (indices) thus collected; that, finally, they emphasise that they will have to decide, in a 
separate judgment, within the framework of an appeal lodged by Mr X ... against an order refusing a 
complementary act of the instruction (instruction) on the notebook, on a possible error in the collection of 
computer data;	 whereas, if it is wrong that the Court of Appeal states that the French courts are not 
competent to decide on the regularity of investigative acts carried out by OLAF, an independent 
administrative body created by the European Commission and entitled to conduct investigations of fraud 
against the financial interests of the European Union, such an act included in criminal proceedings in France 
may be annulled to ensure effective judicial review, if it is established that it has been carried out in violation 
of fundamental rights and the judgment was nonetheless not wrong since the judges rejected, for reasons 
that the means [of appeal] do not criticise, the complaints made by Mr X ...’ (author’s translation). 
100 Art 13 of the Law on the international police transmission of personal data and information with judicial 
purposes, international legal assistance in criminal matters and amending Art 90ter of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Loi sur la transmission policière internationale de données à caractère personnel et 
d’informations à finalité judiciaire, l’entraide judiciaire internationale en matière pénale et modifiant 
l’article 90ter du Code d'instruction criminelle), 9 December 2004. 
101 ‘CHAPTER V – The use of evidence collected abroad. Art 13. Evidence may not be used in proceedings 
in Belgium if: (1) it was irregularly collected abroad, where the irregularity: - arises, according to the law 
of the State in which the evidence has been gathered, from the violation of a procedural rule on form 
prescribed under penalty of nullity; - taints the reliability of evidence; (2) or its use violates the right to a 
fair trial’ (author’s translation). 
102 Judgment of 5 October 2017, file no 04605, unpublished. 
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nullified acts. Their use in Belgium would undermine the essence of the fairness of the 
proceedings in Belgium which was the reason why the evidence was also inadmissible 
under Belgian law.  
In a second decision on the same date,103 the Court of First Instance had to deal 
with the legality of the analysis of digital data obtained during searches and seizures at 
Belgian premises in the Belgian investigation which involved the same OLAF inspectors 
that were also involved in the analysis of the French digital data. In the opinion of the 
Indictment Chamber at the Brussels Court of Appeal these experts were not involved as 
judicial experts, but did provide technical assistance under OLAF Regulation 1073/1999. 
An extraordinary appeal at the Supreme Court was rejected.104 However, the Court of 
First Instance also determined that this evidence was inadmissible as it was impossible to 
make a distinction between evidence that was directly affected by the annulled acts in 
France and the parallel evidence obtained in Belgium.  
 
Judgment of 3 May 2018, Sigma Orionis v Commission, case T-48/16105 
In 2014 OLAF initiated an investigation into claims of time sheets being manipulated and 
excessively high hourly wages being paid in FP7 projects. The investigation was based 
on Article 3 of Regulation 883/2013, under which a production order was submitted and 
witness statements were taken from former employees. That evidence persuaded OLAF 
that it was necessary to conduct an on-site check under Article 5 of Council Regulation 
2185/96.106 OLAF thereby informed the local public prosecutor and requested all 
necessary assistance from the French authorities, including the adoption of precautionary 
measures under national law in order to safeguard evidence. OLAF’s final report was sent 
to the Commission. OLAF also forwarded the report to the French authorities with the 
recommendation that they initiate criminal proceedings at the national level, based on 
French law, in respect of the conduct found to have occurred, in so far as such conduct 
was covered by French law. The persons concerned were prosecuted for fraud in respect 
of acts to the detriment of the EU.  
However, in 2015 the Indictment Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-
Provence determined that the documents used by the French authorities in the criminal 
proceedings brought against the accused in France were invalid.107 According to the court, 
those documents had been obtained in breach of a number of procedural safeguards 
designed to protect the rights of the defence. One of the main breaches was related to the 
fact that OLAF investigators were not assisted by French judicial police, as these latter 
did not show up. The documents held to be invalid included the final report sent by OLAF 
to the French authorities. In 2017 the Commercial Court rejected the claims entered by 
																																								 																				
103 Judgement of 5 October 2017, file no 0606, unpublished. 
104 Judgment of 14 September 2016, unpublished.  
105 Case T-48/16 Sigma Orionis v Commission, EU:T:2018:245. 
106 Council Regulation (Euratom, EC) No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks 
and inspections carried out by the Commission in order to protect the European Communities’ financial 
interests against fraud and other irregularities [1996] OJ L 292/2. 
107 Indictment Division (Chambre de l’Instruction) of the Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence, which 
delivered its judgment on 17 December 2015. 
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the Commission in the inventory of the applicants’ liabilities on the ground that the 
investigation conducted by OLAF as a result of which the Commission found that the 
applicants should not have received payment for some services had been ‘invalidated’ by 
the judgment of the Indictment Chamber of 17 December 2015. In a procedure before the 
General EU Court the applicants claimed the amounts owed by the Commission in the 
context of the implementation of the grant contracts and non-contractual liability. 
At the General EU Court the applicants maintained that the res judicata effect 
barred the use of those reports in EU proceedings. The EU court did not follow that 
reasoning and stated that irrespective of the findings by the French Indictment Chamber 
in its judgment, OLAF’s report continued to be lawful in the EU legal order in so far as 
it had not been invalidated by the EU judicature. As long as this report and evidence had 
not been invalidated by the EU judicature, this report could be used in administrative 
proceedings under EU law, as those related to breaches of contractual grant provisions 
under FP7.  
It is interesting that in this case the applicants also claimed that the use of this 
report and the evidence therein was a breach of Article 47 CFR in so far as the on-site 
checks and inspections had been carried out by OLAF without its investigators being 
accompanied by national police officers, and without the applicants having been informed 
of their right to resist those operations and without the operations having been authorised 
beforehand by a national court. The EU Court rejected these arguments, as the former two 
were not covered by the EU legislation in question and did not fall under Article 47 CFR, 
and as the latter can be compensated by an effective national remedy.  
The EU court also rejected the reasoning of the applicants that Article 53 CFR 
contains a ‘minimum safeguards’ clause under which OLAF, in its investigations, is 
required to comply with national rules where they afford individuals more extensive 
safeguards than those provided for in EU law, by stating that Article 53 CFR cannot be 
construed as allowing a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in 
compliance with the Charter on the ground that they infringe the fundamental rights 
guaranteed by that State’s Constitution.108  
 
Court of Appeal, Amsterdam, Customs Chamber, Judgment 4 October 2012109 
Due to indications of fraud at the place of origin OLAF carried out an inspection of a 
company in Malaysia which specialised in exporting bicycles. The OLAF report 
contained evidence of the fact that a large proportion of the bicycles imported into the 
Community from Malaysia which were stated to be of Malaysian origin had not been 
produced in Malaysia, but in China. These bicycles were transhipped via the Malaysian 
Free Zones to the Community with false or incorrectly obtained Malaysian preferential 
origin certificates. In the Dutch customs debt proceedings, the company challenged the 
use of OLAF’s reports as evidence. The Appeal Court adopted a clear stance on this in 
point 4.4: ‘Setting aside the findings of a fact-finding mission by OLAF is such a far-
																																								 																				
108 With reference to Case C-399/11	Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal,	para 58. 
109 NL:RBHAA:2011:BV1238, case no 11/00839. 
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reaching act that in general this will only be justified if the plaintiff’s allegations against 
the findings of OLAF’s fact-finding mission are so serious that no credibility can any 
longer be attached to the findings of OLAF’.110 The allegations of the person concerned 
did not convince the Court of the lack of credibility of the findings in the OLAF report. 
 
Rechtbank Noord-Holland, Judgment 23 July 2013111 
In this criminal case against a firm accused of falsifying certificates of origin from 
Cambodia and Thailand, the criminal investigation had been commenced on the basis of 
an OLAF inspection mission in these third countries. The reports of these investigations 
were used by the FIOD (the specialised judicial tax enforcement authority) as preliminary 
information for the Dutch criminal investigation and as criminal evidence. The legal 
person accused challenged these reports, because the firm was not informed of their 
existence and because of the fact that a conceptual report had been used by the FIOD and 
not the final report. 
The Dutch Court of First Instance emphasised that the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s 
office is ‘dominus litis’ and that the sanction of the inadmissibility of the prosecution 
under Dutch criminal procedure can only be used in the case of very serious infringements 
of the essence of the procedure or other fundamental rights which result in the right of the 
accused to a fair trial being violated, either intentionally or as a result of serious 
negligence. This was not the case as far as the court was concerned. The court further 
underlined that the textual difference between the OLAF versions was limited to only one 
footnote. The court found that this deviation had no connection whatsoever with the facts 
of which the defendant was accused. There was therefore no evidence of any specific 
defence interests that had been infringed in this respect. As for the report of the OLAF 
mission, the Criminal Court of First Instance literally reproduced verbatim para 4.4 of the 
decision of the Customs Chamber of the Court of Appeal that we quoted above. By doing 
so the court transferred the reasoning on the admissibility and validity of evidence from 
an administrative non-punitive customs procedure to a criminal procedure. The court was 
also not convinced of the reasoning of the defence as to the lack of credibility which could 
be attached to the OLAF report. 
The approach of the Dutch courts contrasts with the French approach, as the 
approach is mainly based on comity and trust, unless there are very serious allegations 
that undermine the credibility of the evidence. Moreover, it is for the accused or the 
defence to come up with convincing arguments to rebut this presumption of credibility. 
If the rationale of the concept of unlawful evidence is also aimed at the protection of the 
defence rights and the fundamental rights of the person concerned, then this presumption 
of lawfulness and credibility is a doubtful approach, as it does not take into account that 
																																								 																				
110 Author’s translation. The original is: ‘4.4. Het terzijde stellen van de bevindingen van een 
onderzoeksmissie door het OLAF is een dusdanig ingrijpende handeling, dat dit in het algemeen slechts 
gerechtvaardigd zal zijn, indien de door eiseres onderzoeksmissie van het OLAF zodanig ernstig zijn, dat 
geen geloofwaardigheid aan de bevindingen van het OLAF (meer) kan worden toegekend’.  
111 RBNHO:2013:9668, case no 15/993018-06. 
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even lawful evidence used in this way can lead to the unfair use of evidence and thus to 
unfair proceedings.  
 
7. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
Although the European Commission has openly recognised, in many documents, that in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice there is a need for harmonised common 
standards on evidence and the admissibility thereof, Article 82(2)(a) TFEU has not been 
used to instigate a legislative proposal in that respect. Even within the framework of the 
European Investigation Order or the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s 
Office no common standards have been elaborated.  
The result is that in the AFSJ the treatment of evidence and of unlawful evidence 
differs very much from one Member State to another and that to such an extent that we 
cannot speak of a presumption of equivalent standards across the EU. This is of course a 
problem, I would say both for the enforcement side as well as for the persons concerned 
or defendants (be they suspects or accused). The only potential protection offered at this 
stage, due to the lack of an equivalent level playing field in the Member States and the 
silence of the legislator, is that which could come from the European Courts and national 
jurisdictions. We have seen, however, that the ECtHR does not offer a common standard 
when it comes to evidence gathering, the admissibility of evidence or the exclusion 
thereof. Besides serious violations of absolute human rights or very serious violations that 
undermine the essence of justice, the ECtHR uses the doctrine of the fairness of the 
proceedings in order to test the admissibility and use of certain types of evidence. The 
main weakness of this approach is not only that the balancing exercise is not always very 
predictable, as it depends on the concrete facts and circumstances of the case, but also 
that this approach, in many cases, is meaningless in a transnational setting of a horizontal 
nature (between Member States) and/or in a vertical setting (with EU actors). The test of 
fairness in these cases is extremely unpredictable, unless it assesses whether a flagrant 
denial of justice has occurred,112 but this standard has a very high threshold.  
The EU Courts are of course not human rights courts and they strike a different 
balance between the effet utile of EU policies and the fundamental rights dimension. Even 
in EU cases where the whole procedure is European, the approach is very much a copy 
paste of the reasoning adopted by the ECtHR, unless under EU law there is really a nullity 
attached to a specific act. But in punitive proceedings the majority of EU cases are dealt 
with at the national level and the evidentiary matters are considered as basically domestic 
matters. In this case the fundamental rights dimension of the CFR does apply, bringing in 
the minimum standards of the ECtHR, but not necessarily higher national fundamental 
rights standards.113 
																																								 																				
112 See Michiel Luchtman, Transnationale Rechtshandhaving – Over Fundamentele Rechten in de 
Europese Strafrechtelijke Samenwerking, Inaugurale Rede (Boom Utrecht 2017), and Michiel Luchtman, 
‘Transnational Multi-Disciplinary Investigations and the Quest for Compatible Procedural Safeguards’ in 
Katalin Ligeti and Vanessa Franssen (eds), Challenges in the Field of Economic and Financial Crime in 
Europe and the US (Hart 2017) 191–209. 
113 Case C-399/11 Melloni v Ministerio Fiscal, para 58. 
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What does all of this mean for the OLAF setting? The selection of OLAF 
evidence-related cases shows that it is important for assessing the applicable law and the 
applicable legal safeguards to distinguish between the different scenarios and modus 
operandi of evidence gathering and the use of evidence. Evidence gathering by OLAF in 
internal investigations is by definition very different from evidence gathering by OLAF 
in external investigations. In the latter case OLAF inspectors also have to apply, in 
combination with the OLAF regulations, national law. The ways in which OLAF 
inspectors investigate and obtain evidence (autonomous, mixed, mandated) or receive 
evidence from other law enforcement agencies (from national investigations at OLAF’s 
request or national investigations which are transferred to OLAF under mutual 
administrative assistance) are of course decisive. In the latter case the question of 
lawfulness is exclusively national and admissibility entirely depends on national law. In 
cases of mixed investigations and even autonomous on-site checks, because of the referral 
to national law for the existence and scope of investigative powers and related safeguards 
the situation is much more complex as national law and EU law are combined and this 
combination can itself be the source of invalid acts or unlawful evidence. 
From the above cases we have seen that the national applicable law can lead to 
the nullity of investigative acts and the nullity of the related OLAF reports and evidence, 
certainly in cases where the unlawfulness affects the fairness of the proceedings and the 
defence rights. The way in which these nullity or exclusion grounds are shaped differ very 
much from one Member State to another. Some Member States have a very strict nullity 
system and have a broad definition of ‘affecting the defence rights or the fairness of the 
proceedings’. We have also seen that the consequence of the nullity or exclusion in one 
Member State may or may not lead to nullity or exclusion in other Member States or even 
at the European level. This horizontal transnational effect does however completely 
depend on the applicable law in the receiving state. As for the EU dimension, the EU 
Courts have filled in the gap by ruling that inadmissibility or nullity at the domestic level 
does not automatically lead to the same effect at the EU level. 
Unlawful evidence does not however automatically lead to nullity or exclusion 
either. In many states it depends on the type of violation and the consequences in the 
punitive proceedings. We have seen above that unlawful evidence is often accepted as 
admissible evidence if the unlawfulness has not been caused by the persons concerned 
and is material to the defence. Finally, under the systemic integrity model with a 
balancing approach (the judicial integrity approach), it is also possible that inculpatory 
unlawful evidence is declared admissible, as long as the ‘proceedings as a whole remain 
fair’.  
So, OLAF has to assess internally the legality of its investigations and the 
lawfulness and fairness of potential evidence in the light of a complex follow-up 
panorama, in which the status of that evidence, when it is assessed concerning its 
admissibility, lawfulness and fairness, is not very predictable, either for OLAF or for the 
persons concerned or defendants. The praetorian approach by the European and national 
courts has not led – and given the high degree of divergence in national standards will not 
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lead – to common standards for the admissibility of evidence and for the exclusion or 
nullity of evidence.  
Finally, the EU legislator should accept its responsibility and submit a proposal 
for a directive under Article 82(2)(b–c) TFEU, with the aim of harmonising the standards 
for the admissibility of evidence and unlawful evidence. This would strengthen the setting 
for the use of mutual recognition instruments such as the European Investigation Order114 
and also the future work of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. For OLAF, an extra 
effort will have to be made within the framework of the reform of Regulation 883/2013, 
as the interlinkage between EU administrative investigations and judicial follow-up has 
to be regulated in more detail in order to guarantee foreseeability, effective enforcement 
and sufficient due process in OLAF cases in domestic punitive proceedings. The actual 
reform proposal115 does limit the reform on this point to Article 11(2)(2):  
Upon simple verification of their authenticity, reports drawn up on that basis shall 
constitute admissible evidence in judicial proceedings of a non-criminal nature before 
national courts and in administrative proceedings in the Member States. Reports drawn 
up by the Office shall constitute admissible evidence in criminal proceedings of the 
Member State in which their use proves necessary in the same way and under the same 
conditions as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. They 
shall be subject to the same evaluation rules as those applicable to administrative reports 
drawn up by national administrative inspectors and shall have the same evidentiary value 
as such reports. 
This has fortunately been amended as follows in the European Parliament version of the 
Committee on Budgetary control:116 
Upon simple verification of their authenticity, reports drawn up on that basis shall 
constitute admissible evidence in judicial proceedings before national courts and in 
administrative proceedings in the Member States. The power of the national courts to 
freely assess the evidence shall not be affected by this Regulation. 
This amendment substantially changes the status of OLAF evidence, as it would become 
admissible evidence, like EPPO evidence, without any reference to the assimilation 
clause included in the actual version of Article 11 and maintained in the Commission 
proposal above. This amendment does also implement the recommendation in that sense 
																																								 																				
114 Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 April 2014 regarding the 
European Investigation Order in criminal matters [2014] OJ L 130/1. 
115 European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor's Office and the 
effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ COM(2018) 338 final, 23 May 2018. 
116 European Parliament, ‘Draft European Parliament legislative resolution on the proposal for a regulation 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 
concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation 
with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations 
(COM(2018)0338 – C8-0214/2018 – 2018/0170(COD)’. 
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of the European Court of Auditors.117 We can qualify this amendment as a mandatory 
inclusion rule, which is different from the non-discrimination clause in Article 37 of the 
EPPO Regulation. This inclusion rule triggers of course new questions as to the 
possibility of the national authorities declaring investigative acts by OLAF invalid (and 
thus annulling the related evidence) or declaring evidence inadmissible because of 
unlawfulness or unfairness. As long as there are no harmonised standards for this an 
automatic, mandatory inclusion rule seems to be problematic. 
It is also interesting that the rapporteur, Ingeborg Gräßle, has introduced a new 
Article 11a in the proposal as follows: 
Action before the General Court 
Any person concerned may bring an action against the Commission for annulment of the 
investigation report transmitted to the national authorities or to the institutions under 
Article 11(3) on the grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties, including violation of the Charter, 
or misuse of powers. 
This effective remedy would be backed up by a right for the person concerned to have 
access to the final report, unless this is precluded by the interest of the 
investigation/prosecution, as included in Article 9(5a): 
For cases where the Office recommends a judicial follow-up, and without prejudice to the 
confidentiality rights of whistle-blowers and informants, the person concerned shall have 
access to the report drawn up by the Office under Article 11 following its investigation, 
and to any relevant documents, to the extent that they relate to that person and if, where 
applicable, neither the EPPO nor the national judicial authorities object within a period 
of six months. 
This would give the person concerned an important right and remedy for judicial control 
over unlawful and unfair evidence at the EU level. But even then, the wording of the 
European Parliament does not regulate the standards for unlawful evidence, nullity or the 
exclusion of evidence and seems to leave this to the Courts. Judicial control by the EU 
Courts can of course lead to a stricter approach concerning the evidence that will be 
included as EU legal evidence in OLAF reports, and as a consequence lead to evidence 
that has more credibility at the national level. However, that does not exclude that national 
courts make use of a stricter standard, based on national law (punitive administrative law, 
criminal law, the national Constitution) when assessing unlawful or unfair evidence. In 
other words, the stamp of lawfulness by the EU Court is an exercise distinct from the 
assessment of the unlawfulness or unfairness of evidence in national punitive 
proceedings. Bridging this EU dimension to the national punitive dimension still remains. 
The proposal is however under negotiation at the European Parliament and it remains to 
be seen if the amendments will actually survive. 
																																								 																				
117	 European Court of Auditors, ‘Opinion No 8/2018 (pursuant to Article 325(4), TFEU) on the 
Commission’s proposal of 23 May 2018 on amending OLAF Regulation 883/2013 as regards cooperation 
with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ (2018). 	
  
4. FRANCE 
J. Tricot 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Concept of punitive administrative proceedings. The concept poses two difficulties, 
one related to the term ‘punitive’ and the other to the term ‘administrative’. Each of these 
terms requires clarification as to the meaning and scope conferred on them under French 
law. 
‘Punitive’ proceedings. The punitive proceedings considered here are diverse 
and fall under different procedural regimes. They concern: for anti-competitive practices, 
the procedure applicable to investigations and sanctions by the competition authority 
(provided for in the French Commercial Code),1 for rating agencies and trade repositories, 
the procedure applicable to investigations and sanctions by the financial markets authority 
(provided for in the French Monetary and Financial Code),2 for the single supervisory 
mechanism (SSM), the procedure applicable to investigations and sanctions by the 
prudential supervisory and resolution authority (provided for in the Monetary and 
Financial Code),3 for the protection of financial interests, primarily, the procedure 
applicable to investigations and sanctions by the tax administration (provided for in the 
tax procedure book)4 and customs administration (provided for in the Customs Code).5 
In the absence of a unified legal framework applicable to these procedures, to 
which it would be sufficient for the legislator to refer, on a case-by-case basis, even if it 
means that the judge would have to rectify the ‘label faking’ if necessary, it is up to the 
judges to verify the effective (and not only formal) nature of the proceedings before them 
in order to determine whether the regime does indeed contain the necessary guarantees. 
This verification may be carried out by the ordinary judge, under the supervision of the 
judge of cassation (administrative or judicial) or by the constitutional judge. In the first 
case, the judge checks whether the criteria for a criminal charge are met, within the 
																																								 																				
1 Louis Vogel, Traité de Droit des Affaires, Tome 1: Du Droit Commercial au Droit Économique (Librairie 
générale de droit et de jurisprudence 2016). 
2 Thierry Bonneau, Régulation Bancaire et Financière Européenne et Internationale (Bruylant 2018); 
Jérôme Lasserre Capdeville, Michel Storck and Eric Chevrier, Code Monétaire et Financier Annoté et 
Commenté (Dalloz 2019). 
3 ibid. 
4 Martin Collet and Pierre Collin, Procédures Fiscales, Contrôle, Contentieux et Recouvrement de l’Impôt 
(Presses Universitaires de France 2017); Jacques Grosclaude and Philippe Marchessou, Procédures 
Fiscales (Dalloz 2018).  
5 Claude J Berr and Henri Trémeau, Droit Douanier Communautaire et National (Economica, 2006); 
Stéphane Détraz, ‘Douanes – Procédure’ (2016) JurisClasseur pénal des affaires, fasc 20 (mise à jour 
2019). 
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meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). While this 
verification is carried out in principle in accordance with the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), it is not uncommon for the administrative or judicial 
judge to identify solutions whose compatibility with the case law of the Court can be 
discussed. The verification of the (punitive) nature of the procedure may also be carried 
out by the Constitutional Council. The latter has forged an autonomous concept, the 
function of which is comparable to that of criminal charge, but whose definition is not 
exactly the same. This is the notion of a ‘sanction having the character of a punishment’ 
which requires compliance with the principles of legality, necessity, proportionality 
(Article 8 of the Declaration of the Rights of the Man and of the Citizen of 1789, 
hereinafter: DDHC) and respect for the rights of the defence (Article 16 DDHC).  
The Constitutional Council has chosen to qualify as a ‘sanction having the 
character of a punishment’ only those measures which have a mainly punitive purpose, 
whether of a criminal, administrative,6 civil7 or disciplinary8 nature. This does not exclude 
any type of sanction a priori but presupposes checking whether the sanction is exclusively 
restorative, not punitive, and whether it takes into account the conduct of the person to 
whom it causes personal annoyance. On the other hand, it does not matter who is 
responsible for imposing these sanctions. These may be sanctions imposed by courts, 
whether judicial or administrative, or sanctions imposed by non-judicial authorities, such 
as an independent administrative authority (eg the Competition Authority, ADLC), an 
independent public authority (eg the Financial Market Authority, AMF) or an institution 
(the Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution, ACPR, which is integrated with the 
Banque de France) or an Administration (such as tax or customs administrations). 
‘Administrative’ proceedings. The administrative nature must also be specified. 
Although the doctrine has long observed the construction of a ‘criminal administrative 
law’9 and the concept of ‘administrative investigation in criminal matters’10 or even 
‘common law of administrative investigation in criminal matters’11 has emerged, the 
terms can be misleading. 
On the one hand, the administrative nature is intended to underline that the 
investigative and sanctioning powers in question are entrusted to administrative 
authorities (either a central administration such as the tax authorities, or independent 
administrative authorities such as the Competition Authority, the Financial Markets 
Authority or the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority). 
																																								 																				
6 Constitutional Council, 25 February1992, no 92-307 DC, paras 24–31. 
7 Constitutional Council, 13 January 2011, Établissements Darty et fils, no 2010-85 QPC, para 3. 
8 Constitutional Council, 28 March 2014, Joël M, no 2014-385 QPC, para 5. 
9 See the pioneer work of Mireille Delmas-Marty and Catherine Teitgen-Colly, Punir sans Juger? De la 
Répression Administrative au Droit Administratif Pénal (Economica 1992). The authors show that the 
administrative nature can also designate another part of criminal law, which is marked by its technical 
dimension and the strong influence of the administration, but located inside the penal system and sometimes 
called ‘administrative criminal law’.  
10 Martin Collet, ‘Les Enquêtes Administratives en Matière Répressive’ in Les Procédures Administratives 
(Dalloz 2015) 161ff. 
11 Camille Broyelle, ‘Vers un Droit Commun de l’Enquête Administrative en Matière Répressive’ (2013) 
Revue juridique de l’économie publique 49. 
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But it does not imply that the regime applicable to these investigations and/or 
sanctions is a matter of administrative law (and procedure). Indeed, the punitive action of 
the administrative authorities is, in the majority of cases, carried out under the supervision 
of ordinary courts (the Paris Court of Appeal, then the Commercial Chamber of the Court 
of Cassation).  
The competence of the administrative courts is nevertheless provided for in tax 
matters and financial matters (financial markets, in the case of investment service 
providers), it concerns the control of administrative sanctions imposed and, in this 
context, may extend to proceedings and investigations. However, this jurisdiction is partly 
shared with the judicial judge since it is he who, during the proceedings, authorises or 
controls the use of certain investigative measures (visit and seizure operations, without 
the consent of the occupant of the premises). 
Thus, although the sanctions imposed are administrative in nature and the 
investigation is conducted by an administrative authority, this does not imply that the 
applicable procedure is governed by administrative law or that the competent judge is the 
administrative judge. 
On the other hand, the terms are misleading because they suggest that there is a 
unified general framework. 
However, nothing could be further from the truth. 
 
1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
Deficiencies of the legal framework. The regime applicable to the procedure is in 
principle clear since it is laid down by the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) and by this 
Code alone.12 However, as Serge Guinchard and Jacques Buisson note in their manual of 
criminal procedure,  
however decisive it may appear, the manifestation of the truth is, in the end, hardly 
covered by the Code of Criminal Procedure, which only devotes a few articles to it. 
Indeed, the system of proof is mainly the work of the doctrine which has developed a 
theory based on the two essential questions, integrated into procedural law, that of the 
burden of proof and that of its means.13  
Even more severe, Etienne Vergès considers that ‘in criminal matters, the CCP only deals 
with evidence indirectly and without any structure’.14 
																																								 																				
12 François Fourment, Procédure Pénale (14th edn, Larcier 2013); Bernard Bouloc, Procédure Pénale (26th 
edn, Dalloz 2017); Serge Guinchard and Jacques Buisson, Procédure Pénale (11th edn, LexisNexis 2018). 
13 Guinchard and Buisson (previous n) no 482. In the same vein, Fourment (previous n) no 43, notes that 
the Code of Criminal Procedure does not contain any general provision on evidence. On the basis of 
scattered provisions (mainly drawn from Arts 427ff of the CCP, on the administration of evidence before 
criminal courts), judges have forged general principles. 
14 Etienne Vergès, ‘Éléments pour un Renouvellement de la Théorie de la Preuve en Droit Privé’ in 
Mélanges en l’Honneur du Professeur Jacques-Henri Robert (LexisNexis 2012) 853–895. 
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Principles of freedom, lawfulness and fairness. The classic presentation of rules 
on the admissibility of evidence combines the principle of freedom of evidence and the 
requirement of legality (lawfulness).15 
Freedom characterises the search for and production of evidence but also its 
assessment (by the judge): no mode of proof is imposed; no mode of proof is prohibited 
or a priori excluded,16 subject to compliance with the conditions of lawfulness and 
fairness. Thus, a mode of proof, even if it is not provided for by law, cannot be excluded 
for this reason and is therefore in principle admissible. Moreover, the possibility of 
proving by any means is not altered by the fact that a text provides a specific mode of 
proof of the offence. 
Thus, the logic of criminal procedure can be summarised as follows: ‘evidence 
may be obtained beyond legal provisions, but not against legal provisions’.17  
The question of lawful and fair evidence is the subject of a particular treatment in 
criminal law that distinguishes this procedure from other procedures (civil, commercial 
and administrative). 
The latter two conditions (lawfulness and fairness) are only fully applicable to 
public authorities. 
Functions of fairness. The principle of fairness has a complementary function in 
relation to the freedom of evidence and a limiting function in relation to the lawfulness 
of the collection of evidence. It sanctions the unfairness of public authorities beyond mere 
lawfulness. 
The purpose is to prevent the circumvention, evasion or destruction of the 
protection provided by the law or the provoking of the offence for which evidence is 
sought. While incitement to commit the offence is always prohibited, incitement to 
evidence of an offence already committed or about to be committed requires a distinction 
to be made between evidence produced by public officials (which is sometimes 
considered unfair and rejected or on the contrary admitted since it does not constitute a 
‘scheme’) and that produced by individuals without the involvement of public authority, 
whose unfairness is not punished, on the grounds of another principle: freedom of 
evidence in criminal matters.18 
																																								 																				
15 Etienne Vergès, Géraldine Vial and Olivier Leclerc, Droit de la Preuve (Presses Universitaires de France 
2015). 
16 Unless otherwise expressly provided by law, all means of proof are admissible, regardless of the offences 
considered. This is deduced from Arts 427 and 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, with 
regard to contraventions (the third category of offences within the three-part classification of French 
criminal law, which covers the least serious offences), the doctrine is divided as to whether the applicable 
principle is that of restricted admissibility (restricted freedom of evidence). 
17 Vergès, Vial and Leclerc (n 15) no 272. 
18 Martine Ract-Madoux, ‘La Loyauté de la Preuve en Matière Pénale: La Liberté des Preuves’ (2015) 
Procédures (dossier) 15. The author – a criminal judge – condemns the case law relating to the principle of 
loyalty and states that ‘by its very nature, criminal evidence does not have to be fair’. Others stress that in 
criminal matters, the accused person is not required to give fair assistance to the judge or police against his 
or her interest, whereas in civil proceedings, everyone is required to give his or her assistance in establishing 
the truth (Art 10 Civil Code), Loïc Cadiet, ‘Le Principe de Loyauté devant le Juge Civil et le Juge 
Commercial’ (2015) Procédures (dossier) 10. 
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In both cases, it is a scheme by public authorities that destroys the rights of the 
accused person. Although lawful, if it irreparably impairs the rights of the defence, it must 
lead to the exclusion of the evidence gathered and to the annulment of subsequent 
measures based on it.  
But the scheme is only established in that it irremediably infringes the rights of 
the defence, so that inadmissibility is not a priori established.19 
In a way, in the silence of the law of criminal procedure (which does not prohibit 
certain means of investigation or means of proof) fairness frames the limits of lawfulness 
(what is not permitted by the CCP is not prohibited: one must demonstrate either the 
misuse of procedure or an interpretation contra legem of the procedure).20 
Admissibility and probative value. However, the admissibility of unfair or 
unlawful evidence does not prejudge its probative value. The judge’s assessment is free 
(principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence). 
On the other hand, the exclusion of unfair or unlawful evidence may have more 
or less extensive effects on the whole procedure. 
The judge may decide to annul all or part of the act. Invalidity may be extended 
to all acts whose necessary support is the annulled act. When an act (or document) of the 
procedure is annulled, it is removed from the file. No information can be derived from 
the invalidated acts or documents.  
Invalidity (nullités):21 Concept of ‘acts or documents of the procedure’. The 
distinction thus made in the system of evidence according to whether it is sought and 
produced by public authorities or by private parties is in line with another distinction: that 
between, on the one hand, acts or documents in the proceedings (Article 170 CCP) and, 
on the other hand, mere means of proof or information. Only the first ones can be annulled 
and excluded from the procedure.22 The latter cannot be annulled. They are subject to 
adversarial debate during the trial and to the unfettered evaluation of the judge. 
																																								 																				
19 François Molins, ‘L’Appréciation du Principe de Loyauté de la Preuve: Applications Pratiques devant le 
Juge Pénal’ (2015) Procédures (dossier) 20. 
20 Didier Guérin, ‘La Loyauté de la Preuve devant le Juge Pénal’ (2015) Procédures (dossier) 11. 
21 Alexandre Gallois, Les Nullités en Procédure Pénale. Guide Pratique (Gazette du Palais 2016). 
22 There are rules that are expressly prescribed ‘under penalty of nullity’. Thus, for example, the power of 
judicial customs officers (Art 28-1; for tax officials, Art 28-2), rules on searches (Arts 56, 56-1, 56-2, 56-
5, 57 and 59, 76, 706-24 and 706-28, 706-35), identity checks (Art 78-3), the conditions of indictment (Art 
80-1), requests for certain acts by the parties during the investigation (Art 82-1, para 1), telephone tapping 
of a parliamentarian, lawyer or magistrate (Arts 100-5, 100-7), etc. There is also nullity when the failure to 
comply with a substantive formality provided for in the Code of Criminal Procedure or any other provision 
of criminal procedure has adversely affected the interests of the party concerned (‘no nullity without 
grievance’). But according to the case law, certain irregularities carry the grievance with them, so that they 
imply annulment (eg, lack of information given to the public prosecutor on the grounds for police custody, 
unjustified absence or delay in notifying a person in police custody of his rights; exceeding the legal 
duration of police custody; failure to present the person concerned to the prosecutor who must decide 
whether to extend police custody; absence of audiovisual recording of an interrogation in criminal matters, 
of the interrogation of a minor during his or her police custody; detention of a person in police custody 
when this measure is incompatible with his or her state of health; absence of a lawyer’s invitation to attend 
the preliminary adversarial debate on pre-trial detention; violation of the rule that the defence always has 
the floor last). Finally, there is nullity even in the absence of a grievance in the event of a violation of a rule 
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The Cour de cassation considers that the invalidity concerns only the violation of 
a rule of criminal procedure, not that of a provision of another nature.23 It also considers 
that the violation of a rule of regulatory origin cannot be sanctioned with nullity and that 
administrative police measures falling within the competence of administrative courts 
cannot be invoked in support of an application for nullity. 
Scope of application. The expression ‘act or document of the procedure’, under 
Article 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, covers not only all procedural acts 
performed by the investigating judge or his delegates (with the exception of judicial acts 
subject to appeal), but also, more broadly, acts of investigation and prosecution.  
All acts of administration of evidence and all acts established by a magistrate 
constitute ‘acts’ of procedure which may be annulled. 
Exclusions. Letters produced by a party in support of the claim,24 magnetic tapes 
submitted as exhibits,25 copies of documents communicated to the prosecutor26 for 
information purposes or the writings of the parties even though they refer to cancelled 
documents do not constitute acts that can be annulled.27 For judges, recordings of private 
conversations made by an individual  
are not in themselves acts or documents of the procedure, within the meaning of article 
170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and as such, liable to be annulled, but evidence 
that can be discussed in an adversarial manner, and the transcription of these recordings, 
whose sole purpose is to give substance to their content, can no longer lead to their 
annulment.28 
Enforcement of invalidity. The investigating judge cannot annul the irregular act 
himself: he must refer the matter to the investigating chamber, after having consulted the 
public prosecutor and informed the parties. 
 
																																								 																				
of public policy (eg organisation, composition, jurisdiction of the courts, irregular appointment of an 
investigating judge, rule enacted in the interest of the proper administration of justice). 
23 Jean Larguier and Philippe Conte, Procédure Pénale (24th edn, Dalloz 2016) 295ff. 
24 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 23 July 1992, no 92-82.721 (Bulletin criminel, 1992) 274. 
25 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 19 January 1999, no 98-83.787 (Bulletin criminel, 1999) 9. Police 
officers who discover, outside the execution of a letter rogatory, apparent indications of criminal acts in 
progress and not related to the referral to the investigating judge, are entitled to carry out investigations in 
accordance with the rules laid down for the investigation of flagrante delicto. The Indictment Chamber 
rightly rejected the claim that the principle of fair evidence had been violated. Indeed, the contested 
recording did not constitute a procedural act capable of being annulled, but only a means of proof subject 
to the adversarial discussion by the parties, having been carried out by a police officer, not in the 
performance of his duties, in order to establish facts of drug trafficking, on judicial delegation, but, as a 
victim of acts of corruption, to constitute proof of the solicitations to which he was subjected. 
26 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 28 January 1992, 90-84.940 et 90-84.941 (Bulletin criminel, 
1992) 34. 
27 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 17 March 1987 (1987) Dalloz (Sommaire) 409. 
28 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 31 January 2012, no 11-85.464, Maud Léna (2012) Dalloz 440 
(note); François Fourment (2012) Dalloz 914 (note). See also: Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 7 
March 2012, no 11-88.118 (audio recordings made by a private individual); Court of Cassation, Criminal 
Chamber, 27 November 2013, no 13-85.042 (2014) Droit pénal no 32 (computer files stolen by an 
employee). 
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1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
A fragmented procedural framework. Each punitive procedure is governed by its own 
legal framework. There is generally no common framework for investigations and 
sanctions by administrative authorities. This absence is even more significant with regard 
to the question of the regime of evidence in these proceedings. 
It is generally possible to observe the absence of systematisation in the texts and 
a recent and fragmented systematisation in the literature.29  
It is nevertheless true that common principles and common rules emerge from a 
comparison of sectoral texts and the case law that has interpreted them.30 But we will see 
that these common elements are quite poor and limited. 
Nevertheless, it can be observed that the general tendency is to use the ordinary 
law of civil procedure when the judicial judge is competent; this may be surprising given 
the punitive nature of the procedure and the sanction. As for administrative case law, it 
should also be noted that it has evolved to move closer to civil procedure and, in so doing, 
away from criminal case law. 
However, we will see that the differences – where texts or case law exist – are not 
so clear-cut. 
A framework that is incomplete and not very explicit. The procedural 
framework for the question of the admissibility of evidence is particularly poor in French 
law. There are few sources – both in criminal law stricto sensu (supra 1.1) and regarding 
punitive proceedings. 
In its conclusions, a public rapporteur31 noted that while public law, case law and 
scholars32 have paid considerable attention to questions of burden and administration of 
proof, questions relating to means of proof and their admissibility have hardly been 
explored beyond the assertion that in the absence of a text, evidence is free before the 
administrative judge. However, others have qualified this statement.33 Moreover, since 
the requirement of fairness has gradually penetrated administrative case law, the origin 
and methods of gathering evidence may lead to the exclusion of certain types of evidence, 
unless the judge refers the difficulty back to the discussion on the evidence so that it is 
																																								 																				
29 Audrey Guinchard, Les Enjeux du Pouvoir de Répression en Matière Pénale (Librairie générale de droit 
et de jurisprudence, Thèses 2003); Club des juristes, Des Principes Communs pour les Autorités 
Administratives Dotées d’Attributions Répressives (2012); Broyelle (n 11); François Brunet, ‘De la 
Procédure au Procès: Le Pouvoir de Sanction des Autorités Administratives Indépendantes’ (2013) Revue 
Française de Droit Administratif 113; Mustapha Mekki, Loïc Cadiet and Cyril Grimaldi (eds), La Preuve: 
Regards Croisés (Dalloz 2015); Marie Crespy-De Coninck, Recherche sur les Singularités du Contentieux 
de la Régulation Économique (Dalloz 2017) Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Thèses, vol 164;  Droit Processuel. 
Droits Fondamentaux du Procès (Dalloz, 2019). 
30 Delmas-Marty and Teitgen-Colly (n 9); Thomas Perroud, La Fonction Contentieuse des Autorités de 
Régulation en France et au Royaume-Uni (Dalloz 2013), Nouvelle Bibliothèque des Thèses, vol 127; 
Crespy-De Coninck (previous n). 
31 Vincent Daumas, Conseil d’Etat, 16 July 2014, Ganem, no 355201. 
32 It should be recalled that in French law, since criminal law is part of private law, it is private law scholars 
who mainly contribute to the study, analysis and systematisation of the criminal field. 
33 Patrick Frydman and Julien Sorin, ‘Le Principe de Loyauté de la Preuve devant le Juge Administratif’ 
(2015) Procédures (dossier) 13. 
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less a restricted admissibility that is organised than a guarantee of an adversarial debate 
on the evidence and its probative value. 
With regard, more specifically, to punitive administrative investigations, one 
author spoke in 2013 of a ‘procedural desert’.34 In particular, she explained the latter by 
an apparent paradox: ‘the improvement of the sanction procedure’. According to the 
author, the argument of the ‘catch-up session’, which would open with the prosecution 
(ie the entry into the sanction phase), favours and maintains the exclusion of procedural 
guarantees at the investigation stage. Not only can this argument justify the exclusion of 
the rights of the defence and the requirements of Article 6 ECHR, but it may also lead to 
an inoperative application of grounds relating to the regularity of the investigation 
procedure, even where the applicants argue that the investigation did not take place in 
accordance with the conditions laid down by the texts. In this sense, the existence of 
guarantees, applicable from the date of prosecution, would not only make it unnecessary 
to assert new rights; it could neutralise those recognised by the texts. 
However, with the ‘proceduralisation’ of the investigation, temperaments were 
introduced. In addition to legislative requirements (aimed at enhancing procedural 
guarantees during the investigation), there are also changes in case law through the 
application of the principle of fairness to the investigation. Placed as a watchdog of the 
rights of the defence, fairness is intended to prevent these rights, which the person 
concerned only holds from the start of the proceedings, from being ‘irremediably 
compromised’. 
This limited framework therefore makes it difficult, if not impossible, to identify 
clear, precise and predictable solutions. 
This is all the more true since the principle of freedom of evidence on the one 
hand, and the rarity of rules on the collection and production of evidence on the other, 
favour a considerable margin of uncertainty (and consequently a margin of manoeuvre 
for the authorities).  
To this is added, first, the framing of (ie restrictions on) the consequences drawn 
from the inadmissibility of certain evidence. Secondly, there is also the postponement 
(except where the review of certain investigative measures is planned and organised) of 
the question of admissibility to the sanction review stage, ie at the end of the proceedings, 
with the effect of diluting the question of admissibility within the broader, more flexible 
(and therefore less rigorous) framework of an overall assessment of the proceedings, 
respect for the rights of the defence, and fair trial. 
Lawfulness and fairness. However, while the investigation phase is not 
comparable to the sanction phase,35 the inapplicability of the rules of fair trial and the 
existence of a ‘procedural desert of investigation’36 have gradually been called into 
question. Indeed, the investigation phase is gradually being ‘affected by the “shadow 
cast” by the rights of the defence, which allows for the extension of judicial review’37 and 
																																								 																				
34 Broyelle (n 11). 
35 Brunet (n 29). 
36 Broyelle (n 11). 
37 Crespy-de Coninck (n 29) no 518. 
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is not without consequence on the system of admissibility of evidence when the sanction 
is reviewed by the judge. 
While excluding the application of the rights of defence at the investigative stage 
– whether invoked as a general principle of law or in their conventional form – the judges 
– administrative and judicial – make them effective from the investigative stage by stating 
that investigations must ‘take place under conditions ensuring that the rights of defence 
of persons to whom complaints are subsequently notified are not irreparably impaired’.38  
Thus, it is through this lens – the risk that the rights of the defence will be 
irreparably compromised – that the judge gradually determines the evidence that must be 
admitted or excluded. 
It is, therefore, the principle of fairness that constitutes the ‘entry point’39 for the 
rights of the defence at the investigation stage. 
Thus, even if the rights of the defence are not directly applicable to the 
investigation phase, they may retroactively affect the latter when its malfunctions are 
likely to ‘contaminate’40 the sanction procedure, which opens the scope for judicial 
review.41  
Yet the question of extending the principles applicable to the sanction procedure 
to the administrative investigation phase raises the question of assessing the defects of 
the investigation that could affect the sanction procedure. This is where the admissibility 
of evidence regime resides. 
But the effectiveness of the generalisation of the principle of fairness is 
questionable.42 Above all, it makes it possible to address the question of the admissibility 
of evidence only indirectly: by the judge, not the legislator, and through the punitive 
purpose of the procedure or measure (which only requires the assessment of the 
irremediable infringement of the rights of the defence and not the assessment of the 
measure/evidence in itself); and only partially: insofar as the regime of elements collected 
outside the legal framework is not resolved.43  
Functions of the admissibility of evidence. Thus, it emerges from these general 
characteristics that the rules applicable to evidence are intended, in general terms, to 
guarantee, with due respect for the rights of the defence, the protection of the general 
																																								 																				
38 In the area of financial markets: Conseil d’Etat, 15 May 2013, Société Alternatives Leaders France, no 
356054. Formula found before the Paris Court of Appeal in competition matters (infra) or the Court of 
Cassation in the case of AMF investigations or the Conseil d’État in the case of investigations conducted 
by the ACPR (20 January 2016, CELR no 374950). 
39 Crespy-de Coninck (n 29) no 521. 
40 Broyelle (n 11). 
41 Crespy-de Coninck (n 29) no 523, 370. 
42 Collet (n 10). 
43 In this respect, it was held that ‘the regulatory authority may rely on the evidence gathered during an 
investigation that led to the opening of sanction proceedings in the exercise of another competence’. See 
for example: Conseil d’Etat 13 July 2011, Vallon, no 337552; Mathias Guyomar (2011) Bulletin Joly 
Bourse (no 11) 596 (conclusions): concerning the use by the AMF Board of evidence gathered during an 
investigation when examining an application for an authorisation. See also: Conseil d’Etat, 26 January 
2015, Bernheim Dreyfus Society, no 368847. 
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interest and the manifestation of the truth through the freedom of evidence; a principle 
which is more broadly applicable in so far as it is a question of proving facts. 
The applicable rules of evidence aim secondly (in particular through the statement 
by the law of the legal conditions for the use of certain evidence-gathering measures and 
the organisation by the law of the monitoring of their compliance) to regulate the 
investigative powers of the administrative authorities in order to guarantee the rights of 
the defence.  
However, this function is limited insofar as the regime applicable to modalities 
not provided for by law (silence of the law) is uncertain (both as regards admissibility but 
also as regards the consequences of possible inadmissibility: simple exclusion or 
invalidity of the procedure). The remark applies more broadly in so far as the question of 
the lawfulness and fairness of the evidence is a controversial, evolving question to which 
not all the answers have been given. 
 
1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
Concepts44 (admissibility – freedom – lawfulness – loyalty). The concept of 
admissibility under French law refers to the ‘aptitude to be taken into consideration as 
evidence’.45 When this aptitude includes all modes of proof, the applicable regime is 
referred to as ‘freedom of evidence’. 
Overall, the areas covered by this study are governed – in principle – by the 
principle of freedom of evidence. However, this principle must be well understood: if the 
evidence is ‘free’, it must be lawful and, in most cases, fair. In principle, evidence can 
therefore be adduced by any means at the disposal of the parties and the authorities. But 
it must be lawful: the collection of evidence is governed by the law and by the requirement 
of fairness.  
However, this requirement of lawfulness and fairness is not understood in the 
same way in punitive proceedings and in (stricto sensu) criminal proceedings. 
 
1.3.1 Criminal law 
According to Article 427 of the CCP, ‘Except where the law otherwise provides, offences 
may be proved by any mode of evidence and the judge decides according to his innermost 
conviction. The judge may only base his decision on evidence which was submitted in 
the course of the hearing and adversarially discussed before him’. The principle of 
freedom of evidence laid down in this text is in line with the provisions of Articles 41, 81 
and 151 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which confer on the investigating judge, the 
public prosecutor and members of the judicial police under their direction the power to 
carry out or have carried out ‘all acts’ necessary for the investigation and prosecution of 
offences or all acts useful for establishing the truth. But the purpose of Article 427 is not 
to define the admissible modes of proof. The purpose of the article is to indicate that the 
existence of an offence may be established by the modes of evidence admitted by law, 
																																								 																				
44 Vergès, Vial and Leclerc (n 15). 
45 Gérard Cornu, Vocabulaire Juridique (12th edn, Presses Universitaires de France 2018). 
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without any of them being excluded or on the contrary privileged and without there being 
any distinction to be made according to whether the evidence results from the 
investigations of a magistrate or a police officer or is provided by the parties. 
However, in certain matters, a particular or enhanced probative value is conferred 
on certain types of evidence. This is the case, in particular, with the official records and 
reports drafted by judicial police officers for the establishment of petty offences 
(contraventions):46 they are prima facie authentic evidence;	proof of the contrary may 
only be established in writing or by witnesses. There is no possibility of dismissal, then, 
for the sole benefit of the doubt; but the judge may resort to expertise. The burden of 
proof to the contrary lies with the defendant. In some areas, such as customs, the records 
are authentic until it is proved they are forged (inscription de faux). 
The requirement of lawfulness and fairness is less strictly understood in criminal 
proceedings: only evidence obtained unfairly or unlawfully by public authorities is not 
admitted. This includes the case where these authorities have participated in the 
unfair/illegal collection of evidence by private persons and the case where, although 
lawful, the collection is part of a scheme whose unfairness results in the inadmissibility 
of the material collected and, where applicable, the invalidity of the procedure.47 
Unlawful and unfair evidence presented by private parties is, however, admissible.48 On 
condition that it is subject to an adversarial debate, this evidence is subject to the 
unfettered evaluation by the judge (who determines its probative value). 
 
1.3.2 Punitive administrative law  
In the absence of specific legal provisions, the principle of freedom of evidence is 
required in the field of punitive proceedings. 
The requirement of lawfulness and loyalty is strictly understood in the context of 
these procedures: evidence obtained unlawfully and/or unfairly is not admitted, whether 
																																								 																				
46 In the case of felonies, the minutes are considered as mere information. This is also the case, unless there 
is a legal exception, for misdemeanors. 
47 Court of Cassation, Plenary Assembly (Assemblée plénière), 6 March 2015, no 14-84.339:  
A stratagem by an official of public authority undermines the right to a fair trial, the right to remain 
silent and the right not to incriminate oneself and the principle of fair evidence. The placement, during 
a period of police custody, during rest periods between hearings, of two persons detained in contiguous 
cells previously equipped with sound systems, in order to encourage verbal exchanges which would be 
recorded without their knowledge for use as evidence, constitutes an unfair investigative procedure 
which frustrates the right to remain silent and the right not to incriminate oneself and violates the right 
to a fair trial. Consequently, the judgment is subject to cassation if, in order to validate such a procedure, 
it finds that several indications constituting plausible grounds for suspecting that one of the persons 
concerned may have participated in the offences being prosecuted justify his detention in police custody, 
in accordance with the requirements of Art 62-2, para 1, of the Code of Criminal Procedure, that the 
interception of conversations took place under the conditions and in the form provided for by Arts 706-
96 to 706-102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which do not exclude the sound system of police 
cells, unlike other places covered by Art 706-96, para 3, of the same Code, where the persons concerned, 
who have been notified of the prohibition on communicating with each other, have made spontaneous 
statements, without any provocation by the investigators, and that the right to silence applies only to 
hearings and not to rest periods. 
48 This applies to the person being prosecuted, the victim or a third party (eg a witness). 
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presented by public authorities or by private persons. Such evidence will not be taken into 
account. It cannot be used as a basis for investigative measures or sanctions.49 
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility  
In criminal proceedings, as in punitive proceedings, there is no decision on the 
admissibility of evidence as such.  
Consequently, there is no specific procedure dedicated to the examination of the 
admissibility of evidence. However, this examination may be carried out incidentally 
during the review of investigative acts undertaken during the (criminal or punitive) pre-
trial phase.  
A special procedure is organised for the review of the validity of criminal acts and 
documents: it is the nullity procedure which gives the investigating chamber the power 
to annul criminal acts and documents due to irregularities committed during the 
investigation by the public authorities. Evidence given by the parties (the prosecuted 
person or the victim) cannot be annulled. It cannot be excluded. It is subject to adversarial 
debate during the trial. As for acts or documents drawn up by public authorities, once 
they have been annulled, they may no longer appear in the file of the proceedings or form 
the basis for any procedural act (acts adopted on the sole basis of an annulled act or 
document must also be annulled). 
 
1.4.1 Criminal law 
Review of investigative acts. If the evidence results from a measure substantially or 
formally related to a judicial police act (tax, customs, anti-competitive practices50 or 
market abuse,51 inspections and seizures), legal remedies are organised to challenge the 
decision to use the measure and then to challenge the conduct of the measure. 
On this occasion, the judge’s control can be exercised and is limited to the measure 
concerned. 
Invalidity. If the evidence constitutes an act or document of the procedure, it may 
be the subject of an application for a declaration of invalidity (Articles 170–174 CCP) at 
the investigation stage or of a plea of invalidity at the judgment stage. 
																																								 																				
49 See, in particular, infra section 3. 
50 Judicial control is limited in the investigation phase to operations of inspections and seizures. For the 
rest, acts likely to cause grievances may be challenged by incidental means if a sanction procedure is 
initiated (Constitutional Council, 8 July 2016 concerning simplified investigations under competition law, 
2016-552 QPC). 
51 Except in the case of an inspection authorised by the judge of freedoms and detention (L621-2 CMF), 
there is no text providing for the possibility of an immediate appeal, which postpones the question until the 
end of the procedure (case of violation of the rights of the defence during the investigation and the collection 
of evidence). This analysis is criticised because it removes the grievance that is ‘drowned’ in the middle of 
the procedure; Emmanuel Brochier, ‘La Loyauté de la Preuve dans l’Enquête AMF. Un Principe Affirmé, 
une Mise en Œuvre Limitée’ (2015) Procédures (Dossier) 17. 
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Judgement / decision on the sanction. In general, it is at the stage of the sanction 
procedure (administrative sanctions or criminal trial) that the admissibility (unlawful / 
unfair evidence) and probative value of the evidence may be challenged. 
 
1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
Subject to the specific case of nullity, whose regime is specific to criminal proceedings, 
the findings made at the time concerning criminal proceedings also apply to punitive 
proceedings.52 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings  
Uncertainties (silence of texts and uncertainties in case law). According to some 
authors, in the event of the annulment of documents by the civil or administrative court, 
if the question arises as to whether their inclusion in criminal proceedings remains 
possible, ‘no clear answer has been given to this question’.53  
Indeed, it must be noted that the question is not settled by the texts or in case law.  
Existing decisions are scattered, sometimes old. 
These are the general rules that must apply with regard to the admissibility of 
evidence and in particular to invalidity in the context of criminal proceedings. 
It can be deduced that: inadmissibility in administrative (non-criminal) 
proceedings does not in itself imply exclusion in criminal proceedings. 
It all depends on the reason for the inadmissibility and the use to be made of the 
evidence in the criminal proceedings. 
Simple information. Elements resulting from the administrative investigation 
may be included as ‘mere information’ in the criminal proceedings.  
In this case, they are in principle admissible and escape the rules relating to 
invalidity.  
However, they are subject to the general principles of the rights of the defence, 
the adversarial principle and the principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence by the 
judge. 
Acts or documents of the procedure. Εlements resulting from the administrative 
investigation may belong to the procedure (as acts or documents of the latter). 
In this case, the rules relating to invalidity may apply.54 
Case of abuse of procedure. Where it is established that specialised officials have 
used their powers for purposes other than those provided for in the texts (in particular 
																																								 																				
52 See also infra, sections 2 and 4. 
53 Frédéric Desportes and Laurence Lazerges-Cousquer, Traité de Procédure Pénale (3rd edn, Economica 
2013) no 2001. 
54 supra, section 1.1. 
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with a view to facilitating the establishment of ordinary offences outside their 
jurisdiction), the information collected may be cancelled.55 
Special case: illicit origin. In any case, the fact that the evidence has an unlawful 
origin is not sufficient in itself to exclude it from the proceedings. Thus, although the 
requirement of fairness may lead to the exclusion of the element in question from the 
administrative procedure, this requirement (since it cannot be established that the public 
authority contributed to or participated in the unlawful gathering of evidence) has no place 
in the criminal proceedings: although it is unlawful56 and inadmissible in non-criminal 
proceedings, it is admissible and subject to the unfettered evaluation of the criminal judge 
in accordance with the principle of adversarial proceedings. 
It is sufficient to establish that these elements have been regularly transmitted to 
the judicial authority. 
 
1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
General remarks. In general, the transfer of criminal evidence to other authorities (in 
particular the civil authority to which part of the punitive proceedings are subject) is 
governed by the following rules: first, the disclosure of criminal documents is permitted 
(and is not unfair) as long as it complies with the law (lawfulness/regularity) and/or is 
justified by the exercise of the rights of the defence.57 Secondly, the fairness of production 
is determined by the regularity of the issuance of documents.58 
																																								 																				
55 Case of the use by customs officers of powers derived from Art 60 of the Customs Code (general right 
of search) to establish traffic offences, Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 18 December 1989 (Bulletin 
Criminel, 1989) 485. Police officers cannot obtain information in flagrante delicto solely through a search 
by customs officers, in the absence of apparent evidence revealing the currentness of the commission of an 
offence. Cases of customs officers assisting police officers conducting searches in flagrante delicto on an 
offence of illegal work, an offence outside their jurisdiction: 17 October 1994 (Bulletin criminel, 1994) 
333. Cases of tax officers: 31 January 2006 (Bulletin criminel 2006) 30, (2006) Droit pénal 23. 
56 Computer files which are alleged to have originated from a theft cannot be annulled since, on the one 
hand, they do not constitute, within the meaning of Art 170 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, acts or 
documents of the procedure which may be annulled, but are evidence subject to an adversarial discussion 
and, on the other hand, judges consider that the public authority did not intervene in the preparation or 
obtaining of the disputed documents. Since they do not constitute acts or documents of the procedure, 
documents thus collected by private persons and used in the proceedings may not be annulled and it is 
solely for the criminal judges, at the trial stage, to assess their probative value, in particular by following 
some rules already specified by the Criminal Chamber: if these documents were entered into the 
proceedings by a civil party when such entry did not constitute a necessary and proportionate measure for 
the defence and protection of the rights of that civil party, within the meaning of Art 8 ECHR, then it will 
be for the judges to accept or reject them on the merits from the proceedings (Court of Cassation, Criminal 
Chamber, 24 April 2007). On the contrary, if the filing of such documents is justified by the need to prove 
the facts of which the author of the recording is a victim and by the needs of his/her defence (or, in the case 
of the accused, by the interest of his/her defence), then a court of appeal, after having debated them in an 
adversarial way, will admit them as evidence without disregarding the provisions of Art 6 ECHR (Court of 
Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 31 January 2007). 
57 Eymeric Molin, ‘La Communication de Pièces Pénales dans une Instance Civile; Entre Loyauté et 
Légalité’ (2015) Procédures (Dossier) 26. 
58 Thus, the party must show that it has lawfully taken possession of the documents (in particular in 
accordance with Art R 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires the authorisation of the 
Public Prosecutor’s Office to issue criminal documents to a third party). 
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Cancelled acts. When the acts or documents of the procedure are annulled, they 
are removed from the file (Article 174, para 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). They 
may not be invoked in criminal59 or civil proceedings.60 
Where invalidity has not been raised in criminal proceedings, the rights of the 
defence require the possibility of challenging the admissibility of the act or document in 
dispute during the civil proceedings.61 Such a challenge can only have the effect of 
declaring unlawfulness and allowing the exclusion of evidence. 
Admissible acts. Moreover, once the criminal judge has considered the evidence 
admissible, the evidence (eg unfair evidence) becomes lawful; it becomes invocable 
before the civil judge.62 The question then moves on to the assessment of the evidence. 
However, the last point must be qualified. Indeed, the Commercial Chamber of 
the Court of Cassation was able to state that:  
it is right that, after having found that documents produced by the Administration in 
support of its request had an unlawful origin, in that they came from a theft, the first 
President of the Court annulled the authorisations [of inspections and seizures] obtained 
on the basis of these documents, stating that it did not matter whether the Administration 
had knowledge of them through the transmission of a public prosecutor or earlier.63 
Tax matters. In tax matters, Act No 2013-1117 of 6 December 2013 validated the use by 
tax officials of documents or information, ‘whatever their origin’ (in other words, even if 
they are unlawful or anonymous), as long as they are regularly brought to their attention 
under the droit de communication64 (power to request documents or information), but 
provided that they are not used for searches (Article L 10-0 AA Book of Tax 
Procedures).65 This rule also applies when the transmission is the result of administrative 
assistance. 
Constitutional guarantee. However, the Constitutional Council, by a reservation 
of interpretation, prohibited the tax and customs services from using documents obtained 
																																								 																				
59 The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation has thus stated that ‘article 174 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure prohibits that annulled acts or documents may constitute the basis for the prosecution of a 
separate procedure, in the event that they have been submitted to the customs administration prior to their 
regular annulment, pursuant to article L 101 of the Book of Tax Procedures’, Court of Cassation, Criminal 
Chamber, 16 May 2012, no 11-83.602, concerning acts carried out in ordinary criminal proceedings and 
then transmitted to officers of the Customs and Excise Administration in other criminal proceedings they 
were conducting. 
60 Jean-Christophe Saint Pau, ‘De la Preuve Pénale à la Preuve Civile’ in Pascal Beauvais and Raphaële 
Parizot (eds), Les Transformations de la Preuve Pénale (Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence 
2018) 185. 
61 ibid 186. 
62 ibid 188 and 194. 
63 31 January 2012, no 11-13.097. 
64 According to the legal remedies provided (and not outside them). Thus, the transmission by the judicial 
authority (Public Prosecutor’s Office) may be carried out because it has received the information from the 
person who collected the information (thief) or because it has acquired it during investigative measures. 
65 Customs equivalent: Art 67 E Customs Code. 
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by an administrative or judicial authority under conditions subsequently declared illegal 
by the judge.66  
This reservation seems to be of a general nature and is in line with the rules of 
criminal procedure mentioned above, which deprive annulled acts of the possibility of 
being used in separate proceedings. 
 
2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
 
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings 
Application of ‘ordinary’ law. In the absence of specific rules specially designed to 
address the question of the admissibility of evidence collected by OLAF, the general rules 
described above (section 1) apply.  
We find the general observation made in the previous report:67 no specific text is 
devoted to cooperation with OLAF or to OLAF’s action on national territory. 
 
2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings  
A limited number of cases. A search for the occurrences of the terms ‘OLAF’ and ‘Anti-
fraud Office’ in the case law leads to a distinction between two types of proceedings: 
customs proceedings and criminal proceedings. 
In the absence of systematic access to the decisions of the trial courts, the research 
and analysis proposed is exhaustive only with regard to the decisions of the Court of 
Cassation. However, reference is made to decisions of trial courts when they have been 
identified by the doctrine or when they are available in the databases of legal publishers. 
Case law on customs procedures. It is therefore customs cases, more specifically 
those relating to notices of recovery68 (Avis de mise en recouvrement), which provide the 
relevant case law examples. This falls within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Chamber 
of the Court of Cassation. 
The case law collected makes it possible to identify the grounds put forward (and 
sometimes recognised by the judges) for directly or indirectly challenging the 
admissibility of OLAF’s findings. The two main grounds concern respect for the 
adversarial procedure through the question of the disclosure of OLAF’s investigation 
report (and its annexes) and the conditions under which the judge may validly justify an 
order authorising customs inspections and seizures (Article 64 of the Customs Code). 
																																								 																				
66 Constitutional Council, 4 December 2013, no 2013-679 DC, recital 33. 
67 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: 
Improving OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement 
Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017). 
68 Instituted by Art 345 of the Customs Code, the notice of recovery is the act by which customs claims 
(taxes and customs duties) that have not been paid within the legal time limits are authenticated, subject, 
where applicable, to referral to the judicial judge. 
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The decisions listed also make it possible to note in advance that the courts very 
early on established the admissibility of the OLAF investigation’s results as evidence. It 
should be noted, however, that the express recognition by judges of their competence to 
control its regularity is more recent.	69 
Admissibility of OLAF’s findings. It is in this context (notice of recovery) that 
the French judge stated that the findings made by OLAF ‘constitute admissible evidence 
in national litigation proceedings’.70 In the same decision, the judge was also careful to 
reject the company’s arguments that the customs administration had relied solely on the 
OLAF report (to establish the Chinese origin of the products). This source alone may be 
sufficient to form the basis for the offence notification report. 
More specifically, the Paris Court of Appeal (whose decision was not criticised 
by the Commercial Chamber of the Court of Cassation)71 was able to consider that: 
the Court is right to point out that, pursuant to Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999, all reports drawn up by OLAF 
constitute admissible evidence in national litigation proceedings; that, in addition, Article 
342 of the Customs Code allows proof of customs offences by ‘all legal means’.72  
This solution is frequently mentioned by judges, including recently. Thus, according to 
the Paris Court of Appeal, Article 342 of the Customs Code states that ‘information, 
certificates, records and other documents provided or drawn up by the authorities of 
foreign countries may be validly presented as evidence’. Since Article 342 allows proof 
of a customs offence by any means, OLAF reports referred to in Regulation No 1073/1999 
(and now Regulation No 883/2013) form part of it.73 
Discussion and assessment of OLAF’s findings. It can be deduced from these 
judgments that the French judge also admits that the findings made by OLAF can be 
challenged and contradicted by the operators.  
For example, before the national court, an importer tried to criticise the findings 
and deductions in an OLAF’s report which invalidated an EUR1 certificate under the 
preferential regime between the EU and Jamaica. The Company criticises OLAF’s report 
for being based only on assumptions and suspicions. It also criticises the findings and 
deductions in OLAF’s report, which are allegedly based solely on statistics and do not 
detail the operations in question by characterising their irregularities. By challenging the 
conclusions of the report, the company was attempting to have them declared null and 
void in order to make the certificates valid and allow it to benefit from the reduced rate 
of duty. But for the French judge, ‘this report, countersigned by the Jamaican government, 
																																								 																				
69 Observation moreover ‘reinforced’ in criminal case law by the decision of the Court of Cassation of 9 
December 2015 (15-82,300) in which it quashed a Court of Appeal decision which had declared itself 
incompetent to review the regularity of OLAF’s investigation, whose report had been incorporated into the 
French criminal procedure file. 
70 Court of Appeal of Paris, 4 March 2014, no 2012/18625, Still c/ Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances 
et du Commerce extérieur (decision not consulted, cited in Guide Lamy des procédures douanières). 
71 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 21 October 2014 (12-17.256). 
72 Court of Appeal of Paris, Pôle 5, Chamber 7, 7 February 2012 – no 2010/14925. 
73 Court of Appeal of Paris, 8 October 2018, no 17/22268, Etam c/ Ministre de l’Économie et des Finances. 
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was not challenged by the European Commission in its decision REM 03/07 of 3 
November 2008, so the objection must be rejected’.74 Incidentally, to return to this point 
below,75 it should be noted that in this decision, the judge made it clear that he or she was 
not ‘the judge of the European investigation’. 
Failure to disclose or late disclosure of OLAF’s report (or its annexes). Failure 
to disclose or late disclosure is one of the main reasons given. In this case, the challenge 
does not directly concern the admissibility of evidence collected by OLAF but rather the 
conditions under which national authorities can rely on such evidence and use it as a basis 
for a sanction decision.  
A decision of the Court of Appeal of Pau of 12 September 2013 perfectly 
illustrates the judges’ reasoning:76 
It follows from the above that, although contradictory exchanges took place in the phase 
prior to the notification of the infringement, none of them allowed Stock Man to engage 
in any discussion with the customs authorities on the proposed taxation. 
Indeed, as regards the hearings held by customs during the inspection, during which the 
manager should have been able to make his observations, he was not aware of all the facts 
on which the proceedings were based, since only extracts from OLAF’s report are 
recorded in the minutes and no annexes are included, even though these documents are 
those on which the customs administration relies in order to consider that the pallet trucks 
imported by Stock Man were mainly of Chinese origin. 
Consequently, in the light only of the extracts from OLAF’s report made available to him 
on the day of the audit, he was unable to make any useful statements. 
Subsequently, before both the first and second AMRs were issued, no debate could take 
place since the customs administration had the first notice of recovery issued two days 
after notifying Stock Man of its refusal to disclose the OLAF report to it and then rushed 
thirteen days after the Bayonne District Court cancelled the first notice of recovery on 8 
September 2010 for purely formal reasons, to issue a new notice of recovery, the subject 
of this challenge, whereas it had not provided the annexes to the report on which it based 
its prosecution. 
It therefore appears that the customs administration took its decision without giving Stock 
Man the opportunity to be usefully heard in its explanations. Those provided ex post in 
the first challenge were not really examined, since as soon as the first notice of recovery 
was cancelled a second notice of recovery was issued and one of the essential elements 
of Annex 29 of OLAF’s report was never communicated to Stock Man despite its request. 
The customs administration may not invoke the volume and content of these annexes in 
order to refuse to disclose them if they concern the company under control. 
It thus appears that the customs administration did not respect the general principle of the 
rights of defence by not allowing Stock Man to put forward its explanations before a 
decision adversely affecting it was taken against it by the public authority. 
																																								 																				
74 Court of Appeal of Douai, 7 September 2017, no 16/07571, Administration des douanes et impôts 
indirects c/ Jules. 
75 infra, section 2.4. 
76 Court of Appeal of Pau, First Chamber, 12 September 2013 – no 12/01441. 
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This reasoning77 is confirmed by the Court of Cassation, which finds that the operator has 
not been able to make a useful argument concerning the documents on which the customs 
proceedings are based (and that the procedure is therefore not in order because the rights 
of the defence are not respected), since, on the one hand, annexes to an OLAF report used 
as the basis for the customs proceedings against this operator were not communicated to 
him (before the notice of recovery) and, on the other hand, only extracts from the OLAF 
report were transcribed in the customs records, whereas they should have been included 
in their entirety.78 
In the same vein, and not surprisingly, the communication by Customs to the 
operator of essential documents on which the demonstration of the facts alleged by a 
notice of recovery (in this case the annexes to the OLAF report) is based, after this has 
been issued, does not respect the principle of adversarial proceedings.79 
However, once it is established that the importer has been given the opportunity 
to make his views known to the customs administration in full and with sufficient time, 
the customs administration is not obliged to forward to that company the full investigation 
report drawn up by OLAF.80 Already in a decision of 2012, the Commercial Chamber of 
the Court of Cassation had stressed that ‘Article 334 of the Customs Code, which provides 
for the elements to be set out in the report drawn up following an inspection by the 
customs administration, does not require the addressee to be provided with all the 
documents referred to therein but only those used as evidence of the offence’.81 Yet ‘the 
only document whose absence is explicitly invoked, namely the report of the Anti-Fraud 
Office (OLAF), could not adversely affect Frimo [ie the company involved] since it was 
not used as evidence’. 
Office of the JLD (Liberty and custody judge). The OLAF report and its 
annexes may be used as a basis for a search and seizure order issued by the JLD at the 
request of the customs administration. It is often on this occasion, in order to challenge 
the order and the resulting procedure, that the regularity of the investigation conducted 
by the European Office and the admissibility of its results are questioned. In particular, 
the inadequacy of the judge’s examination of OLAF’s report is often invoked in order to 
have the authorisation and the subsequent investigative measures annulled. This 
inadequacy may be based on the very large size of the report and annexes, compared to 
the very short time taken by the judge to make his or her decision. It may also be based 
on the fact that the report and annexes have not been translated and have therefore been 
transmitted in English, so that the existence or quality of their examination by the judge 
is questionable. But in any case, since it is not established that the report and annexes do 
not constitute the only element referred to in the customs administration’s request or the 
decisive document that led the JLD to take its decision, these arguments are 
																																								 																				
77 See also, in the same sense, Court of Appeal of Aix-en-Provence, 6 July 2012, no 11/18807. 
78 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 25 November 2014, no 13-26.240. 
79 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 25 November 2014, no 12-26.141. 
80 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 21 October 2014, no 12-17.256. 
81 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 23 October 2012, no 10-25.824. 
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systematically rejected in the name of the power of unfettered assessment of the probative 
value of the evidence submitted to it. 
As for the language of the proceedings, it should be noted that there is an old text 
in France – the Villers-Cotterêts Ordinance of 1539 – which requires that procedural 
documents be drafted in French (and therefore, if necessary, translated). However, this 
order only concerns procedural documents. It does not exclude the production without 
translation of documents in a foreign language.82 
In a decision handed down by the Paris Court of Appeal,83 the company claimed 
that the lack of translation of OLAF’s report made it impossible for ‘the JLD to verify its 
content’. It argued that in the absence of this document, the JLD did not have sufficient 
evidence to presume fraud and should therefore have dismissed the request. The Court of 
Appeal rejected these arguments after recalling that the Villers-Côtterets order only 
concerns procedural acts and does not exclude the production without translation of 
documents written in a foreign language. In particular, it states in the case of documents 
in a foreign language that the JLD  
upon whom it is incumbent to assess the probative value of all the evidence submitted to 
him/her may have sufficient knowledge [thereof]. This was clearly the case here. Indeed, 
the JLD, which did not consider it necessary to request a translation of the document 
criticised, namely the report of the mission commissioned by OLAF to verify a possible 
circumvention via Indonesia of the anti-dumping measures imposed on certain elements 
originating in China, included in the grounds of his/her order which he/she is deemed to 
have established (page 3/7), elements and conclusions whose content is not contested and 
which we[the Court] are in a position to review, taken from that report. There is therefore 
no reason to dismiss it. 
It should be noted that the judges add in response to the invocation of the violation of the 
right to an impartial tribunal that  
the reasons and the operative part of the order issued pursuant to Article 64 of the Customs 
Code are deemed to be established by the judge who issued and signed it. The fact that 
the JLD bases its decision in particular on information contained in OLAF’s report drawn 
up in English does not constitute an objective factor such as to cast doubt on its 
impartiality. 
2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
The case law collected has not made it possible to identify cases in which OLAF’s reports 
have been found inadmissible on their own merits or on the basis of higher national 
standards or on the grounds that OLAF’s sui generis nature would render inadmissible 
the evidence collected by the Office.84 
																																								 																				
82 Court of Appeal of Paris, Pôle 5, Chamber 1, 29 March 2017, no 15/20423. 
83 Court of Appeal of Paris, Pôle 5, Chamber 7, 6 May 2015, no 13/22647. 
84 To our knowledge, the latter argument has only been raised in criminal proceedings: Court of Cassation, 
Criminal Chamber, 16 January 2013, no 12-84.221:  
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2.4  Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules  
The investigation conducted by OLAF may be subject to indirect control in two separate 
frameworks. First, if measures for searches have been requested by the national 
authorities on the basis of the results of the OLAF investigation, the control of the 
investigation may be carried out either at the time of the request for authorisation of the 
measure or at the time of the control of the progress of the measure. 
Secondly, in any case, if a sanction (or ‘punitive’ measure) is imposed, the appeal 
against this measure (and the procedure that led to its imposition) may also provide an 
opportunity to challenge the investigation conducted by OLAF. This is the case in most 
of the decisions mentioned above. 
With regard to the standards for the review of the regularity of OLAF’s 
investigation, the judge shall base himself on the law applicable to the investigation, in 
particular Union law and, where applicable, the law specifically applicable to the 
investigation conducted outside the territory of the EU and based on a special 
agreement.85  
For example, in a recent case decided by the Paris Court of Appeal,86 companies 
invoked the nullity of OLAF’s investigation for having been initiated in violation of the 
principle of confidentiality prescribed by the 1995 Basic Regulation (Council Regulation 
No 384/96 of 22/12/1995). This decision thus shows that while some judges stress that 
they are not ‘judges of the European investigation’,87 they agree to review ‘the nullity of 
OLAF’s investigation’ in the light of EU texts (in this case Regulation 1073/1999), since 
OLAF’s investigation is likely to lead to the irregularity of the French procedure. 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
Whereas, in the light of these grounds, and since, on the one hand, the applicants did not invoke, in 
order to question the impartiality of the experts, whose findings are under discussion, elements other 
than their membership of OLAF, an investigative body whose independence, with regard to the 
Commission representing the European Union, as a civil party, is institutionally guaranteed, on the other 
hand, the judges were able to deduce from the reports already transmitted by the said body that the 
experts had not relied on information not in the file, the investigating chamber justified its decision. 
85 See, for example, the decision of the Court of Appeal of Paris of 8 October 2018 (no 17/22268):  
In the present case, OLAF’s investigation was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Article 
32 of Protocol No. 1 applicable under the Cotonou Agreement on the date of the disputed exports at the 
invitation of the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. The investigation report is 
co-signed by a representative of the Jamaican government. ... In addition, it should be stressed that 
Article 342 of the Customs Code allows proof of a customs offence by any means and Regulation (EC) 
No 1073/199 considers that reports drawn up following investigations carried out by OLAF are 
admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings in the Member State where their use is 
necessary. 
86 Court of Appeal of Paris, Pôle 5, Chamber 10, 12 November 2018, no 17/20991. 
87 cf Court of Appeal of Douai, 7 September 2017, no 16/07571, Administration des douanes et impôts 
indirects c/ Jules. 
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3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
 
3.1 ECB-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation)  
In the absence of special rules specially provided for,88 the general rules apply to ECB-
collected evidence (supra, section 1). These rules are organised around the principles of 
freedom, lawfulness and fairness of evidence. To our knowledge, there is no litigation at 
the moment and no cases have been usefully identified. 
All means of evidence are consequently a priori admissible, provided that their 
collection and production are lawful and fair, whether they are adduced by individuals or 
by the public authority (compliance with the rules on investigative measures, respect for 
privacy, respect for protected secrets, etc). 
This absence of restriction at the collection stage is extended by the unfettered 
evaluation of evidence by the competent authority (whether it is the national authority's 
commission of sanctions or the judge). 
Unlike proceedings before the ADLC or the AMF, remedies are not available at 
the investigation stage. They are limited to the sanction procedure. In addition to the 
arguments that can be put forward before the Sanctions Committee of the ACPR, only an 
appeal to the Conseil d’État89 can make it possible to challenge ex post the administrative 
measures adopted and to raise the irregularity of the control procedure.90 
In the latter respect, the scope and effect of the challenge is itself limited. Thus, 
the doctrine has been able to note that ‘the opening of the adversarial sanction procedure 
is largely insufficient to compensate for the violations of the rights of the defence during 
the control procedure. While the legal person in question may challenge the merits of the 
charges against it and the inspection report, it cannot challenge the very regularity of the 
inspection procedure. Indeed, the Enforcement Committee considers that the grounds for 
raising the irregularity of the control procedure are ineffective as long as the rights of the 
defence have not been “irremediably compromised” during the control mission’.91  
This analysis is supported by a decision of the Conseil d’État of 20 January 2016 
in which it is stated that: 
If, when dealing with acts which may give rise to the sanctions provided for in the 
Monetary and Financial Code, the Enforcement Committee of the Prudential Supervision 
and Resolution Authority must be regarded as deciding on the merits of criminal charges 
																																								 																				
88 The adjustments made to the Monetary and Financial Code to take account of the ECB’s powers are 
limited to the possibility for the ECB to request the ACPR’s supervisory college to initiate sanction 
proceedings. In accordance with EU law, Art L612-38 CMF provides that, ‘In this case, the notification of 
grievances ... shall include any document, including, where appropriate, any on-the-spot audit report, 
provided by the European Central Bank in support of its request’. 
89 The higher administrative court. 
90 Margot Pugliese, ‘L’Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution: Pouvoirs de Contrôle et Garanties 
Procédurales’ (2014) Revue Lamy Droit des Affaires 93. 
91 ibid. ACP, Commission des sanctions, 18 June 2013 and 25 November 2013. 
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within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the principle of the rights of the defence, recalled 
both in Article 6 of that Convention and in Article L. 612-38 of the Monetary and 
Financial Code, applies only to the sanction procedure initiated by the notification of 
grievances by the College of the Authority and by the referral to the Enforcement 
Committee, and not to the prior phase of the controls provided for in Article L. 612-23 of 
that Code. These controls must only take place under conditions which ensure that the 
rights of defence of persons to whom charges are subsequently notified are not irreparably 
prejudiced. The person being prosecuted cannot usefully rely, in support of his challenge 
to the regularity of the Authority’s administrative investigation, on a breach of the 
provisions of Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and Article 14 § 3 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, arguing that the investigators did not notify its officials of their right to 
remain silent, since these provisions are not applicable to the administrative investigation 
procedure. Moreover, since the person prosecuted was able to make his or her 
observations before the Enforcement Committee, and even if some of the shortcomings 
identified by the Committee were based on the oral statements made by his or her officials 
during the on-the-spot inspections, the fact that he or she had not been informed of the 
possibility of being assisted by counsel or of the right of his or her officials to remain 
silent during the administrative investigation procedure did not irreparably affect the 
rights of the defence.92 
 
3.2  ESMA-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 64(8) EMIR) 
In the absence of specific rules,93 the general rules apply to evidence collected by ESMA 
(supra, section 1). These rules are organised around the principles of freedom, lawfulness 
and fairness of evidence. To our knowledge, there is currently no dispute as to the 
admissibility of this evidence and no cases have been usefully identified. Nor does 
consultation of the AMF’s annual reports provide useful information on this point.94 As 
an indication, it may be noted that the obligation imposed on persons heard in Quebec, 
within the framework of cooperation agreements, to answer under oath all the questions 
asked and to tell the truth under penalty of criminal sanctions ignores the right of the 
persons prosecuted to remain silent and not to contribute to their own criminalisation, 
																																								 																				
92 Conseil d’État, 20 January 2016, no 374950, Caisse d’épargne et de prévoyance du Languedoc-
Roussillon (2016) L'Actualité juridique: Droit administratif 818; Jean-Philippe Kovar and Jérôme Lasserre 
Capdeville (2016) Revue Banque (no 794) 90 (note); Nicolas Mathey (2016) Revue Droit bancaire et 
financier 195 (note); Marie-Anne Nicolet, ‘Sanctions ACPR et AMF et Juridictions de Recours’ (2016) 
Banque et Droit (no 166) 95. 
93 The adjustments made to the Monetary and Financial Code to take account of ESMA’s powers are limited 
to organising, in general terms, the exchange of information between authorities (Arts L632-6 and L 632-8 
CMF). 
94 Reference is made in passing to a decision of the Paris Court of Appeal (in the 2017 report) which ruled 
that: ‘it is permissible for the AMF to obtain information from a foreign authority for the purposes of an 
investigation, even in the absence of prior conclusions of a written cooperation agreement’. This decision 
indirectly supports the principle of freedom of evidence. 
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protected by Article 6 ECHR, so that the minutes of these hearings should be excluded 
from the debates.95 
Thus, all means of evidence are a priori admissible, provided that their collection 
and production are lawful and fair, whether they are adduced by individuals or by the 
public authority (compliance with the rules on investigative measures, respect for privacy, 
respect for protected secrets, etc). 
However, it should be noted that the Constitutional Council recently censured the 
powers of AMF controllers and investigators to obtain access to data stored and processed 
by telecommunications operators (former Article L 621-10 CMF). 
When a priority preliminary ruling on constitutionality was referred to it by the 
Court of Cassation, concerning the lack of sufficient guarantees to ensure a balance 
between the right to respect for private life and the constitutional value objectives of 
safeguarding public order and investigating offenders, the Constitutional Council replied 
that the disclosure of connection data was likely to infringe the right to privacy of the 
person concerned. As a result, the Council considered that: 
While the legislator has reserved the power to obtain such data in the context of an 
investigation for authorised officials subject to professional secrecy and has not conferred 
on them the power of forced execution, it has not attached any other guarantee to the 
procedure provided for in the provisions in question. Consequently, the second sentence 
of the first paragraph of Article L. 621-10 of the Monetary and Financial Code must be 
declared unconstitutional; the immediate repeal of the contested provisions would have 
manifestly excessive consequences and, consequently, it should be postponed until 31 
December 2018.96  
To access connection data, AMF staff must now obtain in advance, in accordance with 
Article L621-10-2 of the French Monetary and Financial Code, the authorisation of the 
‘controller of connection data requests’. This function is carried out, alternately every 4 
years, by a member of the Conseil d’État (elected by this court) and then by a magistrate 
of the Court of Cassation (elected by this court). 
Fairness during the investigation.97 As we have seen (section 1), the 
investigation phase offers limited guarantees that are determined by compliance with the 
procedures explicitly provided by the Monetary and Financial Code to govern the powers 
of controllers and investigators. They are supplemented by a minimum standard of 
protection enshrined by judges that the rights of defence of persons to whom charges are 
																																								 																				
95 AMF, 7 December 2016, Louis D’Avout (2017) Bulletin Joly Bourse 96 (note). 
96 Constitutional Council, 21 July 2017, no 2017-646/647 QPC. 
97 See also, Court of Appeal, Commercial Chamber, 24 May 2011, Société Kelly, no 10-18.267, which 
extends to the AMF the case law established with regard to the competition authority regarding the 
admissibility, as evidence, of clandestine recordings (infra section 3.3). 
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subsequently notified must not be irreparably impaired;98 the investigation must be fair 
so as not to irremediably compromise the rights of the defence.99 
Invalidity. The annulment of an act of the AMF’s administrative investigation 
may lead to the annulment of subsequent acts and even the annulment of the entire 
procedure and the decision of the Enforcement Committee based on the annulled act. 
In the Vivendi case, it was decided that the irregularity in the form of a record of 
the hearing is such as to justify its annulment, but without in itself rendering the 
proceedings as a whole invalid: the informal hearing of persons whose unreported 
statements were not used in the prosecution does not affect the rights of the defence.100 
By a judgment dated 30 June 2011,101 the European Court of Human Rights dismissed 
the application against that judgment, on the ground that ‘the applicant has not 
demonstrated that the fact that certain documents were collected during the investigation 
and not placed in the file would have affected the adversarial and fair nature of the 
proceedings and that he had no means of obtaining documents in the file that were 
necessary for his defence’. 
In three judgments of 20 September 2011, the Court of Cassation reiterated the 
principle formulated on 19 December 2006:  
The fact that the Autorité des marchés financiers has selected the documents in the file 
finally submitted to the Enforcement Committee is not, in itself, likely to vitiate the 
procedure, unless it is shown that, in breach of its duty of fairness, it has diverted elements 
likely to influence the assessment by the Enforcement Committee and, if necessary, the 
Court of Appeal, of the merits of the charges retained.102 
This absence of restriction at the collection stage is extended by the unfettered evaluation 
of evidence by the competent authority (Enforcement committee or judge) at the sanction 
or trial stage. 
In general, the remedies available either at the investigation stage against certain 
investigative measures (in the case of searches and seizures)103 or during the sanction 
procedure allow evidence gathered in violation of EU rules to be challenged. At the 
investigation stage, these elements may be challenged if the investigation measure is 
																																								 																				
98 ‘[T]he principle of the rights of the defence, recalled both by Article 6(1) of this Convention and specified 
by Article 6(3) thereof and by Article L. 621-15 of the Monetary and Financial Code, applies only to the 
sanction procedure initiated by the notification of charges by the [AMF] Board and by the referral to the 
Enforcement Committee, and not to the preliminary phase of investigations carried out by [AMF] officials’, 
Conseil d’État, 15 May 2013, Isabelle Riassetto (2013) Bulletin Joly Bourse 409 (note); Conseil d’État, 2 
July 2015, nos 366108 and 366194. 
99 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 1 March 2011, Charles Arsouze (2011) Revue des sociétés 
575 (note). 
100 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 19 December 2006, Thierry Bonneau (2007) Droit des 
sociétés 80 (note); Charles Arsouze (2007) Bulletin Joly Société 580 (note). 
101 Nicolas Rontchevsky (2011) Bulletin Joly Bourse 634 (note). 
102 Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 20 September 2011, nos 10-13.591, 10-13.878 and 10-
13.911. 
103 Art L 621-12 Monetary and Financial Code. 
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based on these elements (exclusively or decisively) or if there is a risk that the rights of 
the defence may otherwise be irreparably impaired. 
 
3.3  DG COMP-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003)  
In the absence of special rules,104 the general rules apply (supra, section 1) to the DG 
COMP-collected evidence. These rules are organised around the principles of freedom,105 
lawfulness and fairness of evidence.106 
‘A cocktail of rules’.107 Before the Competition Authority, the general rules of 
the Code of Civil Procedure and special rules of the Commercial Code apply, as well as 
the rules of criminal procedure and the rules of administrative procedure. However, the 
whole is subject to the principles and guarantees of criminal law because of its repressive 
nature. 
This composite set has given rise to judicial and doctrinal debates, particularly in 
the field of evidence.  
The debate began on the question of the admissibility, as evidence, of clandestine 
recordings made by an individual, as to whether this should be considered as civil 
litigation, which should lead to the exclusion of the evidence thus obtained, or whether it 
should be criminal litigation, which could lead to its being admitted. 
The reasoning of the Paris Court of Appeal is very instructive in this context:  
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which essentially aim to define the 
conditions under which a party may obtain a decision from the judge on the merits of a 
claim against another party based on the recognition of a subjective right, do not apply to 
the procedure followed before the Competition Council which, in the context of its 
mission to protect public economic order, prosecutes for criminal purposes leading it to 
impose punitive sanctions.108 
																																								 																				
104 ‘There is no text dealing with evidence before the Council’, Conseil de la Concurrence (predecessor of 
the ADLC), decision 07-D-50 of 29 December 2007. 
105 The system of proof before the Competition Authority does not involve any particular formalism. All 
types of evidence (written documents, testimonies, confessions) may be used before it, subject to respect 
for the principle of fair evidence; subject to this reservation, the relevance and strength of a piece of 
evidence are directly related to its credibility; Autorité de la concurrence, decision 14-D-08, 24 July 2014. 
106 Although the ADLC’s annual reports have systematically recalled since 2006 the mechanism resulting 
from Art 12 of Regulation 1/2003, consultation of these reports does not provide useful information on this 
point either. 
107 Expression borrowed from Laurence Idot: ‘Application par les Autorités Nationales et Autonomie 
Procédurale’ (2011) Europe 71.  
108 Court of Appeal of Paris, First Chamber, section H, 19 June 2007, Georges Decocq (2007) Contrats, 
concurrence et consommation 208 (note) et Court of Appeal of Paris, 29 April 2009, no 2008/11907: 
Philippe Delebecque (2009) Dalloz  2716 (note); beforehand, in the same case: Conseil de la concurrence, 
5 December 2005, no 05-D-66: Dalloz 2006, Cahiers de Droit des Affaires 225; Court of Appeal of Paris, 
First Chamber, section H, 29 April 2009, no 2008/11907, Philips France, Avantage, Muriel Chagny (2009) 
Communication, commerce électronique 88 (note). 
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Thus, it should be noted that, in order to validate the possibility for the competition 
authority to base a sanction decision on clandestine recordings, the Court of Appeal had 
noted, first, the absence of a text regulating the production of evidence; second, it had 
relied on procedural autonomy with regard to both national private judicial law and 
Community law; in other words, in particular, the possibility of excluding the national 
‘common reference system’. Thirdly, it had jointly addressed the mission of protecting 
economic public order, the repressive nature of prosecutions and the expected 
effectiveness of the financial penalties that might be imposed. These references to the 
proximity of competition law to criminal law made it possible – and thus aimed – to 
establish the admissibility of this type of evidence since the case law of the criminal judge 
allows it.109 
However, the Commercial Chamber and the Plenary Assembly110 of the Court of 
Cassation condemned this approach, referring to Articles 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
and 6 ECHR: ‘unless expressly provided otherwise in the Commercial Code, the rules of 
the Code of Civil Procedure apply to disputes concerning anti-competitive practices under 
the jurisdiction of the Competition Authority’; consequently, ‘the recording of a 
telephone communication made without the author’s knowledge constitutes an unfair 
means by which its production as proof is not admissible’. 
Since then, despite decisions to the contrary by the Union General Court,111 the 
Court of Cassation has not changed its position. However, there are signs112 that a shift 
may occur.113  
																																								 																				
109 This dimension is further strengthened when the Court is seised once again after the cassation of its first 
judgment and it decides to maintain its case law despite the cassation. 
110 Court of Cassation, Plenary Assembly (Assemblée plénière), 7 January 2011, no 09-14.316 and no 09-
14.667 (Bulletin de l’assemblée plénière, 2011) 1; Boris Ruy (2011) La semaine juridique, édition générale 
208 (note); François Fourment (2011) Dalloz 562 (note). Cf Court of Cassation, Commercial Chamber, 24 
May 2011, no 10-18.267; Yves Paclot (2011) La semaine juridique, édition Entreprise 1489 (note). 
111Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV v European Commission, EU:T:2016:455; Julie Grangeon, ‘La Preuve en 
Droit de la Concurrence: La Fin Justifie les Moyens!’ (2016) Revue Lamy de la concurrence 56. 
112 Indeed, on 6 October 2016 (Decision no 16-D-21), the Competition Authority issued a decision in which 
the admissibility of evidence was challenged on the grounds of its alleged unlawful and unfair nature. In 
order to consider the controversial evidence admissible, the Authority states, first, that the unlawfulness is 
only alleged and not established. A filing of a complaint is not sufficient to establish it in the absence of a 
final judgment effectively establishing the unlawfulness of the conditions for obtaining evidence. It goes 
on to state that: ‘Even if, under a final criminal judgment, the fraudulent origin of the documents is 
established, the documents in dispute do not, at first sight, contain any words or statements collected 
unfairly without the author’s knowledge’. Moreover, the authenticity of the documents is not disputed. 
Finally, the Authority notes that: ‘the conditions under which [it] was provided with these documents ... do 
not in themselves affect the principles of fairness enshrined in Article 6(1) of the ECHR, provided that they 
do not deprive the parties of the exercise of their rights of defence and in particular of the possibility of 
challenging the probative value of these documents later during the adversarial examination of the 
application to the court’. It is based on the Schenk decision of the ECtHR (Schenk v Switzerland App no 
10862/84 (ECtHR, 12 July 1988)) and the above-mentioned Goldfish judgment of the EU General Court. 
113 Mustapha Mekki, ‘Le Principe de Loyauté Probatoire A-t-il Encore un Avenir dans le Contentieux de la 
Concurrence ?’ (2016) Dalloz 2355. 
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To date, however, it is possible to consider that evidence collected clandestinely 
(without the knowledge of the person concerned by the statements or information 
reported) or by scheme114 is considered unfair and therefore inadmissible. 
Apart from these cases, fairness is required not of the evidence but of the 
procedure, which amounts to replacing questions of inadmissibility with those relating to 
the principle of adversarial proceedings, fairness and equality of arms115 thus they are 
discussed – and therefore postponed – at the time of the imposition of the sanction (if the 
procedure is successful). 
In continuation of this very narrow approach of the Court of Cassation concerning 
the admissibility of clandestine recordings and more generally concerning the 
admissibility of unfair evidence obtained clandestinely or by stratagem, there is the 
question of protecting the confidentiality of correspondence exchanged with a lawyer. On 
that subject, the First President of the Paris Court of Appeal considered that the privilege 
of confidentiality of correspondence between lawyers and their clients extends to e-mails 
(internal to the company) emanating from the in-house lawyer of the company seized and 
searched, if they reflect the lawyer’s defence strategy.116 Thus, the extension is limited 
insofar as it is based on the content of the e-mails and not on the quality of the senders 
and recipients. In other words, as soon as the internal email includes the defence strategy 
developed and then transmitted by the lawyer, it does not matter who disseminates and 
receives this information. Only the fact that the information in question is covered by 
secrecy is relevant. 
Comparison of the procedure for searches and seizures in competition 
matters and the criminal procedure for searches. Some authors consider that criminal 
procedure would be strengthened if the legal framework governing searches and seizures 
in competition matters were applied to it. Indeed, while criminal proceedings remain 
resistant to the mere presence of the lawyer during searches, competition proceedings 
allow him to be present alongside his client. In addition, any challenge to the searches 
and seizures in competition matters may be brought before the first president of the Court 
of Appeal within the jurisdiction of which the JLD authorised the searches and seizures 
in competition matters, within 10 days of notification of his order (in practice at the end 
of the operations). This possibility of immediate challenge before the judicial authority 
does not exist in criminal matters, as actions for the nullity or release of seizures are 
generally much later than searches. 
																																								 																				
114 That is, by means of an act involving a deceptive process, the use of a trick or scheme that renders the 
result – the evidence obtained – inadmissible. 
115 ‘The fairness cursor moves and is no longer upstream, when obtaining evidence, but downstream during 
its discussion’, Mekki (n 113). 
116 Paris, ord, 8 November 2017, no 14/13384: AJ Pénal 2018.49, obs Cyrille Mayoux; CCC 2017, no 256, 
obs David Bosco. Regarding a search and seizure operation carried out against Whirlpool France by the 
Competition Authority, the first president had to rule – in particular – on the legality of the seizure of two 
internal company emails, repeating the elements contained in writings that the company’s lawyer had sent 
to his client, with a view to preparing his defence because of previous searches made in the same case. In 
his order of 8 November 2017, the first President analyses in concreto the content of the said e-mails, before 
concluding that their seizure has affected, on the one hand, the secrecy of correspondence between the 
lawyer and his client and, on the other hand, the rights of the defence. 
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However, it must be noted that the competition procedure is particularly close to 
criminal procedure: the searches and seizures in competition matters are authorised by an 
order of the JLD and are carried out in accordance with the provisions of Article 56 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure; the remedies are carried out in accordance with the rules 
of criminal procedure; the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation rules in fine. 
Yet, in criminal matters, the seizure of documents covered by secrecy is more 
likely as the number of e-mail seizures – by keywords, or even global – potentially 
containing lawyer/client exchanges and subsequent internal e-mails increases. 
Unfortunately, it is not uncommon to see the presence, in criminal cases, of internal 
company emails containing customer/lawyer correspondence, or even the correspondence 
itself. The seizures of the latter are systematically cancelled by the criminal judge, in the 
name of respect for professional secrecy, but several months or years after their seizure 
and their reading by all those involved in the trial. On the other hand, the Criminal 
Chamber does not yet seem to have cancelled a seizure of internal company e-mails. 
Thus, all means of evidence are a priori admissible, whether they are adduced by 
individuals or by the public authority, provided that their collection and production are 
lawful and fair (compliance with the rules on investigative measures, respect for privacy, 
respect for protected secrets, etc). 
This absence of restriction at the collection stage is extended by the unfettered 
evaluation of evidence by the competent authority (Enforcement committee or judge) at 
the sanction or trial stage. 
In general, the remedies available either at the investigation stage against certain 
investigative measures (in the case of searches and seizures)117 or during the sanction 
procedure allow evidence gathered in violation of EU rules118 to be challenged. 
																																								 																				
117 Art L 450-4 Code de commerce. 
118 In a case where the company’s lawyer, after unsuccessfully seeking the intervention of the JLD, had 
obtained by order of the first president of the court of appeal the annulment of the seizure, the Criminal 
Chamber of the Court of Cassation challenged this annulment on the grounds that ‘the occupant of the 
premises [the company] does not have the right to bring the matter before the judge who authorised the 
visit and the seizure himself, the judicial police officers responsible for attending the operations having to, 
during the search, keep the magistrate informed of the difficulties encountered’ (Court of Cassation, 
Criminal Chamber, 9 March 2016, no 14-84.566 (2016) Dalloz 652; Élisabeth Gautier and Johanna de 
Mortillet (2016) Actualité Juridique Contrats d’Affaires 251 (note)). The solution is reflected in a decision 
stressing that ‘there is no text requiring that the parties or their lawyer have personal access to the judge 
[and that] Competition Authority investigators are not required to communicate precisely the criteria for 
selecting the data seized or to reveal the technical details of the seizures, the search engines and the 
keywords used’ (Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 26 October 2016, no 15-83.477). The company 
faced with the refusal of the judicial police officer can therefore only lodge an appeal a posteriori before 
the first president of the competent court of appeal (it being noted that, in the first decision, no grievance 
had been raised for the refusal by the judicial police officer to the lawyer to record the incident in the record, 
while in the second, it is specified that ‘observations [had] been recorded by the lawyer in the records’, the 
question therefore remains of the obligation for the judicial police officer to collect the observations made, 
Jean-Michel Vertut (2016) Lettre distribution no 12). To qualify somewhat the criticisms formulated above, 
commentators have stressed that the expectation of the Court of Cassation has the merit of specifying the 
mission of police officers during home visits. Since the latter ‘must, during the visit, keep the magistrate 
informed of the difficulties encountered’, the Court does not seem to give them the choice of whether or 
not to refer the matter to the JLD in the event of an incident raised by the company: this is a real obligation 
for them. Only this reading of the judgment seems to make it possible to limit the infringement of the right 
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At the investigation stage, these elements may be challenged if the investigation 
measure is based on these elements (exclusively or decisively) or if there is a risk that the 
rights of the defence may otherwise be irreparably impaired. 
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
4.1 General rules on the admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence collected 
by national administrative authorities 
General principles. Information collected by national administrative authorities is in 
principle admissible, without particular restriction, as evidence in criminal proceedings.  
This is the result of the principle of freedom of evidence that governs French 
criminal procedure. 
This is further reinforced by the provisions which provide for the obligation of the 
administrative authorities to transmit to the judicial authorities (in particular the public 
prosecutor) the elements in their possession which appear likely to justify criminal 
proceedings (Article 40 CCP;119 L462-6 Commercial Code in the case of the Competition 
Authority, for example)120 or which provide more generally for the possibility for the 
administrative authorities to transmit any element to the courts (ex Article L452-3 of the 
Commercial Code), or even to bring civil proceedings.121   
Hence, the general rules of criminal procedure as set out above122 apply. 
Thus, these elements are subject to the principles of lawfulness, fairness and 
regularity of gathering of evidence by the administrative authority, of which the criminal 
judge is the guardian. 
In the case of non-criminal investigations or proceedings. Documents from 
non-criminal proceedings, whether civil, commercial or administrative (including 
elements of an internal administrative investigation), may be included in the file of the 
proceedings. Such documents may not be annulled by the criminal court. In principle, 
																																								 																				
of access to the judge by companies, provided, of course, that the police officers, seized of an incident, have 
the means to join the JLD and systematically do so in accordance with the principle of adversarial 
proceedings, ie in the presence of the occupant of the premises or his representative (cf Gautier and de 
Mortillet (above)). 
119 Art 40, para 2 is a general provision that also applies to independent administrative authorities: ‘Every 
constituted authority, every public officer or civil servant who, in the performance of his duties, has gained 
knowledge of the existence of a felony or a misdemeanour is obliged to notify forthwith the district 
prosecutor of the offence and to transmit to this prosecutor any relevant information, official reports or 
documents’. 
120 As Haritini Matsopoulou points out, since the criminal judge is required to seek the opinion of the AMF 
when deciding on one of the offences against market transparency, ‘it is obvious that when the same facts 
have previously given rise to an administrative investigation, the AMF may forward to the criminal judge 
the evidence it holds’ (Haritini Matsopoulou , ‘De la Preuve Administrative à la Preuve Pénale’ in Beauvais 
and Parizot (n 60) 175). 
121 Art L621-16-1 Monetary and Financial Code with respect to the AMF; Art L232 of the Book of tax 
procedure with respect to the Tax Administration. 
122 supra, section 1. 
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documents not issued by an authority vested with ‘penal’ prerogatives cannot be 
considered as falling within the category of acts that may be annulled. 
However, the status of an administrative procedure may vary depending on the 
role it plays in the initiation of prosecutions and more broadly in criminal proceedings. 
Thus, a preliminary administrative enquiry, included in the procedure, does not 
constitute an act or document that can be annulled,123 as long as it is included for 
information purposes; which is generally the case. On the other hand, in the case of the 
administrative tax audit procedure, because it constitutes the preliminary and necessary 
support for prosecutions, the criminal court is competent to examine its regularity.124 
Otherwise, it is from the point of view of fairness that the act of criminal procedure 
undertaken to obtain the elements of the administrative procedure may be challenged. In 
a very specific case concerning evidence gathered in the course of a canonical procedure, 
the Criminal Chamber held that the mere fact that evidence relating to the offence was 
gathered in the non-criminal procedure according to rules less protective of the rights of 
the defence than those of the criminal procedure did not in itself establish the existence 
of a(n) (unfair) scheme.125 
Case of information transmitted by an internal security attaché. The 
information provided by internal security attachés, provided in accordance with the 
provisions governing the organisation of internal security services within diplomatic 
missions abroad, does not constitute judicial police acts and is intended solely to guide 
any investigative acts by the French authorities, so that these elements, if necessary 
subject to adversarial debate before the trial court in accordance with the rights of the 
defence, may not, pursuant to the last paragraph of the preliminary article of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, serve as the sole basis for a conviction.126 
Consequently, either the attachés act on the basis of a letter rogatory or a 
production order, and their acts constitute acts of judicial police likely to be annulled; or 
they act within the framework of their intelligence mission laid down by the decree of 30 
August 2006 and their acts, though they are not judicial police acts, nevertheless are likely 
to be annulled. In both cases, the formal regularity of the attachés’ acts is subject to 
control. 
Where such regularity is not in question, the content of the notes is a matter of 
substance and therefore of adducing of evidence. The Court of Cassation states 
unsurprisingly that the note is for information purposes only.127 
 
 
																																								 																				
123 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 16 September 2003, no 03-82.918, Jean Pradel, ‘L’Enquête 
Administrative Versée dans une Procédure Pénale n’est pas un Acte ou une Pièce de la Procédure’ (2004) 
Dalloz 670 (note). 
124 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 3 May 2001, no 00-82.416. 
125 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 17 December 2002, no 02-83.679 
126 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 19 September 2017, no 17-82.317, Chloé Fonteix (2017) Dalloz 
actualité (note). 
127 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 19 September 2017, Gildas Roussel, ‘Valeur Probatoire de Notes 
d’Attachés de Sécurité Intérieure’ (2017) AJ Pénal 507. 
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4.2 Admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and especially OLAF, in 
criminal proceedings 
Lack of special rules. The admissibility of evidence collected by European bodies in 
criminal proceedings is governed by the general principles of criminal procedure. As 
indicated above,128 texts relating to evidence are rare and not very detailed. No text 
provides for specific rules to govern the conditions for the admissibility of information 
collected by administrative authorities in the context of criminal proceedings. This also 
applies to evidence collected by European bodies or authorities. 
It is the case law which, on the basis of the principle of freedom of evidence in 
criminal matters, determines the conditions for the admissibility of such information and 
its probative value. 
Apart from the question of the (procedural) regularity of obtaining the information 
(compliance by the administrative authority with the special rules governing the 
collection of this information), no distinction is made between the procedural frameworks 
– in particular punitive or non-punitive – in which this information has been collected.129 
Similarly, there is no distinction between the types of evidence collected. 
Incidentally, however, it is possible to mention the case of information collected 
in the context of the leniency procedure which is the subject of a special approach to its 
use outside the framework of that procedure.130 
OLAF report as ‘act of procedure’. With regard to the evidence collected by 
OLAF and in particular its report, the conditions of admissibility vary depending on 
whether the evidence or the report constitutes an ‘act of the procedure’ within the meaning 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure.131 It is on condition that information, reports or other 
elements emanating from OLAF (or more broadly a foreign or European authority) fall 
into this concept that they may be annulled and thus excluded from the procedure, or even 
be at the origin of the annulment of the entire subsequent procedure. 
Special case of OLAF assistance (participation in the national investigation) 
/ act of cooperation or mutual assistance. OLAF’s assistance to national criminal 
investigations, either on its own initiative or at the request of national authorities, seems 
to fall under the rules of international cooperation and mutual assistance. 
 
																																								 																				
128 supra, section 1. 
129 In this respect, it was held that ‘the regulatory authority may rely on the evidence gathered during an 
investigation that led to the opening of sanction proceedings in the exercise of another jurisdiction’. See, 
eg, Conseil d’État 13 July 2011, Vallon, no 337552; Mathias Guyomar (2011) Bulletin Joly Bourse (no 11) 
596 (conclusions): concerning the use by the AMF Board of evidence gathered during an investigation 
during the examination of an application for approval. See also Conseil d’État, 26 January 2015, Bernheim 
Dreyfus Society, no 368847. 
130 Autorité de la concurrence, Communiqué de procédure, 3 April 2015, relatif au programme de clémence 
français; criticised by the doctrine, see Georges Decocq, ‘Le Rôle du Ministère Public au Regard du Pouvoir 
de Sanction des Autorités Indépendantes. En Droit de la Concurrence’ (2015) Cahiers de Droit de 
l’Entreprise 42. 
131 supra, section 1. 
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Regime of acts of mutual assistance. According to part of the doctrine, OLAF 
acts included in the procedure are treated as acts of international mutual assistance.132 
However, this analysis is fragile insofar as the rules on international mutual assistance 
distinguish two situations which do not correspond perfectly to the case of OLAF’s 
participation in (or contribution to) a national criminal investigation. These two situations 
are as follows: either OLAF acts are treated as acts of assistance executed in France on 
the basis of an international letter rogatory of a foreign (judicial) authority; or they are 
treated as acts executed abroad on the basis of an international letter rogatory of a French 
(judicial) authority.133 
In the first situation, the acts in question are not intended to be part of proceedings 
in France but must be executed in accordance with the legislation of the French State 
acting as the executing State. The Criminal Chamber concluded that these acts could be 
reviewed by French courts, in particular by way of an application for a declaration of 
invalidity under Article 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, in this case, 
the disputed documents must not have been returned to the requesting State. Once this 
return has been made, the validity can no longer be contested in France. 
In the second situation, the acts performed constitute acts of the French procedure. 
However, their regularity cannot be examined under French law (or foreign law). This 
does not mean, however, that the parties cannot request their annulment before the 
investigating chamber, but they can only invoke the violation of the rights of the defence 
or that of a general principle of law, an expression which covers the principles set out by 
the ECHR. 
Cooperation with OLAF. The case law handed down by the Criminal Chamber 
of the Court of Cassation on OLAF investigations extends and clarifies this analysis of 
the doctrine. 
The exchange of information governed by European rules (the legitimacy of 
OLAF’s investigative acts). In a very important decision,134 which has not been 
published and has not been the subject of any analysis by academics, the Criminal 
Chamber provided very valuable information on the qualification and status of the acts 
performed by OLAF in the context of national criminal proceedings. In this case, a request 
for assistance was sent to OLAF by the French investigators consisting in the preparation 
of a report making it possible, firstly, to identify the links between the persons and 
companies identified on the basis of banking and telephone documents provided by the 
investigators to OLAF, secondly, to identify suspect markets and, thirdly, to indicate the 
evidence found. A further request was made for OLAF to use computer data seized during 
searches. These requests and the reports drawn up by OLAF in response were the subject 
of applications for a declaration of invalidity which were rejected by the criminal court. 
The Criminal Chamber validated the analysis of the criminal judge that these requests and 
																																								 																				
132 Marie-Emma Boursier, ‘Entraide Internationale, Lutte contre les Infractions d’Affaires Internationales 
et Nouveaux Leviers d’Efficacité’ (2016) AJ Pénal 137; Olivier Beauvallet, ‘Artt 694 à 695-9’ (2010) 
JurisClasseur Procédure pénale, Fascicule 20, no 41. 
133 Desportes and Lazerges-Cousquer (n 53) no 2000.  
134 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 16 January 2013, no 12-84.221. 
128 J. TricoT 4. France 129
 
the documents sent in response by OLAF constitute acts of ‘mutual cooperation’, 
governed by Regulation 1073/1999 (Article 10, now Article 12 of Regulation 883/2013) 
and the Second Protocol to the PIF Convention (Article 7). According to the criminal 
judge, ‘the disputed act and OLAF’s response can be analysed as diligences performed 
within the framework of the aforementioned European standards, the authority of which 
is greater than that of the legal provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure’. The parties 
unsuccessfully challenged this analysis before the Court of Cassation on the grounds that 
the request of the French investigators did not constitute a mere exchange of information 
within the meaning of Regulation 1073/1999 or an act of cooperation likely to escape the 
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. They claimed that this request was in fact 
an investigative act within the meaning of the Code of Criminal Procedure which could 
not be directly entrusted to OLAF, which had no judicial police powers. The Court of 
Cassation rejects these arguments and states that the request for assistance addressed to 
OLAF is indeed an exchange of information provided for by the Second Protocol to the 
PIF Convention and does not constitute a delegation of investigative powers to OLAF. 
Cooperation subject to compliance with national procedural rules (cases of 
invalidity). However, the request for assistance itself (addressed by the national 
authorities to OLAF) must comply with the rules of national criminal procedure. Failing 
this, this request and the information transmitted by OLAF as a result may be annulled. 
This is what happened in the same case. 
The national investigators had carried out production orders addressed to OLAF 
without prior authorisation from the public prosecutor’s office. This absence is a cause of 
invalidity which affects the request and all the acts that constitute its follow-up. Therefore, 
the reports sent by OLAF in response to this request have been annulled. However, in this 
case, the criminal judge has made a partial annulment as he has the power to do. This is 
confirmed by the Court of Cassation, which emphasises that this decision (that is, the 
decision between a total or a partial annulment) is subject to the sovereign assessment of 
the judges of the merits. 
But, even if only partially, this annulment has far-reaching effects since the final 
investigation report drawn up by OLAF at the end of internal investigations is also null 
and void in so far as it recapitulates and summarises the content of the previously annulled 
and withdrawn documents of the procedure. According to the Criminal Chamber,135 this 
reference infringes the requirement of a fair trial, provided for in the preliminary article 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure and article 6 ECHR, ‘in that it creates a real 
disadvantage to the detriment of the applicants’. In addition, the maintaining in the 
proceedings of this investigation report is contrary to the final provisions of Article 174 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides that ‘no information against the 
parties may be obtained from acts or documents or parts of acts or documents annulled’. 
Yet, it is not possible to distinguish in the report and its annexes the passages referring to 
the annulled documents. Therefore, it is the whole that must be discarded. Thus, the 
																																								 																				
135 Which ruled in another decision of 9 November 2016 (no 16-83.602) in the same case. 
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Criminal Chamber approves the criminal judge on the basis that the final report and its 
annexes were indeed supported by acts that had been definitively annulled. 
In the judgment of 16 January 2013, the participation of OLAF agents in 
searches was also challenged, as it had not been authorised by the prosecutor (in 
accordance with the CCP). However, while the judges considered that the requests for 
assistance should be cancelled, they refused to cancel the police records (signed by OLAF 
agents) and the searches carried out. The judges considered that to the extent that OLAF 
agents did not intervene during the searches (as indicated in the records), the requests 
were ‘fruitless’ acts as they were ‘not followed by effect’. The mere presence of OLAF 
agents shall not be grounds for the annulment of the search and the resulting reports. 
Case law of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation concerning the 
admissibility of OLAF acts and investigations in French criminal proceedings. The 
rulings handed down by the Criminal Chamber are few in number,136 but they already 
make it possible to outline the procedural status of OLAF’s final report (and its 
annexes).137 
First, these judgments confirm that these elements are admissible a priori and that 
they can be used as evidence. Moreover, a decision of 15 November 2015138 shows that 
OLAF’s investigations and report cannot be described as ‘mere allegations’, and 
moreover, as ‘unverified’. 
Secondly, as mentioned above, the request for assistance addressed by the French 
authorities and the acts carried out in response fall within the scope of cooperation 
governed by the specific provisions of Union law applicable to OLAF’s action.139 
Thirdly, however, such cooperation must be conducted by national authorities in 
accordance with the rules of national criminal procedure.140 Otherwise, the risk of 
cancellation of the request for cooperation and the acts carried out in response is 
incurred.141 
Fourthly, the Criminal Chamber considers that OLAF’s final report in the criminal 
proceedings file constitutes, not merely information or evidence ‘only’ subject to 
adversarial debate but an act of the proceedings which may be annulled. The report is 
obviously not annulled as such, but insofar as it constitutes an act of the (French) criminal 
procedure, which implies its exclusion from the file. It cannot be used as a basis for 
																																								 																				
136 There are actually three cases. The first, relating to acts of corruption, is discussed above in this section. 
It was the subject of three decisions of the Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation: on 16 January 2013 
(no 12-84.221), on 10 November 2015 (no 15-82.497), and on 9 November 2016 (no 16-83.602). The 
second case was the subject of the landmark decision of 9 December 2015 (no 15-82.300; published and 
commented decision). The third is of lesser importance; it was issued on 15 November 2015 (no 14-82.819). 
137 Unfortunately, the decisions of the trial courts are not published. 
138 No 14-82.819 (n 136). 
139 Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 16 January 2013 (no 12-84.221), see supra in this section. 
140 In particular, the requesting of OLAF by the police must be based on the prior authorisation of the Public 
Prosecutor’s Office and the swearing in of the required officers. As for OLAF agents, required as experts, 
they must base their expert report on the information in the file. 
141 ibid. 
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decisions by judges or national (investigative or prosecutorial) authorities. The annulment 
also has the effect of depriving all subsequent acts of any merit.142 
The Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation justifies this solution by 
guaranteeing effective judicial control. The annulment in this case is based on a finding 
of a violation of fundamental rights. 
Fifthly, as regards the grounds for annulment and the content of the control carried 
out by the criminal judge, the decision of 9 December 2015143 provides several lessons. 
Thus, the criminal judge made a point in this case of noting that:  
it follows from the examination of the records drawn up by OLAF investigators that they 
have surrounded themselves with guarantees in terms of fundamental rights and freedoms 
since, before hearing Mr. X.... as a witness, they informed him of the context of their 
proceedings and the reasons for the hearing, of his right to request that a person of his 
choice be present during the hearing, of his right not to answer questions likely to 
incriminate him, of his right to submit the documents to be attached to the hearing 
minutes, of his right to receive a copy at the end of the hearing; that they also informed 
him that this record could be used in administrative, disciplinary or criminal proceedings. 
They add: ‘It follows from these elements that the precautions taken by OLAF 
investigators, before and during their investigations and the notifications of rights they 
have made, are not contrary to the treaty provisions invoked, but comply with the 
Community texts governing this body and are compatible with the provisions of criminal 
procedure under national law’. These elements show the content and extent of the control 
that can be carried out by the criminal judge over the OLAF investigation and report, 
noting that the judge emphasises that the guarantees listed are in conformity with EU 
provisions and with those of French criminal procedure. 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
5.1 Exchange of views between OLAF and national authorities on the requirements 
for admissibility of evidence 
In addition to French AFCOS, which seems to be notified only in case of difficulty, OLAF 
contacts the competent national authorities directly. In particular, it seems that in practice 
the information at OLAF’s disposal is transmitted to the Paris Public Prosecutor, who 
forwards it to the prosecutors of the Republic with territorial competence. 
OLAF then refers the matter to the judicial police services and, in particular, to 
the Offices of the Central Directorate of the Judicial Police (DCPJ) for investigation or 
assistance. They may be called upon to investigate OLAF denunciations or to assist 
OLAF investigators when they carry out acts of investigation on national territory.  
																																								 																				
142 See Court of Cassation, Criminal Chamber, 9 November 2016 (no 16-83.602), see supra in this section. 
143 cf no 15-82.300 (n 136). 
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The information of the national authorities is considered as a prerequisite by 
practitioners (a position relayed by the French authorities in the context of the 
negotiations on the reform of the rules on OLAF’s tasks and action). This position is 
based in particular on grounds for coordinating European and national investigations, 
both punitive and non-punitive, but also on grounds relating to the securing of OLAF 
investigations in France and the detection of possible criminal offences. 
The ‘privileged’ services are mainly those dedicated to financial crime, namely 
the Central Office for the Prevention of Major Financial Crime (OCRGDF), which is 
responsible for combating Community fraud, and the Central Office for the Prevention of 
Corruption and Financial and Tax Offences (OCLCIFF), which is responsible, inter alia, 
for combating corruption and illegal taking of interests. The National Judicial Customs 
Service could usefully be activated, but to date this does not seem to have been the case, 
for reasons that seem to stem from the choice of prosecutors initially referred by OLAF. 
Cooperation, which may take the form of assistance by OLAF agents to operations 
(presence during searches) or, conversely, assistance by national agents (customs officers 
in particular) to administrative inspections carried out by OLAF, or requests for assistance 
(provision of information or analysis), is in any event based on compliance with the rules 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure as regards acts of judicial investigation (and the 
Customs Code as regards acts of administrative investigation). 
In this sense, prior consultation is carried out through information and then 
effective assistance from the police (or customs) services concerned, which then act in 
accordance with the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, respect for which they are 
responsible for guaranteeing. 
 
5.2 Duplication of OLAF activities  
Investigative acts carried out by OLAF, on its own initiative or at the request of the French 
authorities, as well as the results of such investigations, shall not constitute judicial police 
acts which cannot be delegated to the OLAF agents. They represent acts of cooperation 
subject to the European rules governing the Office’s activities. Their integration into the 
national criminal procedure presupposes compliance with the rules of the Code of 
Criminal Procedure, which does not require duplication of acts. For example, police 
services may require OLAF agents to carry out analyses. In this case, the request must 
comply with the conditions of the CCP; OLAF’s activity then falls within the scope of 
expertise (agents are appointed as experts in accordance with the provisions of the CCP). 
More generally, acts of investigation carried out by OLAF (in particular on-the-
spot checks), insofar as they constitute acts or documents of national criminal 
proceedings, must, under penalty of being declared void, respect the rights of the defence. 
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1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
In the German criminal justice system, misconduct may be punished by criminal 
sanctions (imprisonment or criminal penalty) or non-criminal sanctions (administrative 
fines). Whereas criminal sentencing is governed by the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch 
– StGB) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung – StPO), the 
imposition of administrative fines and punitive administrative proceedings falls within 
the scope of the Act on Regulatory Offences (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz – OWiG). The 
OWiG applies to all regulatory offences under Federal and state law (§ 2 OWiG). A 
regulatory offence is defined as ‘an unlawful and reprehensible act, constituting the 
factual elements set forth in a statute that enables the act to be sanctioned by imposition 
of a regulatory fine’ (see § 1(1) OWiG), ie any offence that can be punished by a fine. 
According to § 46(1) OWiG, regulatory offences are not governed by administrative law 
(such as the Act on Administrative Proceedings, Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz – VwVfG), 
but by the law of criminal proceedings.  
Regulatory offences are investigated by administrative authorities (§ 35 OWiG). 
If a regulatory offence has been established, the authority may issue a regulatory fining 
notice (Bußgeldbescheid) and thereby impose a fine upon the defendant (§ 65 OWiG). 
The regulatory fining notice is subject to judicial review if the defendant submits a written 
objection to the regulatory fining notice to the Local Court in criminal matters 
(Amtsgericht, § 68 OWiG). If the objection is admissible and the administrative authority 
does not withdraw the fining notice, the public prosecutor will take over the function of 
the administrative authority in court proceedings (§ 69(3) and (4) OWiG), and the rules 
on criminal proceedings apply accordingly unless otherwise provided (§ 71(1) OWiG). 
 
1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
In criminal proceedings, the main aim of admissibility rules is to maintain the rule of law 
and – according to some authors – to deter law enforcement authorities from illegally 
collecting evidence.1 Accordingly, core admissibility rules are derived from fundamental 
																																																						
1 See the overview provided by Matthias Jahn, Beweiserhebungs- und Beweisverwertungsverbote im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen den Garantien des Rechtsstaates und der effektiven Bekämpfung von Kriminalität 
und Terrorismus, Gutachten C für den 67. Deutschen Juristentag 2008 (CH Beck 2008) C 51–65; Hans-
Heiner Kühne, Strafprozessrecht (9th edn, CF Müller 2015) 908–908.5. 
rights and the right to a fair trial.2 Thus, evidence obtained by an interrogation is 
inadmissible if the defendant has not been properly informed of the right to remain silent3 
or of the right to consult with defence counsel4 (§ 136(1)2, § 163a(3)2 and (4)2 StPO). 
The exclusion of evidence, however, must be based upon an overall assessment of the 
gravity of the violation of the individual right and the impact on the fairness of 
proceedings and the public interest in effective criminal law enforcement.5 Therefore, the 
failure to inform the defendant of the right to free legal assistance by counsel if he or she 
has sufficient means to pay it (§ 136(1)5 StPO), does not result in the exclusion of 
evidence obtained by the interrogation of the defendant if he or she has been properly 
informed of the right to consult with defence counsel.6 
Furthermore, evidence may be excluded in order to ensure its quality and 
reliability. For instance, evidence derived from a polygraph test has been rejected for a 
lack of probative value (‘wholly inappropriate’, § 244(3) StPO).7 For similar reasons, the 
examination of a witness during trial shall not be substituted by reading out the record of 
a prior interrogation (§ 250 StPO). The exceptions to this rule distinguish between 
interrogations conducted by judges (§ 251(1) StPO) and interrogations carried out by 
other officials (§ 251(2) StPO, eg public prosecutor, police officer). As can be inferred 
from this distinction, the record of a judicial interrogation is considered to be more 
reliable.8 
If the evidence has been collected in the framework of administrative proceedings 
(eg the supervision of economic operators), the transfer of information (personal data) to 
public prosecutors and criminal courts interferes with the right to privacy and to the 
protection of personal data (Article 2(1) and Article 1(1) Basic Law, Grundgesetz – GG) 
and, thus, requires a legal basis.9 As a rule, administrative law provides for a 
corresponding legal basis (eg § 9(1)3 No 1 Banking Act, Kreditwesengesetz – KWG) or 
even an obligation to transmit the information to criminal law enforcement authorities 
(§ 11 Securities Trading Act, Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG; § 12 Customs 
Administration Law, Zollverwaltungsgesetz – ZollVG). However, information that has 
been collected in tax proceedings is protected by tax secrecy (§ 30 Fiscal Code, 
Abgabenordnung – AO) and may be disclosed to criminal law enforcement authorities for 
the purpose of prosecuting tax crimes or particularly serious crimes only (§ 30(4) and (5) 
AO; see also §§ 31a, 31b AO). Accordingly, evidence which the taxpayer, in compliance 
																																																						
2 Ulrich Eisenberg, Beweisrecht der StPO (10th edn, CH Beck 2017) 330; Werner Beulke and Sabine 
Swoboda, Strafprozessrecht (14th edn, CF Müller 2018) 454. 
3 Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice), official court reports in criminal matters (hereinafter: 
BGHSt) 38, 214 (220). 
4 BGHSt 47, 172 (174). 
5 BGHSt 38, 214 (219–220); 42, 15 (21); for more details see Jahn (n 1), C 45–47. 
6 BGH Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (hereinafter: NStZ) 2018, 671 (671–672). 
7 BGHSt 44, 308 (319); BGH NStZ 2011, 474 (475). 
8 BGHSt 51, 325 (332); Helmut Kreicker, ‘§ 251ʼ in Hartmut Schneider (ed), Münchener Kommentar zur 
Strafprozessordnung, vol 2 (1st edn, CH Beck 2016), para 69. 
9 Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court), official court reports (hereinafter: BVerfGE) 
65, 1; for a detailed analysis see Martin Böse, Wirtschaftsaufsicht und Strafverfolgung (Mohr Siebeck 2005) 
281ff. 
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with his obligations under tax law, has revealed to the competent revenue authority may 
not be used in criminal proceedings, except for the prosecution of tax crimes or 
particularly serious crimes (§ 393(2) AO).  
Furthermore, information that has been collected by an administrative authority 
using particularly intrusive measures (eg surveillance of telecommunication) may be used 
as evidence in criminal proceedings without the consent of the person affected by the 
measure only to investigate and adjudicate an offence in respect of which such a measure 
could have been ordered in a criminal investigation (§ 161(2) StPO – hypothetischer 
Ersatzeingriff, for acoustic surveillance of private homes and online-searches see also 
§ 100e(6) No 1 StPO). However, where, unlike the corresponding measure in a criminal 
investigation, investigative acts in administrative (customs) proceedings do not require 
judicial authorization (eg a search warrant), the obtained evidence may be used in 
criminal proceedings even if the competent authority decided to use its administrative 
powers instead of its corresponding powers in the framework of a criminal investigation 
in order to maintain the secrecy of the ongoing investigation.10 
 It follows from the foregoing that the exclusion of evidence may result from an 
autonomous exclusionary rule (selbständiges Beweisverwertungsverbot) aimed at the 
protection of fundamental rights against the use of evidence collected legally (such as 
§ 161(2) StPO) or an exclusionary rule derived from a provision on gathering of evidence 
(such as the privilege against self-incrimination) that has been violated (unselbständiges 
Beweisverwertungsverbot).11 
 
1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
In punitive administrative proceedings (Ordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren), the 
admissibility rules in criminal proceedings apply accordingly (§ 46(1) OWiG). Likewise, 
these rules shall ensure the rule of law and protect individual rights.12 As a consequence, 
evidence that has been collected by wilfully disregarding the law is inadmissible.13 
However, the provisions on the quality and the reliability of evidence are less strict than 
the corresponding rules in criminal proceedings and allow for a simplified procedure for 
taking the evidence. In particular, the examination of witnesses may be replaced by 
reading out records of a previous examination of witnesses or statements of public 
authorities (§ 77a(1) and (2) OWiG). 
In general, information that has been gathered in administrative proceedings may 
be used in punitive administrative proceedings if the latter proceedings are conducted by 
the same authority (§ 30(4) No 1 AO, § 12 ZollVG). In some cases, the legal basis for the 
transmission (and use) of the collected data allows the investigation and adjudication of 
																																																						
10 BGH NStZ 2018, 296 (297). 
11 Jahn (n 1) C 33–38. 
12 BVerfG Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (hereinafter: NJW) 2011, 2783 (2784); Helmut Seitz and Martin 
Bauer, ‘§ 46ʼ in Erich Göhler (ed), Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten (17th edn, CH Beck 2017), para 10c; 
Joachim Lampe, ‘§ 46ʼ in Wolfgang Mitsch (ed), Karlsruher Kommentar zum Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz 
(5th edn, CH Beck 2018), para 18a. 
13 KG Neue Zeitschrift für Verkehrsrecht (hereinafter: NZV) 1997, 48 (50). 
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any regulatory offence (§ 9(1) No 1 KWG), whereas the scope of other provisions is 
strictly limited to criminal offences (§ 11 WpHG). 
 
1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
	
1.3.1 Criminal law 
As a matter of principle, the German criminal justice system provides for an exhaustive 
list of means of proof.14 Facts relevant for the decision on the merits of the case 
(conviction or acquittal, sentencing) must be proven by a numerus clausus of means of 
evidence (§§ 244–257 StPO, Strengbeweis), ie examination of witnesses (§§ 48ff StPO), 
expert opinion (§§ 72ff StPO), inspection (§ 86 StPO, Augenschein), documentary 
evidence (§ 249 StPO, Urkundenbeweis) and statements of the defendant (§ 243(5) StPO). 
However, facts relevant for procedural decisions (eg on whether to place a witness under 
oath or to terminate proceedings without taking a decision on the merits of the case) may 
be established by any other means of evidence (Freibeweis). 
 
1.3.2 Punitive administrative law 
As far as the investigation and prosecution of regulatory offences are concerned, the 
fining notice of the administrative authority may be based upon any means of evidence 
(Freibeweis).15 The court, however, is bound by the strict rules that apply to a criminal 
trial (Strengbeweis).16 
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility 
	
1.4.1 Criminal law 
In general, there is no remedy to challenge a court’s decision on the admissibility (or 
exclusion) of specific evidence. Instead, the convicted person may appeal the court’s 
judgement on grounds of law (Revision, §§ 333ff StPO), claiming that the judgement was 
based upon inadmissible evidence and, thus, upon a violation of law (§ 337(1) StPO). The 
same argument can be raised when the appeal is based on grounds of fact and law 
(Berufung, §§ 312ff StPO) and the Court of Appeal has to reassess all evidence. 
However, the person concerned has the right to challenge the legality of 
investigative acts such as search and seizure (§ 98(2)2 StPO) or surveillance measures 
(§ 101(7)2 StPO). If the court quashes the seizure, the public prosecutor must return the 
seized documents to the appellant.17 Upon request, the public prosecutor must delete 
corresponding data (§ 489(2) StPO), and the applicant may bring the matter before court 
																																																						
14 See for the following Kühne (n 1) 760. 
15 Karl-Heinz Kurz, ‘§ 66ʼ in Mitsch (ed) (n 12), para 20.  
16 Lothar Senge, ‘§ 71ʼ in Mitsch (ed) (n 12), para 75. 
17 BVerfGE 44, 353 (384); Eva Menges, ‘§ 98ʼ in Jörg-Peter Becker and others (eds), Löwe-Rosenberg, 
Die Strafprozessordnung und das Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz, Band 3, Teilband 1 (§§ 94-111a) (27th edn, 
de Gruyter 2019), para 63. 
5. Germany 135
if the public prosecutor’s office does not comply with its obligation (§ 23 Courts 
Constitution Act, Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz – GVG).18  
Furthermore, the accused person and his or her defence counsel may object to the 
taking and using of inadmissible evidence during trial, in fact, according to well-
established case-law of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof), the defence 
counsel must object to the taking of inadmissible evidence because otherwise the appeal 
against the judgement (Revision) cannot be based on the complaint that this evidence was 
inadmissible (Rügepräklusion, ‘Widerspruchslösung’).19 This requirement, however, has 
been subject to severe criticism20, and according to most recent case-law, it shall not apply 
to inadmissible evidence that has been obtained by an illegal search of private premises.21 
 
1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
As a matter of principle, the aforementioned observations apply to punitive administrative 
proceedings, too. The court will not review the legality of the fining notice, but investigate 
the case and take a decision that is based upon a fresh determination of the facts. To that 
end, a trial will be held (§ 71(1) OWiG), unless the court decides otherwise (§ 72 OWiG). 
The simplified procedure for taking evidence notwithstanding, the rules on judicial 
review of investigative measures apply in as far as the measure is available in 
administrative punitive proceedings (§ 46(1), (3)–(5) and § 62 OWiG). Furthermore, the 
court decision is subject to an appeal on grounds of law (§§ 79, 80 OWiG – 
Rechtsbeschwerde). 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings 
In principle, criminal proceedings and punitive administrative proceedings follow the 
same rules on the admissibility of evidence (supra 1.1 and 1.2). As a consequence, 
evidence excluded from punitive administrative proceedings will not be admissible in 
criminal proceedings either. 
According to the admissibility rules, however, illegally obtained evidence is not 
per se inadmissible; in its decision on the exclusion of such evidence, the court has to 
balance the interest in maintaining the individual right at stake and the public interest in 
effective law enforcement.22 Since the public interest in effectively prosecuting crimes 
has more weight than the interest in sanctioning regulatory offences,23 the court may 
decide to use evidence in trial even though this evidence is or would be excluded in 
punitive administrative proceedings.  
																																																						
18 BVerfG Neue Juristische Online-Zeitschrift (hereinafter: NJOZ) 2006, 2025 (2026). 
19 BGHSt 38, 214 (225); BGH NJW 1997, 2893. 
20 Jahn (n 1) C–101–102, with further references.  
21 BGH NJW 2017, 1332 (1333). 
22 BVerfG NJW 2011, 2783 (2784); BGH NJW 2007, 2269 (2271); Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional 
Court, hereinafter: OLG) Frankfurt NStZ 2017, 588 (589–590).  
23 See, with regard to the proportionality of home searches for the purpose of prosecuting regulatory 
offences, BVerfG Deutsches Autorecht (hereinafter: DAR) 2016, 641 (643). 
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1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
In general, evidence excluded from criminal proceedings must not be used in punitive 
administrative proceedings (supra 1.5). A different assessment may, however, result from 
the fact that the provision on which the exclusion of evidence has been based does not 
apply in punitive administrative proceedings; for instance, the obligation to inform the 
suspect of the right to consult with defence counsel (§ 136(1)2 StPO, supra 1.2) does not 
apply to punitive administrative proceedings (§ 55(2) OWiG).24 Thus, the evidence that 
has been illegally obtained in a criminal investigation could have been legally obtained 
in the framework of punitive administrative proceedings (hypothetischer 
Ersatzeingriff).25 Therefore, the evidence might be used in order to impose an 
administrative fine.26  
 
2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
	
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings 
German law does not provide for specific rules on the use of OLAF-collected evidence 
in punitive administrative proceedings, so the general rules apply (supra 1.2 and 1.3). 
Therefore, the fining notice may be based upon OLAF reports and related evidence 
(Freibeweis). In contrast, court proceedings are subject to the rules of criminal 
proceedings (Strengbeweis), but the court may apply a simplified procedure for taking 
evidence (§ 77a OWiG, supra 1.2). The defendant can challenge the admissibility of 
OLAF-collected evidence during court proceedings in the manner explained above (1.4). 
 
2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings 
There is no case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative or criminal proceedings. The only cases that deal with OLAF-collected 
evidence are related to customs law and customs proceedings, which do not fall under the 
definition of ‘punitive administrative proceedings’ because they do not qualify as 
criminal according to the Engel criteria of the European Court of Human Rights.27 
Nevertheless, the following case-law may be relevant for the evidentiary basis of the 
fining notice because the administrative authority imposing the fine is not bound by the 
																																																						
24 See also Seitz and Bauer (n 12), para 10c; Lampe (n 12), para 18a. 
25 See in general with regard to this criterion: Seitz and Bauer (n 12), para 10c; Lampe (n 12), para 18a. 
26 See, with regard to the use of illegally obtained evidence in tax proceedings, Bundesfinanzhof (Federal 
Fiscal Court, hereinafter: BFH) Betriebsberater (hereinafter: BB) 2002, 1035 (1036); Beck-Rechtsprechung 
(hereinafter: BeckRS) 2014, 94392; Böse (n 9) 482. 
27 See Engel and Others v The Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72 
(ECtHR, 8 June 1976), paras 82ff. 
5. Germany 137
strict rules on evidence that apply in criminal proceedings, but may rely on any means of 
proof (Freibeweis, supra 2.1).  
The relevant cases in customs law were about goods that had been produced in 
China and transported to the EU without payment of the required customs duties.28 In a 
case before the Fiscal Court (Finanzgericht) Düsseldorf, the plaintiff claimed that the 
OLAF report did not constitute sufficient evidence for the imported products originating 
from China.29 The Fiscal Court shared this assessment and reasoned that the information 
contained in the OLAF report did not establish that the goods bought in China were 
identical to the ones transferred from Korea to the EU. This would have required an on-
the-spot inspection which had been undertaken neither by OLAF nor by the national 
authorities. Accordingly, the examination of OLAF inspectors as witnesses would not 
suffice either. However, it should be noted that the court did not reject OLAF-collected 
evidence as such, but on the basis of an assessment of its reliability in this particular case. 
Like the report of a tax inspector, the OLAF report is a piece of evidence, but not a binding 
determination of the facts.30 
In another case brought before the Fiscal Court Bremen, the plaintiff claimed that 
the OLAF travel report was not detailed enough to constitute evidence and that the goods 
in question had been declared correctly.31 Here, the Fiscal Court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument and stated that the OLAF travel report made it possible to retrace the goods 
back to China. In contrast to the decision of the Fiscal Court Düsseldorf, OLAF officials 
had indeed travelled to the place where the goods were shipped and found irregularities 
on the spot. This was probably the reason why the evidence was found convincing. 
However, a few weeks later the Fiscal Court Hamburg accepted OLAF reports as 
evidence, although the report was based on data that OLAF had obtained from Malaysian 
authorities instead of personal on-the-spot checks.32 The Court stated that the report was 
convincing and that there was no reason to doubt the veracity of the report. In another 
case, the plaintiff claimed that the OLAF report did not refer to concrete evidence.33 The 
Fiscal Court Hamburg did not accept this argument, but explained that the basis for the 
OLAF report was convincing and that there was no reason to mistrust it.34 Apparently, it 
is sufficient to refer to the OLAF report rather than to the data that was the basis of the 
report. The reasoning seems to be the following: If the judge is satisfied that the OLAF 
report was based on convincing evidence, it is accepted as evidence in administrative 
																																																						
28 See, eg, Finanzgericht (Fiscal Court; hereinafter: FG) Hamburg 24 July 2017 – 4 K 162/15, BeckRS 2017, 
124276; FG Hamburg 17 May 2017 – 4 K 147/15, BeckRS 2017, 117003; FG Bremen 18 August 2015 – 4 
K 24/14 2, BeckRS 2015, 95745; FG Düsseldorf 2 October 2013 – 4 K 1568/12 Z, BeckRS 2015, 94265. 
29 FG Düsseldorf 2 October 2013 – 4 K 1568/12 Z, BeckRS 2015, 94265. 
30 Ulrich Schrömbges, ‘OLAF-Untersuchungen zum Präferenzursprungʼ (2012) Außenwirtschafts-Praxis 
(hereinafter AW-Prax) 276 (277). 
31 FG Bremen 18 August 2015 – 4 K 24/14 2, BeckRS 2015, 95745. 
32 FG Hamburg 9 September 2015 – 4 K 141/14, BeckRS 2015, 96091. 
33 FG Hamburg 24 July 2017 – 4 K 162/15, BeckRS 2017, 124276. See, also, FG Düsseldorf 2 October 
2013 – 4 K 1568/12 Z, BeckRS 2015, 94265. 
34 FG Hamburg 24 July 2017 – 4 K 162/15, BeckRS 2017, 124276. 
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proceedings regardless of whether it is based on hearsay or findings of an on-the-spot 
check, even if it contains conclusions by OLAF officials. 
In a similar case before the Fiscal Court Hamburg, the plaintiff raised several 
issues with regard to the OLAF final report.35 First, the plaintiff considered the report to 
be unconvincing, incorrect, and not proving the Chinese origin of the goods. These 
arguments are similar to others raised before and refer to the individual quality of the 
evidence, which must be assessed by the court, and are not of interest here. However, the 
plaintiff also maintained that the report and the facts allegedly contained in the report had 
not been disclosed directly to the plaintiff. A similar point was raised in another case 
before the Fiscal Court Hessen when the plaintiff complained that it was not clear how 
OLAF had come to its conclusions.36 In this case, the Court did indeed come to the 
conclusion that not all the points contained in the report were convincing.37 In contrast, 
the Fiscal Court Hamburg did not deal with the issue of non-disclosure and did not object 
to the use of the OLAF report instead of the data that was the foundation of this report.38 
A third point made by the plaintiff before the Fiscal Court Hamburg was that OLAF ought 
to have undertaken an on-the-spot inspection of the ‘goods register’ instead of relying on 
other data.39 Again, this argument relies on reasoning similar to the prohibition to replace 
the examination of witnesses by records of a prior interrogation (supra 1.1), ie to ensure 
the reliability of the collected evidence. Nonetheless, the Court claimed that there was no 
need for an inspection by OLAF officials and that the presented evidence was convincing. 
The case-law clearly reveals that OLAF reports are admissible evidence in fiscal 
court proceedings, but it is for the court to evaluate the report and to assess its accuracy 
and consistency. This approach corresponds to recent case-law of the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (CJEU).40 Nevertheless, it is obvious from these cases that the 
standards of evidence in customs law are much laxer than in criminal law. No case was 
found where the OLAF report was rejected on principle. OLAF reports have been rejected 
in two cases only for being unconvincing.41 Although this result is not surprising in itself, 
it is remarkable to see how willingly the courts accept the OLAF report as convincing and 
how little attention is paid to principle-based objections of the plaintiff. While this may 
be acceptable in administrative law, it would hardly be accepted in proceedings before a 
criminal court. In this respect, the case-law does not allow for conclusions on the use of 
OLAF-collected evidence in criminal proceedings (see, on this issue, infra 4). 
 
																																																						
35 FG Hamburg 17 May 2017 – 4 K 147/15, BeckRS 2017, 117003. 
36 FG Hessen 15 April 2015 – 7 K 440/12, BeckRS 2015, 95543. 
37 FG Hessen 15 April 2015 – 7 K 440/12, BeckRS 2015, 95543. 
38 FG Hamburg 17 May 2017 – 4 K 147/15, BeckRS 2017, 117003. 
39 FG Hamburg 17 May 2017 – 4 K 147/15, BeckRS 2017, 117003. 
40 Case C-47/16 Veloserviss, EU:C:2017:220, paras 44–50; Case C-407/16 Aqua Pro, EU:C:2017:817, 
paras 54–62. 
41 FG Düsseldorf 2 October 2013 – 4 K 1568/12 Z, BeckRS 2015, 94265; FG Hessen 15 April 2015 – 7 K 
440/12, BeckRS 2015, 95543.  
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2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
As has been stated above, there is no case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected 
evidence in administrative punitive or criminal proceedings. Nor are there specific 
provisions on OLAF-collected evidence. As a consequence, the general rules of criminal 
procedure apply (supra 1.1). 
In German law, it is accepted that the criminal court can refuse to admit evidence 
in criminal proceedings, even if this evidence was collected legally (so-called 
selbständiges Beweisverwertungsverbot, supra 1.1). The same is true for administrative 
authorities in the context of regulatory fines because they have to apply criminal 
procedural law (§ 46 OWiG). The prohibition to admit evidence can either stem from an 
explicit provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, or from a violation of fundamental 
rights. The latter option is the one that could apply in the case of OLAF-collected 
evidence. 
The decision on the admissibility (or exclusion) of evidence must be based upon 
a balancing test that weighs the fundamental rights of the defendant against the public 
interest in effective law enforcement.42 The jurisprudence is rather restrictive, particularly 
when the defendant is suspected of having committed serious offences.43  
In case of OLAF-collected evidence, it would depend on which guarantee was not 
taken into account. As the first Hercule III study has shown, the Member States have 
different rules on the procedural safeguards that apply in mixed investigations.44 
However, in the case of the legal professional privilege (LPP) of in-house lawyers that 
was given as an example for this study, German law does not offer better protection than 
EU law. After a controversial debate, the legislator finally decided to change the law in 
order to exclude in-house lawyers from the scope of the right to refuse to testify (see 
§ 53(1) No 3 StPO).45 It should be noted that, under German law, the rules on the 
protection of professional secrecy and confidentiality within the framework of a criminal 
investigation refer back to the right to refuse to testify. Accordingly, the change of law 
also excluded in-house lawyers from the scope of the rules giving protection from seizure 
or wiretapping for certain types of professionals (see §§ 97(1) and 100d(5) StPO).  
Nonetheless, German law recognizes rights to confidentiality that are not 
explicitly accepted in EU law, such as the right to refuse to testify of certified public 
accountants (Wirtschaftsprüfer) and tax accountants (Steuerberater), see § 53(1) No 3 
																																																						
42 See, in more detail, Beulke and Swoboda (n 2) 468; Kühne (n 1) 908ff. 
43 Claus Roxin and Bernd Schünemann, Strafverfahrensrecht (29th edn, CH Beck 2017) § 24, para 30. 
44 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: 
Improving OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement 
Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017). 
45 Law for Restructuring the Rights of In-House Lawyers and Changing the Code of Procedure of Fiscal 
Courts of 21 December 2015 (Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Rechts der Syndikusanwälte und zur Änderung 
der Finanzgerichtsordnung), Bundesgesetzblatt (Federal Law Gazette) 2015 I, 2517. 
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StPO.46 Particularly the latter could hamper the effectiveness of OLAF investigations into 
tax fraud if higher German standards prevailed over EU standards. However, it is doubtful 
whether German courts would actually refuse OLAF-collected evidence on the basis of a 
violation of the professional privilege of professions other than lawyers or medical 
personnel contained in § 53(1) No 3 StPO. This is because such a refusal would have to 
be based on a violation of fundamental rights. In the past, the German Constitutional 
Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) has been reluctant to accept a constitutional obligation 
to protect the professional secrecy of, for instance, certified public accountants or tax 
consultants. The right to refuse testimony of these persons has been considered by the 
Court to be ‘barely’ justified if weighed against the public interest in effective criminal 
law enforcement.47 Another provision, § 160a(1) StPO, which prohibits any investigative 
measure against (among others) non-defense lawyers, has, on balance, also been 
considered to be barely justified.48 This means that such a strong protection of other 
professional secrecies would probably not be justified any more.  
In effect, the German Constitutional Court uses a balancing test in order to decide 
whether the fundamental rights of the professionals concerned require a better protection. 
The circumstances that are taken into account in this test are the nature and severity of 
the penalty, the expected sanction, other possibilities of investigation, the importance of 
the evidence, and the intensity of the infringement upon privacy rights.49 The same test 
																																																						
46 The right to refuse testimony on professional grounds is granted to the following persons (cf § 53(1) 
StPO): 
1. clergymen, concerning the information that was entrusted to them or became known to them in their 
capacity as spiritual advisers; 
2. defence counsel of the accused, concerning the information that was entrusted to them or became 
known to them in this capacity; 
3. attorneys (but not in-house lawyers), patent attorneys, notaries, certified public accountants, sworn 
auditors, tax consultants and tax representatives, doctors, dentists, psychological psychotherapists, 
psychotherapists specializing in the treatment of children and juveniles, pharmacists and midwives, 
concerning the information that was entrusted to them or became known to them in this capacity.  
3a. members or representatives of a recognized counselling agency pursuant to sections 3 and 8 of the 
Act on Pregnancies in Conflict Situations, concerning the information that was entrusted to them or 
became known to them in this capacity; 
3b. drugs dependency counsellors in a counselling agency recognized or set up by an authority, a body, 
an institution or a foundation under public law, concerning the information that was entrusted to them 
or became known to them in this capacity; 
4. members of the Federal Parliament, of the Federal Convention, of the European Parliament from the 
Federal Republic of Germany or of a Land parliament, concerning persons who have confided certain 
facts to them in their capacity as members of these bodies, or to whom they have confided facts in this 
particular capacity, as well as concerning the facts themselves; 
5. individuals who are or have been professionally involved in the preparation, production or 
dissemination of periodically printed matter, radio broadcasts, film documentaries or in the information 
and communication services involved in instruction or in the formation of opinion. 
47 BVerfGE 33, 367, 383. 
48 BVerfGE 129, 208, 264. 
49 See BVerfGE 33, 367, 375:  
Eine solche Einschränkung des Zeugniszwangs im Hinblick auf Art. 2 Abs. 1 i. Verb. m. Art. 1 Abs. 1 
GG kann jeweils nur als Ergebnis einer vom Richter vorzunehmenden konkreten und fallorientierten 
Abwägung zwischen den Belangen der Strafrechtspflege und den Geheimhaltungsinteressen des 
Einzelnen festgestellt werden, wobei – insbesondere unter dem Gesichtspunkt des 
Verhältnismäßigkeitsgebots – alle Umstände des Falles in die Prüfung einzubeziehen sind. Dazu 
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would probably be applied in order to decide whether OLAF-collected evidence could be 
admitted as evidence. 
Another area of law where problems are likely to occur is the privilege against 
self-incrimination.50 This principle enjoys absolute protection under constitutional law as 
the guarantee of human dignity (Article 1(1) GG) prohibits any interference with this 
right.51 Accordingly, it would be difficult for a German court to accept OLAF-collected 
evidence that has been obtained by forced cooperation.52 In case of interviews with a 
person who later becomes the defendant, a conflict is not likely to occur because 
Article 9(2) of Regulation No 883/2013 explicitly recognises the privilege against self-
incrimination. However, problems could arise with regard to production orders. An 
obligation to present documents for inspection in criminal proceedings is considered to 
be in breach of the privilege against self-incrimination and could not be used as 
evidence.53 It is not clear to what extent this reasoning applies to obligations to present 
documents in administrative cases. In one case, the German Constitutional Court decided 
that an obligation to disclose incriminating information in case of insolvency was not in 
breach of fundamental rights provided that the information could not be used as evidence 
in criminal proceedings.54 A similar rule is found in tax law where information that had 
to be disclosed must not, in principle, be used for purposes other than prosecuting tax 
crimes.55 In contrast, documents that had to be presented to the authorities in the area of 
banking supervision have been accepted as evidence in criminal proceedings by the 
courts.56 The situation is far from clear. Still, a violation of fundamental rights leading to 
a prohibition to use the evidence in criminal proceedings might be found in case of OLAF-
collected evidence. 
																																																						
gehören z.B. Art und Schwere der in Rede stehenden Straftat, die Höhe der Straferwartung, das 
Vorhandensein anderer Aufklärungsmöglichkeiten, die Bedeutung des Beweisthemas für die 
Beurteilung der Tat-, Schuld- oder Strafmaßfrage und die Intensität des durch die Zeugenvernehmung 
bewirkten Eingriffs in die Privatsphäre des Betroffenen.  
In English:  
Such a restriction, founded on Article 2(1) and Article 1(1) GG,  to the obligation to testify as a witness 
can only be the result of a concrete and case-based balancing test between the interests of the criminal 
justice system and individual rights to secrecy. In the light of the principle of proportionality, all 
circumstances of the case must be taken into account. These include the nature and severity of the 
penalty, the expected sanction, other possibilities of investigation, the importance of the evidence for 
the determination of guilt or the sentence, and the intensity of the infringement upon privacy rights of 
the person concerned. (Translation by the author Schneider). 
50 See also Luchtman and Vervaele (n 44) 325. 
51 General opinion, see only Andreas Ransiek and André Winsel, ‘Die Selbstbelastung im Sinne des „nemo 
tenetur se ipsum accusare“-Grundsatzesʼ (2015) Goltdammer’s Archiv 620ff; Petra Schmitt, Die 
Berücksichtigung der Zeugnisverweigerungsrechte nach §§ 52, 53 StPO bei den auf Beweisgewinnung 
gerichteten Zwangsmaßnahmen (Duncker & Humblot 1993) 53. 
52 See Frank Peter Schuster, ‘Verwertbarkeit von Beweismitteln bei grenzüberschreitender Strafverfolgungʼ 
(2016) Zeitschrift für Internationale Strafrechtsdogmatik (ZIS) 564, 568ff. 
53 General opinion, see, for instance, Jörn Hauschild, ʻ§ 95ʼ in Hans Kudlich (ed), Münchener Kommentar 
zur Strafprozessordnung, vol 1 (1st edn, CH Beck 2014), para 12. 
54 BVerfGE 56, 37, 48ff. 
55 See Martin Böse and Anne Schneider, ‘Germanyʼ in Luchtman and Vervaele (n 44) 72ff. 
56 ibid 68ff. 
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 2.4 Challenges of OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules 
As punitive administrative proceedings follow the rules on criminal proceedings in 
German law, it is the (criminal) courts’ task to evaluate OLAF-collected evidence 
according to the general rules on evidence. The same is true for the administrative 
authority when taking a decision on whether or not to issue a regulatory fining notice.  
In general, a violation of the law when obtaining evidence can give rise to a 
prohibition to use the evidence for criminal proceedings (so-called unselbständiges 
Beweisverwertungsverbot). However, illegally obtained evidence is not per se excluded 
from punitive administrative proceedings. Depending upon the outcome of the balancing 
test, the evidence might still be used, in particular if the rule concerned did not aim at the 
protection of the defendant from incriminating evidence.57 However, if the case-law on 
purely domestic cases applies accordingly, the violation of the procedural safeguards 
identified in the first Hercule III report (privilege against self-incrimination, access to a 
lawyer) will likely result in the exclusion of the collected evidence.58 As far as evidence 
has been obtained by illegal investigative measures (eg a search without the required 
authorization), the outcome of the balancing test is less predictable, but a deliberate 
disregard of formal and/or substantive requirements will usually render the evidence 
inadmissible (supra 1.1).  
In Germany, the criminal court has to evaluate the evidence ex officio. In the 
inquisitorial system of criminal procedure that is the foundation of German criminal 
procedure, it is not the task of the prosecution service or the defendant to present legal 
arguments and evidence. However, the Federal Court of Justice has established an 
unwritten requirement in the context of evidence law: If the accused person is represented 
by a defence counsel, the counsel (or the defendant him-/herself) must object to the use 
of evidence immediately, otherwise an appeal against the final judgement on grounds of 
law (Revision) cannot be based upon the inadmissibility of this evidence (supra 1.4 – 
Rügepräklusion).59 This requirement, however, does not apply to evidence obtained by 
illegal searches (supra 1.4). In any case, the aforementioned rules are not special to 
OLAF-collected evidence, but apply generally to evidence in criminal proceedings. 
In addition, the exclusion of OLAF-collected evidence raises specific problems 
linked to OLAF’s position as a supranational entity. If a court decides that evidence 
cannot be admitted because it was obtained by OLAF in violation of EU rules and 
safeguards, it decides on the lawfulness of an action by an EU body.60 This, however, 
falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European Union which 
ought to be involved by preliminary question (see Article 267 TFEU). Accordingly, the 
																																																						
57 See Björn Gercke and Dieter Temming, ʻIntroductionʼ in Björn Gercke and others (eds), Heidelberger 
Kommentar zur StPO (6th edn, CF Müller 2019), para 111. 
58 BGHSt 38, 214, 220ff – privilege against self-incrimination; BGHSt 38, 372, 373f – access to a lawyer; 
BGHSt 44, 46, 48f – legal professional privilege. 
59 For an overview, see Beulke and Swoboda (n 2) 460a. 
60 Stefan Strobel, Die Untersuchungen des Europäischen Amtes für Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF) (Nomos 
2012) 333. 
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majority of scholars consider the national courts to be barred from deciding on the 
lawfulness of the investigation by OLAF.61 The same is true for questions about the 
interpretation of an OLAF report.62 
In this respect, some authors refer to the judgement by the Civil Service Tribunal 
in Violetti and Schmit v Commission.63 In this judgement, the Tribunal had to decide on 
the possibility of judicial review against several OLAF measures in internal 
investigations, among them the transfer of evidence by OLAF. It held that, in the absence 
of effective judicial review: ‘The national court would retain before it the information 
forwarded to it by OLAF, even though the implication of any finding by the Community 
judicature of such illegality on account of failure to observe the rights of the defence is 
that the national court should be barred from acting on the basis of such information’.64 
For this reason, the Tribunal accepted a legal remedy against the transmission of 
information, even though judicial review of OLAF measures is problematic in EU Law.65 
According to the Tribunal, the national court would ‘retain’ the illegally transmitted 
information before it. The Tribunal does not consider the possibility that the national court 
might decide on its own not to act on the basis of such information, even if it ought to be 
barred from doing so. This shows that the Tribunal does not accept an indirect judicial 
review of the transmission of data itself. 
However, this judgement was not final but has been overruled on appeal.66 There, 
the appellate court, the Court of First Instance, refused to admit a direct action against the 
transmission of evidence.67 Nonetheless, it stated:  
That finding does not have the effect of making it impossible for the official concerned 
by that breach to dispute the decision. Any unlawful act committed by OLAF which is 
not an act adversely affecting an official may be open to sanction in an action for damages. 
Furthermore, should they decide to open an investigation, the national authorities will 
assess the conclusions to be drawn from that unlawful act, and their assessment may be 
challenged using national legal remedies, with all the safeguards provided by domestic 
law, including those deriving from fundamental rights. If they do not open criminal 
proceedings against the official concerned or close these proceedings without taking an 
act that adversely affects the official, the illegality by OLAF will have no consequences 
for the legal position of the official. Accordingly, having only recourse to damages will 
suffice to guarantee the protection of the official’s fundamental rights in that he or she 
gets compensated for any harm suffered by OLAF’s conduct.68  
																																																						
61 Jan FH Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (Europa 
Law Publishing 2011) 226ff; Cathrin Silberzahn, ‘Rechtsschutz gegen OLAFʼ (2016) Juristische 
Arbeitsblätter (hereinafter: JA) 205, 208; Strobel (n 60) 333. 
62 Inghelram (previous n) 227. 
63 Joined Cases F-5/05 and F-7/05 Violetti and Schmit v Commission, EU:F:2009:39 (Judgment of the Civil 
Service Tribunal). See the references in Inghelram (n 61) 227f; Strobel (n 60) 333. 
64 Joined Cases F-5/05 and F-7/05 Violetti and Schmit v Commission, para 78. 
65 See, eg, Inghelram (n 61) 203ff. 
66 Case T-261/09 P Commission v Violetti and Others, EU:T:2010:215. 
67 ibid, para 58. 
68 ibid, para 59. The original quotation is in French:  
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This view is in direct opposition to what the Tribunal stated and what German scholars 
have claimed. According to the Court of First Instance, the national courts are free to 
assess the illegality of OLAF evidence and take appropriate measures under domestic 
law. Even if this assessment leads to a refusal to open criminal proceedings for lack of 
(admissible) evidence, the Court does not see a problem. 
The view of the Court of First Instance is somewhat supported by Article 11(2) of 
Regulation No 883/2013 that prescribes the same evidentiary value to OLAF reports as 
to reports by national agencies.69 It is also understandable that the Court, having refused 
a direct action against the transmission of evidence under EU law, wants to establish an 
indirect one at national level. It is doubtful whether damages would be considered an 
effective remedy against violations of fundamental rights which might have occurred 
during illegal evidence gathering by OLAF.70 Nonetheless, the fact remains that national 
courts lack the competence to assess the legality of OLAF measures in itself.71 If the 
national courts could freely assess the legality of OLAF measures, this would threaten the 
effectiveness and uniform interpretation of EU law. This shows that this is a case of 
Article 267 TFEU, ie a case for a preliminary question.72 This means that national courts 
can refer the matter to the CJEU and, if taking a final decision or believing in the invalidity 
of an OLAF act, must, in fact, do so (see Article 267(3) TFEU).73 
Accordingly the illegality of OLAF measures can be challenged in national 
criminal proceedings and should indeed be assessed by the court ex officio. However, the 
national court usually ought to refer the question to the CJEU and is thus barred from 
assessing the OLAF-collected evidence only by domestic standards. The only exception 
is if it is merely the interpretation of OLAF-collected evidence that is in question. 
  
																																																						
Il convient d’observer que cette conclusion n’a pas pour effet de rendre impossible toute contestation 
de la part des fonctionnaires concernés par cette violation. En effet, toute illégalité commise par l’OLAF 
qui ne concerne pas un acte faisant grief est susceptible d’être sanctionnée dans le cadre d’un recours 
en indemnité. Par ailleurs, les autorités nationales, dans le cas où elles décident d’ouvrir une enquête, 
apprécieront les conséquences qu’il convient de tirer de cette illégalité et cette appréciation pourra être 
contestée, avec toutes les garanties prévues par le droit interne, y compris celles qui découlent des 
droits fondamentaux, en utilisant les voies de recours nationales. Dans l’hypothèse où celles-ci 
n’ouvriraient pas de procédure pénale à l’encontre du fonctionnaire concerné ou clôtureraient celle-ci 
sans adopter d’acte faisant grief, l’illégalité commise par l’OLAF serait néanmoins restée sans 
conséquence sur la situation juridique dudit fonctionnaire, de sorte que l’ouverture du seul recours en 
indemnité suffit à garantir la protection de ses intérêts en lui permettant d’obtenir la réparation de tout 
préjudice éventuel découlant du comportement de l’OLAF.  
The English translation is partly taken from the official Case Summary and partly by the author Schneider. 
69 See Sabine Gleß, ‘Das Europäische Amt für Betrugsbekämpfung (OLAF)’ (1999) Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (hereinafter: EuZW) 618, 621, on Article 9 of the former OLAF Regulation. 
70 See also Inghelram (n 61) 210ff. 
71 Case 314/85 Foto-Frost, EU:C:1987:452, para 15. 
72 ibid, para 16. 
73 Inghelram (n 61) 227f. 
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3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP IN 
NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
	
3.1 ECB-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation) 
Punitive administrative proceedings in the field of banking supervision and SSM follow 
the legal framework for regulatory offences (Ordnungswidrigkeiten), see § 120 Securities 
Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz – WpHG) and § 56 Banking Act 
(Kreditwesengesetz – KWG). As a consequence, the procedural framework refers to the 
OWiG and, thereby, to the code of criminal procedure rather than to the act on 
administrative proceedings (see 2.1). The competent authority for administrative 
sanctions in this context is the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt 
für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht – BaFin, see § 121 WpHG, § 60 KWG). There are no 
special rules about the use of information provided by the ECB in punitive administrative 
proceedings. Nor was it possible to find any case dealing with evidence collected by the 
ECB. 
As there are no specific rules for evidence collected by the ECB, the general rules 
apply (supra 2.3). Accordingly, higher national standards may prevail if the use of the 
evidence is considered to violate fundamental rights. Article 136 SSM, which provides 
the foundation for the transmission of information to the BaFin, refers to national law and 
thus allows for an assessment of evidence according to the general rules for punitive 
administrative proceedings, which, in case of court proceedings, come from criminal 
procedure law. There are no specific rules on illegally obtained ECB-collected evidence 
either. Accordingly, the general rules apply (see 2.4). 
As far as the exclusion of evidence is based upon the illegality of ECB measures 
and the interpretation of ECB acts, the CJEU has exclusive jurisdiction (supra 2.4). 
Accordingly, the national criminal court must not declare the corresponding act of the 
ECB invalid, but instead, ask the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.74 
 
3.2 ESMA-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 64(8) EMIR) 
The legal and procedural framework of punitive administrative proceedings under Article 
64(8) EMIR is the same as for OLAF and the ECB, ie the OWiG. There are no specific 
provisions on ESMA collected evidence; instead, the general rules on punitive 
administrative proceedings apply. In particular with regard to higher national standards 
and illegally obtained evidence, the same rules apply for ESMA as for ECB and OLAF 
(see 2.3, 2.4, 3.1). There have been no cases yet where ESMA-collected evidence has 
been challenged under German law. 
 
																																																						
74 See, also, Peter-Christian Müller-Graff, ‘Rechtsschutz von Kreditinstituten in der Bankenaufsicht der 
Europäischen Zentralbank’ (2018) EuZW 101, 107. 
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3.3 DG COMP-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003) 
The main legal basis for imposing punitive sanctions for infringements of competition 
law is § 81 of the Act against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbs-
beschränkungen – GWB). It refers to the OWiG and, thereby, to criminal procedure law 
(see 2.1). 
However, in contrast to the other authorities and areas of law, there are specific 
provisions on the use of evidence collected and transmitted by DG COMP. First, it should 
be noted that Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 itself contains restrictions in paragraphs 2 
and 3 on the use of evidence that was transmitted from DG COMP or other Member 
States’ authorities to a Member State. This regulation is directly applicable in the Member 
States. Nonetheless, the German legislator has included a corresponding provision in 
§ 50a GWB, which deals with cooperation within the European Competition Network. 
§ 50a(2, 3) GWB are similar to Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003, but contain slight 
differences which will be explained further below. There was no case law found on the 
use of DG COMP-collected evidence in national punitive administrative proceedings. 
This might be due to the purpose-limitations set out by the provisions mentioned above. 
Punitive administrative proceedings under Competition Law follow the rules of 
criminal procedure (see 2.3). However, there are special restrictions on the use of 
information gathered by the EU Commission and transmitted to national competition 
authorities. These are found in Article 12(2) and (3) of Regulation 1/2003 and also in 
§ 50a GWB. Because this report aims at showing up differences in the national laws of 
the Member States, it will only address § 50a GWB.75 
According to § 50a GWB, the competition authority (Bundeskartellamt – BKartA) 
may use information that was transmitted by DG COMP as evidence (§ 50a(1) No 2 
GWB). However, there are inherent restrictions that aim at the protection of procedural 
safeguards in paragraphs 2 and 3.76 Moreover, there is no obligation to use the information 
as evidence.77 
§ 50a(2) GWB is largely based on Article 12(2) of Regulation 1/2003.78 
According to this provision, the authority may use in evidence the information received 
																																																						
75 See, on this provision, also Martin Böse and Anne Schneider, ‘Germany’ in Michele Simonato, Michiel 
Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Exchange of Information with EU and National Enforcement 
Authorities: Improving OLAF Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Authorities 
(ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2018) 59ff. 
76 Eckard Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ in Ulrich Immenga and Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds), Wettbewerbsrecht 
(5th edn, CH Beck 2014), para 11. 
77 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (previous n), paras 11 and 15. 
78 The English version of § 50a(2) GWB reads as follows: 
 (2) The competition authority may use in evidence the information received only for the purpose of 
applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and in respect 
of the subject-matter of the investigation for which it was collected by the transmitting authority. 
However, information exchanged under paragraph 1 may also be used for the purpose of applying this 
Act if provisions of this Act are applied in accordance with Article 12 (2) sentence 2 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003. 
5. Germany 147
only for the purpose of applying Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the subject-matter for 
which the evidence was collected by the transmitting authority. This means that, in 
principle, the information can only be used as evidence in sanctioning proceedings under 
EU competition law, which are directed against economic entities. This is a key feature 
of the European Competition Network, in which the exchange of information is largely 
unrestricted, but the use of information is limited to the purpose of enforcing EU 
competition law.79 However, § 50a(2) sentence 2 GWB allows the use of evidence in 
national competition law proceedings, which follow the rules of the GWB, under the 
circumstances set out in Article 12(2) sentence 2 of Regulation 1/2003. This means that 
national competition law must be applied in the same case and in parallel to Community 
competition law and that it must not lead to a different outcome. Accordingly, if an 
infringement of EU competition law has been established, the information may be used 
as evidence for the prosecution of an infringement of national competition law by the 
same conduct. 
Where the evidence collected and transmitted by DG COMP was obtained legally, 
it must be considered whether it might still be excluded from national punitive 
proceedings because national (German) law provides for a higher standard of procedural 
safeguards. Such an approach would establish a ‘dual’ standard that combines the 
protection under the law of the transmitting authority, ie in case of DG COMP, EU law, 
with the protection provided by law of the receiving authority (German law). Most legal 
scholars refuse such a double control in the ECN.80 They argue that the purpose of the 
ECN is to provide for free exchange of evidence which would be severely hampered by 
double control.81 Indeed, Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 gives no indication that the 
legislator intended to establish a system of double control.82 Nor does such a system fit 
with the purpose to provide free exchange of information. Moreover, the recently adopted 
Directive on the effective enforcement of EU competition law by national competition 
authorities supports the view that EU law (including procedural safeguards) takes 
precedence over national law.83  
Nonetheless, national evidence law can still play a role. This is because the 
Member States may use transmitted evidence, but they are not obliged to do so. Therefore, 
a national court assessing evidence from DG COMP may exclude this evidence for a 
violation of fundamental rights (see 2.3).84 At first sight, this comes close to a double 
control because the evidence will be evaluated twice, once by EU and once by national 
standards. However, a prohibition to use legally gathered evidence requires a substantial 
																																																						
79 See, in more detail, Böse and Schneider, ‘Germany’ (n 75) 60f. 
80 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 14; Hans-Hermann Schneider, ʻ§ 50aʼ in Eugen Langen and Hermann-
Josef Bunte (eds), Kartellrecht, vol 1 (13th edn, Luchterhand 2018), para 34. For a different opinion, see 
Bettina Bergmann, ʻ§ 50aʼ in Wolfgang Jaeger and others (eds), Frankfurter Kommentar zum Kartellrecht 
(issue 82, November 2014) § 50a, para 23. 
81 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 14; H-H Schneider, ʻ§ 50aʼ (previous n), para 34. 
82 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 14. 
83 Art 3 (Safeguards) of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of 11 December 2018 to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning of the 
internal market [2019] OJ L 11/3. 
84 Bergmann, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 80), para 23. 
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violation of fundamental rights. In other words, a violation of any national law is not 
sufficient. Like OLAF-collected evidence, information transmitted by DG COMP will, 
therefore, be excluded in exceptional cases only. 
§ 50a(3) GWB contains other restrictions on the use of evidence transmitted by 
DG COMP for the purpose of sanctioning natural persons. § 50a(3) GWB shows 
similarities to Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003, but also differences. It reads as follows: 
(3) ¹Information received by the competition authority pursuant to paragraph 1 can only 
be used in evidence for the purpose of imposing sanctions on natural persons where the 
law of the transmitting authority provides for sanctions of a similar kind in relation to 
violations of Articles 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
²Where the conditions set out in sentence 1 are not fulfilled, the information may be used 
in evidence if it has been collected in a way which ensures the same level of protection 
of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under the law applicable to the 
competition authority. ³The prohibition to use evidence pursuant to sentence 1 shall not 
exclude using the evidence against legal persons or associations of persons. 4Compliance 
with prohibitions to use evidence which are based on constitutional law shall remain 
unaffected. 
The first sentence copies Article 12(3) first hyphen of Regulation 1/2003. In any case, it 
does not apply to evidence transmitted by DG COMP because EU competition law does 
not provide sanctions for natural persons.85 Furthermore, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply to legal persons (§ 50a(3), sentence 3 GWB).  
The second sentence grants a high level of protection to natural persons. 
Transmitted evidence may only be used ‘if it has been collected in a way which ensures 
the same level of protection of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for 
under the law applicable to the competition authority’. Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 
contains the same rule, but clarifies that the evidence must not be used for the purpose of 
imposing custodial sentences. In German law, there was no need for this clarification 
because regulatory offences are not punishable by custodial sentences.86 
According to § 50a (3) sentence 2 GWB, the transmitted information may be used 
in evidence if it has been collected in a way which ensures the same level of protection 
of the rights of defence of natural persons as provided for under German law. This 
assessment must not be made on the basis of the general level of protection, but of the 
safeguards that were applied to the investigative measure by which the evidence was 
obtained.87 Defence rights include the privilege against self-incrimination,88 witness 
privilege (including legal professional privilege)89 and the right of access to a lawyer.90 
																																																						
85 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 18; H-H Schneider, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 80), para 43. 
86 Bergmann, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 80), para 48. 
87 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 19. 
88 Bergmann, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 80), para 48; Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 19; Dorothea Seckler, ʻ§ 50aʼ in 
Werner Berg and Gerald Mäsch (eds), Deutsches und Europäisches Kartellrecht (3rd edn, Luchterhand 
2018), para 20. 
89 Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 19. 
90 Bergmann, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 80), para 48. 
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If the protection of the rights of defence was sufficient, the evidence may be used even if 
national law is stricter in other respects.91 
However, § 50a(3) sentence 4 GWB explicitly refers to prohibitions to use 
evidence that are based on fundamental and constitutional rights (selbständige 
Beweisverwertungsverbote, supra 1.1). Even if all the requirements in § 50a(2) and (3) 
GWB are fulfilled, the court may nonetheless refuse to admit the evidence under these 
circumstances. This is exactly what has been explained as a general principle of German 
criminal law for the use of evidence collected by OLAF, ESMA and ECB (supra 2.3). 
There are no explicit rules on illegally collected evidence. Therefore, the general 
rules of criminal procedure that have been explained above apply (supra 2.4).92 It should 
also be noted that, again, the national criminal courts do not have jurisdiction to declare 
investigative measures by the Commission void or illegal. Accordingly, preliminary 
questions would be required in these cases (supra 2.4).  
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
	
4.1 General rules on the admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence collected 
by national administrative authorities  
As far as the transfer of information (evidence) to public prosecutors and criminal courts 
is concerned, the legal basis depends upon whether the information has been gathered in 
punitive administrative proceedings (Ordnungswidrigkeitenverfahren) or in 
administrative (supervisory) proceedings (Verwaltungsverfahren). In general, however, 
both procedural frameworks allow for the transfer of evidence: If the evidence has been 
obtained in punitive administrative proceedings, the administrative authority may 
transmit the evidence to the public prosecutor and/or the competent criminal court 
(§ 49a(1) No 1 OWiG; for the corresponding obligation to transfer the case to the public 
prosecutor see § 41 OWiG). If the evidence (information) has been gathered in the 
framework of administrative proceedings, the transfer to criminal law enforcement 
authorities is subject to the applicable sectoral rules (eg § 9(1) No 1 KWG, supra 1.1). 
In as far as the exclusion of evidence may result from a violation of the law, the 
different legal framework and the applicable rules on gathering of evidence may become 
relevant: For instance, evidence obtained from an information request in the framework 
of monitoring or supervisory activities must be excluded if the competent authority has 
failed to inform the requested person about the right not to incriminate oneself and to 
consult with defence counsel (§ 6(15) WpHG; supra 1.2).93  
																																																						
91 Asja Krauser, ʻ§ 50aʼ in Joachim Bornkamm and others (eds), Münchener Kommentar Europäisches und 
Deutsches Wettbewerbsrecht (2nd edn, CH Beck 2015) § 50a GWB, para 15. 
92 See, also, Rehbinder, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 76), para 14; H-H Schneider, ʻ§ 50aʼ (n 80), para 35. 
93 See with regard to the corresponding obligation in tax proceedings (§ 393(1)4 AO) BFH BB 2002, 1035, 
1036; BeckRS 2014, 94392; Böse (n 9) 482. 
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As a matter of principle, however, the information gathered and transmitted by 
national administrative authorities may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. In 
this regard, the general rules on evidence apply, including the numerus clausus of means 
of proof (Strengbeweis, supra 1.3). 
The officials that have collected the evidence may be examined as witnesses 
(§§ 48ff StPO), objects may be inspected, and documents (eg business records) may be 
read out (documentary evidence, § 249 StPO) during trial. As a matter of principle, the 
interrogation of witnesses must not be replaced by documentary evidence such as records 
or statements (§ 250 StPO – Unmittelbarkeitsgrundsatz). This applies in particular to tax 
investigators or tax auditors and the findings of their investigations.94 There are, however, 
exceptions to this rule, in particular if the witness cannot be examined by the court within 
reasonable time (§ 251(1) No 3 StPO) or if the document concerns the existence or the 
level of an asset loss (§ 251(1) No 4 StPO).  
Furthermore, the court may use expert opinions that have been rendered in 
administrative proceedings. In contrast to the witness, the expert will not report on 
observations he or she made at a certain place on a certain day, but on the current state of 
scientific knowledge in his or her areas of expertise and the conclusions that have been 
drawn from certain (given) facts on the basis of this knowledge. In other words, the expert 
opinion shall not prove the facts on which the opinion is based (Anknüpfungstatsachen), 
but the facts established by the expert’s conclusions (Befundtatsachen).95 The expert 
opinion may be rendered by an officer of the prosecution service,96 but the expert must 
not be biased by his or her prior involvement in the investigation.97 Like the witness, the 
hearing of the expert shall not be replaced by reading out the written opinion (§ 250 StPO) 
unless otherwise provided (§ 251 StPO).98  
In contrast, court proceedings in fiscal (tax and customs) matters 
(Finanzgerichtsverfahren) follow a less strict approach and allow for the use of reports 
and other documents without formal requirements such as reading them out in a public 
hearing.99 This might explain the fact that there is more case law on the use of OLAF 
reports in such proceedings than in the framework of criminal proceedings (supra 2.2). 
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule that the examination of a witness or 
expert must not be replaced by reading out the record of a prior examination (§ 250 StPO). 
First, statements containing a certificate or an expert opinion from public 
authorities may be read out (§ 256 (1) No 1 lit a StPO). This exception, however, does 
																																																						
94 Brigitte Hilgers-Klautzsch, ‘§ 385’ in Günter Kohlmann (ed), Steuerstrafrecht (issue 53, November 
2015), para 694; Armin von Döllen, 3. Kapitel: ‘Unternehmensperspektive, staatsanwaltschaftliche 
Ermittlung und Verteidigungsstrategie, C. Ermittlungen gegen Unternehmen – Verteidigungsstrategien’ in 
Carsten Momsen and Thomas Grützner (eds), Wirtschaftsstrafrecht (CH Beck 2013), para 251. 
95 Kühne (n 1) 857–858. 
96 BGHSt 28, 381–384. 
97 Hilgers-Klautzsch (n 94) 704–705. 
98 Helmut Kreicker, ‘§ 250’ dans H Schneider (ed) (n 8), para 8. 
99 Ulrich Herbert, ‘§ 82’ in Fritz Gräber (ed), Finanzgerichtsordnung (8th edn, CH Beck 2015), para 40. 
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not apply to mere witness statements even if the witness is a public official (eg a tax 
investigator, see supra).100 
Secondly, records and statements from criminal prosecuting authorities about 
investigatory acts may be read out, insofar as their subject is not an examination (§ 256(1) 
No 5 StPO). The scope of this exception, however, is limited to ‘criminal prosecuting 
authorities’ (prosecution service, police, tax investigation service). Therefore, it does not 
apply to administrative authorities that are not vested with tasks and powers in a criminal 
investigation. Furthermore, any report that – at least in part – relies on a questioning of 
witnesses or suspects will not be covered by the exception either.101 
 
4.2 Admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and especially OLAF, in 
criminal proceedings 
German law does not provide for special rules on the admissibility of evidence collected 
and transmitted by supranational agencies; in this regard, the general rules apply 
accordingly. The admissibility of evidence is subject to the general rules of criminal 
procedure that apply irrespective of whether the evidence has been gathered by national 
authorities or by their supranational counterparts. 
As a matter of principle, any evidence contained in a written document must be 
read out during trial; this also applies to electronic documents (§ 249(1) StPO). The court 
may dispense with the reading if the judges have taken cognizance themselves of the 
wording of the document and the other participants have had an opportunity to do so 
(§ 249(2) StPO). In contrast, examination records may not be read out unless permitted 
by the law (§§ 250 and 251ff StPO). Objects that cannot be read out may be used in 
evidence by the court’s inspection (Augenschein). This may be relevant for digital 
forensics (eg photos or videos).102 
In particular, the provision on reading out certificates or expert opinions from 
public authorities (§ 256(1) No 1 lit a StPO, supra 4.1) also applies to foreign 
authorities103 and supranational agencies.104 In contrast, the provision on statements and 
records of criminal law enforcement authorities (§ 256(1) No 5 StPO) does not apply to 
OLAF and the other supranational entities because they are, unlike the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office, not conducting a criminal investigation (supra 4.1). 
Apparently, there is no case-law on the exclusion of evidence collected by the 
ECB, ESMA, DG Competition and OLAF in criminal proceedings as most of the cases 
(apart from those investigated by OLAF) are supposed to be related to regulatory 
offences. 
																																																						
100 Petra Velten, ‘§ 256’ in Jürgen Wolter (ed), Systematischer Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (5th 
edn, Carl Heymanns 2016), para 20. 
101 BGH NJW 2010, 3383, 3384. 
102 Lothar Senge, ‘§ 86’ in Rolf Hannich (ed), Karlsruher Kommentar zur Strafprozessordnung (7th edn, 
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Nevertheless, the law of criminal procedure may exclude evidence collected by 
these supranational institutions if the gathering of evidence is incompatible with general 
standards of criminal procedural law, in particular if the evidence could not have been 
collected in the framework of a criminal investigation (hypothetischer Ersatzeingriff, 
supra 1.1). In this regard, the rules on protection of professional secrecies (eg with regard 
to lawyers, tax consultants, sworn auditors) in criminal investigations (§§ 53, 97, and 
160a StPO) may prohibit the use of evidence that has been collected by recourse to 
administrative powers that do not provide for a corresponding level of protection.105 
Furthermore, evidence that has been gathered from the suspect by compulsory 
information requests must not be used in criminal proceedings because this would be in 
breach with the privilege against self-incrimination (nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare).106 
However, national standards will only be relevant where EU law does not provide for a 
corresponding protection, either by a right to remain silent and to consult with counsel 
(Article 9(2)(2) and (6) of Regulation  No 883/2013) or by exclusion of such evidence 
from criminal proceedings against natural persons (Article 12(3) of Regulation  1/2003, 
§ 50a(3) GWB). 
The decision on the exclusion of evidence is taken by the trial court, and the court 
is obliged to assess the admissibility of evidence (ex officio control). The accused or his 
or her defence counsel may object to the use of illegally obtained evidence; if the 
objection is overruled by the trial court, there is no further remedy, but the accused (or 
his or her defence counsel) may lodge an appeal against the judgement on grounds of law, 
claiming that the verdict has been based upon inadmissible evidence (supra 1.4). If the 
exclusion of evidence is derived from a violation of EU law, the appeal court shall ask 
for a preliminary ruling of the Court of Justice (Article 267 TFEU; supra 2.4). 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
5.1 Exchange of views between OLAF and national authorities on the requirements 
for admissibility of evidence   
The lack of corresponding case-law suggests that the admissibility of OLAF reports as 
evidence in criminal proceedings is not an issue in court practice. This may be due to the 
fact that reports of administrative authorities may not be directly used in evidence so that 
the findings of the report may only be introduced by examining the author of the report 
(the inspector, auditor etc.) as witnesses (supra 4.1). 
As a consequence, there seems to be no need for an exchange of views between 
OLAF and the competent authorities in Germany on issues related to the admissibility of 
OLAF-collected evidence in criminal proceedings either. Likewise, a parallel national 
report on inspections under administrative (respectively customs) law might serve as a 
																																																						
105 See with regard to evidence collected in tax proceedings Böse (n 9) 339–346. 
106 BVerfGE 56, 37; see in detail Böse (n 9) 523ff and 541ff.  
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backup, but has no additional probative value. This does not apply to national reports in 
the framework of a criminal investigation. In this case, the report may be read out as a 
statement on investigative acts in criminal proceedings in as far as it does not rely on the 
examination of a witness or suspect (§ 256(1) No 5 StPO; supra 4.1) 
According to the national contact point and antifraud coordination service 
(AFCOS), the competent national authority assists OLAF in preparing and carrying out 
on-the-spot inspections (eg by transmitting relevant documents). German officials may 
be present during the inspection, but usually do not initiate an administrative investigation 
under German law, but wait for the OLAF report in order to proceed on the basis of 
OLAF’s findings. Since 2012, AFCOS has not been notified of any case where the 
competent authority has drafted a parallel national report on the inspection or where the 
admissibility of evidence has been discussed with OLAF.107 It must be noted, however, 
that the available information is limited to inspections related to expenditure side 
(subsidies) of the EU budget and AFCOS is not informed of all inspections carried out by 
OLAF within German territory. In any case, the information obtained by AFCOS supports 
the view that the issue of admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings does not have 
an impact on the cooperation between OLAF and the competent national authorities.  
 
5.2 Duplication of OLAF activities 
The admissibility of OLAF reports as evidence in criminal proceedings mainly depends 
upon the numerus clausus of means of proof (Strengbeweisverfahren). In other words, 
the question is not if, but how to introduce the report into evidence at trial. The 
investigative act (inspection, on-the-spot check) is not repeated, but only its findings are 
presented in a different manner. 
A repetition of the investigative measure might be considered where the evidence 
has been obtained by an investigative measure violating the law and/or fundamental rights 
of the defendant. In this case, however, the exclusion of the evidence will significantly 
depend upon whether the information could have been obtained lawfully (hypothetischer 
Ersatzeingriff, supra 1.6 and 4.1). If this requirement is not met and, as a consequence, 
the evidence is excluded, the trial court may repeat the investigative act in order to obtain 
the evidence lawfully. For instance, if the suspect has not been properly informed of his 
or her right to remain silent and to consult with defence counsel, the court may notify the 
accused of his or her rights and of the inadmissibility of his or her former statement as 
evidence in court (qualifizierte Belehrung) and examine the accused person again in order 
to obtain a statement that may be used in evidence.108 As far as OLAF-collected evidence 
is concerned, no such case has been reported to AFCOS yet.109 
																																																						
107 The authors would like to thank Mr Martin Leuvering (Federal Ministry of Finance – Bundesministerium 
der Finanzen) for providing this information. 
108 BGH NJW 2009, 1427–1428. 
109 Information provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance (n 107). 
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6. CONCLUSION 
The German legal order draws a clear distinction between punitive proceedings (criminal 
proceedings and punitive administrative proceedings) on the one hand and administrative 
proceedings on the other. This concept of administrative proceedings relies upon the 
objective to be pursued and the measure to be taken (termination of illegal conduct, 
recovery of illegally obtained subsidies). It fundamentally differs from a concept of 
administrative proceedings that mainly refers to the relevant actor (administrative vs 
judicial authority) and may cover punitive administrative proceedings as well. EU law, 
and the legal framework of OLAF in particular, adheres to the latter concept, as has most 
recently been confirmed by the Regulation on the establishment of the European Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO).110 According to the provision on the relations with OLAF, 
the EPPO may request OLAF to support its activity by conducting administrative 
investigations (Article 101(3)(c) EPPO Regulation). If the distinction between criminal 
and administrative proceedings is based upon the objective pursued (functional 
approach), any investigative measure intended to support a criminal investigation forms 
part of a criminal investigation and cannot be qualified as (merely) administrative. On the 
other hand, the principle of conferral and the limited legislative powers of the Union do 
not allow for vesting OLAF with investigative powers in the framework of criminal 
proceedings.111  
Conceptual differences and tensions notwithstanding, the OLAF Regulation112 
provides for procedural guarantees such as the privilege against self-incrimination and 
the right to consult with counsel (Article 9(2) of Regulation No 883/2013) and, thereby, 
establishes a standard of protection that is an indispensable requirement for the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in criminal proceedings (see also Article 11(2) 
OLAF Regulation). There may, however, be higher standards in criminal proceedings 
(see supra 2.3, with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination and the production 
of documents). Furthermore, the admissibility of evidence does not only depend upon 
procedural safeguards and fundamental rights OLAF has to comply with in the course of 
its investigation, but is also subject to the rules on hearing evidence in a criminal trial 
(supra 4.2). As the comparison of court proceedings in customs matters on the one hand 
and criminal proceedings (and, to some extent, court proceedings on regulatory offences 
as well) on the other has revealed, the admissibility of OLAF reports as evidence may be 
subject to different rules and standards in a Member State’s legal order. Thus, OLAF-
reports and OLAF-collected evidence should be evaluated and used in court proceedings 
under the same conditions as evidence collected by the Member States’ administrative 
authorities (Article 11(2)(2) and (3) OLAF Regulation), ie the requirements should be 
neither more nor less favourable than for reports drawn up by domestic administrative 
																																																						
110 Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the 
establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (‘the EPPO’) [2017] OJ L 283/1. 
111 Strobel (n 60) 321–324. 
112 Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 September 
2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [2013] OJ L 248/1. 
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authorities. In the German criminal justice system, the rules on the admissibility and 
exclusion of evidence and the balancing test in particular allow for an assessment that 
takes the Union’s interest in an effective protection of its financial interests into due 
consideration. This interest, however, does not justify a limitation of the court’s 
competence to rule on the admissibility of evidence by an obligation to ‘automatically’ 
use and rely on OLAF-collected evidence.113 
																																																						
113 See the proposed amendment of Art 11(2) OLAF Regulation, COM(2018) 338 final, 23 May 2018 
(‘reports … shall constitute admissible evidence in judicial proceedings of a non-criminal nature before 
national courts and in administrative proceedings …’). It is not entirely clear from the wording whether the 
new provision shall apply to punitive administrative proceedings. 
 
6. HUNGARY* 
A. Csúri 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
A brief introduction should illustrate that the Hungarian legal framework for 
administrative procedures is in a transitional state and subject to possible and continuous 
amendments during and subsequent to the finalisation of this report. Some laws have only 
recently become effective while others will enter into force in the future. The new system 
in its entirety is planned to be set up by 2020. 
As part of an ongoing judicial reform, the system of Hungarian procedural laws 
was subjected to a general overhaul in 2018. The new Codes of Civil and Administrative 
Procedure entered into force 1 January 2018, while the new Code of Criminal Procedure 
entered into force 1 July 2018. Previously, in 2016, the government had also announced 
plans to set up a distinct court system for administrative cases. As a first step, the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary1 was amended in order to comply with a related decision 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court.2 Next, the National Assembly passed the Act on 
Administrative Courts in December 2018.3 The law was supposed to enter into force in 
2020, establishing a separate system of administrative courts, with a separate high court 
(the Supreme Administrative Court) and its own judicial council (the National 
Administrative Judicial Council). The law has been passed without waiting for the 
opinion of the Venice Commission on the draft law, which the Hungarian Minister of 
Justice had requested in November 2018. The Venice Commission published its opinion4 
in March 2019, acknowledging that creating a new separate legal order in the area of 
administrative law falls within the sovereign right of the national legislature and is fully 
in line with European standards and practices. The opinion states, however, that the law 
is fairly general as regards the jurisdiction and competence of the future administrative 
courts, which shall cover, among other things, administrative decisions taken by the 
																																								 																				
* The author would like to thank all the interviewed experts, who prefer to remain anonymous, for their 
valuable input and comments.  
1 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, 25 April 2011 (Magyarország Alaptörvénye (2011. április 25.). The 
translation of the Hungarian Ministry of Justice uses the term ‘The Fundamental Law of Hungary’. In 
English texts it is also referred to as ‘Basic Law’ or ‘Constitution’. The report indicates the full title of the 
legislative acts in the footnotes but uses shorter form in the text.  
2 Constitutional Court of Hungary, 17 January 2017, Decision No 1 (1/2017. (I. 17.) AB határozat). All 
case law cited in this report is available by searching for the case number at <https://birosag.hu/birosagi-
hatarozatok-gyujtemenye> accessed 29 April 2019. 
3 Act CXXX on Administrative Courts (2018. évi CXXX törvény a közigazgatási bíróságokról). 
4 Opinion no 943 / 2018 <www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-
AD(2019)004-e> accessed 29 April 2019. 
police, economic matters, disputes in the area of taxation, the issuing of building permits 
and planning permission, the media and market competition. The government reacted 
swiftly and in April 2019 made the first substantial amendments to the law,5 which was 
still supposed to enter into force in 2020. This was the state of reform when this report 
was originally submitted. Since then, in May 2019, the government, in a rather 
unexpected turn, proposed suspending the establishment of administrative courts 
indefinitely due to the ongoing Article 7 proceedings against Hungary. The law was 
passed by the Parliament, thus the new courts will not be established in the near future. 
The national report has been revised to take account of the latest developments.  
The general rules concerning administrative procedures are laid down in the 2016 
Act on Administrative Procedure (hereinafter APA),6 which entered into force in January 
2018. In principle, the nature of the proceedings, such as detecting violations of law or 
imposing sanctions (ie administrative punitive proceedings), is irrelevant with regard to 
the application of the law. However, the new law defines procedures to which specific 
laws apply. These include procedures such as those for regulatory offences,7 tax8 and 
customs administration,9 competition proceedings10 and National Bank of Hungary 
administration11 (Article 8 APA). These procedures were previously covered by the APA. 
That said, if the specific laws do not contain diverging rules, the APA applies also to the 
special procedures. 
Administrative authorities may currently impose the following sanctions: 
warnings, fines and confiscations. The detailed rules of these sanctions are laid down in 
the 2017 Act on Transitional Provisions on Sanctions with regard to Administrative 
Offences.12 As the title suggests, this law, in line with the ongoing reform, is of a 
provisional nature. A new separate law on Administrative Penalties13 with new forms of 
administrative sanctions was to enter into force as of 1 January 2019. This did not happen 
and currently the law ought to enter into force on 1 January 2020. 
 
																																								 																				
5	Act XXIV of 2019 on Further Guarantees regarding the Independence of Administrative Courts (2019. 
évi XXIV. Törvény a közigazgatási bíróságok függetlenségét biztosító további garanciákról). 
6 Act CL of 2016 on Administrative Procedure (2016. évi CL. Törvény az általános közigazgatási 
rendtartásról).  
7 Act II of 2012 on Regulatory Offences (2012. évi II. Törvény a szabálysértésekről, a szabálysértési 
eljárásról és a szabálysértési nyilvántartási rendszerről).  
8 Act CLI. of 2017 on Tax Administration (2017. évi CLI. Törvény az adóigazgatási rendtartásról).  
9 Act CLII of 2017 on the implementation of the Union customs legislation (2017. évi CLII. Törvény az 
uniós vámjog végrehajtásáról).  
10 Act LVII of 1996 on the prohibition of unfair market conduct and restriction of competition (1996. évi 
LVII. Törvény a tisztességtelen piaci magatartás és a versenykorlátozás tilalmáról). 
11 Act CXXXIX of 2013 on the National Bank of Hungary (2013. évi CXXXIX. Törvény a Magyar Nemzeti 
Bankról. 
12 The full name of the law is Act CLXXIX of 2017 on Transitional Provisions for Sanctions for 
Administrative Offences and Amending Certain Acts in Connection with the Reform of Administrative 
Procedural Law (Articles 1-4) (2017. évi CLXXIX. Törvény a közigazgatási szabályszegések szankcióinak 
átmeneti szabályairól, valamint a közigazgatási eljárásjog reformjával összefüggésben egyes törvények 
módosításáról és egyes jogszabályok hatályon kívül helyezéséről).  
13 Act CXXV of 2017 on Administrative Penalties (2017. évi CXXV. Törvény a közigazgatási 
szabályszegések szankcióiról).  
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1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
The new Hungarian Code of Criminal Procedure14 (hereinafter CCP) entered into force 
on 1 July 2018 and introduced a number of changes. Notably, the preparatory meeting 
(előkészítő ülés) has become more important in order to speed up proceedings. This 
meeting is now obligatory and involves the defence, the prosecutor and the judge. It sets 
the framework for any further action, including evidentiary issues, thereby also affecting 
the admissibility regime. According to the law, once charges have been brought, the court 
calls the defendant and the defence counsel to submit requests for taking or excluding 
evidence, at the latest, at the preparatory meeting (Article 497 CCP). At the meeting the 
defendant may plead guilty. If the defendant does not plead guilty, he or she needs to 
present the evidence on which the defence is based. At the same time the defendant may 
request the collection or exclusion of further evidence (Article 499 CCP). The aim of this 
exercise is to avoid later time-consuming strategies, as the possibility of gathering further 
evidence after the session is limited. Accordingly, after the hearing the court may, without 
giving reasons, reject applications which are not necessary to establish the facts or impose 
fines if the application, although necessary to establish the facts, has been made in a 
manner which unreasonably delays the proceedings (Article 500(1) CCP). 
The new code also provides for a possible agreement between the prosecution and 
the defendant during the pretrial phase (Articles 407–410 CCP). The aim is to encourage 
the defendant’s cooperation and confession. By agreeing to such a measure, the defendant 
inevitably withdraws from other defence strategies. Should the prosecution unjustifiably 
deviate from the agreement at a later stage, the confession and other evidence thus 
obtained must be excluded from the proceedings. 
 
Function of admissibility rules 
It should be noted at the outset that both the Fundamental Law of Hungary and the Code 
of Criminal Procedure explicitly provide for the right to a fair trial and the right to 
defence. In addition, the new CCP implements all adopted EU defence rights directives.  
The Fundamental Law of Hungary grants everyone the right to a fair and public 
trial (Article XXIV) and the defendant the right to legal protection at any stage of the 
proceedings (Article XXVIII). The Constitutional Court has consistently held that a fair 
trial is an integral part of the rule of law and has established a checklist in a 1998 
decision.15 It confirmed in further decisions that the right to defence may only be 
restricted in accordance with the principles of necessity and proportionality, but not in its 
core.16 Accordingly, procedural rights in criminal proceedings cannot be circumvented 
and in most cases not even restricted. 
Correspondingly, the general objective of the admissibility rules in the CCP is to 
ensure that evidence has been collected lawfully and in full respect of fundamental rights. 
																																								 																				
14 Act XC of 2017 on Criminal Procedure (2017. évi XC. Törvény a büntetőeljárásról). 
15 Constitutional Court of Hungary, 11 March 1998, Decision No 6 (6/1998 (III.11) AB határozat). 
16 Constitutional Court of Hungary, 23 April 1990, Decision No 8 (8/1990 (IV. 23) AB határozat); 
Constitutional Court of Hungary, 11 March 1998, Decision No 6 (6/1998 (III.11) AB határozat).  
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The guiding rule being that no information is admissible that has been obtained by the 
authorities in the form of a criminal offence, by other infringements of the law or by a 
significant limitation of the rights of the defence (Article 167(5) CCP). In addition, there 
are exclusionary rules in the law on the use of specific evidence (see section 1.3.1).  
As a rule, evidence is obtained by the courts of first instance. The second instance 
intervenes only if further evidence is needed (eg additional witnesses need to be heard) 
or procedural mistakes are made while obtaining evidence in the first instance. The latter 
makes it possible to correct obvious procedural errors in the course of the trial. 
Accordingly, the courts of the second instance are entitled to convert findings obtained 
improperly or even unlawfully by the court of first instance into admissible evidence 
(Article 353(1) CCP), for example by requestioning accused persons who had not 
previously been informed of their rights. Even if the content remains the same, the 
evidence collected by the court of second instance will be entirely new evidence. 
 
1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
In administrative proceedings, the authorities are obliged by law to establish the facts of 
the case (Article 3 APA). In most cases, a decision can be made on the basis of available 
facts. If the information is insufficient, the authority will seek further evidence by the 
means provided by law. All evidence, with the exception of evidence obtained unlawfully, 
may be used to establish the facts of the case (Article 62(2) APA).  
A decision of the Hungarian Supreme Court (hereinafter Curia)17 – which was 
taken in the regulatory context before 2018 but which is still considered to be indicative 
– states that if the decision of a criminal court is necessary to establish the legality of a 
piece of evidence (eg in the case of coercive measures), the administrative authority must 
exclude this evidence until a criminal court has ruled on the matter.18 This would be the 
case, for example, with covert investigations such as interception of telecommunications. 
Due to the serious impairment of the fundamental rights of individuals, the law requires 
that a criminal court rules on the legality of such evidence. In the absence of a decision 
by a criminal court, the evidence must be excluded from the administrative procedure. 
This limitation of the free system of evidence serves the interests of the defendant. 
The above principles also apply for the special administrative procedures, all of 
which exclude the admissibility of evidence gathered in violation of the law, while 
generally providing for a free system of proof (see for instance Article 64/A of the Act 
on the implementation of the Union customs legislation, Article 57(3) of the Law on 
Regulatory Offences or Article 58 of the Law on Tax Administration).  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
17 Curia, 2016, Judgment No 594 (Kfv. I. 35.594/2016/24, [83]; [102].). 
18 Curia, 2016, Judgment No 594 (Kfv. I. 35.594/2016/24. [102].) 
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1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
 
1.3.1 Criminal law  
Hungarian criminal procedure is based on a free system of proof in the sense that all 
relevant information may in principle serve as evidence. On the one hand, this allows the 
authorities to use any evidence permitted by law, including statements, expert opinions, 
records, electronic data and the opinion of probation officers (Article 165 CCP). On the 
other hand, the courts, prosecutors and investigating authorities are free to evaluate all 
evidence, both individually and collectively, in order to draw conclusions based on their 
convictions. Any type of information may be transferred into documentary evidence. The 
courts are not obliged to prove facts for which no applications have been made. In 
addition, undisputed issues do not have to be proved. 
Nevertheless, certain evidence may not be used. The law generally prohibits the 
use of evidence obtained by the authorities by way of a criminal offence, other violations 
of the law or a substantial restriction of the defendant’s procedural rights (Article 167(5) 
CCP). Evidence obtained by criminal means usually involves compulsory questioning 
(Article 303 of the Hungarian Criminal Code).19 Other forms of infringement may be 
procedural deficiencies which do not constitute a criminal offence but call into question 
the legality (and reliability) of the evidence so collected. 
To correct such violations already in the course of the proceedings the law enables 
the courts of second instance to take evidence in order to convert findings obtained 
improperly into admissible (new) evidence (Article 353(1) CCP). For example, if the 
witnesses were questioned in violation of their rights, the testimony might be repeated in 
the second instance. According to the interviewees, however, a subsequent hearing may 
affect the probative value of the evidence for the prosecution, as the witness may have 
learned facts at the first hearing of which he or she did not know previously.  
Further, there are special exclusionary rules in the law concerning specific means 
of evidence. For example:  
- Witness statements, if the record does not include that the witnesses have been 
informed of their rights; of the obstacles to testifying; of the obligation to tell the truth or 
of the consequences of false testimony (Chapter XXIX CCP). 
- Statements made by the accused, the witness or the victim on the facts of the 
case at an expert hearing. For instance, while preparing an expert report, a psychiatrist 
may write down the reactions of the accused to the charges against him or her. Since such 
an expert hearing does not comprise a notification of defence rights, these parts of the 
report cannot be used as testimony (Chapter XXXI CCP). 
- The defendant’s testimony, if he or she was not informed of not being obliged to 
testify (Chapter XXX CCP). 
																																								 																				
19  Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (2012. évi C. törvény a Büntető Törvénykönyvről). 
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- Statements made by the defendant and the victim in the mediation process 
(Article 414(3) CCP). 20 
  
1.3.2 Punitive administrative law  
Administrative proceedings are also based on a free system of proof. All evidence, with 
the exception of evidence obtained unlawfully, may be used to establish the facts of the 
case (Article 62(2) APA). Thus, there are no specific impediments to the admissibility of 
evidence from any other administrative authority, including OLAF, and the authorities 
are free to assess its admissibility (Article 62(4) APA). However, there might be some 
limitations to the free system. Accordingly, a statute or government decree may prescribe 
the use of documentary evidence in specific cases and for reasons of public interest 
(Article 62(5) APA).  
In principle, the special laws on certain administrative proceedings mentioned 
above, such as those regarding tax and customs or regulatory offences, follow these 
general rules. As an example, the Act on Regulatory Offences, in line with the APA, 
prohibits the admissibility of any information as evidence which was gathered by the 
respective authorities by means of a criminal offence, by otherwise breaching the law or 
by significantly restricting the procedural rights of the person concerned (Article 57(3) 
Act on Regulatory Offences). The law provides for specific exclusionary rules concerning 
special means of evidence, for example if a witness has been heard despite the existence 
of an impediment to testify (eg due to mental impairment or professional secrecy; Article 
59 Act on Regulatory Offences) or if the witness has not been informed of the right to 
refuse to testify (Article 60 Act on Regulatory Offences). The competent authorities are 
otherwise free to choose the applicable means of evidence provided by the law (Article 
57(1) Act on Regulatory Offences). The law does not list the means of evidence 
exhaustively, which indirectly indicates that information from other lawful proceedings 
may also be admissible as evidence. Finally, the Act expressly permits the use of evidence 
from other authorities (Article 57(2) Act on Regulatory Offences). 
Article 80/C of the Act on the prohibition of unfair market conduct and restriction 
of competition explicitly requires evidence collected by the Commission to be 
substantiated for the purposes of the proceedings.  
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility  
 
1.4.1 Criminal law 
As has been repeatedly emphasised, the law generally excludes the admissibility of 
evidence taken by the courts, the public prosecutor’s office or the investigating authorities 
																																								 																				
20 See in further detail Petra Bárd, ‘Country Reports on Hungary’ in Elodie Sellier and Anne Weyembergh, 
‘Criminal Procedural Laws across the European Union – A Comparative Analysis of Selected Main 
Differences and the Impact They Have over the Development of EU Legislation’ (Study for European 
Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs 2018) 
<www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604977/IPOL_STU(2018)604977(ANN01)_EN.p
df> accessed 29 April 2019.  
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through a criminal offence, other prohibited means or through a substantial violation of 
defence rights (Article167(5) CCP). In all other cases, the court is free to decide which 
facts are to be admitted or excluded as evidence.  
The courts of first instance may justify in their decision why certain evidence was 
admitted while other evidence was not. An appeal may be lodged against this decision. 
Based on the free system of proof, the conclusions of the court on the use of evidence are 
otherwise not subject to review (Article 167(4) CCP). An exception is when the decision 
is not properly substantiated, eg wrongly derived from a fact or from illegally obtained 
evidence (Article 592 CCP) or there were procedural errors (Articles 608 and 609 CCP). 
As mentioned above, in order to resolve procedural errors already during the proceedings 
the law enables the courts of second instance to obtain evidence for such purposes as well 
(Article 353(1) CCP). The court of second instance is obliged to set aside the judgment 
of the court of first instance and shall initiate a new procedure if the procedural defects 
had a substantial effect on the procedure, which cannot be remedied by the second 
instance. These include impact on the determination of guilt, the classification of the 
offence, the imposition of penalties and the review of the case (Article 609 CCP). 
Appeals to the courts of second instance may only contain new evidence if the 
party proves that it became aware of it following the judgment of the first instance. In 
addition, appeals can include requests to consider evidence which was rejected in the first 
instance. 
Final court decisions might be reviewed exceptionally on the basis of procedural 
violations. The Curia has stated that there is only a limited possibility, and only within 
the context of the individual appeal, to review the use of evidence.21 
The law itself provides for exceptions where new evidence could lead to acquittals 
or convictions, where false or falsified evidence has been used, or where the court, 
prosecutor or investigating authority has violated its duties in the main proceedings by 
breaching the law. This may lead to the exclusion of evidence (Article 637(3) lit a)–b) 
CCP). 
 
1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
At present, the judicial review of administrative decisions takes place within the 
framework of the court system. There have been two reforms in the area. In 2013 
administrative courts and labour tribunals were set up at local court level. Within the 
regional courts, there are chambers, sections and divisions devoted to administrative 
cases. These courts are responsible for the judicial supervision of administrative decisions 
as well as other cases assigned to them by law. Should the 2018 law on administrative 
courts enter into force – with or without further amendments – the review of 
administrative decisions will be the competence of separate administrative courts. 
As a main rule the APA generally prohibits the use of evidence obtained by the 
authority in violation of the law (Article 62(2) APA). The complaint system differentiates 
																																								 																				
21 Curia, 2016, Judgment No 594 (Kfv. I. 35.594/2016/24.). 
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between complaint procedures on request (complaints and administrative procedures) and 
ex officio complaint procedures (modification or annulment of a decision within the 
authority’s own competence). In these appeal procedures it is possible to challenge the 
legality of gathered evidence. 
In the above-mentioned special procedures, the laws also provide for complaint 
mechanisms. In this regard, the special laws refer back to the APA (see Article 57/B(1) 
of the Act on the National Bank of Hungary; Article 80/I of the Act on the prohibition of 
unfair market conduct and restriction of competition; Article 124 of the Act on Tax 
Administration). The use of illegally obtained evidence is always prohibited (Article 
58(2) of the Act on Tax Administration; Article 46(2) 11 of the Act on the National Bank 
of Hungary; Article 57(2) and (3) of the Act on Regulatory Offences). As a specific rule, 
Article 80/C of the Act on the prohibition of unfair market conduct and restriction of 
competition requires evidence collected by the Commission to be substantiated for the 
purposes of the proceedings. 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings  
The CCP allows for the use of evidence produced or obtained by administrative 
authorities in criminal proceedings, given it was gathered in the performance of their 
duties before or simultaneously with the initiation of the criminal proceedings (Article 
167(2) CCP). The general rule excluding evidence obtained by a criminal offence, other 
illegal means or a substantial violation of the rights of participants in criminal proceedings 
(Article 167(5) CCP) also applies to evidence obtained in this way by administrative 
authorities. 
According to the law, the courts, the prosecution and the investigating authorities 
are not bound by decisions or facts taken in civil, administrative, disciplinary or other 
proceedings (Article 7(5) CCP). On the one hand, this means that evidence declared 
inadmissible in administrative proceedings may still be admissible in criminal 
proceedings, for example in the form of documentary evidence. On the other hand, in 
accordance with the free system of proof (see section 1.4), evidence admissible in 
administrative proceedings may still be ignored in criminal proceedings.   
 
1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
The free system of evidence does not mean that evidence obtained in criminal proceedings 
can be used in administrative proceedings without verification of its legality. Thus, the 
admissibility of evidence from criminal proceedings is also examined under 
administrative law. In this context, evidence that does not meet the higher standards may 
still correspond to the lower ones. 
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2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
 
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings  
Among its tasks, the Supreme Court of Hungary, the Curia, examines selected appeals 
defined by law, which were submitted against the decisions of the county courts and the 
regional courts of appeal. The Curia also reviews final decisions if challenged through an 
extraordinary remedy and adopts uniformity decisions, which are binding for the lower 
courts.22 The Curia repeatedly ruled that OLAF reports are to be considered evidence 
under the same conditions as the reports of national administrative authorities.23 
Nonetheless, OLAF final reports as such do not waive the obligation of the administrative 
authorities to investigate the facts of the case. Thus, OLAF reports as such do not 
constitute evidence on which the authority could automatically base a final decision.24  
 
2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings  
The Curia took a position in several of its decisions on the status of OLAF final reports 
in Hungarian administrative proceedings. In sum, OLAF reports qualify as a piece of 
evidence admissible in administrative and court proceedings in the same way and under 
the same conditions as an administrative report (minutes) prepared under the national law. 
They shall be subject to the same evaluation as those applicable to administrative reports 
drawn up by national administrative inspectors and shall be of identical value to such 
reports.25 This also means that when an OLAF report is used as evidence, the defendant 
has the same rights to access it as in the case of any other evidence.26 
According to the Curia, reports drawn up by administrative authorities (national 
or otherwise) generally describe data and intelligence gathered during their respective 
investigations. Even when containing concrete findings or recommendations, they do not 
constitute evidence in themselves.27 Thus, OLAF final reports (and that of national 
administrative authorities) as such do not constitute evidence on which a final decision 
could be automatically based.28 Consequently, these reports cannot define procedural 
																																								 																				
22 See Act CLXI of 2011 on the Organisation and Administration of the Courts (2011. évi CLXI. törvény 
a bíróságok szervezetéről és igazgatásáról). See also the website of the Curia <https://kuria-birosag.hu/en> 
accessed 29 April 2019. 
23 See the Curia decisions Kfv. V .35.299/2016/7, Kfv. IV. 35.651/2016/8 and Kfv. IV. 35.543/2016/5. 
24 Curia decisions Kfv. V. 35.299/2016/7 [28] and Kfv.IV.35.543/2016/5.[26]. 
25 Curia decisions Kfv. IV. 35.543/2016/5 [29]. See also Communication concerning the decision of the 
Curia of Hungary in administrative case no Kfv.I.35.420/2017. Available in English at <https://kuria-
birosag.hu/sites/default/files/selected_case_law/administrative_case_march_2018.pdf> accessed 29 April 
2019.  
26 Curia decisions Kfv. IV. 35.651/2016/8; Kfv. IV. 35.543/2016/5 or Kfv.V.35.542/2016/8 [33]. 
27 Curia decision Kfv. V. 35.299/2016/7 [28]. 
28 Curia decisions Kfv. V. 35.299/2016/7 [28] and [32]; Kfv.IV.35.543/2016/5.[26] and Kfv. IV. 
35.651/2016/8. 
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steps that would change the legal position of the individual in the underlying 
administrative procedure.29 
In addition, the Curia ruled that OLAF final reports and recommendations as such 
do not oblige national authorities to take specific measures. The Curia referred to Camós 
Grau v Commission30 by stating that the opinion in OLAF final reports imposes no 
obligation, even of a procedural nature, on the authorities to which it is addressed.31 Thus, 
the national authorities, each within their respective powers, decide freely on the 
measures to be taken.  
 
2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
The interviewees and the author are not aware of any court decisions on this subject. 
According to the opinion of the expert interviewed, the decision of the administrative 
authority would result in a breach of the law if the use of the evidence received from 
OLAF infringes or circumvents the basic principles of Hungarian procedural law and its 
safeguards. 
 
2.4 Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules  
The interviewees and the author are not aware of any court decisions on this subject. 
According to the expert interviewed, answering the question of the use of such evidence 
in national proceedings would only be possible by examining the specific infringement, 
ie the gravity of the violation and its consequences. 
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
As mentioned above, the APA sets out the procedures for which special laws apply. The 
procedures include those concerning regulatory offences, tax and customs administration, 
competition proceedings and National Bank of Hungary administration. The free system 
of proof also applies to the special procedures (see, for instance, Article 58 Act on Tax 
Administration; Article 46(2) 11 Act on the Hungarian National Bank or Article 57(1) 
Act on Regulatory Offences). 
There are no specific rules regarding the admissibility of evidence gathered by the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) 
or the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP) in the 
administrative procedure code. In line with the general rules the law allows for the use of 
evidence lawfully collected by any administrative authorities, including said EU agencies. 
The reports of these agencies typically qualify as documentary evidence. Thus, ECB, 
ESMA, DG COMP-collected information might be admissible as evidence, even in the 
																																								 																				
29 Curia decision Kfv.IV.35.698/2016/11 [41]. 
30 Case T-309/03 Camós Grau v Commission, EU:T:2006:110, para 50.  
31 Curia decision Kfv.IV.35.698/2016/11 [40]. 
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face of higher national standards. The only strict restriction is, as provided in all the 
above-mentioned special laws, if the evidence has been obtained illegally (see above 
section 1.4.2). In addition, Article 80/C of the Act on the prohibition of unfair market 
conduct and restriction of competition explicitly mentions that the national competition 
council ‘shall substantiate in its reasoning to the resolution the admissibility of [evidence 
originating from DG COMP or a national competition authority of another Member 
State], by demonstrating that the conditions set out in Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 
have been met’. 
Notably, while assessing evidence in national administrative proceedings, the 
authorities are only bound by decisions and facts established in national criminal 
proceedings. Thus, administrative authorities are not bound by decisions made or facts 
established in other administrative proceedings, including ECB, ESMA and DG COMP 
investigations and final reports. Finally, it is possible both ex officio and on motion to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence that was obtained in breach of EU law. No specific 
provisions apply for the EU agencies in this regard, only the general rules described in 
section 1.4.  
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
With regard to the admissibility of evidence collected by administrative authorities in 
criminal proceedings, the following basic rules apply. First, any information collected 
lawfully by national administrative authorities prior to or during the criminal proceedings 
may be admissible as evidence in criminal proceedings (Article 167(2) CCP). Second, all 
information collected in administrative proceedings is considered to have weaker 
evidential value in criminal proceedings. According to experts, this is due to the fact that 
the information was gained during administrative proceedings or, more precisely, not 
gained during criminal proceedings. Third, according to the law, as to whether the 
defendant has committed a criminal offence, the courts, the prosecution and the 
investigating authorities are not bound by decisions made or by facts established in 
administrative proceedings (Article 7(5) CCP). This covers both national and EU 
administrative proceedings, including those of OLAF. Fourth, in line with the free system 
of proof, any information gathered lawfully might be admissible as evidence in criminal 
proceedings.  
Thus, information gathered according to lower procedural safeguards, comprising 
OLAF final reports, might still be admissible and used as evidence in criminal 
proceedings. These reports constitute documentary evidence and have ‘weaker’ probative 
value than evidence collected in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
According to the law documentary evidence proves a fact, the accuracy of data and the 
accuracy of an event or declaration (Article 204(3) CCP). This also applies to OLAF final 
reports, which are admissible as documentary evidence. Documentary evidence, 
including OLAF final reports, may take on a stronger form, such as testimony, if it is 
taken up again by the prosecution service in accordance with the CCP, for instance by 
hearing the witness.  
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The interviews pointed out that in practice evidence collected by administrative 
authorities, and thus by OLAF, are in general repeated, supported by an investigative 
measure under the CCP. This repetition serves as a verification measure, but may also 
increase the probative value of the evidence in criminal proceedings.   
The interviewees also stated that while affirming the probative value of 
administrative findings for the purposes of criminal proceedings, for instance by means 
of witness testimony, is possible, it is also rather difficult. During a subsequent hearing 
by the prosecution service the perception of the witness could be considered already 
‘influenced’ by the previous OLAF hearing for the purposes of criminal proceedings. 
The law allows the prosecutor and the investigating authority to call in an ‘adviser’ 
if special expertise is required to find, obtain, collect or record evidence or to clarify a 
technical issue (Article 270 CCP). Different to experts, advisers only give advices but do 
not provide for analysis (Chapter XXXI CCP). The interviews stressed that OLAF 
officials could best contribute to the cases as advisers. In practice, it would mean that 
OLAF would be informed of an investigation and the authorities could request OLAF to 
help by providing knowhow on what evidence needs to be collected and how.  
According to the interviewees, OLAF was informed that its officials might 
participate best as advisers in national criminal proceedings, but the Office has not yet 
made use of this possibility. The reason for this could be that adviser opinions do not 
constitute evidence as such but only special knowledge to assist the case. To convert it 
into evidence, future OLAF advisers should be heard as witnesses. Thus, advisers have a 
weaker legal position than experts in criminal proceedings.  
According to the interviews, even if OLAF gathered information in violation of 
its own rules of procedure, the information might still be admissible in evidence if it was 
not gathered in violation of the CCP. That said, it is possible both ex officio and on motion 
to challenge the admissibility of evidence on the ground that it was obtained in breach of 
EU law. There are no specific provisions in the law but the general rules apply (see section 
1.3). 
All of the above also applies to the admissibility of information provided by ECB, 
ESMA and DG COMP as evidence in criminal proceedings. 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
Various interviewees participated in OLAF meetings, which take place three to four times 
a year at the Office of the Prosecutor General of Hungary. These meetings serve to discuss 
both general as well as case-related issues. According to the interviewees, Hungarian 
authorities repeatedly communicated some of the above-mentioned essential 
requirements at these meetings. Most important, as OLAF carries out its investigation 
according to lower procedural standards and powers than do the national authorities in 
criminal proceedings, interviewees support having the national authorities carry out all 
investigative measures, not just coercive ones. Thus, they would prefer that, once OLAF 
informs them, the national authorities take over the investigation (or at least carry out the 
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investigative measures). In their view this would raise the probative value of the collected 
evidence and would avoid duplication of activities.  
In this regard the interviewees stressed that in practice investigative activities of 
both OLAF and national authorities are repeated in accordance with the CCP – on the one 
hand to raise the probative value of the evidence, on the other hand because OLAF final 
reports often proved to contain mistakes or ‘facts’ based on rumours. As an example, the 
interviewees referred to the final report on the Budapest M4 Metro line case, an OLAF 
investigation lasting more than five years, where according to the interviewees most of 
the report proved to be erroneous.  
Thus, OLAF final reports, in the form in which they are submitted, just like the 
reports of Hungarian administrative authorities, might be used only as documentary 
evidence. By taking up this evidence again in accordance with the rules of the CCP, for 
instance by hearing the witness, the content can be verified and the evidence can take on 
a stronger form (such as testimony instead of documentary evidence). 
As another example, the interviewees noted that OLAF usually provides copies of 
documents. In line with Hungarian law, handwriting experts, however, can work only 
with original documents. Therefore, if the prosecution service receives copies, it either 
cannot commission such expertise or needs to repeat the measure.  
In principle, the prosecution service tends to verify the content of OLAF final 
reports in the same way as it controls the content of reports of national administrative 
authorities.  
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7. Italy 
M. Caianiello and G. Lasagni 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
In the Italian legal system, there is not an autonomous definition of ‘administrative 
punitive proceedings’, nor a single code or regulation establishing common procedures 
for ‘administrative punitive proceedings’.  
On the contrary, the attribution of a substantially criminal nature generally occurs 
at the national level through an ex post, case-by-case assessment of the competent judicial 
authorities, in application of the Engel case-law of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR),1 also as applied by the Court of Justice (CJEU).2  
For the purpose of this study, there are three main fields of law where a punitive 
nature has been attributed to (certain) national administrative sanctions: Tax law (under 
various provisions of Legislative Decree No 74 of 10 March 2000, hereinafter ‘tax 
administrative punitive proceedings’),3 financial market supervision (under various 
provisions of Legislative Decree No 58 of 24 February 1998 – Testo unico delle 
disposizioni in materia di intermediazione finanziaria or ‘TUF’, hereinafter ‘financial 
administrative punitive proceedings’),4 and competition law (according to Law no 287 of 
10 October 1990).5 
In this report, therefore, the term ‘administrative punitive proceedings’ will refer 
to these three kinds of proceedings, although OLAF-collected evidence is mainly relevant 
to administrative tax proceedings.  
This does not mean that in Italy there are no other types of sectoral administrative 
proceedings which may fall under the definition of ‘administrative punitive proceedings’ 
(for instance, in banking supervision), but given the lack of case-law on the matter, and 
the sectoral fragmentation of the Italian legal framework on administrative sanctions, the 
present report will focus only on the three aforementioned fields of law. 
                                                
1 Engel and Others v the Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 
June 1976). 
2 Starting from the Case C-489/10 Criminal proceedings against Łukasz Marcin Bonda, EU:C:2012:319, 
paras 36–46. 
3 cf, eg, Case C-524/15 Criminal proceedings against Luca Menci, EU:C:2018:197. 
4 cf, eg, Grande Stevens and Others v Italy App no 18640/10 (ECtHR, 4 March 2014), and, for the CJEU, 
Case C-537/16 Garlsson Real Estate SA and Others v Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa 
(Consob), EU:C:2018:193; Joined Cases C-596/16 and C-597/16, Enzo Di Puma v Commissione Nazionale 
per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) and Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (Consob) v 
Antonio Zecca, EU:C:2018:192. 
5 cf A Menarini Diagnostics S.r.l. v Italy App no 43509/08 (ECtHR, 27 September 2011). 
 1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
According to Article 190 of the Italian criminal procedure code (hereinafter CPP), courts 
shall admit all evidence requested by the parties of the proceedings, as long as it has 
neither been obtained in violation of the law, nor is manifestly superfluous or irrelevant 
to the thema probandum (as defined by Article 187 CPP). Evidence may be admitted ex 
officio by the court only as a residual option, and only where the law authorizes it (in 
particular, in the cases of Articles 70, 195, 224, 237, 422, 507, 511, and 603 CPP). 
According to Article 188 CPP, moreover, techniques which may interfere with the 
self-determination of a person or alter his or her memory (such as lie detectors) shall not 
be used to collect evidence, even if such person grants his or her consent. 
Lastly, Article 191 CPP states that information obtained in violation of a 
prohibition established by the law cannot be used as evidence at all. A party may seek to 
exclude any evidence obtained by illegal methods at any stage of the criminal 
proceedings.  
The interpretation of this specific provision has given rise to different legal 
solutions.  
For instance, it is highly debated whether ‘implicit prohibitions’ (whose 
recurrence could be deduced from an affirmative proposition, for instance if the law 
provides that a certain operation is admissible only respecting a specific formality) should 
be included in the notion of ‘prohibition’. 
Moreover, the meaning of the wording ‘established by the law’ is not very clear, 
as ‘law’ had been both narrowly interpreted with an exclusive reference to procedural 
law, and, more broadly, as also including substantive criminal law (although in many 
cases there is little doubt regarding the application of the rule: for example, when an 
interception of communication has been issued despite the lack of the lawful conditions). 
Finally, there are some uncertainties regarding the admissibility of evidence 
obtained through an illegal search. The solution given by the Italian Supreme Court 
(Corte di cassazione) is to allow the use of such evidence when it constitutes the corpus 
delicti (rejecting the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine) and to forbid the admission of 
any other element gathered by an illegal search.6 This solution permits the courts to use 
the most relevant pieces of evidence that police or prosecutors might find as a 
consequence of a search – even if illegal; at the same time, it is possible to say that in 
some way the principle of fairness in the conduct of the investigation is preserved. 
Against this background, admissibility rules in criminal proceedings have been 
established to highlight the adoption of an accusatorial structure in the current criminal 
procedure code. They are an expression of the accusatorial principle also in the matter of 
evidence admissibility (principio dispositivo), which aims at guaranteeing the equality of 
arms among parties of the proceedings. At the same time, the prohibition to admit 
evidence acquired in violation of the law aims at protecting both the dignity of all subjects 
potentially involved in criminal proceedings (see, in this sense, the aforementioned 
                                                
6 cf, eg, Court of Cassation, United Chambers, 27 March 1996, no 5021, Defendant: Sala. 
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 Articles 191 and 188 CPP), and ensuring a minimum level of fairness, and thus of 
reliability, to the information that could potentially be put at the basis of the court’s 
decision.  
 
1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
In Italy the specific regulation of administrative (punitive and non-punitive) proceedings 
results from the combination of a general legal framework (composed essentially by Law 
No 241 of 18 August 1990 and by the ‘code of administrative proceedings’, Law Decree 
No 104 of 2 July 2010) with sectoral regulation which differs from public administration 
to public administration (and sometimes also within the same public administration, 
depending on the purpose of the proceedings). 
The general law on administrative proceedings (Law No 241 of 18 August 1990) 
contains only very general minimum rules, upon which every public administration shall 
build its own regulation.  
Concerning evidence, it establishes that the administration responsible for the 
proceedings shall evaluate the admissibility of information used to issue a decision and 
may adopt all necessary acts and apply all necessary measures to adequately perform its 
evaluations, including asking for oral statements, issuing production orders, and 
performing inspections and other technical assessments (Article 6(1), lit a and b).  
Subjects which may be addressed by the administrative decision (according to 
Article 7) have the right to deposit written statements and documents which the 
administration is under the obligation to consider, as long as they are relevant to the 
proceedings (Article 10(1), lit b).  
Very few relevant rules may be found in the code of administrative proceedings 
(Law Decree No 104 of 2 July 2010). In particular, according to Article 63 of this code, 
administrative courts may use production orders, written testimony and technical expert 
witnesses, require inspections, and all others means of proof established by the Civil 
Procedure Code, except for the oath and a specific form of interview (interrogatorio 
formale).  
When it comes to the ‘administrative punitive proceedings’ (in the sense referred 
to in section 1) relevant for this study, further sectoral legal provisions apply, which differ 
from each other.  
In addition to the general legal framework just described, tax administrative 
proceedings are also regulated by Legislative Decree No 546 of 31 December 1992, 
which at Article 7 allows competent authorities to adopt production orders, carry out 
technical assessments, and grants powers of access. Oath and testimony, on the contrary, 
are not allowed.  
According to Article 75 of Presidential Decree No 633 of 26 October 1972, 
moreover, for what not specifically provided for in the sectoral regulation, the Italian 
criminal procedure code shall apply – and in particular, for the purpose of this report, 
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 Article 191 CPP (see above section 1.1).7 Nonetheless, in practice, such criminal code 
provision is rarely applied, as traditionally all evidentiary material that may be relevant 
for the purposes of tax proceedings is considered admissible.8  
Financial administrative and administrative punitive proceedings are regulated, 
besides for the aforementioned general legal framework, also by Article 24(1) of Law No 
262 of 28 December 2005, and by Law No 681 of 24 November 1981. None of these 
regulations, however, provides for specific rules concerning admissibility. Article 13 of 
Law 681/1981, in particular, only establishes that when a competent authority is 
investigating in proceedings which may end with the imposition of a sanction, it may 
acquire information and perform inspections, confiscations and all other necessary 
technical operations. 
Lastly, again in addition to the general legal framework, according to Articles 12 
and 14 of Law No 287 of 10 October 1990, in exercising its decision-making power, the 
Italian Antitrust authority shall take into account all elements which it may already 
possess, or which are communicated to it by other public administrations or by everyone 
who might have an interest in the cause. This authority may also perform inspections, 
interviews, and carry out other technical forms of assessment. Subjects that may be 
addressed by the Authority’s decision have the right to be heard and may provide 
statement and documents. 
Regardless of this fragmented legal framework, the control of admissibility in 
administrative proceedings in Italy appears therefore rather limited, due both to the 
applicable regulation9 and to the case-law interpreting the latter. Indeed, in general terms, 
as long as the applied means of proof are provided for by the law, the information so 
gathered may be used as evidence at trial (critical issues may therefore arise concerning 
the use of evidence, but not its admissibility).  
This model seems to mainly serve the need to focus the attention of the 
administration on relevant material; the goal of fair proceedings is then pursued, in this 
phase of the proceedings, through the administrative authority’s obligation to consider 
also the elements furnished by the subjects under investigation rather than by specific 
admissibility rules.  
                                                
7 On the potential applicability of Art 191 CPP to tax punitive proceedings, see, eg, Court of Cassation, Tax 
Chamber, 24 September 2007, no 24533; Third Criminal Law Chamber, 7 February 2007, no 403/12017; 
Tax Chamber, 10 June 2004, no 19689; Tax Chamber, 5 March 2007, no 9568; Tax Chamber, 20 February 
2007, no 8181; Tax Chamber, 24 February 2006, no 7314; United Chambers (Civil Law), 17 October 2002, 
no 16424. See also District Tax Commission, Treviso (Commissione tributaria provinciale di Treviso), 
Sixth Chamber, 5 June 2007, no 67; Regional Tax Commission, Rome (Commissione tributaria regionale 
di Roma), Twenty-seventh Chamber, 12 April 2007, no 72.  
8 On this favor fisci, see, eg, Court of Cassation, Fifth Chamber, 16 June 2006, no 14058; Fifth Chamber, 
13 October 2006, no 22035; Fifth Chamber, 5 February 2007, no 2450; Fifth Chamber, 16 April 2007, no 
8990.  
9 This consideration is not substantially challenged even if considered applicable to the administrative 
proceedings Art 245 of the Italian civil procedure code, according to which the admissibility of witness 
testimony shall be evaluated according to relevance and pertinence criteria, in addition to the respect of the 
rule of law. Indeed, in administrative proceedings testimony may only be given in written form, and, in any 
case, is not allowed in tax administrative proceedings, i.e. the administrative punitive proceedings OLAF-
collected evidence is most relevant to. 
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 1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
 
1.3.1 Criminal law 
In Italy, the system of proof in criminal proceedings is controlled, but with a (rather broad) 
opening clause.  
Indeed, the Italian criminal procedure code provides for a list of means of proof, 
whose admissibility requirements are established by law.  
However, according to Article 189 CPP, ‘atypical’ evidence (i.e. evidence whose 
mechanism of gathering is not regulated by law) can also be admitted at trial, as long as 
it is capable of contributing to proving the thema probandum and does not violate the 
moral liberty of subjects potentially involved in the investigations (this provision is used, 
for instance, in case of online searches, which are not explicitly regulated by the Italian 
criminal procedure code). 
 
1.3.2 Punitive administrative law  
The system of proof does not vary in the Italian legal framework for administrative 
punitive and non-punitive proceedings.  
In general terms (as much as it is possible to generalise, against the fragmented 
background illustrated under section 1), systems in this field are de facto of free proof, 
although in some kinds of administrative proceedings, certain means of proof may be 
barred (for instance, in tax administrative proceedings, testimony and oath are not 
admitted, in accordance with Article 7(4) Legislative Decree No 546/1992, see above, 
section 1.2). 
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility  
 
1.4.1 Criminal law 
In criminal proceedings, the decision of the court on admissibility of evidence cannot be 
directly subject to review.  
However, if a party challenges the decision of the court on culpability, he or she 
can complain about the non-admission of evidence he or she had previously requested be 
admitted.  
Different conditions apply depending on which type of appeal the party decides 
to exercise.  
No limits to this possibility have been established before Court of Appeals, as the 
scope of review of these Courts covers both merit and legitimacy issues. 
On the other side, when appealing before the Supreme Court (Corte di 
cassazione), only the non-admission (albeit requested by the party) of a decisive 
counterevidence can represent a ground for appeal (cf Article 606(1), lit d CPP).  
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 1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
In administrative (also punitive) proceedings, the possibility to review the decision on 
admissibility is relatively limited, due to the very broad margin of discretion granted to 
administrative authorities in using for their decision all means of proof provided for by 
the law (see above, section 1.2): The party may therefore only challenge the final decision 
according to the ordinary means of appeal established by Law Decree no 104/2010. 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings  
As the requirements to admit evidence are different and, in any case, autonomous, in 
criminal and administrative (also punitive) law, whether or not a piece of evidence has 
been admitted in other proceedings is not relevant for its admission in criminal 
proceedings. Also in this case, therefore, evidence may be admitted in criminal 
proceedings, as long as it complies with the general requirements established by the 
criminal procedure code (see section 1.1).  
 
1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
Similarly, as the requirements to admit evidence are different and, in any case, 
autonomous for criminal and administrative (also punitive) proceedings, whether or not 
a piece of evidence has previously been considered admissible or inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings is not relevant for its admission in administrative proceedings.  
 
2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
 
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings  
As noted in section 1, in Italy there is no general regulation covering administrative 
punitive proceedings, nor a general and ex ante classification of which administrative 
proceedings are substantially punitive. Therefore, there is no general distinction between 
admissibility rules applicable in administrative proceedings and those applicable in 
administrative punitive proceedings.  
In some cases, such as in financial market regulation, rules may differ for 
proceedings which may end up imposing a sanction (regardless of it being considered 
substantially criminal in light of the Engel criteria or not). However, as noted above (see 
section 1.2), also in this area, there are no specific rules concerning admissibility.  
In any case, so far, no specific provisions have been established with regard to 
OLAF-collected evidence. 
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  2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings  
 
In general terms, jurisprudence concerning OLAF-collected evidence cannot be found at 
the national level with regard to the field of financial market protection or competition 
law.  
On the other hand, relevant case-law may be found concerning proceedings in tax 
matters. According to a settled jurisprudence, in line with the content of Article 11 OLAF 
Regulation, no further investigation is generally required by national authorities 
following the transmission of OLAF final reports of the assessment contained in such 
reports. The latter are indeed recognised as having the same evidentiary value as reports 
issued by national administrative authorities.  
This jurisprudence has been confirmed both by lower jurisdictions,10 as well as by 
the Italian Supreme Court,11 according to which any information transmitted by OLAF 
(documents, information, and even reports of particular actions undertaken by the 
Antifraud Office) may be used as sources of evidence at trial.12 
 
2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
In Italian administrative proceedings, the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence does 
not appear to be impaired by national standards on procedural safeguards.  
This could derive from the fact that safeguards provided for by OLAF Regulation 
883/2013 are generally higher than the guarantees established in national administrative 
proceedings, and more similar to the safeguards required under criminal procedural law 
(especially with regard to the right to remain silent). 
                                                
10 See, eg, District Tax Commission, Milan (Commissione tributaria provinciale di Milano), Section XXXI, 
no 86 of 19.11.2004, in Mass Comm. Trib. Lombardia, 2005, 105: ‘In presenza di una comunicazione 
dell'Ufficio europeo della lotta antifrode (Decisione 1999/352/CE, CECA EURATOM della Commissione), 
nessun altro obbligo di accertamento incombe sulle autorità doganali dello Stato membro, essendo compito 
di questo Ufficio, appunto svolgere le indagini amministrative oltre a lottare contro la frode, la corruzione 
ed ogni altra attività illecita lesiva degli interessi finanziari della Comunità europea. Le relazioni 
dell'Ufficio costituiscono elementi di prova nei procedimenti amministrativi o giudiziari dello Stato 
membro nel quale risulti necessario avvalersene, al medesimo titolo ed alle medesime condizioni delle 
relazioni amministrative redatte da ispettori amministrativi nazionali (art. 9, Reg. CE n. 1073/1999)’ (‘In 
the presence of a communication from the European Anti-Fraud Office (Commission Decision 
1999/352/EC, ECSC, EURATOM), no further obligation to conduct inspections is incumbent on the 
customs authorities of the Member State, since it is for this Office to carry out administrative investigations 
as well as to fight against fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of 
the European Community. The Office’s reports constitute evidence in the administrative or judicial 
proceedings of the Member State in which it is necessary to make use of them, in the same way and under 
the same conditions as the administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors (Article 9, 
EC Reg. No. 1073 / 1999)’, authors’ translation). 
 11 cf Court of Cassation, Fifth Chamber, 21 April 2017, no 10118; Fifth Chamber, 8 March 2013, no 5892; 
Fifth Chamber, 3 August 2012, no 14036; Fifth Chamber, 27 July 2012, no 13496; Fifth Chamber, order of 
2 March 2009, no 4997; Fifth Chamber, 24 September 2008, no 23985. 
12 Fifth Chamber, 8 March 2013, no 5892. 
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 This conclusion is confirmed by the aforementioned case-law on tax matters 
(section 2.2), according to which OLAF reports may be directly used as evidence in 
national proceedings (see also section 5). 
 
2.4 Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules  
In the absence of any specific rule, the same rules on admissibility (and the same right to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence) provided for other information collected in 
administrative proceedings shall apply also to OLAF-collected information in the context 
of administrative punitive proceedings (see above, section 1.4.2). 
Powers concerning evidence to be used at trial may be exercised also ex officio 
by administrative courts, in accordance with Article 64 of Law Decree No 104/2010. 
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
 
3.1 ECB-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation)  
As noted in section 1, in Italy there is no general regulation covering administrative 
punitive proceedings, nor a general classification of which proceedings are substantially 
punitive; therefore, no general distinction between admissibility rules applicable in 
administrative proceedings and those applicable in administrative punitive proceedings 
may be found in the Italian legal system.  
As with OLAF-collected evidence, no specific provisions concerning the 
admissibility of information collected by the ECB and transmitted to national authorities 
according to Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation (FR), or regarding its use in 
administrative punitive proceedings relevant for this study may be observed. 
In addition, in the specific case of ECB-collected information, the referral 
mechanism (from ECB to national competent authorities-NCAs) of Article 136 SSM FR 
concerns ‘criminal offence[s]’. The admissibility and use of such information, therefore, 
is not for the administrative authorities to check, but rather for the judicial authorities.  
In this sense, however, at the national level no critical issues have been reported 
so far specifically concerning the admissibility of ECB-collected evidence in criminal 
proceedings (on the contrary, for critical considerations arising from the use in criminal 
proceedings of evidence collected in administrative proceedings, see section 4.1). 
Lastly, it is relevant to point out that Article 136 SSM FR does not impose an 
obligation for NCAs to refer such information to judicial authorities but leaves the matter 
to national legislation.  
In Italy, such a regulation may be found in Article 331 of the criminal procedure 
code, and in Article 7 of the Italian Consolidated Law on Banking (Legislative Decree no 
385 of 1 September 1993 – Testo Unico Bancario, hereinafter ‘TUB’), which establishes 
the powers and obligations of the Banca d’Italia, the Italian NCA. 
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 According to Article 331 CPP, public officials and persons in charge of public 
services have a duty to report, without delay, any suspicions of crime which arise in the 
course of carrying out, or because, of their functions or their service.  
According to Article 7(2) TUB, employees of Banca d’Italia in the exercise of 
their supervisory functions are to be considered public officials. Moreover, the 
professional secrecy generally applicable to such Banca d’Italia personnel cannot be 
opposed to judicial authorities when the information requested is necessary for the 
investigation or prosecution of criminal offences.13  
However, the same provision also establishes that all irregularities detected, even 
when they might involve criminal offences, shall be reported by employees exclusively 
to the collegial managing body of Banca d’Italia (Direttorio).  
This reporting duty refers to the information itself, as well as, in the most 
significant cases, where accuracy in the referral and effective cooperation between Banca 
d’Italia and judicial authority are all the more necessary, to potential insights into the 
case, aimed at corroborating at technical and legal level the relevance of the suspicions 
of a crime.  
From the wording of Article 7(2) TUB, however, it is not clear whether such a 
provision represents an exception to the general reporting duty established by Article 331 
CPP. In particular, it is not clear whether the obligation to refer the notitia criminis to 
judicial authorities, which is exceptionally, not directly, applicable to public officials 
working for Banca d’Italia, exists for the Direttorio of Banca d’Italia.   
 Although it would be appropriate to amend Article 7 TUB in order to make such 
an obligation explicit, legal scholars (and, to a certain extent, also Banca d’Italia itself)14 
generally believe that the Direttorio remains indeed bound by duty to refer suspicions of 
crime to judicial authorities. The procedure of Article 7(2) TUB, therefore, shall be 
interpreted not as a real derogation to Article 331 CPP, but only as a precautionary 
reporting mechanism to prevent or reduce an unregulated dissemination of potential 
notitiae criminis having detrimental effects on the stability of the financial markets.15 
 
3.2 ESMA-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 64(8) EMIR) 
As noted in section 1, in Italy there is no general regulation covering administrative 
punitive proceedings, nor a general classification of which proceedings are substantially 
punitive; therefore, no general distinction between admissibility rules applicable in 
                                                
13 cf Art 7(1) TUB. 
14 Luigi Federico Signorini, ‘Attività di Vigilanza e Giurisdizione Penale’ (Associazione Italiana dei 
Professori di Diritto Penale. II Convegno Nazionale – ‘Economia e diritto penale nel tempo della crisi’, 
Palermo 15 November 2013) 11 <www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/interventi-direttorio/int-dir-
2013/Signorini-151113.pdf> accessed 19 April 2019. The author was, at the time, Vice-President of Banca 
d’Italia. 
15 Antonella Antonucci, ‘Articolo 7’ in Concetto Costa (ed), Commento al Testo Unico delle Leggi in 
Materia Bancaria e Creditizia, vol 1 (Giappichelli 2013) 58–59. 
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 administrative proceedings and those applicable in administrative punitive proceedings 
may be found in the Italian legal system.  
As with OLAF or ECB-collected evidence, no specific provisions concerning the 
admissibility of information collected by ESMA and transmitted to national authorities 
according to Article 64(8) EMIR, or regarding its use in administrative punitive 
proceedings relevant for this study may be observed. 
Article 64(8) EMIR, moreover, explicitly considers the case in which ESMA 
‘shall refer matters for criminal prosecution to the relevant national authorities’. In such 
cases, therefore, the admissibility of information referred by ESMA shall be addressed 
by judicial, rather than by administrative authorities.  
In this sense, however, no critical issues have been reported so far which 
specifically concern the admissibility of ESMA-collected evidence in criminal 
proceedings (on the contrary, for critical considerations arising from the use in criminal 
proceedings of evidence collected in administrative proceedings, see section 4.1). 
 
3.3 DG COMP-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003)  
As noted in section 1, in Italy there is no general regulation covering administrative 
punitive proceedings, nor a general classification of which proceedings are substantially 
punitive; therefore, no general distinction between admissibility rules applicable in 
administrative proceedings and those applicable in administrative punitive proceedings 
may be found in the Italian legal system.  
As with OLAF, ECB or ESMA-collected evidence, no specific provisions 
concerning the admissibility of information collected by DG COMP and transmitted to 
national authorities according to Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003, or regarding its use in 
administrative punitive proceedings relevant for this study may be observed. 
In this sense, no critical issues have been reported so far in the case-law 
specifically concerning the admissibility of DG COMP-collected evidence. 
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
4.1 General rules on the admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence collected 
by national administrative authorities 
The Italian criminal procedure code allows for the admissibility of information gathered 
by national administrative authorities as evidence in criminal proceedings.  
Generally, information gathered by national administrative authorities taking the 
form of a report or document can be admitted as documentary evidence in criminal 
proceedings, according to Articles 234 (documents) and 234-bis (electronic documents) 
CPP.  
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 According to Article 234 CPP, written and other types of documentary evidence 
(such as pictures, video, or audio) concerning facts, persons or things may be admitted as 
evidence at trial, in accordance with the general requirements established for the 
admission of evidence (see section 1.1). However, according to Article 234(3) CPP, 
documents containing anonymous information or which concern the morality of the 
parties of the proceedings cannot be used as evidence. In case of electronic documents 
(Article 234-bis CPP), the possibility to use documents at trial extends also to data stored 
abroad, as long as the subject who retains the ownership gives his or her consent.  
In all these cases, the admission of documentary evidence is therefore quite 
straightforward (as is in the case of OLAF reports).16  
However, the situation in which it is not clear whether the report produced by the 
administrative authority has really only a documentary nature, or whether it also contains 
evaluations made by the administrative authority could be problematic.  
Information gathered by a national administrative authority may also be 
introduced at trial through the testimony of the administrative officials that carried out 
the investigative act, following the regulation applicable to the testimony of law 
enforcement (which provides for some limitations in case of hearsay testimony ex Article 
195(4) CPP). 
In any case, a general limit to the admissibility of information collected by 
administrative authorities is provided for by Article 220 of the rules implementing the 
CPP. According to this, if during inspections or supervisory tasks performed by 
administrative authorities, suspicions of a crime emerge, then all the subsequent 
investigative acts shall be carried out in accordance with the rules of the criminal 
procedure code (and not the rules, usually less safeguarding, established for the 
administrative proceedings at stake).  
 
4.2 Admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and especially OLAF, in 
criminal proceedings 
No specific rules are laid down in the Italian legal framework concerning the admissibility 
in criminal proceedings of information collected by OLAF, ECB, ESMA or DG COMP. 
The general rules illustrated under section 4.1 apply also in these contexts.  
This consideration holds true also with regard to the rights of the concerned person 
to challenge evidence which was allegedly obtained in violation of EU rules on 
investigatory powers and procedural safeguards.  
                                                
16 cf Tribunal of Marsala, Mixed Chamber (Sezione promiscua), 17 December 1998, according to which: 
‘Gli atti di accertamento si qualificano come atti promananti da un organo pubblico di controllo e come 
tali posseggono tutti i requisiti prescritti dall’art. 234 c.p.p. per l’inserimento nel fascicolo del 
dibattimento’ (‘Such reports qualify as acts originating from a public investigating authority body and as 
such posses all the requisites prescribed by Article 234 CPP for their inclusion in the trial file’, authors’ 
translation). See Ernesto Lupo, ‘La Protezione dei Diritti Fondamentali nella Giurisprudenza Italiana’ in 
Valentina Bazzocchi (ed), La Protezione dei Diritti Fondamentali e Procedurali. Dalle Esperienze 
Investigative dell’Olaf all’Istituzione del Procuratore Europeo (Fondazione Lelio e Lesli Basso 2013) 71 
<www.europeanrights.eu/public/eventi/eppo_ita.pdf> accessed 19 April 2019. 
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 In the absence of any specific rule related to information collected in 
OLAF/ECB/ESMA/DG COMP proceedings at the national level, the same rules on 
admissibility (and rights to challenge the admissibility of evidence) provided for 
information collected in national administrative proceedings shall apply.  
According to the latter, parties may discuss admissibility of evidence through an 
adversarial procedure before the judge(s) of the trial (Articles 189ff CPP). Judges may 
exercise ex officio powers in this regard, where so allowed by the law – i.e. at least 
theoretically, in residual cases. 
Where the admissibility of an exculpatory piece of evidence had been .requested 
by a party, in order to challenge the evidence presented by the counterparty, but such a 
request had not been admitted by the judge, the party is entitled to challenge the final 
decision (in which the exculpatory evidence was not taken into account) before the 
Supreme Court, in accordance with Article 606(1), lit d) CPP. 
With regard to OLAF-collected evidence, in particular, no specific critical issue 
on admissibility arising from different procedural safeguards in OLAF and in criminal 
law proceedings has been reported in the Italian case-law, when the evidence is merely 
documentary (but see above, section 4.1 about Article 220 of the rules implementing the 
CPP).  
Where, on the other hand, a different kind of evidence is at stake, lower standards 
of safeguards could in principle impair the admissibility of such evidence at criminal trial.  
As highlighted below in section 5, however, the problem has scarcely emerged in 
the Italian case-law with regard to OLAF investigations, possibly due to the relatively 
high procedural standards contained in Regulation 883/2013 with regard to the privilege 
against self-incrimination (under Article 9(2)) and to the reported practice of OLAF 
investigators performing activities in Italy of taking into account in advance the 
procedural safeguards established in the Italian criminal procedure code, precisely to 
avoid creating admissibility issues.  
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS17 
 
5.1 Exchange of views between OLAF and national authorities on the requirements 
for admissibility of evidence 
No consistent practice of previous discussions between OLAF and national authorities 
concerning the prospective admissibility of the OLAF report in criminal proceedings has 
been reported in the Italian legal system. That is due to several reasons. 
First of all, usually discussion about the legal requirements to be fulfilled under 
national law in order to make a piece of evidence admissible at the national level are not 
carried out between OLAF and national authorities, but rather inside OLAF itself (thanks 
to the Judicial and Legal Advice Unit, operational until 2012, and also thanks to Eurojust 
                                                
17 All the answers under this section follow interviews with national practitioners (judges). 
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 or to Italian national members – judges, law enforcement – that are part of OLAF 
personnel).  
In this way, in most cases, the team that has to perform the investigative act is 
reportedly made aware in advance of the conditions they have to fulfil and will follow 
such recommendations while performing the act (although no structural mechanism is put 
into place to ensure that such an exchange of views occurs in each and every 
investigation). 
Secondly, again in most cases, OLAF does not reportedly proceed to on-the-spot 
checks or inspections together with national authorities, but it rather carries out its 
investigations independently and only at the end transmits the report to national 
authorities.  
National authorities, acting only in their administrative capacity, may assist OLAF 
during on-site inspections or on the spot checks, in case OLAF requires such an assistance 
(for instance, to force access to a location), but in this case they do not act on their own 
initiative to seek evidence. Therefore, in such situations, no practice of previous 
discussion has been reported. 
Being public authorities, members of national authorities assisting OLAF (eg 
Guardia di Finanza) shall draft a report illustrating their activity even in these 
circumstances. Such report, however, does not contain evidence, as reportedly the latter 
is collected only by the authority who promotes the investigative act (i.e. OLAF). After 
the conclusion of the investigative act, a national authority may ask that OLAF be sent 
relevant gathered information, but the evidence is then collected only by OLAF, and not 
by national authorities.  
Moreover, in application of the aforementioned Article 220 of the rules 
implementing the CPP, law enforcement cannot assist OLAF in its administrative 
function if suspicions of a crime have already emerged. In such cases, national judicial 
authorities shall directly act in application of the rules and safeguards provided for by the 
criminal procedure code. 
There are (reportedly residual) cases where a criminal investigation is ongoing in 
parallel to an OLAF investigation. If OLAF is aware of this circumstance, its notification 
of the intention to perform an inspection/on-the-spot check to the national contact 
authority (which, however, is usually different from the proceeding judicial authority 
involved in criminal investigation) could in principle come to the attention of the 
proceeding judicial authority, in time for this latter to be able to join OLAF during the 
operations: This option, however, is limited to cases where the investigative act to be 
carried out takes place in Italy (and not abroad, as often is the case, considering that OLAF 
investigations have a broad scope). Moreover, also in this case, no exchange of 
information between OLAF and national authorities is reportedly carried out during the 
execution of the investigative act: Clearly both authorities assist in the act, but again, also 
in this case the information is collected by OLAF, and not jointly by OLAF and national 
judicial authorities.  
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 Reported cases in which the investigative act is carried out following the initiative 
of national judicial authorities (eg a search), and it is OLAF that joins the operation are 
different. In such situations, the applicable rules are those of the Italian criminal 
procedure, so no specific issue arises as to the admissibility of the collected evidence.  
 
5.2 Duplication of OLAF activities  
No national provision requires a repetition of the investigative acts performed by OLAF 
in order for their results to be used in national proceedings. 
In this sense, in the Italian legal system an indictment (rinvio a giudizio) may be 
based solely or decisively on the OLAF final report, and the same goes for the subsequent 
criminal trial.  
Nonetheless, in some cases, investigative acts performed by OLAF are reportedly 
repeated due to practical, rather than normative reasons. There appear to be two main 
reasons for this.  
Firstly, this may occur due to a reported unawareness of some part of the 
prosecution and judicial service of the exact value of OLAF final reports (Article 11 of 
Regulation 883/2013), which suggests the need for more training of national authorities 
on the matter (and in general, on the interactions with European authorities when it comes 
to evidence circulation). 
Secondly, the different aims of OLAF investigations and criminal proceedings 
shall also be taken into account. Indeed, especially in case of interviews, the need to repeat 
an investigative act to collect a piece of evidence may depend on which questions had 
been asked in the specific circumstances at stake – as it often happens that the prosecutor 
is interested in different or additional information to that asked for by OLAF.  
Therefore, if the person interviewed by OLAF is also the defendant in the criminal 
proceedings, the interview is generally repeated; with witnesses, on the other hand, there 
is a case-by-case assessment depending on the specific information needs of the 
prosecutor.  
Lastly, in case of other kind of evidence collected by OLAF (due to the 
aforementioned preclusion of Article 195(4) CPP), also contained in the final report, it is 
quite common to examine the OLAF investigator who drafted the final report as a witness 
at trial.  
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8. LUXEMBOURG 
K. Ligeti and F. Giuffrida1 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
Before discussing the Luxembourgish rules on admissibility of evidence, it is worth 
noting that only a few OLAF cases have concerned Luxembourg so far.  
In the area of EU Traditional Own Resources, Luxembourg is the only EU country 
where, between 2013 and 2017, there were no OLAF investigations closed with 
recommendations and no fraudulent and non-fraudulent irregularities were detected.2 
Likewise, in the area of the European Structural and Investment Funds and Agriculture, 
between 2013 and 2017 there were no OLAF investigations closed with recommendations 
in Luxembourg and only two cases of irregularities were detected. 3  In addition, 
Luxembourgish judicial authorities took action following OLAF’s recommendations 
issued between 2010 and 2017 in five cases.4  
The most relevant Luxembourgish criminal procedure rules are to be found in the 
Code de procédure pénale (CPP), which was adopted in December 1808 and has been 
amended several times over the years.  
As for Luxembourgish administrative law, proceedings before administrative 
courts (Tribunal administratif and Cour administrative) are regulated by the Law of 7 
November 1996 on the organisation of administrative jurisdictions (Loi du 7 novembre 
1996 portant organisation des juridictions de l’ordre administrative) and the Law of 21 
June 1999 (Loi portant règlement de procédure devant les juridictions administratives; 
hereinafter: ‘1999 Law on proceedings before administrative courts’).  
Administrative proceedings that do not take place before courts are instead 
regulated by a plethora of sectoral pieces of legislation, although the Law of 1 December 
1978 (Loi réglant la procédure administrative non contentieuse 1/12/1978) and the 
Regulation of 8 June 1979 (Réglement grand-ducal relatif à la procedure à suivre par les 
                                                
1 The authors are greatly indebted to Mandy Marra (LLM student, University of Luxembourg) for her 
support with background research and interviews, and to Dr Valentina Covolo (postdoctoral researcher, 
University of Luxembourg) for her comments and remarks on a previous version of the report. They also 
wish to thank Jean-Paul Frising (Procureur d’État), Patrick Konsbrück (Substitut principal au parquet de 
Luxembourg), Jeannot Nies (Procureur général d’État adjoint), and the other experts who preferred to 
remain anonymous for kindly agreeing to be interviewed in the frame of this research, as well as Myra 
Courte (legal advisor at the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier) and Nora Humbert (librarian 
at the Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier) for granting access to the library of the 
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier.  
2 OLAF, ‘OLAF Report 2017’ (2018) 40. 
3 ibid 41.  
4 ibid 43.  
   
administrations relevant de l’État et des communes) lay down some common rules. For 
the purpose of this report, ‘administrative proceedings’ are those that do not take place 
before administrative courts, unless otherwise specified.  
Among the sectoral regulations, the Law of 23 October 2011 (Loi du 23 octobre 
2011 relative à la concurrence) ought to be mentioned. It bestows upon the Competition 
Council (Conseil de la concurrence) investigating and sanctioning powers in the field of 
competition law.5 In the tax law domain – with exclusive reference to VAT for the 
purposes of this report – similar powers are attributed to the ‘VAT Administration’ 
(Administration de l'enregistrement, des domaines et de la TVA), the rules on which can 
be found in the Law of 10 August 2018 (Loi du 10 août 2018 portant organisation de 
l’Administration de l'enregistrement, des domaines et de la TVA) and in the Regulation 
of 5 December 2018 (Règlement grand-ducal du 5 décembre 2018 fixant l’organisation 
des services d’exécution de l’Administration de l’enregistrement, des domaines). For 
matters concerning VAT proceedings that are not regulated by these two recent pieces of 
legislation, the general rules (ie those enshrined in the Law of 1 December 1978 and the 
Regulation of 8 June 1979 on administrative proceedings) apply.6 
As some interviewees confirmed, Luxembourgish law does not expressly refer to 
‘administrative punitive proceedings’, yet the doctrine and the case law have sometimes 
extended the typical criminal law guarantees to administrative proceedings having a 
punitive nature. For instance, the Council of State (Conseil d’État), which has a 
consultative function in Luxembourg, has often noted that administrative sanctions may 
be regarded as having a penal nature, in the light of the criteria established by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).7 Administrative courts have taken a similar 
stance with respect to some administrative proceedings, such as those before the 
Commission de Surveillance du Secteur Financier (CSSF), when a sanction is issued at 
the end of these proceedings. Established by the Law of 23 December 1998, the CSSF 
supervises the financial sector in Luxembourg and is the competent authority for the 
purpose of the Market Abuse Regulation 8  and the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR).9   
                                                
5 See more in Philippe-Emmanuel Partsch and Joe Zeaiter, ‘La Sanction en Droit de la Concurrence’ (2017) 
50 Journal des Tribunaux 53. 
6 Fernand Schockweiler, La Procédure Administrative non Contentieuse et le Contrôle de l’Administration 
en Droit Luxembourgeois. Le Citoyen et l’Administration (Paul Bauler 2004) 26–27; Alain Steichen, 
Manuel de Droit Fiscal. Droit Fiscal Général (5th edn, Éditions Saint Paul 2015) 136–137. The latter 
author acknowledges that sometimes Luxembourgish courts do not apply the Law of 1 December 1978 and 
the Regulation of 8 June 1979 to VAT proceedings because of the alleged special nature of VAT. 
7 See Georges Wivenes, ‘Les Sanctions Administratives au Luxembourg’ in Les Sanctions Administratives 
en Belgique, au Luxembourg et aux Pays-Bas. Analyse Comparée (2011) 22ff <www.raadvst-
consetat.be/?page=about_competent_electroniclibrary&lang=en&q=sanctions+administratives> accessed 
19 April 2019. See also Marc Thewes, ʻ Quel Régime Juridique pour les Sanctions Administratives?ʼ (2017) 
50 Journal des Tribunaux 41. 
8 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market 
abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC, 2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC [2014] OJ L 173/1.  
9 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L 201/1. See Art 1(1) of the Law of 23 
December 2016 on market abuses (Loi du 23 décembre 2016 relative aux abus de marché, Mémorial A – 
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In a case that was eventually referred to the Court of Justice for a preliminary 
ruling,10 the CSSF ordered Mr DV, the director of an entity regulated by the CSSF, to 
resign on the ground that he was no longer trustworthy because of alleged links with 
Bernard Madoff and his fraudulent activities. The Luxembourgish Administrative Court 
of Appeal (Cour administrative), which was requested to review the validity of the 
CSSF’s decision not to grant Mr DV access to documents possessed by the CSSF, 
expressly acknowledged that the administrative procedure before the CSSF was a 
‘procedure within which the rights of defence deserve the most scrupulous respect, 
especially when the sanction is [the order for Mr DV to resign as soon as possible] and 
resembles, in view of the requirements of Article 6 ECHR, a procedure having penal 
nature’.11  
In a similar vein, the Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal administratif) has applied, 
by analogy, some principles laid down by the ECtHR in the criminal law domain and 
concerning the right to be tried within a reasonable time to the administrative proceedings 
at the end of which the Competition Council issued financial penalties against the 
Luxembourgish post and telecommunications company.12 
Finally, the Constitutional Court has clarified that the nullum crimen, nulla poena 
sine lege applies to criminal penalties as well as to administrative sanctions.13  
 
1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
As discussed further below, Luxembourgish criminal procedure is based on the principle 
of freedom of proof. Any evidence is in principle admissible. However, if an investigative 
act is carried out in violation of the law, which includes the provisions of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), the interested party can require the competent 
courts to declare that act – as well as the acts that are adopted as a consequence of that 
act – null and void.14 If the request is granted, the evidence so collected will be declared 
inadmissible and discarded.15 Even if this request is not lodged (or if it is rejected), trial 
                                                
No 279 de 2016); Art 1(1) of the Law of 15 March 2016 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and 
trade repositories (Loi du 15 mars 2016 relative aux produits dérivés de gré à gré, aux contreparties 
centrales et aux référentiels centraux, Mémorial A – No 39 de 2016); Art 1(2) of the Law of 30 May 2018 
on markets in financial instruments (Loi du 30 mai 2018 relative aux marchés d’instruments financiers, 
Mémorial A – No 446 de 2018). For an overview of the CSSF and its punitive powers, see André Lutgen 
and Marie Marty, ʻLa Pratique des Sanctions Administratives en Matière Financièreʼ (2017) 50 Journal des 
Tribunaux 46–53. 
10 Case C-358/16 UBS Europe, EU:C:2018:715. 
11  Administrative Court of Appeal (Cour administrative), 16 December 2014 <www.ja.etat.lu/30001-
35000/34766C.pdf> accessed 19 April 2019 (translation of the authors; emphasis added). Some authors 
have noted that, in the field of market abuse, the CSSF can also order the restitution of the advantage gained 
by committing infractions, and that this measure is entirely equivalent to the confiscation that criminal 
courts may order (Lutgen and Marty (n 9) 47).  
12  Administrative Tribunal (Tribunal administratif), 21 November 2016 <www.ja.etat.lu/35001-
40000/35847a.pdf> accessed 19 April 2019.  
13 For some references, see Thewes (n 7) 39.  
14 See immediately below in the text. 
15 Valentina Covolo, ‘Luxembourg’ in Silvia Allegrezza and Valentina Covolo (eds), Effective Defence 
Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Wolters Kluwer-CEDAM 2018) 337. 
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courts keep nonetheless the power to ‘assess freely the admissibility and probative value 
of evidence’.16  
According to a 2007 leading case by the Luxembourgish Court of Cassation (Cour 
de Cassation), criminal courts cannot base a conviction on evidence that has been 
unlawfully obtained if: i) the respect of given formal requirements is imposed by law 
under penalty of nullity; ii) the committed irregularity has tainted the credibility of 
evidence; or iii) the use of evidence is contrary to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.17 It 
is for the court to assess the admissibility and reliability of evidence that has been 
unlawfully obtained, taking into account the elements of the case considered as a whole, 
including the way in which evidence has been obtained.  
The wording of this judgment would imply that, in principle, evidence that has 
been unlawfully obtained could be admitted at trial, if none of the three above-mentioned 
conditions are met. 18  However, it is worth mentioning that the Cour de Cassation 
specifies that the defendant’s right to a fair trial can only be ensured if legality in the 
administration of evidence is respected. In the same case that gave rise to the 2007 
decision of the Cour de Cassation and after this judgment, the Court of Appeal stressed 
indeed that the principle of legality in the administration of evidence is the fundamental 
requirement to ensure the right to a fair trial.19 Hence, judicial authorities should evaluate 
the admissibility of evidence mostly with respect to the third above-mentioned criterion 
(use of evidence that is contrary to the right to a fair trial), with the further consequence 
that, in practice, ‘[i]llegally or improperly obtained evidence cannot be used at trial or 
before the chambre du conseil [ie the pretrial chamber]’.20 In a recent case, for instance, 
the Cour de Cassation noted that neither the procedural rules that had been violated were 
prescribed under penalty of nullity nor the reliability of evidence was at stake, yet the lack 
of legality in the administration of evidence should lead to declaring the evidence 
inadmissible.21 
It follows that admissibility rules in national criminal procedural law are mostly 
intended to safeguard the rights of the parties involved in the proceedings. In addition, 
admissibility rules aim to ensure the fairness of the proceedings by preventing judicial 
authorities from reaching a decision on the basis of acts and measures that are forbidden 
by law or not reliable enough.22 For instance, the testimony of persons who are legally 
incapable of being a witness is not admissible (Articles 156-1 and 189 CPP). 
                                                
16 ibid 366.  
17 Court of Cassation, 22 November 2007, No 2474 available at <www.stradalex.lu> (this webpage, which 
is further mentioned in some footnotes below, was last accessed on 19 April 2019). This judgement is often 
mentioned in Luxembourgish decisions where the issue of admissibility of evidence comes up (see, for 
instance, Court of Cassation, 20 December 2017, No 493/17 available at <www.stradalex.lu>).  
18 Séverine Menetrey, ‘Preuve et Droits Fondamentaux en Droits Europeén et Luxembourgeois’ (2013) 23 
Annales du droit luxembourgeois 23, 33.  
19 Court of Appeal, 26 February 2008, No 106/08 available at <www.stradalex.lu>.  
20 Martin Petschko, Marc Schiltz and Stanislaw Tosza, ‘Luxembourg’ in Katalin Ligeti (ed), Toward a 
Prosecutor for the European Union, Vol 1 (Hart 2013) 466.  
21 Court of Cassation, 20 December 2017 (n 17). 
22 See, in that respect, Court of Cassation, 28 April 2015, No 158/15 available at <www.stradalex.lu>.  
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The rules and procedures laid down in Articles 24-2, 48-2, and 126 CPP shall be 
followed in order to declare the invalidity (or nullity, ‘nullité’) of acts of pretrial 
proceedings, and thus to exclude inadmissible evidence that was collected via those acts. 
In general, a nullity can be ‘formal’, ie it is provided for by the law, 23  or 
‘substantial/virtual’. Substantial/virtual nullities have been introduced via case law, when 
serious irregularities, including irregularities affecting the rights of defence, occur.24 In 
line with the monist approach adopted by Luxembourgish courts,25 alleged violations of 
the rights enshrined in the ECHR, especially the rights of defence, could determine the 
nullity of a given procedural act.26  
The public prosecutor, as well as any interested party with a legitimate interest, 
can ask the pretrial chamber of the district court (chambre du conseil du tribunal 
d’arrondissement) to decide on the validity of acts (requête en nullité) of the instruction, 
ie the investigation conducted by the investigative judge (juge d’instruction) (Article 126 
CPP). As in a few other countries in Europe, the juge d’instruction is still a party to the 
pretrial proceedings. Once he or she is seised by the prosecutor – which is mandatory for 
the most serious crimes27 – the investigative judge ‘has the exclusive authority to decide 
whether and how to investigate the case’.28 If the investigation was carried out by the 
public prosecutor without involving the investigative judge (enquête préliminaire), and 
an instruction is then not opened at the end of the enquête préliminaire, the defendant 
shall ask the district court (tribunal d’arrondissement) to rule on the invalidity of acts of 
the investigation before raising any other argument (save for the exception of 
incompetence).29 
                                                
23 In regulating investigative measures, the CPP provides that some formalities shall be respected under 
penalty of nullity (‘à peine de nullité’). For instance, if the investigative judge fails to inform the suspected 
person of the right to be assisted by a lawyer before questioning him or her, such questioning is invalid (Art 
81(2) and (12) CPP; see Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza (n 20) 469).  
24 Covolo, ‘Luxembourg’ (n 15) 366.  
25 On the monist approach of Luxembourgish courts, see ibid 330–331. Covolo notes that ‘Luxembourg 
judges give direct effect to the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Convention as well as to EU 
Directives harmonising defence rights in criminal proceedings, which prevail over national legal 
provisions’ (ibid 331).  
26 See, for instance, Pretrial Chamber of the Court of Appeal (Chambre du conseil de la cour d’appel), 16 
May 2012, No 301/12 available at <www.stradalex.lu>; Court of Cassation, 31 January 2013, No 7/2013 
<https://juricaf.org/recherche/+/facet_pays%3ALuxembourg> accessed 19 April 2019; Pretrial Chamber 
of the Court of Appeal (Chambre du conseil de la cour d’appel), 12 February 2014, No 102/14 available at 
<www.stradalex.lu>; Pretrial Chamber of the Court of Appeal (Chambre du conseil de la cour d’appel), 24 
December 2015, No 1017/15 available at <www.stradalex.lu>.  
27 According to Luxembourgish law, ‘crimes’ are the most serious infractions, which are subject to a ‘peine 
criminelle’ such as imprisonment from a minimum of five years to life imprisonment, financial penalty of 
minimum €250 (‘amende’), or confiscation (Arts 1(1), 7, 8(1), and 9 of the Luxembourgish Penal Code). 
‘Délits’ are less serious than crimes and are punished with a ‘peine correctionnelle’ such as imprisonment 
between eight days and five years, financial penalty of minimum €250 (‘amende’), or confiscation (Arts 
1(2), 14, 15(1), and 16 of the Luxembourgish Penal Code). Finally, ‘contraventions’ are the least serious 
offences and they are punished with a ‘peine de police’, which does not include imprisonment but only 
sanctions such as a financial penalty of between €25 and €250 or confiscation (Arts 1(3), 25, and 26 of the 
Luxembourgish Penal Code). 
28 Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza (n 20) 452.  
29 Art 48-2(3) CPP. See more in Covolo, ‘Luxembourg’ (n 15) 365–366. The same rule applies to acts of 
the mini-instruction, if no instruction is eventually opened (Art 24-2(3) CPP). ‘Mini-instruction’ refers to 
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As anticipated, if the requête en nullité is well-founded, the pretrial chamber of 
the district court annuls the act as well as the acts that have been adopted after, and as a 
consequence of, the act that has been declared null and void.  
 The above rules lead to two final considerations. First, if no control on illegally 
or improperly obtained evidence is triggered on time (or at all), such evidence becomes 
valid (‘purge de nullité’).30  
Second, the legislator clearly aims to ensure that the objections to the admissibility 
of evidence are confined to the pretrial phase. The fact that the requête en nullité cannot 
– save for exceptional circumstances – be lodged before the trial court is meant to ensure 
the good administration of justice within a reasonable time, as decisions taken within the 
pretrial phase cannot be called again into question during the trial.31 
 
1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
Admissibility rules in national administrative law aim to ensure that the competent 
authorities take decisions on the basis of relevant evidence and information. More 
broadly, they are meant to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. 
The Regulation of 8 June 1979 does not contain any specific provision on 
admissibility of evidence, while Article 1 of the Law of 1 December 1978 provides – in 
rather general terms – that the rules on administrative proceedings shall ensure the respect 
of the defence rights of the individuals subject to the administration (administré) by 
arranging, as much as possible, their participation in the decision-making process of 
public bodies. This implies, among other things, the right of individuals to be heard. 
Article 5 of the Regulation of 8 June 1979 indeed requires that interested persons shall 
have the possibility of bringing their observations to the attention of the public 
administration.  
In competition law, as well in financial market regulation and in banking 
supervision, the Council of competition and the CSSF have a wide array of powers to 
collect all evidence needed to reach a decision (eg request information, inspections, etc).32  
Admissibility rules of administrative court proceedings are not very strict either 
(see more in section 1.3.2 below). For instance, Article 8(2) of the 1999 Law on 
proceedings before administrative courts states that the elements on which the defendant 
                                                
the procedure in which the public prosecutor is ‘entitled to ask the investigative judge to perform certain 
acts without formally opening an investigation … This procedure is generally used for cases which appear 
to be clear and may be sent directly to the chamber du conseil or the Court (for lower crimes (délits)) 
without a formal investigation being open, but the public prosecutor needs a piece of evidence that only the 
investigative judge may obtain (eg the video recording from a CCTV camera)’ (Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza 
(n 20) 464–465; see also Jeannot Nies, ‘Detecting Economic and Financial Crime: A Special Toolkit of 
Investigation Techniques in Luxembourg’ in Katalin Ligeti and Vanessa Franssen (eds), Challenges in the 
Field of Economic and Financial Crime in Europe and the US (Hart 2017) 88–89).   
30 Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza (n 20) 466–467; Covolo, ‘Luxembourg’ (n 15) 366.  
31  Court of Appeal, 28 February 2017, No 9/17 available at <www.stradalex.lu>. See also Court of 
Cassation, 28 April 2016, No 17/2016 available at 
<https://juricaf.org/recherche/+/facet_pays%3ALuxembourg> accessed 19 April 2019.  
32 See Arts 14–19 of the Law of 23 October 2011 (competition), Art 45 of the Law of 30 May 2018 
(financial market), and Art 53 of the Law of 5 April 1993 on the financial sector.  
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or a third party wishes to rely shall be indicated in the statement of case (mémoires en 
réponse) and deposited at the court’s registry (greffe) together with those mémoires. 
There is no specification or limit on the nature and content of these elements.33  In 
addition, Article 8(5) of the same Law requires the administration that adopted the act 
that is subject to judicial review to submit the full dossier to the court’s secretariat. Parties 
to the proceedings can obtain a copy of the documents of the dossier, in line with the 
adversarial principle (‘principe du contradictoire’).34   
 
1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
 
1.3.1 Criminal law 
While contraventions shall be proved by means of either official reports or witnesses in 
the absence of official reports, or in support of those reports,35 the Luxembourgish system 
is proof free as far as crimes and délits are concerned.36 The Court of Cassation posits 
that the principle of freedom of proof (‘liberté de la preuve’) is linked to the fact that 
criminal proceedings require the proof of the material and psychological elements of a 
given fact rather than that of a legal act, as is instead the case in civil or commercial 
proceedings.37 
According to Luxembourgish criminal law, it is however of the essence that 
evidence is useful, 38  ‘loyally’ obtained, 39  and subject to the adversarial principle 
(contradictoire).40  
                                                
33  As far as tax matters are concerned, however, Art 59(3) of the 1999 Law on proceedings before 
administrative courts excludes the oath from the admissible means of proof (see more in section 1.3.2 
below). 
34 In exceptional cases, the court may limit the parties’ access to the dossier. 
35 Art 154 CPP. 
36 Court of Cassation, 12 October 2016, No 481/16 available at <www.stradalex.lu>. See also Court of 
Cassation, 14 March 2017, No 112/17 available at <www.stradalex.lu>.  
37 Court of Cassation, 12 October 2016 (previous n). 
38 See, for instance, Art 53(1) CPP, which allows the public prosecutor to ask the investigative judge to 
undertake any act that he or she deems useful to find the truth (‘utiles à la manifestation de la vérité’). 
Likewise, the investigative judge carries out all the measures that he or she deems useful to find the truth 
(Art 51(1) CPP). See also Art 218 CPP. The defendant has the right to present all the elements that he or 
she believes are useful for his or her defence (see, in this respect, Pretrial Chamber of the Court of Appeal 
(Chambre du conseil de la cour d’appel), 6 February 2009, No 91/10 available at <www.stradalex.lu>). 
39 For example, evidence by means of ‘provocation policière’ is inadmissible. In other words, the police 
shall not encourage someone to commit a crime in a way that the police’s manoeuvres determine that person 
to commit the crime and dominate his or her will to such an extent that he or she could have not behaved 
differently (Court of Cassation, 12 June 2007, No 304/07 available at <www.stradalex.lu>; see also 
Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza (n 20) 462). Luxembourgish case law refers in similar instances to the 
necessary ‘loyalty’ (‘loyauté’) in the administration of evidence (see, for instance, Court of Cassation, 26 
February 2008, No 106/08 available at <www.stradalex.lu>; District Court (Tribunal d’arrondissement de 
Luxembourg), 2 July 2014, No 1872/2014 available at <www.stradalex.lu>).  
40 For example, unilateral expert reports are admissible as long as the parties have the possibility to freely 
discuss them (Pretrial Chamber of the Court of Appeal (Chambre du conseil de la cour d’appel), 6 
December 2013, No 699/13, available at <www.stradalex.lu>; see also Court of Appeal, 28 February 2017 
(n 31)).  
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Evidence that has been legally obtained in another Member State or even in third 
countries is admissible in Luxembourgish criminal proceedings,41 as long as it has been 
duly communicated to the defence.42  
 
1.3.2 Punitive administrative law 
The Luxembourgish administrative law system is proof free,43 as long as the adversarial 
principle (contradictoire) is respected with regard to each piece of admitted evidence.44 
There are however a few exceptions. In tax matters, Article 59(3) of the 1999 Law on 
proceedings before administrative courts allows any kind of evidence with the exception 
of the oath. Likewise, in VAT administrative proceedings, the VAT Administration can 
prove taxpayers’ violations by means of any evidence with the exception of the oath.45  
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility 
 
1.4.1 Criminal law 
In principle, decisions on admissibility cannot be subject to judicial review as such.46 
However, decisions of the pretrial chamber of the district court, including those 
concerning the nullity of pretrial measures, can be appealed before the pretrial chamber 
of the Court of Appeal (chambre du conseil de la Cour d’appel) (Article 133 CPP).47 On 
the other hand, once the district court decides on a case, its decision can be appealed 
before the Court of Appeal. The appeal is the last opportunity for the interested party to 
challenge the admissibility of evidence. If no control on illegally or improperly obtained 
evidence is requested, that evidence cannot be further challenged before the Court of 
Cassation.48  
 
 
 
                                                
41 Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza (n 20) 467.  
42 See, for example, Court of Cassation, 7 July 2000, No 235/00 available at <www.stradalex.lu>, where 
the Court – despite the differences between US and Luxembourgish law in the field of evidence gathering 
– declared admissible the testimony given by witnesses before US federal courts, which was duly 
communicated to the defence.  
43 According to Administrative Court of Appeal (Cour administrative), 16 December 2014 (n 11), for 
instance, administrative courts can order all the measures they deem necessary to resolve the case pending 
before them. As for the proof free nature of tax proceedings, see Steichen (n 6) 213.  
44 See Arts 14, 30, and 51 of the 1999 Law on proceedings before administrative courts. On the importance 
of the adversarial principle (contradictoire) in Luxembourgish administrative law, see Schockweiler (n 6) 
52–53 and 64–65; Jérome Guillot and Marc Feyereisen, Procédure Administrative Contentieuse (4th edn, 
Larcier 2018) 111–112 and 259. 
45 Art 68 of the Law of 12 February 1979 on VAT (Texte coordonné de la loi du 12 février concernant la 
taxe sur la valeur ajouté telle que modifiée en dernier lieu par la loi du 26 mai 201, Mémorial A – No 93 
de 2014.1444).  
46 See Covolo, ‘Luxembourg’ (n 15) 370.  
47 ibid 338.  
48 ibid 374.  
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1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
As for administrative court proceedings, there are no specific rules concerning the review 
of admissibility decisions, which can thus be subject to appeal together with the decision 
on the merits of the case.  
Likewise, there are no specific rules concerning the review of admissibility 
decisions in non-judicial administrative proceedings. Issues concerning admissibility of 
evidence could be discussed before the competent judicial authorities, if administrative 
decisions are subject to judicial review. For instance, decisions taken by the CSSF and 
the Competition Council can be appealed before the Administrative Tribunal,49 which can 
quash or reform those decisions.50 VAT Administration decisions that impose financial 
penalties (‘amendes fiscales’) are instead first subject to the so-called ‘reclamation’, by 
which the individual requires the Administration to reconsider its decision. This further 
decision of the Administration may then be challenged before the civil chamber of the 
district court of Luxembourg.51 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings  
In principle, evidence that has been declared inadmissible in administrative proceedings 
can be used in criminal proceedings, due to the principle of autonomy of criminal law. 
On a case by case basis, however, national criminal courts can exclude such evidence. 
 
1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
In principle, evidence that has been declared inadmissible in criminal proceedings can be 
used in administrative proceedings. In the field of tax law, it has been noted that, in the 
light of the principle of independence of the procedures, irregularities that occur in 
criminal proceedings do not have any influence on tax proceedings.52  
 
2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
 
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings  
There are no specific provisions on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in 
punitive administrative proceedings. OLAF-collected evidence is thus subject to the 
ordinary rules of administrative law (see section 1 above). As mentioned, the system of 
Luxembourgish administrative law is one of free proof and is based on the adversarial 
                                                
49 See, for the Council of Competition, Art 28 of the Law of 23 October 2011, and, for the CSSF, Art 2-
1(5) of the Law of 23 December 1998 and Art 65 of the Law of 30 May 2018. 
50 See Georges Ravarani, ‘Les Sanctions Administratives en Jurisprudence Luxembourgeoise’ (2012) 35 
Publications du Benelux 673, 691. 
51 Art 79 of the Law of 12 February 1979 on VAT. 
52 Steichen (n 6) 153.  
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principle (contradictoire), which requires public authorities (CSSF, Council of 
Competition, etc) to share their files with the other parties to the proceedings, and vice 
versa.  
 
2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings  
No case law has been found.  
 
2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
No case law has been found.  
 
2.4 Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules 
The concerned person in an OLAF investigation can challenge evidence which was 
allegedly obtained in violation of EU rules on investigatory powers and procedural 
safeguards in accordance with the ordinary rules of national administrative proceedings. 
In other words, issues concerning admissibility of evidence could be discussed before the 
competent judicial authorities, if administrative decisions are subject to judicial review.  
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
As far as national administrative proceedings are concerned, in Luxembourg there are no 
specific provisions concerning the admissibility of evidence collected and transmitted by: 
a) the European Central Bank (ECB), in accordance with Article 136 SSM Framework 
Regulation;53 b) the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), in accordance 
with Article 64(8) EMIR; and c) the Commission’s Directorate-General for Competition 
(DG COMP) according to Article 12 of Regulation No 1/2003.54 The general rules will 
thus apply (see section 1 above).  
No information has been found on cases where such evidence has been expressly 
declared inadmissible, nor are higher national standards in relation to procedural 
safeguards believed to impact its admissibility.  
 In addition, it shall be noted that Article 136 of the SSM Framework Regulation 
requires the ECB to request the relevant national competition authority (NCA) to refer 
the matter to the appropriate authorities for investigation and possible criminal 
prosecution. Hence, it is for national criminal – and not administrative – authorities to 
check the admissibility of evidence that may be shared by the ECB, in accordance with 
                                                
53 Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the framework 
for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank and national 
competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM Framework Regulation) [2014] L 
141/1.  
54  Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1. 
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the general principles discussed above. At the national level, Article 33(3) of the Organic 
Law of the Central Bank of Luxembourg55 provides that Article 23 CPP applies to board 
members and Central Bank staff members. Pursuant to Article 23(2) CPP, any public 
official or person charged with public service functions who becomes aware of facts that 
may amount to a criminal offence shall inform without undue delay the public 
prosecutor’s office.  
Likewise, Article 64(8) EMIR requires ESMA to refer matters for criminal 
prosecution to the relevant national authorities. Hence, it is for national criminal – and 
not administrative – authorities to check the admissibility of evidence that may be shared 
by ESMA, in accordance with the general principles discussed above. At the national 
level, a similar duty to inform public prosecutors – as enshrined in Article 23(2) CPP – is 
bestowed upon the CSSF, which is the competent authority for the purpose of EMIR.56  
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS  
 
4.1 General rules on the admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence collected 
by national administrative authorities   
The Luxembourgish system of criminal law allows for the admissibility of information 
gathered by national administrative authorities as evidence in criminal proceedings. As 
the system is one of free proof, these pieces of information are admissible in accordance 
with the general conditions discussed in section 1 above (eg, evidence shall be useful, 
collected in a loyal way, etc). There are neither sectoral nor general rules on the matter in 
the code of criminal procedure, so the general principles on evidence apply.  
It is worth adding that, pursuant to Article 16(1) of the Law of 19 December 2008 
on the cooperation between tax administrations,57 the VAT Administration shall transmit 
to judicial authorities – upon their request – relevant pieces of information that may be 
used within a criminal procedure.  
 
 
 
                                                
55 Law of 23 December 1998 on the monetary regime and on the Central Bank of Luxembourg (Loi du 23 
décembre 1998 relative au statut monétaire et à la Banque centrale du Luxembourg, Mémorial A – No 112 
de 1998).  
56  CSSF, ‘Rapport d’Activités 2017’ (2018) 108 and 138 
<www.cssf.lu/fileadmin/files/Publications/Rapports_annuels/Rapport_2017/CSSF_RA_2017.pdf> 
accessed 19 April 2019.  
57 Law of 19 December 2008 on the interadministrative and judicial cooperation and on the enhancement 
of the means of the Administration of direct taxes, the Administration of the registration and estates, and 
the Administration of customs and excise (Loi du 19 décembre 2008 ayant pour objet la coopération 
interadministrative et judiciaire et le renforcement des moyens de l’Administration des contributions 
directes, de l’Administration de l’enregistrement et des domaines et de l’Administration des douanes et 
accises, Mémorial A – No 206 de 2008).  
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4.2 Admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and especially OLAF, in 
criminal proceedings 
There are no specific rules on the admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies in 
criminal proceedings. Hence, the general principles on evidence apply. This also means 
that the ordinary rules on the requête en nullité should apply, including those concerning 
the time limits for lodging the requête.58 According to recent case law, these time limits 
apply to all cases of invalidity, independently of whether such invalidity allegedly derives 
from the violation of national or supranational rules.59 Although there is no case law on 
inadmissibility of OLAF-collected evidence, one would however imagine that – in line 
with the Sigma Orionis case60 and with the case law of other Member States, eg France61 
– the requête en nullité would aim to exclude such evidence from the case file, if it was 
gathered illegally: in other words, OLAF-collected evidence could not be used by national 
criminal law authorities to adopt their decisions but would still remain valid in the EU 
legal order. 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
5.1 Exchange of views between OLAF and national authorities on the requirements 
for admissibility of evidence   
OLAF has been reported to carry out its investigations in a way that pays considerable 
attention to defence rights and avoids any risk of inadmissibility of its reports. Our 
interviewees explained that OLAF usually gets in touch with national authorities (police 
judiciaire and public prosecutors) in the early phase of its investigations and transmits 
the file to them, who then continue with the investigation. This takeover of investigations 
by national authorities has been explained as a way to enhance the admissibility and 
credibility of evidence.62 Reports by Luxembourgish judicial police officers, indeed, are 
presumed true until it is proven that the officer falsified the report (‘jusqu’à inscription 
de faux’).63 Reports by other agents (such as OLAF ones) are also admissible yet their 
content may be denied simply by proving that facts stated therein are not true (‘preuve du 
fait contraire’).64  
 
 
                                                
58 See more in section 1.  
59 Valentina Covolo, ‘National Report: Luxembourg’ in Serena Quattrocolo and Stefano Ruggeri (eds), 
Personal Participation in Criminal Proceedings. A Comparative Study of Participatory Safeguards and in 
Absentia Trials in Europe (Springer 2019) 302, who refers to Court of Cassation, 19 February 2013, No 
3/13.   
60 Case T-48/16 Sigma Orionis v Commission, EU:T:2018:245. 
61 See French report, section 4.2. 
62 A consequence of the fact that national authorities usually take over OLAF investigations is that joint on-
the-spot checks are reported to be very rare in Luxembourg.  
63 Art 154 CPP. 
64 Petschko, Schiltz and Tosza (n 20) 467.  
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5.2 Duplication of OLAF activities  
Activities already performed by OLAF are not repeated according to the relevant national 
rules of criminal procedure as OLAF-collected evidence is admissible as such in national 
criminal proceedings.  
In a case decided in 2015, the defendant complained that the investigative judge 
limited himself to including OLAF’s report in the dossier without carrying out his own 
investigations. Article 51 CPP requires the investigative judge to conduct investigations 
by gathering inculpatory (‘à charge’) and exculpatory (‘à décharge’) evidence, while 
OLAF allegedly only carried out investigations à charge. 
The pretrial chamber of the Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s argument by 
expressly recognising that the juge d’instruction can base his or her decisions on OLAF-
collected evidence without any need to repeat activities already performed by OLAF.65 
In addition, it recognised that OLAF had carried out its investigations à charge and à 
décharge, so that no violation of the right to a fair trial occurred.  
According to our interviewees, especially bearing in mind that Luxembourg is a 
monist system,66 the need not to repeat OLAF investigative activities also follows from 
the general principle of effet utile of EU law. The fact that OLAF-collected evidence is 
admissible in national criminal proceedings does not imply, however, that such evidence 
is always enough to indict or convict the suspect. It may also be the case that national 
authorities consider OLAF-collected evidence insufficient to prove the suspect’s criminal 
liability.  
                                                
65 Pretrial Chamber of the Court of Appeal (Chambre du conseil de la cour d’appel), 6 January 2015, No 
09/15 available at <www.stradalex.lu>.  
66 See n 25.  
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9. THE NETHERLANDS 
A.P.W. Duijkersloot, A.J. de Vries and R.J.G.M. Widdershoven 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
In the Netherlands, punitive sanctions can be imposed on the basis of criminal and 
administrative law. The fact that sanctions under criminal law are punitive does not 
require further explanation. However, the Dutch administrative law system provides for 
two different kind of sanctions. In the first place, administrative sanctions may be of a 
reparatory nature; these sanctions are aimed at restoring a lawful situation. Good 
examples are tax surcharges (naheffing or uitnodiging tot betaling) and the recovery of 
unlawfully paid subsidy. These may be imposed by Customs or the subsidy authorities 
on the basis of an OLAF report (see section 2.2). Another example of a reparatory 
sanction is the periodic penalty payment (last onder dwangsom) which is sometimes 
imposed to enforce compliance with existing legal obligations in competition cases (the 
area of DG COMP) and banking/financial supervision (area of ECB and ESMA).1 In the 
second place, administrative law provides for sanctions of a punitive nature. According 
to Dutch legislation and case law, administrative fines are always considered to be of a 
punitive nature.2 They qualify as a ‘criminal charge’ in the meaning of Article 6 ECHR 
and as a ‘sanction of a criminal nature’ under EU law.3 Administrative fines are the most 
important administrative sanctions imposed in the area of competition (competence of 
DG COMP) and in banking/financial supervision (competence of ECB and ESMA). 
Moreover, the tax and customs authorities (competence of OLAF) are empowered to 
impose administrative fines as well. Because fines are considered to be punitive, specific 
criminal law guarantees apply.4 Most important for the topic of this report is the nemo 
																																								 																				
1 It should be noted that at present, no Dutch credit rating agencies are registered with ESMA and there are 
no Dutch trade repositories either. This might change in future. 
2 See Art 5:2(1)(c) and Art 5:40 GALA. The first provision gives a definition of a ‘punitive sanction’ and 
the second one defines the ‘administrative fine’ (bestuurlijke boete). GALA stands for ‘General 
Administrative Law Act’ (Argemone wet bestuursrecht or Awb), the Dutch act which contains general rules 
on administrative decision-making, administrative enforcement and procedural law (applied by the 
administrative courts). 
3 In this context, the so-called Engel-criteria – which have also been adopted by the CJEU – are relevant. 
See Engel and Others v the Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 (ECtHR, 
8 June 1976) and Case C-489/10 Bonda, EU:C:2012:319. That administrative fines qualify as ‘criminal 
charge’ and ‘sanctions of a criminal nature’ follows from Öztürk v Germany App no 8544/79 (ECtHR, 21 
February 1984); Case C-617/10 Åkerberg Fransson, EU:C:2013:105. See also Case C-524/15 Menci, 
EU:C:2018:197. 
4 Besides the nemo tenetur principle, the following procedural guarantees apply to the imposition of 
administrative fines: the presumption of innocence (Arts 6(2) ECHR and 48(1) CFR), specific defence 
rights (Arts 6(3) ECHR and 48(2) CFR), the legality principle (Arts 7 ECHR and 49(1) CFR), the 
proportionality principle (Arts 6(1) ECHR and 49(3) CFR) and the ne bis in idem principle (Art 50 CFR). 
 
	
tenetur principle, as the violation of this principle by the supervisory authorities might 
lead to the exclusion of the evidence thus gathered in the punitive administrative or 
criminal proceedings (see section 4.1). 
 
1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
The function in Dutch criminal law of rules on evidence in general – and admissibility 
rules in particular – is related to the essence of the ‘rule of law’ (rechtsstaatgedachte). 
Punishment of a citizen by the state is only accepted if it has been established in a proper 
way and according to the applicable rules of law that an offence has really been committed 
and that the accused can be held responsible for that offence. In establishing these 
elements rules on evidence play an important role.5 The rules on evidence prevent courts 
from declaring offences proven based on a foundation in fact that is too small, for example 
through the presence of an amount of evidence which is too limited or because certain 
material is (potentially) unreliable or obtained unlawfully. This function shines through 
in various provisions of the Dutch Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) (see section 1.4). 
The rules on admissibility of evidence in Dutch criminal law are usually 
characterised as a negative regulatory system (negatief wettelijk stelsel).6 It is ‘regulatory’ 
(and not ‘free’), because only means of evidence that have a basis in the law are in 
principle admissible. It is ‘negative’, because the court is not obliged to find a suspect 
guilty of an offence if a minimum of evidence has been brought forward – as is the case 
in a ‘positive’ system. Instead, the judge should also be convinced on the basis of the 
available evidence that the suspect did indeed commit the offence. Because of the fact 
that these rules have been elaborated upon in case law the expression negative 
jurisprudential system is also used. The founding principle of the rules on evidence is the 
principle of immediacy (onmiddellijkheidsbeginsel). The principle of immediacy can be 
discerned in Article 301 CCP which reads:  
1. Official records, reports of expert witnesses or other documents shall be read out by order of the 
presiding judge, when requested by one of the judges or the public prosecutor.  
2. The aforementioned documents shall also be read out on application of the defendant, unless 
the District Court orders otherwise, ex officio or on application of the public prosecutor.  
3. Instead of reading out the documents, the presiding judge may give a verbal summary of the 
contents of said documents, unless the public prosecutor or the suspect objects thereto on 
reasonable grounds. 
4. Documents, which have not been read out or whose contents have not been given in a verbal 
summary in accordance with paragraph (3), shall not be taken into account to the detriment of the 
defendant. 
Formally, the principle of immediacy is expressed in the fact that the court is in its 
deliberations bound by the court hearing (Articles 338, 348 and 350) and also in other 
CCP provisions (eg, Articles 33, 301, 322). The aim of the principle of immediacy in 
																																								 																				
See Felix CMA Michiels and Rob JGM Widdershoven, ‘Handhaving en Rechtsbescherming’ in Felix CMA 
Michiels and Erwin R Muller (eds), Handhaving. Bestuurlijk Handhaven in Nederland (Kluwer 2013) 105. 
5 See Jan M Reijntjes, Minkenhof’s Nederlandse Strafvordering (Kluwer 2017) 4. 
6 Geert JM Corstens and Matthias J Borgers, Het Nederlandse Strafprocesrecht (Kluwer 2013) 676. 
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materiae is furthering the fact that only information that has been put forward during the 
trial – in the presence of the defence, the prosecutor, the deciding judge(s) and eventually 
the public – is used. However, it should be noted that the Supreme Court of the 
Netherlands (Hoge Raad) has accepted that a written statement obtained during the 
preliminary investigative phase can be used as evidence at the hearing.7 In general, 
witnesses no longer have to come to court to give evidence directly as an official report 
(proces-verbaal) containing their statements acquired during the preliminary 
investigative phase suffices.  
 
1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
Rules on admissibility of evidence in Dutch administrative law are limited. The guiding 
principle of Dutch administrative law of evidence is the so-called free evidence doctrine 
(vrije bewijsleer).8 Administrative law courts have much discretion as far as evidence is 
concerned: this relates to questions about the scope of evidence, the division of the burden 
of proof, means of evidence and the appreciation of evidence by the courts. The General 
Administrative Law Act only contains a few provisions concerning formal law of 
evidence, in particular on the involvement in proceedings of witnesses and experts 
(Article 8.1.6 GALA). In addition, Dutch legal doctrine (rechtsleer) has derived some 
substantive rules on evidence from the GALA system. In this regard, the duty for 
administrative authorities to investigate carefully the case before issuing a decision 
(Article 3:2 GALA) and the duty for the citizen to provide information which is necessary 
to decide on an application for the decision (Article 4:2 GALA) give guidance in dividing 
the responsibilities between the parties as far as the establishment of facts is concerned. 
The ratio behind or function of these rules on admissibility of evidence is first and 
foremost – and in the view of the legislator – the wish to search for substantive truth 
(materiële waarheid).9 Nevertheless, the literature has also pointed at other (possible) 
functions, like guaranteeing the rights of defence.10  
In addition, it should be noted that the judicial discretion implied in the free 
evidence doctrine may be limited by international or EU fundamental rights, in particular 
by the ECHR and the CFR. The latter has supremacy above national law on the basis of 
EU law itself. The Convention enjoys the same status on the basis of Dutch constitutional 
law, as the ECHR is considered to have direct effect in the Dutch legal order on the basis 
of Articles 93 and 94 of the Dutch Constitution (Grondwet). The supremacy of the ECHR 
is concerned with the case law of the ECtHR as well (also in cases in which the 
Netherlands is not a party) which is considered to be incorporated in the ECHR rights. 
																																								 																				
7 Supreme Court of the Netherlands (Hoge Raad, HR), 20 December 1926, NJ (Nederlandse Jurisprudentie) 
1927, 85. See also Marloes C van Wijk, Cross-Border Evidence Gathering. Equality of Arms in the EU? 
(Eleven International Publishing 2017) 110. 
8 Michiels and Widdershoven (n 4) 114. See also Arthur R Hartmann, Bewijs in het Bestuursstrafrecht 
(Gouda Quint 1998). 
9 Kamerstukken II 2003/04, 29 702, nr. 3 131. Albert T Marseille and Hanna D Tolsma (eds), Bestuursrecht. 
Rechtsbescherming Tegen de Overheid (Boom juridische uitgevers 2016) 281. 
10 See Ymre Schuurmans, ‘Rechtsvorming Bewijsrecht in Bestuurlijke Boetezaken’ (2017) 4 JBPlus 273. 
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The supremacy of EU law and the ECHR obviously also applies in the area of criminal 
law. 
 
1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
 
1.3.1 Criminal law 
The criminal law system concerning evidence is controlled. Article 338 CCP states that a 
criminal court may find that there is evidence that the defendant committed the offence 
as charged in the indictment only when the court through the hearing has become 
convinced thereof from legal means of evidence. Those legal means of evidence have 
been enumerated in Article 339(1) (1° to 5°) CCP.11 Exclusively admissible as legal 
means of evidence are the court’s own observations, the statements of the defendant, the 
statements of a witness, the statements of an expert witness, and written materials. Facts 
or circumstances which are common knowledge shall not require evidence (Section 
339(2) CCP). Articles 340 to 344a CCP provide for more specific rules for each of these 
means of evidence. In the present context, Section 344 is of particular importance. It 
concerns written materials and reads: 
1. ‘Written materials’ shall mean:  
1°. decisions drawn up in the form prescribed by law by tribunals, courts or persons charged with 
the administration of justice, as well as punishment orders drawn up in the form prescribed by 
law; 2°. official records and other documents drawn up in the form prescribed by law by 
competent bodies and persons, and containing their statement of facts or circumstances which 
they have observed or experienced; 3°. documents prepared by public bodies or civil servants 
concerning issues related to their competence, as well as documents drawn up by a person in the 
public service of a foreign state or of an organisation under international law; 4°. reports of expert 
witnesses prepared in answer to the assignment given to them to provide information or to 
conduct an investigation, based on the insights they have gained from their own expertise and 
knowledge about the subject on which their opinion is sought; 
5°. all other written materials; however, said materials may only be used in conjunction with the 
content of other means of evidence.  
2. The court may find that there is evidence the defendant committed the offence as charged in 
the indictment on the basis of the official record of an investigating officer. 
From this provision it is clear that ‘documents drawn up by a person in the public service 
of a foreign state or of an organisation under international law’ qualify as written 
materials that can be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. Obviously this category 
includes documents drawn up by EU institutions, agencies or offices as well. 
The Dutch criminal law system contains some minimum evidence rules as well. 
For instance, Article 344a(1) CCP determines that the court may not find that there is 
evidence that the defendant committed the offence as charged in the indictment 
exclusively or to a decisive extent on the basis of written materials containing statements 
of persons whose identity is concealed. Other examples are found in Article 344a(2) to 
(4) CCP: 
																																								 																				
11 Corstens and Borgers (n 6) 680. 
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2. An official record of questioning conducted before the examining magistrate, which contains 
the statement of a person who is deemed to be a threatened witness, or the statement of a person 
who is deemed to be a protected witness and whose identity is concealed, may be used as evidence 
that the defendant committed the offence as charged in the indictment only if at least the following 
conditions have been met: 
a. the witness is a threatened witness or a protected witness and has been questioned as such by 
the examining magistrate, and 
b. the offence as charged in the indictment, to the extent proven, involves a serious offence as 
defined in section 67(1), and in view of its nature, the fact that it was committed by an organised 
group or the relation to other serious offences committed by the defendant constitutes a serious 
breach of law and order. 
3. Apart from the case described in paragraph (2), a written material containing the statement of a 
person whose identity is concealed may only be used as evidence that the defendant committed 
the offence as charged in the indictment, if at least the following conditions have been met: 
a. the judicial finding of fact is supported to a significant extent by other evidence, and 
b. the application to question or to have others question the person, referred to in the opening 
sentence has not been made by or on behalf of the defendant at some point in the proceedings. 
4. The court may not find that there is evidence the defendant committed the offence as charged 
in the indictment exclusively on the basis of statements of witnesses with whom an agreement has 
been made under Articles 226h(3) or 226k. 
 
1.3.2 Punitive administrative law  
As far as administrative law is concerned, the system of evidence is free. In the 
administrative law system, the leading principle is the free evidence doctrine (vrije 
bewijsleer, section 1.2). This doctrine implies that the administrative court in principle is 
free to accept as means of evidence all materials, statements, etc, that can contribute to 
the evidence. The doctrine applies irrespective of the possible punitive nature of the 
sanction decision contested. By exception, sectoral laws may require to prove certain facts 
with specific (authentic) documents. 
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility  
 
1.4.1 Criminal law 
The decision on admissibility cannot be subject to review as such. The Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (Openbaar Ministerie or OM) assembles the file and decides to put 
evidence in the file. This is not the task of the court. The rules on admissibility of evidence 
do not as such apply to the OM. In criminal court proceedings the judgment of this court 
concerning the admissibility of certain evidence can be the object of appeal only as part 
of the appeal proceedings concerning the court judgment as a whole. There is no 
possibility of a separate review. 
 
1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
In administrative proceedings, the option of appealing against the use of evidence 
corresponds to the one in criminal matters. The decision of the first instance court on the 
admissibility of evidence cannot be contested separately, but only as part of the appeal 
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against the first instance judgment as a whole (Article 8:104(3)(b) GALA). This rule 
applies irrespective of whether the contested decision is a punitive administrative sanction 
or not. 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings  
In the present context, it is prudent to differentiate between two questions which are 
relevant with regard to the use in criminal proceedings of evidence that was unlawfully 
obtained in administrative proceedings. The first question concerns the norms which 
govern the use of evidence that was gathered unlawfully. Can such evidence be admitted 
on the basis of Dutch criminal law and, if so, under which conditions? Secondly, can a 
criminal court make an autonomous assessment on the admissibility if that evidence has 
already been declared to be unlawful in the (parallel) administrative procedure? 
Evidently, the use of lawfully obtained evidence does not raise any questions. 
A detailed answer to the first question is provided later in this report (section 4.1). 
In short, it can be concluded that this question has been rarely dealt with in Dutch case 
law. The provision on the admissibility of evidence in the CCP (Article 359a) does not 
apply to evidence obtained during administrative proceedings. Consequently, evidence 
will be admissible as a rule. According to the literature, evidence that has been unlawfully 
seized in administrative investigations may be used in criminal proceedings, unless it has 
been seized in a way that runs so much against the proper acting of government that any 
use of it is intolerable, or when the use of the evidence would violate the fair trial 
requirement, or when the proper conduct of procedure has been (severely) violated, or 
when fundamental rights have been infringed in an excessive way.12 
With respect to the question concerning the admission and use in criminal 
proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative proceedings, we also 
refer to the detailed explanation of the Dutch system of rules on evidence in criminal 
cases (section 4.1). From this system it is clear that a criminal court determines the 
question of admissibility of evidence by applying the criminal law rules in the Code of 
Criminal Procedure and case law of the Hoge Raad. Therefore, criminal courts are in 
principle not bound by a prior judgment on admissibility of evidence by an administrative 
court. 
 
1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
The questions posed in the previous paragraph are also relevant in the reversed situation: 
can evidence which was obtained unlawfully during criminal investigations be admitted 
in administrative proceedings and, if so, under which conditions? And can the 
administrative court make an autonomous assessment of the admissibility if the evidence 
																																								 																				
12 See Opinion of Advocate General Wattel, 28 May 2014, NL:PHR:2014:521, point 7.18. 
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has already been declared to have been obtained in an unlawful manner by a criminal 
court?  
Since 1992, the case law of the Hoge Raad is clear: no legal rule exists under 
Dutch law which precludes every use of unlawfully obtained evidence during criminal 
investigations in administrative proceedings.13 It follows from the wording of the Hoge 
Raad that the use of unlawfully obtained evidence is only disallowed under certain 
circumstances. The use of evidence is certainly not impermissible if it is not the 
procedural rights of the suspect himself that have been violated. If the rights of the suspect 
himself are violated and the evidence is obtained as a consequence of this violation, it 
should be established – with due observance of all circumstances of the case – whether 
the administrative authority acts contrary to any general principles of good administration 
(algemeen beginsel van behoorlijk bestuur), if the evidence is used in administrative 
proceedings, especially for imposing a fine. Special regard should be given to the 
principle of due care (zorgvuldigheidsbeginsel) under administrative law. In subsequent 
case law, the Hoge Raad added that there can be no violation of general principles of 
good administration if the administrative authority could have obtained the evidence in a 
lawful way as well. The Hoge Raad concludes by stating that the use of evidence 
unlawfully obtained in criminal proceedings in administrative proceedings is precluded 
only in case that evidence is obtained in a way that runs so counter to what may be 
expected of a properly acting administrative authority (zozeer indruist tegen hetgeen van 
een behoorlijk handelende overheid mag worden verwacht) that the use of evidence 
should be considered inadmissible in all circumstances.14 We will refer to this criterion 
as the ‘manifestly improper criterion’.15 It should be noted that the manifestly improper 
criterion has also been adopted by the administrative courts to assess whether evidence 
which was gathered unlawfully during administrative procedures – ie, both monitoring 
and administrative investigations – can be used in punitive administrative procedures.16  
The application of the manifestly improper criterion does not lead to the exclusion 
of evidence very often. It is a high threshold. The criterion has been elaborated in the case 
law. Judgments of the administrative courts show that especially infringements of 
fundamental rights such as Articles 6 and 8 ECHR may result in inadmissibility of 
evidence.17 With respect to Article 6 ECHR, not warning (cautioning) a citizen that he or 
she is not obliged to answer questions when interrogated in relation to the imposition of 
																																								 																				
13 HR 1 July 1992, NL:HR:1992:ZC5028, para 3.2.2. 
14 HR 1 July 1992, NL:HR:1992:ZC5028, para 3.2.5. 
15 See Opinion of AG Wattel 28 May 2014, NL:PHR:2014:521, para 6.1. 
16 Ymre Schuurmans, ‘Onrechtmatig Verkregen Bewijsmateriaal in het Bestuursrecht’ (2017) 5 Ars Aequi 
391. See for example: Central Appellate Court (Centrale Raad van Beroep, CRvB), 15 March 2016, 
NL:CRVB:2016:947; CBb 22 February 2017, NL:CBB:2017:47. Interestingly, the administrative courts 
are more inclined to exclude evidence which was unlawfully obtained during an administrative 
investigation than evidence which stems from criminal investigations. See in that context Meriam CD 
Embregts, Uitsluitsel over Bewijsuitsluiting. Een Onderzoek naar de Toelaatbaarheid van Onrechtmatig 
Verkregen Bewijs in het Strafrecht, het Civiele Recht en het Bestuursrecht (Kluwer 2003) 292–293; 
Karianne CLGFH Albers, ‘Bestraffend bestuur 2014’ in Karianne CLGFH Albers et al (eds), Boetes en 
Andere Bestraffende Sancties: Een Nieuw Perspectief? (Boom Juridische uitgevers 2014) 93. 
17 See Schuurmans (previous n) 391ff. 
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a punitive administrative fine – as required by Article 5:10a GALA18 – means that his or 
her statement cannot be used as evidence for the facts that underlie the sanction.19 
Concerning Article 8 ECHR, entering a private home without (informed) consent of the 
inhabitant as prescribed by Article 1(4) General Act on the Entry into Dwellings 
(Algemene wet op het binnentreden) is in some cases regarded as meeting the threshold 
of the manifestly improper criterion as well.20 Thus, the evidence gathered after entering 
the home is excluded. 
A recent judgment of the Hoge Raad has explicitly reaffirmed the well-established 
case law from 1992 and the manifestly improper criterion.21 This judgment is also of 
importance as far as the more specific question whether evidence that has been declared 
inadmissible by a criminal court can still be used in administrative proceedings is 
concerned. Although this is a tax case, its relevance for administrative law is more 
general. According to the Hoge Raad the administrative court determines autonomously, 
in accordance with its own procedural law, which facts have to be regarded as being 
certain. Therefore, it is not bound by the judgment of the criminal court relating to the 
evidence, not even if it concerns the same means of evidence as the criminal court. In this 
context, the Hoge Raad refers a previous ruling from 1999 which establishes the same 
rule.22 As far as the legal question of whether the gathering of evidence in a criminal case, 
taking into account the certain facts, has been unlawful is concerned, the administrative 
court is again not bound by the irrevocable judgment of the criminal court, even if the 
criminal court has built its decision upon the same facts. However, specific authority has 
to be attributed to the judgment of the criminal court, because this court is the pre-eminent 
one to answer this type of legal question. If the administrative court – building upon the 
same facts – deviates from the judgment of the criminal court with respect to the 
unlawfulness of the gathering of evidence, it has to explicitly state in its judgment its 
reasons for deviating. A divergence is acceptable because of the differences concerning 
the existing rules on evidence in criminal and administrative law, as well as the differing 
frameworks relating to judgment on the use of the available evidence in such 
procedures.23 
 
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
18 As mentioned, administrative fines are considered to be punitive according to Dutch law and fall under 
the scope of the ‘criminal charge’ within the meaning of Art 6 ECHR and ‘sanctions of a criminal nature’ 
under EU law respectively. Accordingly, in proceedings concerning the imposition of such fines the nemo 
tenetur principle applies and the supervisor has a duty to warn (caution) the individual that he is not obliged 
to answer questions. See Michiels and Widdershoven (n 4) 114. 
19 ABRvS 27 June 2018, NL:RVS:2018:2115. 
20 See, eg, ABRvS 20 April 2016, NL:RVS:2016:1163. 
21 HR 20 March 2015, NL:HR:2015:643. 
22 HR 10 March 1999, NL:HR:1999:AA2713, para 3.5. 
23 HR 20 March 2015, NL:HR:2015:643, paras 2.6.1-2.6.6. 
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2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
 
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings 
On the basis of the principle of equivalence the (few) Dutch administrative rules of 
evidence apply to the admissibility of evidence collected by OLAF as well. These rules 
do not as such limit the use of OLAF collected evidence in any way.24 OLAF reports are 
treated in the same way as reports of Dutch supervisors or inspectors. There are no 
specific provisions related to OLAF collected evidence. 
At present specific case law regarding the possible inadmissibility of OLAF 
evidence in punitive and non-punitive administrative cases obtained by OLAF unlawfully 
does not exist. In the area of tax law and social security law, there is some case law 
concerning the admissibility of foreign evidence which was (possibly) unlawfully 
obtained abroad. From this, it is clear that the manifestly improper criterion developed 
and applied by the Hoge Raad in purely domestic cases, is applicable in a cross-border 
context as well. 
The leading case in tax law is KB Lux.25 This case concerned Dutch citizens that 
held an account at Kredietbank Luxembourg (KB-Lux). They did not declare their income 
from these accounts and, consequently, the Dutch treasury suffered a significant tax loss. 
In the early 1990s, an employee of KB-Lux stole microfiches with account numbers and 
names from the bank and provided them to the Belgian judicial authorities which were 
involved in the scheme to steal the microfiches. Via these authorities, the microfiches 
eventually came into the possession of the Dutch tax authorities. On the basis of the 
information from the microfiches, the Dutch account holders of KB-Lux were faced with 
additional tax assessments, but also with criminal prosecution and administrative fines. 
In both the criminal and the (punitive) administrative cases of the KB-Lux affair, it was 
argued that evidence was obtained unlawfully in another country, ie, Belgium. 
In its judgment of 21 March 2008, the Hoge Raad ruled on the admissibility of 
this foreign evidence. In the earlier appeal proceedings, the Court of Appeal has decided 
that the evidence was admissible in the (punitive) administrative proceedings. In its 
ruling, the Court of Appeal referred to the standard case law of the Hoge Raad that there 
is no absolute rule which precludes the use of unlawfully obtained criminal evidence in a 
punitive administrative procedure. In that context, the Court of Appeal stated that it 
remained uncertain whether the foreign (Belgian) authorities had been actively involved 
in the gathering of evidence through the theft of microfiches, but that – even if that had 
been the case – this would not be an impediment for the tax inspector as long as he would 
not act contrary to any (Dutch) general principle of good administration. In that regard, 
the Court of Appeal established that a tax subject is under the obligation to provide the 
tax authorities with required information and, thus, the latter could have lawfully obtained 
																																								 																				
24 Adrienne JC de Moor-van Vugt and Rob JGM Widdershoven, ‘Administrative Enforcement’ in Jan H 
Jans, Sacha Prechal and Rob Widdershoven (eds), Europeanisation of Public Law (Europa Law Publishing 
2015) 325–326. 
25 HR 21 March 2008, NL:HR:2008:BA8179. 
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the information. Moreover, the Court of Appeal reiterates that the use of unlawful 
evidence is only precluded if it has been obtained in a way which runs so counter to what 
can be expected of a properly acting administrative authority (zozeer indruist tegen 
hetgeen van een behoorlijk handelende overheid mag worden verwacht) that the use of 
evidence should be considered inadmissible in all circumstances. Thus, the Court of 
Appeal applied the manifestly improper criterion in the context of foreign evidence. In its 
ruling, the Hoge Raad dismissed the appeal in cassation and stated that the judgment of 
the Court of Appeal was neither incomprehensible nor unclear.26  
It can be concluded from the KB-Lux case that the question on the admissibility 
of evidence unlawfully obtained abroad is dealt with in accordance with the well-
established manifestly improper criterion of the Hoge Raad. Thus, there is no difference 
as to the stringency of review. Cases of unlawfully obtained evidence are dealt with in an 
identical way, regardless of the national or foreign character of the evidence. 
In social security law cases the competent administrative court of appeal, the 
Central Appellate Court (Centrale Raad van Beroep or CRvB) has followed the line of 
reasoning of the Hoge Raad. The cases concerned investigations carried out by Dutch 
authorities in Turkey – without the involvement of the Turkish authorities – from which 
it appeared that several persons who were receiving Dutch social security benefits 
possessed real estate with considerable value in Turkey. As a result of the investigations, 
the benefits were withdrawn and recovered and administrative fines were imposed 
because the persons had violated their statutory duty to inform the Dutch authorities about 
the real estate. 
In appeal the CRvB formulated general rules on the admissibility of the evidence 
gathered abroad which are also applicable to the situation in which foreign officials would 
have carried out the investigations. According to the court the admissibility of the 
evidence gathered should be assessed on the basis of the Dutch law, including the 
applicable international and European law. Compliance with the applicable foreign rules 
is not relevant. Under Dutch law, the use of the evidence concerned is excluded only if 
this would violate the fair trial requirement of Article 6 ECHR or the right of respect of 
private life of Article 8 ECHR, or if the evidence otherwise was obtained in a way which 
runs so counter to what can be expected of a properly acting administrative authority, that 
the use of it should be considered inadmissible in all circumstances, ie, the manifestly 
improper criterion.27 In the case at hand, the CRvB determined that the fair trial 
requirement had not been violated, as the appellants had the opportunity to contest the 
foreign evidence. Moreover, their right of private life had not violated. Consequently, the 
use of evidence did not meet the manifestly improper threshold and was admissible. 
There is no case in the Netherlands in which the admissibility of OLAF collected 
evidence has been questioned by one of the parties and/or has been assessed by the 
administrative courts. If this did occur, it is most probable that the OLAF report would 
be excluded as evidence only if it had been obtained by OLAF in a way which runs so 
counter to what can be expected of a properly acting administrative authority that the use 
																																								 																				
26 ibid, paras 3.4.1–3.4.2. 
27 CRvB 1 October 2018, NL:CRVB:2018:2914; CRvB 1 October 2018, NL:CRVB:2018:2913. 
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of it should be considered inadmissible in all circumstances (the ‘manifestly improper 
criterion’). This would be the case particularly if the use of it would violate the right to a 
fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) or the right of respect of private life (Article 8 ECHR). The 
Dutch court will not assess the question whether OLAF complied with the rules of 
evidence of the Member State in which the OLAF investigation was conducted. 
 
2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings  
There is a substantive amount of Dutch case law concerning tax surcharges 
(uitnodigingen tot betaling) in customs cases in which OLAF reports play a role. These 
decisions are not, however, punitive. Moreover, in this aforementioned case law the 
unlawfulness of the OLAF investigation has never been questioned by the parties and/or 
assessed by the court. Case law concerning punitive administrative decisions based on 
OLAF-collected evidence does not exist. This is the result of a search of the online search 
engine www.rechtspraak.nl (keyword: OLAF) which contains all relevant case law. 
 
2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
In the Netherlands, the Legal Professional Privilege principle (LPP) applies to all lawyers 
who are member of the Dutch Bar Association. Therefore, the principle extends to in-
house lawyers as well. In administrative law, this wider principle can be derived from 
Article 5:20 (2) GALA, which states that any person who is bound by a duty of secrecy 
by virtue of his office or profession or by statutory regulation may refuse to cooperate 
with an inspector. Article 10a (1) Council Act (Advocatenwet) establishes the duty of 
secrecy for all lawyers. Consequently, the Dutch LPP principle offers more protection 
than the EU principle of LPP as interpreted by the Union courts in the case of AKZO & 
Akcros.28 How this tension is resolved in competition law, is elaborated upon later in this 
report (section 3.3). In the context of OLAF investigation LPP problems have never 
occurred. Therefore, it is not completely clear how the Dutch courts would assess a 
national punitive administrative sanction based on an OLAF investigation in another 
Member State in which the wider Dutch LPP principle was not upheld. The yard stick is, 
as always, the manifestly improper criterion. Whether a violation of the wider principle 
would mean that OLAF obtained the information in a manifestly improper way is 
doubtful. We expect that the Dutch courts would declare the OLAF report evidence 
admissible, because this violation would not qualify as a breach of the fair trial 
requirement of Article 6 ECHR/47 CFR and would not affect the essence of Article 8 
ECHR/7 CFR either. 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
28 Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo & Akcros, EU:T:2007:297. Confirmed by the ECJ in Case C-
550/07 P Akzo & Akcros, EU:C:2010:512. 
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2.4 Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules  
The concerned person can challenge the use of evidence on the ground of a violation of 
EU rules before the administrative court during the proceeding directed against the 
administrative sanction based on the OLAF report. It is not possible to contest the 
investigation (and the means used in it) separately (see section 1.4). Ex officio control by 
the Dutch administrative courts only comprises rules concerning the competence of the 
administrative authority and of the court itself and rules regarding the admissibility of 
remedies.29 Rules on the admissibility of evidence – even if they are derived from a 
fundamental right, such as Article 6 ECHR – do not fall within that scope. 
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
 
3.1 ECB-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation)  
The administrative law rules of evidence under Dutch law apply mutatis mutandis to the 
admissibility of ECB-collected evidence. There are no specific provisions relating to 
ECB-collected evidence. As regards the possible inadmissibility of ECB-collected 
evidence, the manifestly improper criterion applies.  
 
3.2 ESMA-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 64(8) EMIR) 
The rules concerning evidence collected by ESMA are the same as those that govern ECB 
evidence: the administrative rules on the admissibility of evidence apply and there are no 
specific provisions on evidence collected by ESMA. The manifestly improper criterion is 
relevant. 
 
3.3 DG COMP-collected evidence and national punitive administrative proceedings 
(Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003) 
The administrative law rules of evidence under Dutch law apply mutatis mutandis to the 
admissibility of DG COMP-collected evidence. There are no specific provisions related 
to it. As regards the possible inadmissibility of DG COMP-collected evidence, the 
manifestly improper criterion applies. 
As mentioned above (see section 2.3), in the Netherlands the LPP principle applies 
to all lawyers who are member of the Dutch Bar Association and, thus, also to in-house 
lawyers. In competition law, this wider Dutch LPP principle is – on the basis of the case 
of AKZO & Akcros30 – not applied in cases where the Dutch competition authority 
(Authority for Consumers and Markets) assists in a Commission investigation of an 
infringement of European competition law. However, the wider Dutch LPP principle still 
																																								 																				
29 Marseille and Tolsma (eds) (n 9) 245ff. 
30 Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03 Akzo & Akcros. Confirmed by the ECJ in Case C-550/07 P Akzo & 
Akcros. 
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applies when the authority itself investigates a violation of Dutch or European 
competition law. Whether DG COMP-collected evidence would be declared inadmissible 
by a Dutch court if the wider Dutch LPP principle were not upheld, is doubtful, as non-
observance of the wider Dutch LPP principle does not seem to meet the threshold of the 
manifestly improper criterion (see already section 2.3). As yet there is no Dutch case law, 
confirming or rejecting this opinion. 
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
4.1 General rules on the admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence collected 
by national administrative authorities 
In principle the Dutch legal system allows for the admissibility of information gathered 
by national administrative authorities as evidence in criminal proceedings. After all, it 
qualifies as ‘written material’ in the meaning of Article 344 CCP (see section 1.3.1). 
When assessing possible admissibility problems in criminal proceedings two scenarios 
should be distinguished. 
The first scenario concerns the situation in which the administrative supervisor or 
inspector has gathered information in the monitoring phase before there was a reasonable 
suspicion of a criminal act.31 In this phase the nemo tenetur principle stemming from 
Article 6 ECHR does not apply yet. The individual is obliged to cooperate with the 
supervisor and, thus, to provide oral or written information and materials. In the case of 
Saunders, the ECtHR has ruled that the use of incriminating evidence not existing 
independently of the will of the accused – in particular oral and written statements – 
obtained during this phase cannot be used in a subsequent criminal case.32 Therefore, in 
line with Saunders, those incriminating statements made before a reasonable suspicion 
has arisen are in principle excluded in Dutch criminal proceedings. However, they may 
be used as starting information for a criminal investigation into the case at hand. This rule 
is considered to be the reflex effect of the nemo tenetur principle.33 It should be stressed 
that this exclusion does not cover evidence gathered by the administrative supervisor 
which exists independently of the will of the accused, for example evidence deriving from 
the professional administration or computer data. 
In the second scenario, the administrative supervisor has acted unlawfully in some 
way when applying monitoring/investigatory powers, for example because procedural 
rules were not followed. Can the evidence which is collected unlawfully be admitted in 
the criminal trial? As regards the possible inadmissibility in criminal proceedings of 
evidence, Article 359a CCP is the starting point.34 It holds: 
																																								 																				
31 Or of an act which can be sanctioned with a punitive administrative sanction. 
32 Saunders v UK App no 19187/91 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996). 
33 Opinion of Advocate General Keus, 12 April 2017, NL:RVS:2017:1034, para 4.3.4. 
34 Matthias J Borgers and Lonneke Stevens, ‘The Use of Illegally Gathered Evidence in the Dutch Criminal 
Trial’ (2010) 14 (3) Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 2. See also Reindert Kuiper, Vormfouten: 
Juridische Consequenties van Vormverzuimen in Strafzaken (Kluwer 2014). 
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1. The District Court may, if it appears that procedural requirements were not complied with during 
the preliminary investigation which can no longer be remedied and the law does not provide for 
the legal consequences thereof, determine that: 
a. the length of the sentence shall be reduced in proportion to the gravity of the non-compliance 
with procedural requirements, if the harm or prejudice caused can be compensated in this manner; 
b. the results obtained from the investigation, in which there was a failure to comply with 
procedural requirements, may not be used as evidence of the offence as charged in the indictment; 
c. there is a bar to the prosecution, if as a result of the procedural error or omission there cannot 
be said to be a trial of the case which meets the principles of due process. 
2. In the application of subsection (1), the District Court shall take into account the interest served 
by the violated rule, the gravity of the procedural error or omission and the harm or prejudice 
caused as a result of said error or omission. 
3. The judgment shall contain the decisions referred to in subsection (1). Said decisions shall be 
reasoned. 
In short, this provision establishes that the deciding criminal court can, when it becomes 
clear that there has been a breach of procedural rules (vormverzuim) that cannot be 
remedied and that the legal consequences of that breach cannot be established on the basis 
of the law, decide that the sentence should be reduced, the evidence be excluded or that 
the public prosecutor be declared inadmissible in the prosecution.35 
In principle, only a breach of procedural rules during the preliminary (criminal) 
investigative phase, within the meaning of Article 132 CCP, that took place in the case of 
the suspect can be addressed on the basis of Article 359a CCP. Thus, the scope of 
application of the Article is limited. This follows directly from the case law of the Hoge 
Raad.36 Consequently, breaches that have taken place during an administrative 
investigation cannot lead to the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence on the basis of 
Article 359a CCP.37 In other words, this means that evidence that is obtained during the 
administrative compliance monitoring phase will, as a rule, be admissible in a criminal 
case.38  
However, the Hoge Raad has recognised that the exclusion of evidence is also 
possible outside the scope of Article 359a CCP in exceptional circumstances. In 2013, it 
ruled that the exclusion of evidence outside the scope of that provision is only possible if 
an important rule or principle of criminal procedural law has been violated to such a 
considerable extent (in zodanig aanzienlijke mate geschonden is) by the breach of 
procedural rules that the evidence should be excluded.39 In respect of evidence gathered 
in the administrative phase, there is hardly any case law. According to Dutch legal 
literature, evidence that has been unlawfully seized in the administrative investigations 
																																								 																				
35 In accordance with the wording of Dutch law, it is the public prosecutor who is declared inadmissible, 
not the evidence (Art 348 CCP). If the public prosecutor is declared inadmissible, he cannot bring a case to 
court and the court will not assess the material aspects of the case. This constitutes a grave sanction and is 
– according to the Hoge Raad – only applicable in cases of the most serious breaches of procedural rules. 
See Corstens and Borgers (n 6) 732. 
36 HR 30 March 2004, NL:HR:2004:AM2533; HR 19 February 2013, NL:HR:2013:BY5321. 
37 Corstens and Borgers (n 6) 728. 
38 Kuiper (n 34) 222. 
39 HR 29 January 2013, NL:HR:2013:BY0816. 
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may be used in criminal proceedings, unless it has been seized in a way that runs so 
counter to a proper government action that any use is intolerable (the ‘manifestly 
improper criterion’), or when the use of the evidence would violate the fair trial 
requirement, or when the proper conduct of procedure has been (severely) violated, or 
when fundamental rights have been infringed in an excessive way.40  
 
4.2 Admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and especially OLAF, in 
criminal proceedings 
Evidence which is gathered by ECB, ESMA, DG COMP or OLAF is, in principle, 
admissible in criminal proceedings. As mentioned above, Article 344 CCP is of particular 
relevance because it establishes that documents drawn up by a person in the public service 
of a foreign state or of an organisation under international law can be admitted as 
evidence. It should be noted that the admissibility of this kind of evidence has never been 
questioned before a Dutch criminal court and no case law exists which establishes how 
Dutch courts deal with evidence which has been gathered illegally – ie, through the breach 
of procedural rules – by EU bodies.41 In this context, two situations are possible: evidence 
has been gathered in breach of procedural rules by an EU authority in the Netherlands – 
eg, during an on-the-spot inspection carried out by OLAF – or evidence has been gathered 
by an EU body in another Member State. How would the Dutch courts review the 
evidence in these situations? Because this question has never been dealt with in the 
Netherlands, it is not possible to provide a clear-cut answer. However, several 
overarching principles can be discerned from judgments of the Hoge Raad which will, in 
our view, be highly relevant to sketching the approach of Dutch courts in such situations.  
Firstly, the well-established case law of the Hoge Raad on the admissibility of 
evidence which was gathered by national administrative authorities should be taken into 
account. As we have seen, the scope of the review on the admissibility of evidence which 
has been gathered during an administrative procedure is limited in criminal proceedings 
(see section 4.1). In short, Article 359a is the central provision in the CCP for the context 
of the admissibility of evidence. It follows from the wording of the Article and the case 
law of the Hoge Raad that its scope of application does not cover administrative 
procedures – ie, monitoring and administrative investigations – but only the preliminary 
criminal investigation within the meaning of Article 132 CCP. Evidence which has been 
gathered illegally in the administrative phase is, in principle, admissible in the criminal 
proceedings and will only be excluded in exceptional cases. This approach should, in our 
view, also apply if the evidence has been gathered by a foreign administrative authority 
or an EU body, for example OLAF. It should be remembered that the EU bodies are 
administrative authorities. Therefore, the evidence which is gathered by the EU authority 
will be subjected to the same conditions and stringency of review as evidence which has 
																																								 																				
40 See Opinion of Advocate General Wattel, 28 May 2014, NL:PHR:2014:521, para 7.18. 
41 There is case law available in which the reliability of OLAF reports is challenged. However, this does 
not concern the admissibility of such reports. Instead, it concerns the autonomous evidentiary value of the 
reports after they have been admitted in the proceedings. See Court of Noord-Holland 23 July 2013, 
NL:RBNHO:2013:9668; Court of Noord-Holland 23 July 2013, NL:RBNHO:2013:9658. 
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been obtained by national administrative authorities. In this regard, the principle of 
equivalence comes into play.42 
Secondly, the case law of the Hoge Raad on the review on the admissibility of 
foreign evidence is relevant. In 2010, the Hoge Raad explained how Dutch courts should 
review the admissibility of evidence which was gathered in a State which is a party to the 
ECHR.43 The Hoge Raad ruled that if evidence is gathered during an investigation abroad 
which was led by foreign authorities, the Dutch criminal courts should restrict their 
assessment to establishing whether the use of the evidence would violate Article 6 
ECHR.44 They are not allowed to review whether the foreign investigation complied with 
the national legal provisions of that country, or whether another ECHR right – in 
particular that described in Article 8 ECHR – was violated in the foreign investigation. 
This lenient and restricted review is primarily legitimised by the mutual trust between the 
ECHR Member States, but the Hoge Raad also stipulates that other violations of 
fundamental rights can be addressed before the courts of the other Member State on the 
basis of Article 13 ECHR.  
The above-mentioned approaches could – in our view – both be opted for if 
evidence is gathered by EU bodies. Evidently, we can engage only in reasoned 
speculation until the Dutch courts are confronted with this complex question and provide 
a conclusive answer to it. However, we can conclude that the review of evidence collected 
by EU bodies will not take place on the basis of Article 359a CCP and will, therefore, be 
lenient. Regardless of the approach taken, the result will essentially be the same: the 
review will be limited to ensuring compliance with Article 6 ECHR and Articles 47 and 
48 CFR and the exclusion of evidence will be limited to the exceptional case where a 
breach of procedural rules renders the proceedings as a whole unfair. The case law of the 
Hoge Raad on the admissibility of administrative evidence and foreign evidence 
stipulates that the right to a fair trial should be guaranteed at the minimum.45	
An example of a possible breach of Article 6 ECHR in a foreign investigation or 
an investigation conducted by ECB, ESMA, DG COMP or OLAF which can be assessed 
by a Dutch criminal court and may lead to the exclusion of the evidence obtained, is a 
violation of the nemo tenetur principle. This principle is concerned with the right to 
remain silent, and is in principle not applicable to incriminating evidence produced by the 
individual existing independent of his will.46 Therefore it does not apply to business 
records, documents and digital forensic operations. It does, however, apply to oral or 
written statements made during an interview.  
																																								 																				
42 See, eg, Art 11 of Regulation 883/2013 and Art 8 of Regulation 2185/96. 
43 That the EU itself is not a party to the ECHR seems not to be a reason for not applying this approach, as 
the level of fundamental rights protection within the EU is equivalent to that of the ECHR. See Art 52(3) 
CFR. 
44 HR 5 October 2010, NL:HR:2010:BL5629. 
45 ibid, para 4.4.1; HR 30 March 2004, NL:HR:2004:AM2533, para 3.4.2. 
46 Saunders v United Kingdom App no 19187/91 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996). Unless an exception to this 
rule exists as recognised by the ECtHR. See, eg, JB v Switzerland App no 31827/96 (ECtHR, 3 May 2001) 
and Chambaz v Switzerland App no 11663/04 (ECtHR, 5 April 2012). 
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As stated before (section 2.3), in the Netherlands the LPP principle applies to all 
lawyers who are member of the Dutch Bar Association, which includes in-house lawyers 
as well. Moreover, according to the Hoge Raad it is in principle the lawyer who decides 
whether documents, records of other information fall under their legal privilege.47 In both 
respects the Dutch principle of LPP seems to offer more protection than the EU principle 
of LPP. At present, the admissibility of evidence collected by ECB, ESMA, DG COMP 
or OLAF in cases where the wider Dutch principle was not upheld, has not been decided 
in the case law. Most probably it will be treated as ‘foreign’ evidence and the admissibility 
will be assessed in the light of Article 6 ECHR. Although we are not completely certain, 
we presume that the criminal courts will accept the evidence, because the (lower) EU 
principle of LPP seems not to be contrary to Article 6 ECHR and Articles 47 and 48 CFR. 
After all, on the basis of Article 52(3) CFR, the level of protection of both CFR rights 
which correspond to Article 6 ECHR cannot be lower than the protection offered by the 
Convention. 
The concerned person can put forward arguments in the criminal proceedings 
before the criminal court that certain evidence has been obtained in violation of EU rules 
on investigatory and procedural safeguards. The criminal court will then apply the rules 
on admissibility of evidence described above. But also if the person concerned does not 
raise the question of inadmissibility of evidence, the Dutch criminal court will control 
this question ex officio. The main task of the criminal court in criminal proceedings has 
been laid down in Article 350 CCP. The court shall, on the basis of the indictment and 
the hearing at the court session, deliberate on the question whether it has been proven that 
the defendant committed the criminal offence, and, if so, which criminal offence is 
constituted under the law by the judicial finding of fact; if it is found that the offence is 
proven and punishable, then the District Court shall deliberate on the criminal liability of 
the defendant and on the imposition of the punishment or measure, prescribed by law.  
In conformity with the continental tradition, the criminal court has an active role 
during the court hearing. It has to seek the truth, and controls whether the relevant 
procedural rules are complied with. The criminal court takes responsibility for the 
completeness of the investigation during the court hearing, the way it takes place and the 
correct outcome of the criminal procedure.48 This finds expression in, inter alia, the fact 
that the court decides on the admissibility of evidence as well as the evidence as such. 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
5.1 Exchange of views between OLAF and national authorities on the requirements 
for admissibility of evidence 
In accordance with the Dutch Customs Manual, a Dutch representative from Customs – 
ie, the Anti-fraud coordination service (AFCOS), in practice – will always be present 
																																								 																				
47 HR 29 March 1994, NL:HR:1994:ZC9693. 
48 See Stijn AA Franken, ‘De Zittingsrechter in Strafzaken’ (2012) 34 Delikt & Delinkwent 361.  
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during on-the-spot inspection by OLAF.49 After the joint inspection has been conducted, 
OLAF is informed by the Dutch authorities of the requirements an inspection report must 
meet to be used as evidence in Dutch (punitive) administrative or judicial proceedings. 
These requirements are mainly concerned with the way the established facts are to be 
formulated. The data and materials which have been collected during the inspection must 
be added in an annex to substantiate the findings of the report. It should be noted that the 
joint inspection by OLAF and Dutch inspectors cannot concern the investigation of 
criminal acts. After all, OLAF is not competent to conduct criminal investigations on the 
basis of Regulation 2185/96. If the Dutch inspector is of the opinion that a reasonable 
suspicion of a criminal act arises during the inspection, the OLAF inspection is halted.50 
The facts and circumstances of the particular case are communicated to a specialised 
official from Customs: the penalty fraud coordinator/contact official (boete fraude 
coördinator/contactambtenaar). This official will assess whether there really is a 
reasonable suspicion in accordance with Dutch law. If this is the case, the investigation 
is usually transferred to the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (Fiscale 
Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst or FIOD).51 If this is not the case, OLAF can continue 
its inspection. Before the inspection takes place, OLAF is informed of this modus 
operandi. 
After the conclusion of the joint inspection, OLAF drafts a preliminary report 
which contains the facts found during the inspection. This report is handed over to the 
national inspector in the joint evaluation meeting which takes place after each inspection. 
If the national inspector agrees with OLAF’s account of the inspection findings, he will 
sign the report. The preliminary report then becomes the final OLAF report in the 
meaning of Article 11 Regulation 883/2013. It should be noted that the Dutch inspector 
that is present during the on-the-spot inspection always drafts a ‘national’ report as well. 
It contains an overview of the course of the inspection, an account of the inspection 
findings and, as an annex, a shadow dossier of the data which have been copied by 
OLAF.52 This national report, however, does not function as a parallel report to the OLAF 
report in the sense that it is drawn up with the aim of being used as an autonomous basis 
for, for example, the imposition of a fine.53 It allows OLAF to elaborate its report if the 
Dutch inspector is of the opinion that the OLAF account of the factual findings of the 
inspection is insufficient and, thus, constitutes a back-up. OLAF can complement its 
finding on the basis of the national report. As long as the Dutch inspector does not agree 
with the OLAF account of the factual findings, he will not sign the report. It follows from 
Article 8 Regulation 2185/96 that the signature of a national official is not required for 
the report to be admitted as evidence; the signature is merely a sign for OLAF that the 
national inspector has taken note of the findings. Thus, a final report within the meaning 
																																								 																				
49 Handboek Douane, section 45.00.00 Samenwerking met OLAF, 4.3.1. See also Joske Graat, ‘The 
Netherlands’ in Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural 
Safeguards: Improving OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with other EU Law 
Enforcement Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017) 93–94. 
50 See Corstens and Borgers (n 6) 76. 
51 Handboek Douane, section 45.00.00 Samenwerking met OLAF, 4.3.5. 
52 ibid, 4.4.1. 
53 In national case law concerning decisions based on OLAF reports, the national report is never mentioned. 
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of Regulation 883/2013 does not require the signature to be admitted as evidence in the 
Netherlands.54 It should be noted that as yet a Dutch national inspector has never 
completely refused to sign the OLAF report. 
 
5.2 Duplication of OLAF activities  
Inspection activities performed by OLAF are not repeated on the ground of provisions in 
the Dutch CCP. As seen before, an OLAF report is considered to be written materials in 
the meaning of Article 344(1) CCP, and may in principle be used as evidence in criminal 
proceedings (see section 1.3.1). In criminal proceedings, an OLAF report is treated in the 
same way as a Dutch administrative inspection report. The rules on the possible 
inadmissibility of such reports in criminal proceedings apply mutatis mutandis (see 
section 4.1). It should be noted that the standard for criminal liability may be different or 
higher than the standard for (punitive) administrative liability. In order to meet the 
criminal law standard, it might be necessary for the criminal authorities to conduct 
additional investigatory activities. 
																																								 																				
54 In the Customs Manual, the term ‘synthesis report’ is used to refer to the OLAF report which has been 
complemented on the basis of the national report. However, this is not a legal term under Regulation 
883/2013. See Handboek Douane, section 45.00.00 Samenwerking met OLAF, 4.5. 
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10. THE UNITED KINGDOM1 
P. Alldridge 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law 
The function of admissibility rules in criminal procedure is, partly at least, a function of 
the jury system. The system in England and Wales reveres the jury, but is very concerned 
to avoid it being given any evidence which might be irrelevant or prejudicial. In criminal 
procedure, the exclusion of an item of evidence may be for one or more of the following 
reasons: 
(a) to prevent irrelevant information going into the proceedings; 
(b) to ensure the fairness of the proceedings; 
(c) to exercise control over the enforcement authorities; or 
(d) to provide more widely acceptable decisions. 
 
1.2 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law 
Broadly speaking, administrative proceedings, including administrative proceedings that 
may have penal consequences (and are not an independent category), are civil 
proceedings and the function of rules excluding evidence is to enable fact finding by 
excluding irrelevant evidence. Rules of admissibility are permissive. In principle, any 
evidence, howsoever obtained, which is relevant to a fact in issue, is admissible. There 
are general ‘fairness’ exclusionary reasons, which are restrictively applied. 
 
1.3 System of proof: Free or controlled? 
The English law of evidence, which historically did not differentiate civil from criminal 
proceedings, is one of free proof, at least in principle, in two senses. First, in principle 
any relevant evidence may be adduced as to any fact in issue, and any single item of 
evidence may prove, without more, any probandum. There are few exceptions in civil 
cases, including cases before tribunals. Public Interest Privilege and Legal Professional 
Privilege (LPP) are among them. There are some exceptions in criminal cases, including 
the ones available in civil law cases, and also some exclusionary principles to do with the 
reliability of the evidence or the treatment of criminal defendants. Second, there is no 
established hierarchy of categories of evidence (written does not necessarily override oral 
evidence, or vice versa, and so on). 
																																								 																				
1 Any reference to the UK should be understood as referring to the English and Welsh legal system.  
	 
	
It follows from the free proof precept that evidence gathered in non-punitive 
administrative proceedings may be admitted in punitive administrative proceedings 
unless one of the exceptions applies. 
 
1.4 Review of the decision on admissibility  
 
1.4.1 Criminal law 
Where a trial judge in a Crown Court admits evidence adverse to a defendant that may 
constitute a matter rendering the conviction ‘unsafe’ within the terms of the Criminal 
Appeal Act 1968, the conviction may be quashed altogether or a retrial may be ordered. 
Appeal before the Court of Appeal is by way of review not rehearing. That is, the Court 
of Appeal asks itself whether the Crown Court adopted correct procedures, admitted only 
admissible evidence, applied the right tests for the definition of the offence and the 
allocation of the burden of proof. 
 Where a trial judge in a Crown Court admits evidence adverse to the prosecution, 
it is possible (though rare) for the trial to be paused and an appeal taken against that 
decision,2 or for the Attorney-General to refer an issue of law arising from an acquittal to 
the Court of Appeal.3 
 
1.4.2 Punitive administrative law 
The default position is that a decision in administrative proceedings to admit evidence 
may be challenged by a judicial review of that decision. The basis of the challenge is that 
the decision was one which no reasonable tribunal, properly directed as to the applicable 
law (including the law on the admissibility of evidence) could have arrived at that 
conclusion. This is appeal by way of review, as distinct from appeal by way of rehearing. 
The effect of a successful judicial review is, in principle, that the original decision-taking 
body has to take the decision again, having regard to the correct evidence. The decision 
in administrative proceedings may also be challenged by an appeal, if the decision is one 
against which appeals may be made, usually to a higher court or tribunal. In that event 
the higher court or tribunal has the choice between substituting its own view of the facts 
(which it does rarely), remitting the case to the original tribunal or a new tribunal for 
rehearing (or deciding that the error was not significant).  
The allocation of appeals, within the structure of courts and tribunals, is partly a 
matter of expense, court time and court availability. Appeals to higher courts are more 
expensive. For example, under section 137 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 
2000, as enacted, appeal from the administrative tribunal with penal powers lay on a 
matter of law (ie appeal by way of review) to the Court of Appeal, which, in practical 
terms, is the final court of appeal in the UK (the UK Supreme Court hears only about 60 
cases a year). The repeal (in 2010) of section 137 has the effect that appeal is now by way 
																																								 																				
2 Code for Crown Prosecutors <www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/prosecution-rights-appeal> accessed 25 
March 2019.  
3 Criminal Justice Act 1972, s 36.  
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of judicial review to the Divisional Court (below the Court of Appeal in the court 
structure), with the expectation that cases can be dealt with more cheaply and 
expeditiously. 
 
1.5 Use in criminal proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings 
The fact that evidence is declared inadmissible in administrative proceedings will not 
necessarily prevent its use in criminal proceedings, but the reasons that prevent it being 
admitted in administrative proceedings (for example, fairness reasons) may also provide 
reasons to exclude in criminal proceedings. In general, the rules of criminal evidence are 
stricter. In practice, the administrative proceedings, including those of OLAF, would be 
stayed pending resolution of the criminal proceedings. 
 
1.6 Use in administrative proceedings of evidence declared inadmissible in criminal 
proceedings 
The fact that evidence is declared inadmissible in criminal proceedings will not 
necessarily prevent its use in administrative proceedings, but the reasons that prevent it 
being admitted in criminal proceedings may also provide reasons to exclude in 
administrative proceedings. 
 
2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
 
2.1 Admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings  
The default position is that relevant evidence is admissible regardless of its provenance. 
Therefore no special provision is needed to render admissible evidence gathered by 
OLAF. In such proceedings the bald admissibility criteria are relevance and absence of 
unfairness. 
 
2.2 Case law on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in punitive 
administrative proceedings  
The answer to the previous question being as it is, one would not expect extensive 
deliberations. There are references to the fruits of OLAF investigations in the following 
cases: 
1. Belgravia Trading v Revenue and Customs4 where OLAF-supplied information 
to HMRC (Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs), which statements were reported 
to the tribunal as evidence of their truth. The statements before the tribunal were 
therefore multiple hearsay, but, the proceedings being civil, conducted under the 
more permissive rules of evidence under the Tribunal Procedure (First Tier 
Tribunal) (Tax Chamber) Rules 2009, there was no reason to exclude. HMRC put 
																																								 																				
4 [2014] UKFTT 31. 
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in evidence statements in the OLAF report which relied on something that the Sri 
Lankan authorities stated to an OLAF officer in relation to something which the 
Sri Lankan authorities were apparently told by the Indian authorities. In 
proceedings governed by the stricter rules of criminal evidence there would have 
been hurdles to surmount to secure the admissibility of the evidence.5 In the 
tribunal, the doctrine of free proof runs more strongly. In para 37 of the decision, 
the judge stated:  
I accept that the fact that OLAF is an EU institution charged with a particular 
relevant remit and that it is built into the architecture of the European Regulation 
… are matters which indicate the OLAF report is likely to be a relevant matter to 
consider. But, this is distinct from saying that the Tribunal’s discretion to exclude 
evidence is curtailed and it is obliged to consider the OLAF evidence whatever 
the circumstances by which it came about. The Faroe Seafood and Others cases 
confirm the Tribunal may take the OLAF mission report into account but do not 
go as far as suggesting that the Tribunal must take them into account.6  
That is, the judge still has a discretion to exclude (either on the ground of relevance 
or under the fairness discretion) evidence gathered by OLAF, as he would have 
for any other evidence. 
2. FMX Food v HM Revenue and Customs7 where OLAF had furnished evidence 
of the fraudulence of certificates of origin, as to whose admissibility there was not 
a problem; and  
3. Kam Leisurewear v HM Revenue and Customs8 in which OLAF customs 
investigators gave evidence under oath as to similar issues.  
In none of these cases was there any direct question as to its admissibility. 
 
2.3 Impact of potentially higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence 
Assuming the other conditions to be satisfied on the basis of which LPP would be 
available to the in-house lawyer where the investigation is under UK law, the 
communications will be privileged. The state of the law of legal professional privilege is 
in all important respects the creature of common law, and is known to be unsatisfactory 
and in need of legislative reform. One of the issues that will need to be addressed is that 
of the in-house lawyer.9 Clearer guidance is also needed on what exactly is the ‘legal’ 
element of LPP,10 and the relationship between lawyers acting for corporates and those 
																																								 																				
5 Criminal Justice Act 2003, s 121.  
6 Belgravia Trading v Revenue and Customs [2014] UKFTT 31, para 37.  
7 [2018] EWCA Civ 2401. 
8 [2011] UKFTT 726 (TC). 
9 Currently the privilege extends equally to in-house and contracted-out lawyers. See Alfred Crompton 
Amusement Machines Ltd v Customs and Excise [1972] 2 QB 102. 
10 In Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England (No 6) 
[2004] UKHL 48; [2005] 1 AC 610, the House of Lords gave ‘legal advice’ a fairly wide reading, holding 
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acting for individual employees.11 OLAF would not be able to collect evidence in breach 
of LPP from an in-house lawyer. Any difference in the rules between in-house and 
contracted-out lawyers is far more likely to affect the practices of the respective lawyers 
than the admissibility of evidence. Lawyers know which communications are privileged 
and alter their behaviour accordingly. That is, if the written communications of in-house 
lawyers are not privileged, they will communicate in another way. 
 
2.4 Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules  
Violations of EU rules do not, without more, provide a reason to exclude evidence, though 
the violations would be matters to be taken into account in determining whether it would 
be fair to admit the evidence. 
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
The general rule is that any evidence howsoever gathered is admissible. There are no 
specific provisions related to evidence collected according to Article 136 SSM 
Framework Regulation, Article 64(8) EMIR and Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003. 
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY EU BODIES AND AGENCIES IN 
NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
There are no specific rules on the admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and 
especially OLAF, in criminal proceedings. In principle, relevant evidence is admissible 
in criminal proceedings irrespective of who gathered it, and so long as the criminal 
proceedings do not constitute an abuse of state power. This is subject to the following 
qualifications: (i) if the violation is sufficiently gross that the criminal proceedings 
become an abuse of the process, then they may be stayed; (ii) any item of evidence is 
subject to exclusion by the trial judge under a discretion conferred by Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 s 78, which states: 
(1) In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution 
proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the 
circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the 
admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.  
																																								 																				
that ‘legal advice’ extended to advice as to what should prudently and sensibly be done in a ‘relevant legal 
context’, which would include the presentation of a case to an inquiry. 
11 In Director of the Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corp Ltd [2018] EWCA Civ 2006, 
as to legal advice privilege, the Court of Appeal stated that Three Rivers (No 5) had decided that 
communications between an employee of a corporation and that corporation’s lawyers would not attract 
legal advice privilege unless the employee had been tasked with seeking and receiving such advice on 
behalf of the client. On that analysis, the interview notes (in Eurasian) could not attract legal advice 
privilege. However, had it been open to it to do so, the Court of Appeal stated that it would have been in 
favour of departing from Three Rivers (No 5), as a matter of principle.  
	 
	
 
There is a great deal of law on the exercise of this discretion. The most likely areas which 
may be relevant here are the use of unlawful surveillance or the use of agent 
provocateurs.12 
 
5. PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES IN DEALING WITH ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-
COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
The OLAF report will rarely be admissible in its entirety. It is the specific items of 
evidence (witness statements, forensic accountancy, document analysis, etc) whose 
admissibility needs to be considered. If some exclusionary rule of the English law of 
evidence stands in the way of admitting the OLAF evidence (for example, if Belgravia 
had been before a Crown Court on a criminal charge rather than in a tribunal on appeal 
from a penalty notice, the multiple hearsay rules might have excluded it), it would be 
necessary either to secure the admissibility of the OLAF evidence (which might require 
OLAF officers to attend the court to avoid the hearsay issues) or to obtain it by other 
means. 
Duplication of OLAF activities would not be necessary. The entirety of an OLAF 
report would be unlikely to satisfy the underlying relevance requirement for all items of 
evidence in criminal trials. What would be put in evidence would be individual items of 
evidence produced or secured by OLAF. This might, for example, be witness statements, 
document analysis or forensic accountancy. These kinds of items of evidence would be 
admissible – typically for the prosecution, and, where they are expert evidence (as they 
would be in the cases of document analysis or forensic accountancy), usually without the 
attendance of the expert.13 Whether or not they could be deployed on their own, or 
whether further evidence were to be sought, would depend upon the weight attached to 
the OLAF evidence by the prosecutor, and the strength of the opposing evidence, if any. 
If unchallenged, no further evidence might be led. Typically, the more ‘scientific’ the 
statement (eg forensic document analysis showing the age or provenance of a piece of 
paper), the more likely that it would pass unchallenged, or challenged only on ‘scientific’ 
grounds. The more evaluative, the less likely that it would pass unchallenged. This is, I 
take it, why OLAF separates the different items of evidence in the annexes to its reports.  
Interviews by OLAF with suspects would generally be repeated by the domestic 
police before criminal proceedings are brought, because the conditions under which 
interviews with suspects are conducted is regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984. But, as stated above, if criminal proceedings are envisioned, then all other 
enquiries, whether national or EU, would usually be stayed pending their completion.  
																																								 																				
12 R v Loosely [2001] UKHL 53. 
13 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s 127. 
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11. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
F. Giuffrida* 
 
 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The ADCRIM project is a comparative study involving seven EU Member States (France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).1 Its 
aim is to analyse their approach to the admissibility of evidence in punitive proceedings, 
with a focus on criminal proceedings, in order to identify obstacles and limits to the 
admissibility of OLAF reports in national procedures. Building upon the seven national 
reports and the two transversal reports, the present comparative analysis therefore points 
out common trends and significant differences that have emerged in the study of national 
case law and legislation concerning the admissibility of evidence in national criminal and 
punitive administrative proceedings. This report shines a light on issues that are relevant 
in assessing the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national procedures and 
paves the way for some recommendations that could help to improve the status quo.  
The next section sets the scene for the analysis by presenting the main features of 
national systems of criminal and administrative law. Section 3 focuses on the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national punitive administrative 
proceedings, assessing whether some lessons can be learnt by comparison with the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), 
and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG COMP). 
Section 4 discusses the admissibility of evidence collected by these EU entities, and 
especially OLAF, in national criminal proceedings. Section 5 then zooms in on problems 
and practices in dealing with OLAF-collected evidence in the framework of criminal 
proceedings. The main findings of the analysis are summarised in section 6.  
 
2. RULES ON EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
Before delving into the specific topic of the admissibility of evidence collected by EU 
bodies – and especially OLAF – in national proceedings, an outline of some key rules and 
principles of the seven systems under analysis is necessary. This section provides such an 
overview by first making some remarks on the notion of ‘punitive administrative 
																																								 																				
* The author is extremely grateful to the members of the ADCRIM study group and the OLAF 
representatives who shared their invaluable comments on a previous draft during the second project 
meeting. He is indebted to Katalin Ligeti, Michiel Luchtman, John Vervaele, Giulia Lasagni, and András 
Csúri for their further suggestions in the finalisation of the comparative analysis.  
1 Any reference to the UK should be understood as referring to the English and Welsh legal system.  
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proceedings’ (section 2.1). It then moves on to the analysis of the function of admissibility 
rules in national criminal law (section 2.2) and punitive administrative law (section 2.3). 
The nature of national evidentiary systems, ie whether they are ‘controlled’ systems 
adopting a numerus clausus of means of proof (and therefore excluding ‘atypical’ means) 
or based instead on the principle of free proof, is discussed in section 2.4. Section 2.5 
concerns the reviewability of the decisions on the admissibility of evidence, while the last 
section addresses the possibility of using in criminal proceedings evidence declared 
inadmissible in administrative proceedings, and the possibility of using in administrative 
proceedings evidence declared inadmissible in criminal proceedings (section 2.6). 
 
2.1 Introductory remarks on ‘punitive administrative proceedings’  
As explained in the introduction, national experts within the ADCRIM project have 
drafted their national reports on the basis of a questionnaire that was circulated at the 
beginning of the study. While some notions did not require any further specification, 
others called for some working definitions. This is the case of ‘punitive administrative 
proceedings’, which has been used to refer to national proceedings aimed at applying 
administrative sanctions that would qualify as having a criminal nature according to the 
so-called Engel criteria set out by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),2 which 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently endorsed.3 Pursuant to 
these criteria, national courts consider some administrative proceedings ‘punitive’, with 
the consequence that the typical criminal law guarantees – presumption of innocence, ne 
bis in idem, nemo tenetur, etc – (should) apply in the context of these procedures as well.4   
This is the case of Italy,5 where national courts are becoming progressively more 
receptive to European case law on the ‘punitive’ nature of administrative penalties and 
proceedings, and Luxembourg. In the latter country, administrative courts have 
sometimes considered some administrative proceedings as having a penal nature, such as 
those before the Financial Sector Supervisory Commission (Commission de Surveillance 
du Secteur Financier, CSSF), when a sanction is issued at the end of these proceedings. 
The CSSF supervises the financial sector in Luxembourg and is the competent authority 
for the purpose of the Market Abuse Regulation6 and the European Market Infrastructure 
Regulation (EMIR).7 In a case that was eventually referred to the Court of Justice for a 
																																								 																				
2 See Engel and Others v The Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 (ECtHR, 
8 June 1976). 
3 See, for instance, Case C-489/10 Bonda, EU:C:2012:319.  
4 For the purpose of this study, which deals with OLAF and three other EU entities from which OLAF could 
learn lessons (ECB, ESMA, and DG COMP), most national reports have focused on administrative 
proceedings concerning competition, tax, customs, banking, and financial supervision matters. 
‘Administrative proceedings’ refer to proceedings before administrative authorities and not before courts. 
When the national reports refer to the latter kind of procedures, expressions such as ‘proceedings before 
administrative courts’ and the like are used.  
5 Italian report, section 1. 
6 Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on market 
abuse (market abuse regulation) [2014] OJ L 173/1.  
7 Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on OTC 
derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories [2012] OJ L 201/1. See Luxembourg report, 
section 1. 
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preliminary ruling,8 the CSSF ordered Mr DV, the director of an entity regulated by the 
CSSF, to resign on the ground that he was no longer trustworthy because of alleged links 
with Bernard Madoff and his fraudulent activities. The Luxembourgish Administrative 
Court of Appeal, which was requested to review the validity of the CSSF’s decision not 
to grant Mr DV access to documents possessed by the CSSF, expressly acknowledged 
that the administrative procedure before the CSSF was a ‘procedure within which the 
rights of defence deserve the most scrupulous respect, especially when the sanction is [the 
order for Mr DV to resign as soon as possible] and resembles, in view of the requirements 
of Article 6 ECHR, a procedure having penal nature’.9 
The status quo is not so different in France, although the notion of ‘administrative 
proceedings’ seems to a certain extent misleading. Proceedings such as those entrusted to 
the Competition Authority are ‘administrative’ insofar as this entity is an administrative 
authority, yet its punitive action is often carried out under the supervision of ordinary – 
and not administrative – courts.10 Ordinary courts can then assess the real nature of 
proceedings before them to evaluate whether the criminal law safeguards should be taken 
into account.11 The Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) can also carry out 
such an assessment and, when it does so, relies on the concept of ‘sanction having the 
character of punishment’, which the Council itself introduced and which requires the 
respect of defence rights and the principles of legality, necessity and proportionality of 
the sanction.12 Sanctions having the character of punishment can be issued by courts or 
administrative authorities13 and have a mainly punitive purpose, independently of 
whether they are formally of a criminal, administrative, civil or disciplinary nature.14  
In France, Luxembourg, and Italy, the application of the Engel criteria by national 
courts goes hand in hand with a highly fragmented legislative scenario. There is indeed 
no single code on ‘punitive administrative proceedings’ in these systems,15 nor is there in 
Hungary,16 but different pieces of legislation lay down the relevant provisions concerning 
																																								 																				
8 Case C-358/16 UBS Europe, EU:C:2018:715. 
9 Luxembourgish Administrative Court of Appeal, 16 December 2014 (Luxembourg report, section 1; 
emphasis added). The Administrative Tribunal has applied, by analogy, some principles laid down by the 
ECtHR in the criminal law domain to the administrative proceedings at the end of which the Competition 
Council issued financial penalties against the Luxembourgish post and telecommunications company. 
Likewise, the Constitutional Court has clarified that the nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege principle 
applies to criminal penalties as well as to administrative sanctions (Luxembourg report, section 1). 
10 French report, section 1. Administrative courts are however competent to review the sanctions issued in 
the field of tax law and financial market supervision. Nonetheless, ‘this jurisdiction is partly shared with 
the judicial judge since it is he who, during the proceedings, authorises or controls the use of certain 
investigative measures’ (ibid). 
11 French report, section 1. Although the French courts overall apply the ECtHR’s case law, ‘it is not 
uncommon for the administrative or judicial judge to identify solutions whose compatibility with the case 
law of the Court can be discussed’ (ibid). 
12 ibid.  
13 For instance, the Financial Market Authority or the Competition Authority.  
14 French report, section 1.  
15 See especially section 1 of: French report; Italian report; Luxembourg report.  
16 In Hungary, the new Act on Administrative Procedure has recently entered into force. It lays down the 
general rules concerning all administrative procedures. However, in case of specific procedures such as 
those concerning tax, customs, and competition matters it also refers to special rules, which are to be found 
in separate laws (Hungarian report, section 1). 
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administrative procedures in the fields of competition, tax, financial supervision, customs, 
etc. In Germany, rules on administrative fines and punitive administrative proceedings 
are instead to be found in the Act on Regulatory Offences (Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz), 
which applies to all ‘regulatory offences’ – ie offences that may be punished with a fine 
– under federal and state law.17 According to the Act, the law of criminal proceedings 
applies to regulatory offences rather than administrative law. In addition, while it is for 
administrative authorities to investigate regulatory offences, the judicial review of the 
fines issued at the end of such investigations is bestowed upon the competent local 
criminal court. If administrative authorities do not withdraw the regulatory fining notice, 
the public prosecutor replaces them in the proceedings before the criminal court and 
criminal procedural rules in principle apply.18  
Finally, in the Netherlands, the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) contains 
general rules on administrative decision-making, administrative enforcement, and 
procedural law, and also defines the notion of ‘punitive sanction’ and ‘administrative 
fine’. According to Dutch legislation and case law, administrative fines – which are the 
most important administrative sanctions imposed in the area of competition and in 
banking/financial supervision19 – fall within the remit of Article 6 ECHR (‘criminal 
charge’) and qualify as ‘sanctions of a criminal nature’ under EU law.20  
This bird’s eye view shows, first, that national systems deal with issues related to 
‘punitive administrative law’ in different ways. Supranational standards apply to different 
national legal realities, so that they are codified in some Member States while their 
application looks much more fragmented in others. Whereas systems like the Dutch and 
the German apply directly the Engel criteria, others adapt (or are in the process of 
adapting) to them via national case law (France, Luxembourg, Italy). Therefore, although 
the Engel criteria had a strong harmonising impact, a unified interpretation and 
application of them is still missing and Member States have different approaches to the 
matter. Second, ‘external’ differences, ie among Member States, are sometimes 
accompanied by ‘internal’ legislative fragmentation, which makes it difficult to find 
consistent or homogenous rules within the Member States themselves. This can have two 
consequences for OLAF and the admissibility of its reports in national proceedings, if the 
rule on such admissibility will continue to be based on the assimilation between OLAF 
reports and those of national inspectors.21  
First, the assimilation principle per se and in all its forms, including the traditional 
assimilation of sanctions as inaugurated by the Greek Maize case of the Court of Justice,22 
																																								 																				
17 German report, section 1.  
18 ibid. 
19 Dutch report, section 1. In addition to fines, Dutch administrative law contemplates administrative 
sanctions of a reparatory nature, ie aimed at restoring a lawful situation, such as tax surcharges and the 
recovery of unlawfully paid subsidy (ibid). 
20 Tax and customs authorities can also impose administrative fines (ibid). 
21 Art 11(2) of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 11 September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) 
[2013] OJ L 248/1 (hereinafter also ‘OLAF Regulation’).  
22 Case 68/88 Commission v Greece (‘Greek Maize’), EU:C:1989:339.  
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implies that disparities among Member States will continue to exist.23 OLAF reports have 
different status and follow-up in the Member States, according to the specificities of each 
national system. The assimilation between national and EU rules (or authorities) favours 
the process of EU integration in a way that minimises the EU’s impact on national systems 
and assuages Member State concerns over the loss of sovereignty. Perhaps surprisingly, 
there is considerable room for assimilation even in the context of the recently created 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO): in the light of the extensive interplay 
between national and EU law within the EPPO and of a clear political will to keep the 
EPPO close to national systems,24 the Regulation refrains from equipping the Office with 
a broad set of powers defined autonomously at the EU level but mostly aims to ensure 
that the EPPO can use the same powers as national prosecutors can.25 The extensive 
reliance on national legislation sits uneasily with – and could hamper the achievement of 
– the mission with which OLAF and the EPPO are tasked, namely that of protecting a 
quintessentially supranational legal interest such as the EU budget.26  
Second, the assimilation principle requires comparable rules or authorities at the 
national level. If national rules do not per se pass muster, their ineffectiveness will 
unavoidably extend to the EU setting in which they apply.27 Moreover, if ‘assimilable’ 
national rules or authorities do not exist or are difficult to pinpoint, eg because national 
legislation is fragmented, the application of the assimilation principle risks being 
stalemated.28 Indeed, as for OLAF reports, Ligeti points out that Article 11(2) of 
Regulation 883/2013 ‘presupposes the existence at national level of an administrative 
authority comparable, in its functions and powers, to OLAF. If there is no such 
																																								 																				
23 Katalin Ligeti, ‘The Protection of the Procedural Rights of Persons Concerned by OLAF Administrative 
Investigations and the Admissibility of OLAF Final Reports as Criminal Evidence’ (Study for the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control 2017) 27. See also, with respect to the assimilation principle 
in the aftermath of the Greek Maize case, Giovanni Grasso, ‘Relazione Introduttiva’ in Giovanni Grasso 
and Rosaria Sicurella (eds), Per un Rilancio del Progetto Europeo. Esigenze di Tutela degli Interessi 
Comunitari e Nuove Strategie di Integrazione Penale (Giuffrè 2008) 13–16. 
24 For an overview on this interplay and some of its potential consequences, see Fabio Giuffrida, ‘The 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office: King without Kingdom?’ CEPS Research Report No 2017/03 (2017) 
<www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/european-public-prosecutors-office-king-without-kingdom/> accessed 
30 June 2019.  
25 See Art 30(1) and (4) of the Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing 
enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s office (‘the EPPO’) [2017] 
OJ L 28/1 (hereinafter ‘EPPO Regulation’), especially in comparison with Art 26 of the Commission’s 
Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office 
COM(2013) 534 final, 17 July 2013.  
26 On OLAF’s extensive reliance on national law, see the in-depth analysis of the first Hercule III study, 
Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: Improving 
OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement Authorities 
(ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017). 
27 See, with respect to the ‘traditional’ assimilation principle as per the Greek Maize case, ‘Explanatory 
Memorandum’ in Mireille Delmas-Marty (ed), Corpus Juris Introducing Penal Provisions for the Purpose 
of the Financial Interests of the European Union (Economica 1997) 16. 
28 Ligeti (n 23) 27. Similar difficulties in finding a comparable offence, when it comes to the assimilation 
principle concerning crimes against national and EU budgets, have been mentioned by Petter Asp, 
‘European Criminal Law and National Criminal Law’ in Valsamis Mitsilegas, Maria Bergström and 
Theodore Konstadinides (eds), Research Handbook on EU Criminal Law (Edward Elgar 2016) 318; André 
Klip, European Criminal Law. An Integrative Approach (3rd edn, Intersentia 2016) 76.  
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administrative actor at national level, the assimilation provision will remain an empty box 
leading to the potential inadmissibility of the OLAF Final Report’.29  
 
2.2 Function of admissibility rules in national criminal law  
As Vervaele notes in his transversal report, the rationale behind admissibility rules in 
national criminal law varies from country to country, although some broad categorisations 
are possible.30 Despite such differences, one can agree with the UK report’s remarks, 
according to which, 
[i]n criminal procedure, the exclusion of an item of evidence may be for one or more of 
the following reasons: 
(a) to prevent irrelevant information going into the proceedings; 
(b) to ensure the fairness of the proceedings; 
(c) to exercise control over the enforcement authorities; or 
(d) to provide more widely acceptable decisions.31 
What the UK report does not expressly mention, unlike the French, German, Hungarian, 
and Luxembourgish reports, is the relevance of admissibility rules for the protection of 
human rights of persons involved in criminal proceedings, although this is somehow 
implied in the reference to the fairness of the proceedings. The Italian report does not 
include a formal reference to human rights either, yet it underlines that admissibility rules 
in national criminal proceedings aim to ensure the equality of arms among the parties, the 
protection of the dignity of all individuals potentially involved in criminal procedures, 
and the fairness of the proceedings.32  
The German and Dutch reports highlight the link between the rules on 
admissibility of evidence and the rule of law. As we read in the latter, ‘Punishment of a 
citizen by the state is only accepted if it has been established in a proper way and 
according to the applicable rules of law that an offence has really been committed and 
that the accused can be held responsible for that offence’.33 The German report also 
clarifies that German admissibility rules are based on what could be called a ‘balancing 
approach’,34 since in principle the exclusion of evidence should follow an overall 
																																								 																				
29 Ligeti (n 23) 27 (emphasis added). For further remarks on the assimilation principle as enshrined in Art 
11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, see the transversal report by Michiel Luchtman, Argyro Karagianni and 
Koen Bovend’Eerdt on ‘EU Administrative Investigations and the Use of Their Results as Evidence in 
National Punitive Proceedings’, section 6.3; transversal report by John Vervaele on ‘Lawful and Fair Use 
of Evidence from a European Human Rights Perspective’, section 6.  
30 Vervaele, transversal report, section 2, where there is a distinction among countries adopting: the 
‘vindication of rights approach’ (evidence is excluded because its admissibility would infringe fundamental 
rights); the ‘deterrence approach’ (rules on evidence aim to ensure that law enforcement authorities do not 
collect evidence in an illegal way); and the ‘judicial integrity (or balancing) approach’ (evidence is declared 
inadmissible after a balancing exercise between the violation of individual rights and the Member State’s 
interest in convicting the alleged offenders) (ibid).  
31 UK report, section 1.1.  
32 Italian report, section 1.1.  
33 Dutch report, section 1.1. 
34 Vervaele, transversal report, section 2. 
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balancing exercise between the gravity of individual rights’ violations and the impact of 
admitting that evidence on the fairness of the proceedings, as well as on the public interest 
in enforcing criminal law.35  
In a way confirming that Member States have divergent takes on evidentiary 
matters, German and Dutch rules are however different with regard to, among other 
things, the examination of witnesses before and during the trial. In Germany, the 
examination at trial cannot in principle be replaced by reading reports of a pre-trial 
interrogation, although there are some (limited) exceptions. This rule shows that the 
record of an interrogation carried out before a judge is considered more reliable than that 
of the examination conducted by public prosecutors or police officers.36 In the 
Netherlands, on the contrary, the Supreme Court accepted several decades ago that a 
written statement obtained during pre-trial investigations can be used as evidence at trial, 
so that witnesses no longer have to come to court to give evidence; an official report 
containing their statements collected during the pre-trial phase is in principle sufficient.37 
In a recent CJEU judgment on admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings 
(Dzivev),38 the Court stressed both the human rights and the rule of law dimensions behind 
the rules on admissibility.39 In the frame of Bulgarian investigations on serious VAT-
related crimes, the recording of some conversations involving the defendant had been 
ordered by a court that was not competent to do so and, apparently, without sufficient 
reasons to justify it. The Specialised Criminal Court of Bulgaria thus required the CJEU 
to rule on whether the national rule providing for the inadmissibility at trial of such a 
recording was at variance with Article 325(1) TFEU, ie with the obligation of Member 
States to adopt effective and dissuasive measures to counter illegal activities affecting the 
Union budget. It was clear that, without the recording, the defendant would be acquitted 
of the serious PIF crimes for which he had been indicted in Bulgaria.40  
Sharing in essence the Advocate General’s view,41 the Court of Justice argues that 
the Bulgarian court is not required to disapply national legislation on the admissibility of 
evidence, as the protection of EU financial interests cannot trump respect for fundamental 
rights and general principles of the EU. As for the former, in particular, the CJEU 
emphasises the importance of the principles of legality and of the rule of law, which forbid 
national courts from acting beyond the legal limits set out by national legislation.42 
Furthermore, the Court reiterates that the interception of telecommunication entails a 
																																								 																				
35 German report, section 1.1. For instance, the failure to inform the defendant of the right to free legal 
assistance would not lead to the exclusion of evidence collected by interrogating him or her, if the defendant 
was properly informed of the right to consult with a defence counsel and has sufficient means to afford a 
defence lawyer (ibid).   
36 ibid. 
37 Dutch report, section 1.1. 
38 Case C‑ 310/16 Dzivev and Others, EU:C:2019:30. 
39 For further remarks on Dzivev see Vervaele, transversal report, section 2. 
40 Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Spetsializiran nakazatelen sad (Bulgaria) lodged on 31 May 
2016 — Criminal proceedings against Petar Dzivev (Case C-310/16). PIF stands for ‘protection des intérêts 
financiers’. 
41 Case C‑ 310/16 Dzivev and Others, Opinion of AG Bobek, EU:C:2018:623. 
42 Case C-310/16 Dzivev, paras 33–35.  
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violation of the right to privacy enshrined in Article 7 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union (CFR). Hence, as the interception was authorised by a court 
lacking the necessary jurisdiction, it amounts to a limitation of the right to privacy that is 
not in accordance with the law and thus violates Article 52(1) CFR.43 In other words, 
‘Article 325 TFEU cannot be used as the legal base for introducing a balancing test 
between EU effectiveness and applicable legal safeguards in case of unlawful evidence’.44 
Finally, some reports link criminal law rules on admissibility with core features 
of national criminal justice systems.45 For instance, in Italy, such rules mirror the 
adversarial structure that the 1988 Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP) introduced, 
radically departing from the previous inquisitorial tradition; they aim to ensure that each 
party is in a position to put forward the relevant evidence that is useful for the courts to 
decide on a case.46 This is the bulk of the principle of equality of arms, which in turn is 
the cornerstone of accusatorial systems.47 In a similar vein, admissibility rules are a 
function of the jury system in the UK, at least partly. The English and Welsh system 
reveres the jury but is very concerned to avoid it being given any evidence which might 
be irrelevant or prejudicial.48  
The strict link between the very nature of national criminal justice systems and 
rules on admissibility of evidence is a testament to the matter’s sensitivity, which 
currently escapes the European harmonisation even in its cross-border dimension, ie when 
evidence is collected in one Member State and is to be used in another. Although Article 
82(2)(a) TFEU allows the Council and the Parliament, to the extent necessary to facilitate 
mutual recognition of judgments, to adopt minimum rules concerning the mutual 
admissibility of evidence between Member States, to date	there is no relevant EU legal 
instrument that deals with the issue.49 It goes without saying that the Member States’ 
resistance to approximate the rules on evidence, which the laconic EPPO Regulation’s 
provision on the matter further confirms,50 can represent an obstacle to OLAF’s delivery 
of coherent and efficient results.  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
43 ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be provided 
for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms …’ (Art 52(1) CFR; emphasis added). 
44 Vervaele, transversal report, section 2. For further remarks on Dzivev, see also Luchtman, Karagianni 
and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 3.5.  
45 See also Vervaele, transversal report, section 2.  
46 Italian report, section 1.1.  
47 For further detailed remarks on the equality of arms in Europe, see Marloes C van Wijk, Cross-Border 
Evidence Gathering. Equality of Arms within the EU? (Eleven International Publishing 2017) 13ff. 
48 UK report, section 1.1.  
49 See also Vervaele, transversal report, section 3.  
50 ibid. Reference is meant to Art 37 of the EPPO Regulation (‘Evidence’). For further remarks on this 
provision see Silvia Allegrezza and Anna Mosna, ‘Cross-Border Criminal Evidence and the Future 
European Public Prosecutor. One Step Back on Mutual Recognition?’ in Lorena Bachmaier Winter (ed), 
The European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The Challenges Ahead (Springer 2018) 157–160. See more in 
section 5.3 below. 
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2.3 Function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative law  
The transversal report on ‘Lawful and Fair Use of Evidence from a European Human 
Rights Perspective’ notes that, in general,  
the conceptual framework of evidence is related to the finality of the punitive process, 
based on the formal and substantive truth sustained by evidence/proof that does respect 
due process. This therefore includes the legality of the proceedings from the start of the 
pre-trial investigations and respect for fundamental rights and procedural guarantees 
during the proceedings.51  
When discussing the function of admissibility rules in national punitive administrative 
law, all national reports touch upon – either alternatively or cumulatively – these issues. 
With slightly different nuances, they stress that regulating the process of seeking the truth 
is the rationale behind the rules on admissibility, especially as such rules require the 
exclusion of information that is not relevant to the final decision that the competent 
administrative authorities should adopt. Likewise, the majority of national reports 
mention that rules on (in)admissibility of evidence are also linked with the need to ensure 
adequate protection of the rights of persons involved in punitive administrative 
proceedings, either as such or as part of the fairness of the proceedings.  
At the same time, rules concerning the admissibility of evidence in national 
administrative proceedings are overall rather scarce in the Member States, as the Dutch, 
French, Italian, and Luxembourgish reports explicitly note.52 Furthermore, punitive 
administrative proceedings seem to have an unclear identity within the EU. In countries 
like Germany, they are closer to criminal than civil proceedings, and the criminal law 
rules on admissibility apply accordingly.53 At the other end of the spectrum, 
administrative proceedings, including punitive ones (which are not an independent 
category), are civil proceedings in the UK.54 Likewise, in France,  
the general tendency is to use the ordinary law of civil procedure when the judicial judge 
is competent; this may be surprising given the punitive nature of the procedure and the 
sanction. As for administrative case law, it should also be noted that it has evolved to 
move closer to civil procedure and, in so doing, away from criminal case law.55 
Finally, in Italy, procedures before administrative courts are based on civil procedure 
rules, as these courts can rely on all means of proof established by the Civil Procedure 
																																								 																				
51 Vervaele, transversal report, section 2 (emphasis added).  
52 See section 1.2 of: Dutch report; French report; Italian report; and Luxembourg report. In a similar vein, 
the Hungarian report mentions that administrative authorities, when they need to establish the facts of a 
case for their decisions, are free to choose from the means of evidence provided for by law and all evidence 
may be used to this end, save for that obtained unlawfully (Hungarian report, section 1.2).  
53 German report, section 1.2. However, the provisions on the quality and reliability of evidence are less 
strict than in criminal law and allow for a simplified procedure of taking evidence, eg they allow the reading 
of previous statements by witnesses rather than examining them anew (ibid).  
54 UK report, section 1.2. 
55 French report, section 1.2. 
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Code, with a few exceptions.56 However, in tax administrative proceedings in the field of 
VAT, the rules of the CCP apply to fill the gaps of sectoral rules.57  
Once again, the scenario described so far can have a bearing on OLAF activities 
and on the assimilation rule enshrined in Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013. The lack 
of clear rules at the national level obscures the fate of OLAF-collected evidence once 
transmitted to national authorities. This may change with the forthcoming amendment of 
Regulation 883/2013, as further discussed in section 5.3 below.  
 
2.4 Free or ‘controlled’ systems of proof 
Having discussed the rationale behind the admissibility rules in national systems, it is 
now appropriate to look more closely at such rules, in order to understand how they (can) 
impact OLAF-collected evidence. This section offers a panorama of the key principles of 
the seven Member States under analysis, assessing whether these countries are systems 
of free or controlled proof, both in criminal (section 2.4.1) and punitive administrative 
law (section 2.4.2). 
 
2.4.1 Criminal law  
France, Hungary, Luxembourg, and the UK are free proof systems.58 Any kind of 
evidence is admissible and can be accepted and taken into account by criminal courts 
when deciding a case. However, ‘free’ does not mean ‘unconditional’. Even if there is no 
numerus clausus of means of proof, evidence collected shall meet some requirements to 
be admissible. In general, such requirements are justified by the need to protect the 
fundamental rights of persons subject to criminal investigations and, more broadly, the 
legality and fairness of the proceedings.  
In France, the principle of freedom of evidence is tempered by those of lawfulness 
and fairness. As stated in French literature, ‘[E]vidence may be obtained beyond legal 
provisions, but not against legal provisions’.59 If the law is violated in the collection of 
evidence, such evidence is inadmissible (principle of lawfulness). In addition, even when 
the procedure of gathering evidence is lawful, the principle of fairness may still come into 
consideration and lead to the exclusion of evidence. As the French rapporteur notes, the 
principle of fairness  
sanctions the unfairness of public authorities beyond mere lawfulness … Although 
lawful, if [a scheme by public authorities] irreparably impairs the rights of the defence, it 
																																								 																				
56 Italian report, section 1.2. 
57 ibid. 
58 The Luxembourgish criminal justice system is one of free proof as long as the most serious offences (ie 
crimes and délits) are concerned, while contraventions (ie less serious offences) shall be proved by means 
of either official reports or witnesses in the absence of official reports, or in support of those reports (Art 
154 of the Luxembourgish CCP; see Luxembourg report, section 1.3.1). In a similar vein, French doctrine 
is divided on whether freedom of evidence is restricted with respect to contraventions (French report, 
section 1.1, fn 16).  
59 Etienne Vergès, Géraldine Vial and Olivier Leclerc, Droit de la Preuve (Presses Universitaires de France 
2015) no 272 (translation by Juliette Tricot in French report, section 1.1). 
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must lead to the exclusion of the evidence gathered … In a way, in the silence of the law 
of criminal procedure … fairness frames the limits of lawfulness (what is not permitted 
by the CCP is not prohibited: one must demonstrate either the misuse of procedure or an 
interpretation contra legem of the procedure).60 
An example of an unfair scheme by public authorities is incitement to commit an 
offence.61 This disloyal way to obtain evidence determines its inadmissibility also in 
Luxembourg, along the lines of the ECtHR’s case law.62 To be admitted at trial, evidence 
shall be ‘loyally’ obtained, useful, and subject to the adversarial principle 
(‘contradictoire’).63 According to a 2007 leading case by the Luxembourgish Court of 
Cassation, criminal courts cannot base a conviction on evidence that has been unlawfully 
obtained if: i) the respect of given formal requirements is imposed by law under penalty 
of nullity; ii) the committed irregularity has tainted the credibility of evidence; or iii) the 
use of evidence is contrary to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.64 The wording of this 
judgment would imply that, in principle, evidence that has been unlawfully obtained 
could even be admitted at trial, if none of these conditions is met. However, the Court of 
Cassation clarifies that the defendant’s right to a fair trial can only be ensured if legality 
in the administration of evidence is respected. In the same case that gave rise to the 2007 
decision and after this judgment, the Court of Appeal stressed indeed that the principle of 
legality in the administration of evidence is the fundamental requirement to ensure the 
right to a fair trial.65 Hence, in practice, illegally or improperly obtained evidence cannot 
be used at trial.66  
By the same token, the UK free proof system is tempered by some exclusionary 
principles to do with the reliability of the evidence or the treatment of criminal 
defendants.67 In particular, evidence can be declared inadmissible either when public 
authorities’ violations are so gross that the criminal proceedings become an abuse of the 
process or when, ‘having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in 
which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an 
adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it’.68 
Finally, Hungarian law, while opting for a system of free proof, generally denies the 
admissibility of evidence gathered by means of a criminal offence, by otherwise 
breaching the law or by a substantial restriction of the defendants’ procedural rights.69 In 
																																								 																				
60 French report, section 1.1 (emphasis added).  
61 ibid. When private parties present unlawful and unfair evidence, however, such evidence is in principle 
admissible. Subject to an adversarial debate, its probative value is to be assessed by the judge in accordance 
with the principle of unfettered evaluation of evidence (ibid, section 1.3.1).  
62 See more in Vervaele, transversal report, section 5.1. 
63 Luxembourg report, section 1.3.1. 
64 ibid. Reference is meant to Court of Cassation, 22 November 2007, No 2474. 
65 Court of Appeal, 26 February 2008, No 106/08.  
66 Luxembourg report, section 1.3.1.  
67 UK report, section 1.3.1. 
68 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 s 78. See UK report, section 4.1. 
69 Hungarian report, section 1.3.1. Violations of law in the collection of evidence may be repaired in second 
instance proceedings: for example, if a witness was examined without the usual warnings, he or she can be 
heard again before the second instance courts, although this may affect the probative value of the testimony 
(ibid). 
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addition, it provides for specific exclusionary rules, such as those concerning witnesses’ 
and defendants’ statements collected in violation of their rights.70 
Unlike the countries mentioned so far, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands are 
controlled systems. According to Dutch law, admissible means of evidence are only: i) 
the court’s own observations; ii) the statements of the defendant; iii) the statements of a 
witness, including experts; and iv) written materials.71 By the same token, there is an 
exhaustive list of means of proof in Germany (examination of witnesses, expert opinion, 
inspection, documentary evidence, and defendant statements)72 and in Italy.73 In the latter 
country, however, Article 189 CCP also allows for ‘atypical’ means,74 insofar as they 
contribute to proving the thema probandum and do not breach the moral freedom of 
subjects potentially involved. The mentioned provision is used, for instance, in case of 
online searches, which the Italian CPP does not explicitly regulate. Hence, the Italian 
system can be defined as one of controlled proof with a rather broad opening clause.75 
As further discussed below, it ought to be noted that both proof-free and controlled 
systems in principle consider OLAF reports admissible. In the former, this conclusion is 
straightforward, as freedom of proof implies that reports drawn up by OLAF – as long as 
the other requirements are met (eg fairness, contradictoire, etc) – are admissible. In 
controlled systems, OLAF reports usually fall within the notion of ‘written 
materials’/‘documents’, the admissibility of which is not contentious. Therefore, the 
nature of the criminal justice system – ie whether it is a controlled system or one of free 
proof – does not seem to have a bearing on the de iure admissibility of OLAF-collected 
evidence in national criminal proceedings.  
 
2.4.2 Punitive administrative law  
All punitive administrative systems under analysis are of free proof, although in some 
countries there are exceptions in specific sectors. For instance, Italian legislation forbids 
the oath in tax administrative proceedings.76	 Likewise, in Luxembourgish VAT 
administrative proceedings, the VAT Administration can prove taxpayers’ violations by 
means of any evidence with the exception of the oath.77 Some reports also clarify that the 
usual requirements concerning fairness/lawfulness of the procedures or the adversarial 
principle (contradictoire) shall be respected in order for the evidence to be admissible 
																																								 																				
70 ibid. 
71 Dutch report, section 1.3.1, where the few further Dutch rules concerning evidence are also discussed. 
72 German report, section 1.3.1. These are the only means of proof on which decisions on the merits of the 
case can be based, while procedural decisions (eg whether to place a witness under oath) can take into 
account any other means of evidence (ibid). 
73 Italian report, section 1.3.1. 
74 ibid.  
75 ibid. 
76 ibid, section 1.3.2. 
77 Luxembourg report, section 1.3.2. See also the Dutch report, section 1.3.2, where it is stated that sectoral 
laws may require that certain facts are proved with specific (authentic) documents, and the Hungarian 
report, section 1.3.2, where we read that ‘there might be some limitations to the free system’ since ‘a statute 
or government decree may prescribe the use of documentary evidence in specific cases and for reasons of 
public interest’. 
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(eg, France and Luxembourg).78 Similarly, Hungarian administrative law considers in 
principle inadmissible evidence that was gathered by the competent administrative 
authorities by means of a criminal offence, by otherwise breaching the law or by 
significantly restricting the procedural rights of the person concerned.79 As noted above, 
OLAF-collected evidence is in principle admissible in systems of free proof.  
 
2.5 Review of the decisions on admissibility of evidence 
It can be gleaned from the previous sections that each Member State approaches the issue 
of the admissibility of evidence in a different way. When it comes to the possible review 
of the decisions on the (in)admissibility of evidence, a certain degree of consistency 
seems to exist throughout the EU.  
In the seven Member States’ criminal justice systems there is reportedly no 
decision on admissibility as such that may be subject to judicial review. The only and 
limited exception seems to be the UK, in cases where a trial judge in a Crown Court 
admits evidence adverse to the prosecution. In this situation, ‘it is possible (though rare) 
for the trial to be paused and an appeal taken against that decision’.80 
A control on evidence and its admissibility may nonetheless be triggered in two 
different ways. First, the admissibility of evidence can be contested by appealing the 
decision that criminal courts adopt at the end of the criminal proceedings. While this is a 
general principle, there are some specificities in each Member State. In Italy, for instance, 
only the non-admission of decisive counter-evidence can represent a ground for appeal 
before the Court of Cassation, while the same limitation does not stand with respect to 
the appeal lodged before the Courts of Appeal.81 In Germany, the defence counsel shall 
raise the objection that inadmissible evidence has been accepted and used during the trial, 
otherwise the potential appeal of the court’s decision cannot contest issues related to the 
admissibility of that evidence.82  
Second, in most Member States it is usually possible to challenge, already during 
the pre-trial phase, an investigative measure carried out by public authorities (eg, public 
prosecutors or judicial police). If this action is successful, the evidence collected through 
that investigative measure shall not be included in the case file. This scheme is known in 
most countries as ‘nullity’ (or ‘invalidity’) of investigative acts.83 The French system is a 
case in point. Acts or documents of the procedure – a notion that covers not only the 
procedural acts performed by the investigative judge and his or her delegates, but also 
																																								 																				
78 See, respectively, French report, section 1.3.2 (where it is specified that lawfulness and fairness are 
interpreted strictly in this context, ie, any evidence that is unlawfully or unfairly gathered by private or 
public parties is not admissible; cf n 61 above), and Luxembourg report, section 1.3.2.  
79 Hungarian report, section 1.4. 
80 UK report, section 1.4.1. 
81 Italian report, section 1.4.1. 
82 German report, section 1.4.1. The German rapporteurs however note that such a requirement has been 
highly criticised and does not apply, according to recent case law, to inadmissible evidence that has been 
collected by illegally searching private premises (ibid).  
83 Vervaele, transversal report, section 2. See also Martyna Kusak, Mutual Admissibility of Evidence in 
Criminal Matters in the EU. A Study of Telephone Tapping and House Search (Maklu 2016) 169ff. 
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acts of investigations and prosecutions – can be annulled by the investigating chamber 
(and not by the investigative judge), in principle upon request of the interested parties.84 
The nullity (‘nullité’) of an act can be provided for by the law, such as when given 
measures shall comply with a given requirement ‘under penalty of nullity’, but can also 
depend on the failure to abide by a substantive formality enshrined in a rule of criminal 
procedure, when such a failure adversely affected the concerned party’s interests.85  
Likewise, in Luxembourg, nullities can be ‘formal’, ie provided for by the law, or 
‘substantial/virtual’. Substantial/virtual nullities have been introduced via case law, when 
serious irregularities, including irregularities affecting the rights of defence, occur.86 
Luxembourgish public prosecutors, as well as any interested party having a legitimate 
interest, can ask the pre-trial chamber of the district court, within strict deadlines, to 
decide on the invalidity of acts (‘requête en nullité’) of pre-trial investigations. The 
legislator aims to ensure that objections to the admissibility of evidence are confined to 
the pre-trial phase, since the requête en nullité cannot – save for exceptional 
circumstances – be lodged before the trial court. If no control on illegally or improperly 
obtained evidence is triggered in time (or at all), such evidence becomes valid (‘purge de 
nullité’).87 Similar possibilities to challenge the legality of investigative acts such as 
searches and seizures or surveillance measures are mentioned in the German report, which 
clarifies, ‘If the court quashes the seizure, the public prosecutor must return the seized 
documents to the appellant. Upon request, the public prosecutor must delete 
corresponding data … and the applicant may bring the matter before court if the public 
prosecutor’s office does not comply with its obligation’.88 
Finally, as in the criminal law domain, there is reportedly no decision on 
admissibility as such in administrative proceedings that may be subject to judicial review. 
Again, issues concerning the admissibility of evidence can be contested when challenging 
the decision adopted by administrative authorities at the end of the administrative 
proceedings.89 Administrative courts are usually competent for this review, but in some 
cases a first review is carried out within the administrative authorities themselves.90 
The possibility to challenge the admissibility of evidence – even if not as such but 
together with the merits of the case or by indirectly challenging an investigative measure 
																																								 																				
84 French report, section 1.1. The notion of ‘acts or documents of the procedure’ is highly discussed in 
French doctrine and does not cover mere means or proof of information, which cannot be annulled but are 
subject to adversarial debate during the trial and to the unfettered evaluation of the judge (ibid).  
85 ibid.  
86 Luxembourg report, section 1.1. In line with the Luxembourgish courts’ monist approach, alleged 
violations of the ECHR rights, especially the rights of defence, could determine the nullity of a given 
procedural act (ibid). 
87 ibid. See also Vervaele, transversal report, section 2. 
88 German report, section 1.4.1. 
89 The above-mentioned criminal law rules on the judicial review of investigative measures apply as well, 
as long as a given investigative measure is available in punitive administrative proceedings (German report, 
section 1.4.2).  
90 In Luxembourg, for instance, VAT Administration decisions that impose financial penalties are first 
subject to the so-called ‘reclamation’, by which the individual requires the Administration to reconsider its 
decision. This further decision of the Administration can then be challenged before the civil chamber of the 
district court of Luxembourg (Luxembourg report, section 1.4.2). 
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– is of the essence to ensure both adequate protection of the parties’ rights and the lawful 
functioning of punitive systems. This becomes all the more important vis-à-vis OLAF 
reports, which are acts of an EU body that, albeit often adopted at the end of investigations 
that build on a blend of national and supranational law, enter national punitive 
proceedings. Precisely because of the nature of OLAF as an EU body, the right to 
challenge its reports should take into account the well-established CJEU case law 
according to which national courts cannot invalidate EU acts and decisions.91   
 
2.6 Use of evidence declared inadmissible in different sets of proceedings  
The present study has also discussed the possibility of using evidence gathered in one set 
of proceedings – for example criminal – in another set of proceedings – for example, 
administrative – and vice versa. After all, Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 is 
inherently based on such a ‘migration’ of evidence: OLAF carries out administrative 
investigations, yet the results of its activities can (or at times should) be used in criminal 
proceedings. The nub of the issue is whether and to what extent the different rules and 
standards of the different sets of proceedings hamper the transfer and use of evidence. 
The question has not come often to the attention of the Court of Justice, and when it has, 
the solution has not always been clear-cut. In the light of national law (and consequent 
different approaches to the issue), therefore, there seem to be loopholes and gaps leaving 
the fate of OLAF-collected evidence unpredictable.  
In one of the few cases where the CJEU addressed the issue of the ‘migration’ of 
evidence from one set of proceedings to another, WebMindLicenses,92 the Court in 
essence ruled that the transfer of evidence obtained in the frame of criminal proceedings 
to parallel administrative procedures concerning violations of VAT rules does not breach 
EU law, and especially the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter, as long as some 
requirements are complied with.93 However, if they are not respected, national courts must 
disregard the evidence so collected. This case thus seems to suggest that  
the Luxembourg approach towards the appreciation of unlawfully obtained evidence in 
criminal proceedings is different from that of ‘Strasbourg’ … The latter court has held 
that violations of the right to privacy do not necessarily render a trial unfair, not even 
when these violations concern the use of intrusive techniques, such as covert listening 
devices without a legal basis … After all, a violation of Article 8 ECHR does not 
necessarily amount to a violation of Article 6 ECHR. Yet for ‘Luxembourg’, serious 
violations of procedural safeguards do seem to have an impact on, particularly, Articles 
																																								 																				
91 See more in sections 3.3 and 4 below.  
92 Case C-419/14 WebMindLicenses Kft. v Nemzeti Adó- és Vámhivatal Kiemelt Adó- és Vám 
Főigazgatóság, EU:C:2015:832. 
93 ‘EU law does not preclude the tax authorities from being able in the context of an administrative 
procedure, in order to establish the existence of an abusive practice concerning VAT, to use evidence 
obtained in the context of a parallel criminal procedure that has not yet been concluded, provided that the 
rights guaranteed by EU law, especially by the Charter, are observed’ (ibid, para 68; in the following paras 
the CJEU explains how such rights should be protected). For further remarks on this case, see Luchtman, 
Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, sections 2.3 and 3.3, and Vervaele, transversal report, 
section 5.2. 
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41 CFR (good administration) and 47 CFR (fair trial). If correct, the argument is, 
presumably, that proceedings in which the investigative or prosecutorial bodies can afford 
not to follow the ‘rules of the game’ cannot be considered ‘fair’, nor can one maintain 
that such a situation is in line with the principles of a good administration.94 
Against this backdrop, it has been first queried whether, at the Member State level, 
evidence declared inadmissible in administrative proceedings can be used in criminal 
proceedings. In Germany, this would not be in principle possible, as the same rules on the 
admissibility of evidence apply to criminal and punitive administrative procedures. 
Nonetheless, the admissibility of (any) evidence in criminal proceedings eventually 
depends on the criminal courts’ balancing exercise: if they find that the interest in 
effectively prosecuting crimes trumps conflicting interests, they may even admit evidence 
that has been declared inadmissible in punitive administrative proceedings.  
In the other countries, the approach is the opposite: despite a few caveats that have 
been put forward, evidence declared inadmissible in administrative proceedings is in 
principle admissible in criminal proceedings. According to the Italian and 
Luxembourgish reports, this is linked with the principle of autonomy of criminal and 
administrative proceedings, which, as in the UK,95 does not oblige criminal courts to align 
themselves with administrative authorities’ decisions. However, it is still possible that, 
on a case-by-case basis, evidence that has been declared inadmissible in administrative 
proceedings is not admitted in criminal proceedings either.96 The Hungarian rapporteur 
adds that the above-mentioned autonomy may also lead to the opposite situation, ie 
evidence that has been declared admissible in administrative proceedings may be 
excluded from criminal proceedings on a case-by-case basis.97  
In the Netherlands, criminal courts are in principle not bound by a prior 
administrative decision on admissibility of evidence either. According to the dominant 
position of Dutch doctrine,98 evidence that has been unlawfully seized in non-criminal 
investigations, and not (yet) declared inadmissible, could only be excluded in criminal 
proceedings if: i) it has been seized in a way that runs so much against the proper acting 
of government that every use is intolerable; ii) the use of the evidence would violate the 
fair trial requirement; iii) the proper conduct of procedure has (severely) been violated; 
or iv) fundamental rights have been excessively infringed.99 Similarly, the French 
rapporteur notes that legal texts do not provide a clear answer to the problem at stake, and 
court decisions are scattered and sometimes obsolete. As anticipated, the principle is that 
evidence declared inadmissible in administrative proceedings can be admitted in criminal 
proceedings and is then subject to the criminal judge’s unfettered evaluation. If 
																																								 																				
94 Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 3.3. 
95 UK report, section 1.5. 
96 Italian report, section 1.5; Luxembourg report, section 1.5; UK report, section 1.5, where it is added that, 
in practice, administrative proceedings are stayed pending resolution of the criminal proceedings. 
97 Hungarian report, section 1.5. 
98 Courts have rarely touched upon the matter (Dutch report, section 1.5). 
99 ibid.  
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administrative specialised officials have used their powers for purposes other than those 
provided for by the law, however, the evidence may be annulled.100  
The French approach is different in the opposite scenario: when acts or documents 
of the criminal procedure are annulled, they are removed from the file and cannot be 
invoked any longer in other proceedings, whether criminal or administrative. This has 
been recently restated by the French Constitutional Council, which ‘prohibited the tax 
and customs services from using documents obtained by an administrative or judicial 
authority under conditions subsequently declared illegal by the judge’.101 A similar 
approach can be found in Germany where, in general, evidence declared inadmissible in 
criminal proceedings cannot be used in administrative ones. However, this is not always 
true, as there may be cases where a given criminal law rule that is violated does not apply 
in administrative proceedings, hence the evidence collected is still admissible in 
administrative proceedings. For instance, the obligation to inform the suspect of the right 
to consult a lawyer does not apply to punitive administrative proceedings. Hence, ‘the 
evidence that has been illegally obtained in a criminal investigation could have been 
legally obtained in the framework of punitive administrative proceedings … Therefore, 
the evidence might be used in order to impose an administrative fine’.102 
In the other Member States, evidence that has been declared inadmissible in 
criminal proceedings seems to be in principle admissible in administrative proceedings.103 
This is again linked with the principle of autonomy of different procedures.104 The Dutch 
report extensively addresses the issue, by highlighting that, in accordance with 
established case law, unlawfully obtained evidence is in principle admissible in non-
criminal proceedings,105 unless the procedural rights of the suspects have been violated. 
Even if procedural rights are violated, evidence will not be automatically declared 
inadmissible, as the Dutch Supreme Court clarified that the use in administrative 
proceedings of evidence unlawfully obtained in criminal proceedings is not allowed ‘only 
in case that evidence is obtained in a way that runs so counter to what may be expected 
of a properly acting administrative authority … that the use of evidence should be 
considered inadmissible in all circumstances’.106 This is the so-called ‘zoozer indruist’ 
criterion, roughly translated as the ‘manifest improper criterion’, which leads to the 
exclusion of evidence only in a few cases, as it is a rather high threshold. Especially 
																																								 																				
100 French report, section 1.5. 
101 ibid, section 1.6. The author refers to the decision of the Constitutional Council, 4 December 2013, no 
2013-679 DC, recital 33, and adds that such a reservation ‘seems to be of a general nature and is in line 
with the rules of criminal procedure … which deprive annulled acts of the possibility of being used in 
separate proceedings’ (French report, section 1.6).  
102 German report, section 1.6.  
103 This evidence will usually be examined under the rules of administrative law and, as the latter can set 
lower standards than those of criminal law, evidence declared inadmissible in criminal proceedings may be 
admissible in administrative ones (see, eg, Hungarian report, section 1.6). The UK rapporteur however 
specifies that the reasons that prevent evidence from being admitted in criminal proceedings may also lead 
to its exclusion in administrative proceedings (UK report, section 1.6).  
104 See especially Italian report, section 1.6; Luxembourg report, section 1.6.  
105 If the administrative court decides to admit such evidence, in this way contradicting the criminal court’s 
stance, it shall state the reasons for this (Dutch report, section 1.6). 
106 ibid (emphasis in the original). 
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infringements of fundamental rights such as those enshrined in Articles 6 and 8 ECHR 
may result in the inadmissibility of evidence.107    
The scenario described so far lacks homogeneity and seems overall inspired by a 
case-by-case approach. With few exceptions, the transfer of (inadmissible) evidence from 
one set of proceedings to another is allowed. The violation of criminal law rules does not 
imply, at least per se, the inadmissibility of evidence in administrative proceedings, and 
vice versa. It is difficult to draw lessons for OLAF from this multifaceted state of affairs. 
One might for instance expect that – although clear and conclusive data are not available 
– the more national systems have an open attitude towards the ‘migration’ of evidence 
from criminal to administrative proceedings (and vice versa), the fewer problems the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence would encounter when passing from EU to 
national level. In addition, the more the issues dealt with in this section are left to the 
decision of national courts rather than being regulated by the legislator, the less 
foreseeable is the eventual admissibility of OLAF reports in domestic proceedings. At the 
same time, however, fundamental rights of individuals concerned by these proceedings 
may be better protected thanks to the involvement of national courts and their assessment 
of the admissibility of evidence on a case-by-case basis. In a way, as mentioned, this also 
seems required by the WebMindLicenses decision by the CJEU.  
  
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS  
This section examines how the general principles discussed above play out in the context 
of national punitive administrative proceedings where OLAF-collected evidence is to be 
used. After an overview of national legislation and case law (section 3.1), the focus of the 
analysis shifts to the issues of whether potentially higher national standards on procedural 
safeguards have an impact on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence (section 3.2) 
and of the challenges to OLAF-collected evidence by interested parties (section 3.3). 
Section 3.4 concludes by looking at other EU entities that may provide evidence to be 
used in punitive administrative proceedings, namely the ECB, ESMA, and DG COMP, 
in order to assess whether their experience may provide useful examples for OLAF.  
 
3.1 OLAF-collected evidence and punitive administrative proceedings: Legislation 
and case law  
In all legal systems under analysis, there is no specific rule concerning OLAF-collected 
evidence and its admissibility in punitive administrative proceedings. The general rules 
apply. Especially since all seven national systems of punitive administrative law are based 
on the principle of free proof,108 OLAF-collected evidence should be in principle 
admissible, as long as it complies with the specific requirements that may be provided for 
by each system. The Hungarian report however specifies that OLAF reports as such do 
not absolve administrative authorities from the obligation to investigate the facts of the 
																																								 																				
107 ibid. 
108 See above, section 2.4.2. 
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case. Therefore, ‘OLAF reports as such do not constitute evidence on which the authority 
could automatically base a final decision’.109 As OLAF reports are treated in the same 
way as reports of national administrative authorities,110 this is a clear example of the risks 
attached to the assimilation principle. As further discussed in section 5, such a restrictive 
approach by Hungarian authorities, which requires OLAF activities to be substantiated 
by further investigations by national authorities, has also come to light with respect to 
criminal proceedings.  
The French report mentions instead a decision where the Paris Court of Appeal 
held exactly the opposite stance, at least insofar as customs proceedings are concerned. 
In a case decided in March 2014, ‘[T]he judge was … careful to reject the company’s 
arguments that the customs administration had relied solely on the OLAF report … This 
source alone may be sufficient to form the basis for the offence notification report’.111 
Likewise, the Italian rapporteurs clarify that, as far as tax proceedings are concerned,112 
established case law abides by the rules of Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013. Italian 
courts do not require national authorities to conduct further investigations following the 
transmission of OLAF final reports. All kinds of information transmitted by OLAF 
(documents, information, and even reports of the single actions overtaken by the Office) 
can be used as sources of evidence.113 
The fact that OLAF reports are admissible in punitive administrative proceedings, 
however, does not automatically imply that this evidence will suffice to adopt an 
administrative sanction or that this evidence will be used altogether. While all national 
rapporteurs mention that, for the time being, there is no case law on the inadmissibility of 
OLAF reports in national punitive administrative proceedings, they give some interesting 
examples of judgments where the use of OLAF-collected evidence was challenged before 
national courts, mostly in customs cases.114   
For instance, the UK report lists three cases where OLAF provided evidence that 
was eventually admitted in non-criminal proceedings.115 In none of them was there any 
direct question as to its admissibility. Belgravia Trading Co Ltd & Others v Revenue & 
Customs is worth mentioning in this context, although it does not concern the 
admissibility and use of OLAF-collected evidence in ‘punitive administrative 
proceedings’ as such but rather in proceedings before the UK first-tier tribunal (tax 
chamber). In that case, OLAF provided the Revenue & Customs authority (HMRC) with, 
among other things, multiple hearsay, the admissibility of which before the tribunal was 
contested by the interested company and supported by the HMRC. The tribunal endorsed 
the stance of the latter. In accordance with its rules of procedure, which are less strict than 
																																								 																				
109 Hungarian report, section 2.1.  
110 ibid, section 2.2. 
111 French report, section 2.2. The same goes for Germany, as may be inferred from the German report, 
section 2.1. 
112 The same applies to customs proceedings (cf n 10 of the Italian report, section 2.2). 
113 Italian report, section 2.2.  
114 As the German rapporteurs note, customs proceedings ‘do not fall under the definition of “punitive 
administrative proceedings” because they do not qualify as criminal according to the Engel criteria’ 
(German report, section 2.2). 
115 UK report, section 2.2.  
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those of criminal procedure,116 the tribunal can exclude evidence if it would be unfair to 
admit it. This was precisely the company’s request with respect to OLAF reports, because 
of the hearsay included therein. The tribunal rejected such a request, pointing out that the 
company could cross-examine a Commission official to obtain further information on 
OLAF activities and could also ‘invite the Tribunal through submissions to place whether 
weight, if any, on that evidence in view of any shortcomings identified by the 
appellants’.117 Hence, as long as the contradictoire on OLAF-collected evidence is 
ensured, the admissibility of this evidence cannot be denied, especially because OLAF’s 
findings – as well as any other evidence – are not binding on the tribunal. The tribunal 
indeed clarifies that the duty of sincere cooperation between EU institutions and Member 
States implies that the tribunal ‘may take the OLAF mission report into account but [does] 
not go as far as suggesting that the Tribunal must take them into account’.118 The tribunal 
is thus free to exclude these reports, as well as any other evidence, if the circumstances 
so require.  
Customs cases where the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence has been 
upheld are also mentioned by the Dutch, French, and German reports. In the Netherlands, 
there are several judgments concerning the ‘uitnodigingen tot betaling’ (tax surcharges) 
in customs cases, in which OLAF reports play a role. In these decisions, which are not 
punitive, the unlawfulness of the OLAF investigation has never been questioned by the 
parties and/or assessed by the court.119 The rapporteurs however argue that, should this 
be the case in the future, it is likely that the OLAF report would be excluded as evidence 
only if it had been obtained by OLAF ‘in a way which runs so counter to what can be 
expected of a properly acting administrative authority that the use of it should be 
considered inadmissible in all circumstances (the “manifestly improper criterion”)’.120 
This seems in line with a customs case decided by the Customs Chamber of the 
Amsterdam Court of Appeal in 2012, where the Dutch court rejected the plaintiff’s 
challenge to the use of OLAF reports, noting, ‘Setting aside the findings of a fact-finding 
mission by OLAF is such a far-reaching act that in general this will only be justified if 
the plaintiff’s allegations against the findings of OLAF’s fact-finding mission are so 
serious that no credibility can any longer be attached to the findings of OLAF’.121 
In France, while it is not contentious that OLAF reports are admissible as evidence 
in customs proceedings, the challenges raised by the parties relate sometimes to language 
issues. In some cases, OLAF reports have been the basis upon which the French liberty 
and custody judge (‘juge des libertés et de la détention’, JLD) ordered – upon request by 
the customs administration – searches and seizures. According to an old French legal text, 
procedural documents shall be drafted in French. Hence, interested parties have often 
																																								 																				
116 On the contrary, ‘In proceedings governed by the stricter rules of criminal evidence there would have 
been hurdles to surmount to secure the admissibility of the evidence’ (ibid). 
117 Belgravia Trading Co Ltd & Others v Revenue & Customs [2014] UKFTT 31 (TC), para 29.  
118 ibid, para 37 (emphasis added).  
119 Dutch report, section 2.2. 
120 ibid, section 2.1.  
121 NL:RBHAA:2011:BV1238, case no 11/00839 (emphasis added), as reported and translated by Vervaele, 
transversal report, section 6.  
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argued that the JLD cannot base his or her decisions on OLAF reports, which are drafted 
in English and usually not translated before the JLD adopts search and seizure orders. 
However, French courts systematically dismiss these arguments, as only documents of 
the procedure as such shall be drafted in French, while this does not exclude that 
documents in a foreign language may be produced and may form the basis of a decision 
by a JLD who is able to understand them.122  
In other French cases, the interested party has complained about the competent 
authorities’ failure to disclose OLAF reports. Hence, the challenge here does not touch 
upon the admissibility of evidence collected by OLAF but rather ‘the conditions under 
which national authorities can rely on such evidence and use it as a basis for a sanction 
decision’.123 In a case decided in 2013, the Court of Appeal of Pau found that the customs 
proceedings against a company were irregular because ‘annexes to an OLAF report used 
as the basis for the customs proceedings against this operator were not communicated to 
him (before the notice of recovery) and … only extracts from the OLAF report were 
transcribed in the Customs records, whereas they should have been included in their 
entirety’.124 The Commercial Chamber of the French Court of Cassation subsequently 
upheld this judgment.125 Therefore, the issues that OLAF reports raise do not relate to 
their EU origin but rather to their use at the national level and to the breach of defence 
rights that can follow from their late disclosure to the interested party.  
Interested parties have at times challenged the non-disclosure of OLAF reports in 
Germany as well. In a case before the Hessen Fiscal Court, the plaintiff argued that it was 
not clear how OLAF reached its conclusions and the court agreed that not all the points 
included in the OLAF report were convincing.126 There were other instances where 
German fiscal courts did not find OLAF reports convincing. In a case concerning the 
shipment to the EU of goods produced in China without the payment of the due customs 
duties, the Düsseldorf Fiscal Court agreed with the plaintiff that OLAF reports were 
insufficient to issue a fine, because on-the-spot checks would have been necessary but 
were not carried out by national authorities or OLAF. In another case where OLAF 
officials had instead travelled to the place where irregularities were detected, and reported 
these irregularities accordingly, another German fiscal court was convinced by the 
findings of OLAF reports.127 The German rapporteurs thus comment on this case law by 
noting, ‘OLAF-reports are admissible evidence in fiscal court proceedings, but it is for 
the court to evaluate the report and to assess its accuracy and consistency … No case was 
found where the OLAF report was rejected on principle’.128  
																																								 																				
122 French report, section 2.2. 
123 ibid (emphasis added).  
124 ibid.  
125 ibid. 
126 German report, section 2.2.  
127 ibid. 
128 ibid. They also add that ‘it is remarkable to see how willingly the courts accept the OLAF report as 
convincing and how little attention is paid to principle-based objections of the plaintiff. While this may be 
acceptable in administrative law, it would hardly be accepted in proceedings before a criminal court’ (ibid), 
as in criminal proceedings the standards of evidence are much higher than in customs law.  
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Therefore, in Germany as well as in the other Member States, the admissibility of 
OLAF reports as such does not automatically entail that they will be used by national 
administrative authorities or by domestic courts. Once an OLAF report is admitted in 
national proceedings, the use that domestic courts or authorities can make of it will mostly 
depend on its quality and on the reliable evidence that it can provide. As this study will 
further demonstrate, the admissibility of OLAF reports is only one side of the coin, and 
not necessarily the most contentious. 
 
3.2 Impact of higher national standards on admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence 
If national administrative law provides for higher standards in relation to procedural 
safeguards than EU law provides, this may in principle hinder the admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence in domestic punitive administrative proceedings. Such a situation 
could for instance occur in the field of competition law, where, according to the case law 
of the Court of Justice, in-house lawyers are not covered by legal professional privilege 
(LPP).129 If national law accords such a privilege also to in-house lawyers, it may be thus 
the case that evidence collected in competition proceedings regulated by EU law is not 
admissible in national proceedings where there are higher standards of procedural 
safeguards. It has thus been queried whether the same could happen in the frame of OLAF 
activities. The issue is crucial in assessing the effectiveness of OLAF investigations, 
especially from the perspective of their follow-up in national systems. As the OLAF 
Supervisory Committee argued in 2017,  
[T]he standard of protection of fundamental rights and procedural guarantees of the 
persons concerned has a direct influence on admissibility of evidence in subsequent 
proceedings before national authorities. Special attention should be paid to avoiding 
differences in standards, especially if the standards of relevant national proceedings … 
are higher. This would avoid situations where OLAF investigations and the evidence 
collected within become devalued.130 
The differences in standards may be especially relevant when OLAF-collected evidence 
is to be used in criminal proceedings. One may also wonder to what extent the provisions 
of the OLAF Regulation on evidence still allow for higher national standards. The guiding 
principle should in any case be the one singled out by the CJEU in Melloni, and namely 
that higher national standards are allowed as long as ‘the level of protection provided for 
by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of 
EU law are not thereby compromised’.131 
																																								 																				
129 See more in Mira Scholten and Michele Simonato, ‘EU Report’ in Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 26) 
38 and 51. For further remarks on competition proceedings, see Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, 
transversal report, section 4. 
130 OLAF Supervisory Committee, ‘Opinion 2/2017 Accompanying the Commission Evaluation report on 
the application of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council No 883/2013 (Article 
19)’ (2017), para 35 (emphasis added).  
131 Case C-399/11 Melloni, EU:C:2013:107, para 60. See more in Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, 
transversal report, section 3.1; Vervaele, transversal report, section 7.  
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Be that as it may, as far as national punitive administrative proceedings are 
concerned, none of the national reports mentions a case where the disparity between EU 
and national standards led to the inadmissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in such 
proceedings. The German and Dutch reports make some remarks on the LPP. In the 
Netherlands, all lawyers who are members of the Dutch Bar Association enjoy this 
privilege. Hence, national standards of protection are higher than EU standards. The 
Dutch rapporteurs note however that, on the one hand, LPP-connected issues have never 
arisen with respect to OLAF. On the other, they wonder what would happen if OLAF 
carries out an investigation in another Member State, in which the LPP does not apply to 
in-house lawyers (unlike the Netherlands), and evidence collected by the Office is then 
used in the Netherlands. They argue that the ‘manifest improper criterion’ would apply, 
ie evidence would be excluded only if it was obtained in a way that runs so excessively 
counter to what may be expected of an administrative authority that its use should be 
considered inadmissible in all circumstances. However, as mentioned above, this is a 
rather high threshold; hence, one may expect that Dutch courts would declare OLAF 
reports admissible, because the violation of the LPP is likely neither to qualify as a breach 
of the right to fair trial nor to affect the essence of the right to privacy.132  
The German report draws a similar conclusion. The LPP does not cover in-house 
lawyers in Germany, yet it applies to other categories of professionals who are not taken 
into account by EU law, such as tax accountants. The German rapporteurs note however 
that it is unlikely that evidence collected by OLAF in violation of the accountants’ LPP 
would lead to its inadmissibility, as previous national case law suggests that – in the 
balancing exercise that characterises the German system of evidence – the interest in 
effective law enforcement would trump the safeguarding of the privilege at hand.133 The 
privilege against self-incrimination may instead bring to the fore different issues, since it 
enjoys absolute protection under German constitutional law as an expression of inviolable 
human dignity. When individuals are obliged to disclose self-incriminating information 
in tax or insolvency proceedings, this information cannot be used in criminal proceedings. 
However, criminal courts have sometimes accepted documents presented to the 
authorities in banking proceedings as evidence. As the German rapporteurs note, the 
situation is still unclear in this respect but, in principle, there should be no issues 
concerning the violation of the privilege at hand in OLAF interviews, as Article 9(2) of 
the Regulation 883/2013 recognises the right to avoid self-incrimination.134 
Precisely in the light of the procedural safeguards provided for by Article 9 of the 
OLAF Regulation, the Italian rapporteurs put forward a potential explanation of the 
reason why higher national standards are not reported as affecting the admissibility of 
OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings. They argue that OLAF 
safeguards as provided for by Regulation 883/2013 are ‘generally higher than the 
guarantees established in national administrative proceedings, and more similar to the 
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133 German report, section 2.3. 
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safeguards required under criminal procedural law’.135 This is confirmed by a number of 
recent studies that have voiced or reported some concerns over the excessive safeguards 
provided for by the OLAF Regulation. For example, Ligeti reports,  
Imposing ‘quasi-criminal law’ safeguards for OLAF investigations as laid down in 
Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013 has been seen by some practitioners interviewed for this 
briefing paper as being disproportionate. Since OLAF has no coercive powers and OLAF 
Final Reports have no binding legal effect, it is maintained that there are excessively 
strong safeguards applicable to OLAF investigations.136 
Hence, as it is rare that national standards are higher than OLAF’s, it is not surprising that 
national reports do not mention issues of inadmissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in 
punitive administrative proceedings flowing from the differences between EU and 
national standards. This conclusion becomes less tenable when the focus shifts to criminal 
proceedings, as discussed in section 4 below.  
 
3.3 Challenges to OLAF-collected evidence on the ground of violation of EU rules  
The first Hercule III study concerning OLAF, ESMA, the ECB, and DG COMP 
extensively addressed EU rules on investigatory powers (notably production orders, 
interviews, on-site inspections, access to traffic and telecommunication data), and 
procedural safeguards (legal professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, 
and access to a lawyer).137 On this basis, the present project has thus queried whether and 
how – in punitive administrative proceedings – the person concerned by an OLAF 
investigation can challenge evidence that was allegedly obtained in violation of these EU 
rules. Once again, national case law offers very limited, if any, answers to the question. 
As there is usually no judicial review of the admissibility decision as such in national 
punitive administrative proceedings,138 violations of EU rules in the gathering of evidence 
by OLAF could be brought to the attention of the competent courts when the interested 
party challenges the legality of the sanction issued at the end of punitive proceedings.  
This is directly or indirectly mentioned in the Dutch, Italian, Luxembourgish, and 
French reports. The last also mentions that national authorities may require searches (eg 
of premises) on the basis of the OLAF investigations’ results. Therefore, controls on 
OLAF investigations may also be carried out during the investigation stage, ie either at 
the time of the request for authorisation of the measure or at the time of the control of the 
progress of the measure.139 Furthermore, in a recent case decided by the Paris Court of 
																																								 																				
135 Italian report, section 2.3 (emphasis added). See also Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, 
transversal report, section 6.4. 
136 Ligeti (n 23) 20 (emphasis added). The OLAF Regulation’s assessment carried out by the consultancy 
ICF makes similar remarks: ‘the majority of stakeholders interviewed … expressed the view that Article 9 
introduced a set of rights and safeguards that are disproportionate to the administrative nature of OLAF’s 
investigations’ (ICF, ‘Evaluation of the Application of Regulation No 883/2013 Concerning Investigations 
Conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF)’ (2017) 139–140).  
137 Luchtman and Vervaele (eds) (n 26). 
138 See section 2.5 above. 
139 French report, section 2.4. 
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Appeal, the interested parties challenged OLAF activities because they had been allegedly 
initiated in breach of the principle of confidentiality enshrined in Council Regulation 
384/96.140 This decision shows that, ‘while some judges stress that they are not “judges 
of the European investigation”, they agree to review “the nullity of OLAF’s 
investigation” in the light of EU texts (in this case Regulation 1073/1999), since OLAF’s 
investigation is likely to lead to the irregularity of the French procedure’.141  
The clarification that national judges are not judges of the European investigations 
follows from the status of OLAF as an EU entity, which thus implies that – unlike the 
EPPO – its acts and decisions are subject to the jurisdiction of the CJEU. Although OLAF 
and the EPPO share the common key feature of extensively relying on national law,142 
different rules apply to their acts. Article 42 of the EPPO Regulation bestows the 
competence to review EPPO procedural acts and decisions having legal effects vis-à-vis 
third parties upon national courts, with limited exceptions. As we can read in the 
Preamble of the EPPO Regulation, the ‘specific nature of the tasks and structure of the 
EPPO, which is different from that of all other bodies and agencies of the Union … 
requires special rules regarding judicial review’.143 Subjecting an EU office to the judicial 
control of national courts is indeed quite exceptional.  
The OLAF Regulation, however, includes no provision on the judicial review of 
OLAF reports. The ordinary EU principles thus apply, especially that according to which 
‘EU courts alone have jurisdiction to determine that an act of the European Union is 
invalid … OLAF’s report continues to be lawful in the EU legal order in so far as it has 
not been invalidated by the EU judicature’.144 It is known, however, that the CJEU is 
reluctant to invalidate OLAF reports. According to established case law, as these reports 
do not bring about a distinct change in the individuals’ legal position, requests to annul 
them are inadmissible.145 Hence, in practice, OLAF reports cannot be subject to the 
CJEU’s judicial review in accordance with Article 263 TFEU. At the most, the EU shall 
make good any damage caused by OLAF misconduct.146 As for national courts, since 
																																								 																				
140 Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 on protection against dumped imports from 
countries not members of the European Community OJ [1996] L 56/1.  
141 French report, section 2.4 (emphasis added). See more in section 4.2 of the same report, as well as in 
section 4.2. below.  
142 See Vervaele, transversal report, section 1.  
143 Recital 86 of the EPPO Regulation. 
144 Case T-48/16 Sigma Orionis SA v Commission, EU:T:2018:245, paras 62–63 (emphasis added). This 
principle dates back to Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, EU:C:1987:452. See more in 
Katalin Ligeti and Gavin Robinson, ‘Transversal Report on Judicial Protection’ in Luchtman and Vervaele 
(eds) (n 26) 219ff; Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 3.1; Vervaele, 
transversal report, section 6. 
145 The leading case is Case T-193/04 Tillack, EU:T:2006:292. See more in, eg, Xavier Groussot and Ziva 
Popov, ‘What’s Wrong with OLAF? Accountability, Due Process and Criminal Justice in European Anti-
Fraud Policy’ (2010) Common Market Law Review 605, 609–615; Jan FH Inghelram, Legal and 
Institutional Aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF). An Analysis with a Look Forward to a 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office (Europa Law Publishing 2011) 203ff; Ligeti and Robinson (previous 
n) 238–239; Vervaele, transversal report, section 6, which highlights that the principle at stake has been 
recently upheld in Case T-289/16 Inox Mare Srl v Commission, EU:T:2017:414, para 20. For the European 
Parliament’s recent proposal to bridge this gap in individuals’ judicial protection, see section 5.3 below.  
146 German report, section 2.4. 
246 F. GiuFFrida 11. Comparative analysis 247
26 
	
they cannot assess the legality of OLAF measures and declare them null and void, even 
if they violate EU (or national) law,147 they can (or shall) refer a request for preliminary 
ruling, if they entertain doubt about the validity of OLAF reports,148 or decide not to use 
that piece of evidence altogether if it is considered unreliable or unlawful. 
 
3.4 Admissibility of evidence collected by ECB, ESMA and DG COMP in national 
punitive administrative proceedings: Lessons for OLAF? 
OLAF is not the only EU administrative authority that can transmit reports and evidence 
to national authorities with a view to a punitive follow-up. Such transmission (and 
potential use) of evidence having a special ‘EU origin’ may take place also under the 
frameworks of: the ECB, in accordance with Article 136 of the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) Framework Regulation;149 ESMA, in the supervision of trade 
repositories, pursuant to Article 64(8) of the EMIR Regulation; and DG COMP (Article 
12 of Regulation 1/2003).150 These provisions are addressed below, to inquire whether 
they can provide useful lessons for OLAF.  
 
ECB and ESMA 
The wording of Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation is clear in requiring that, shall 
the ECB suspect that a criminal offence may have been committed, it shall forward the 
relevant information and evidence to the national competent authority. The latter has then 
to inform the ‘appropriate authorities for investigation and possible criminal prosecution’, 
which are arguably criminal law authorities.151 Hence, the provision at hand concerns 
criminal (rather than punitive administrative) proceedings and, unlike Article 11(2) of 
Regulation 883/2013, does not deal with the admissibility of ECB-collected evidence as 
such in national proceedings.152 This is perhaps the main reason why national reports 
contain scant information concerning the admissibility of such evidence in national 
punitive administrative proceedings, and case law on the matter is reportedly almost non-
existent. Furthermore, none of the seven legal systems under analysis provides for 
																																								 																				
147 ibid.  
148 See more in Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects (n 145) 226–229; Ligeti and Robinson (n 144) 
242–243. For further critical remarks on whether the request lodged in accordance with Art 267 TFEU is 
likely to fulfil the requirements of admissibility, see Valentina Covolo, L’Émergence d’un Droit Pénal en 
Réseau. Analyse Critique du Système Européen de Lutte Antifraude (Nomos 2015) 578–580. 
149 Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing the 
framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European Central Bank 
and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (hereinafter ‘SSM Framework 
Regulation’) [2014] OJ L 141/1.  
150 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L 1/1 (hereinafter ‘Regulation 1/2003’).  
151 On the obligation of national central banks to report suspicions of crime to national public prosecutors, 
see Italian report, section 3.1, and Luxembourg report, section 3. For further remarks on the ECB and the 
links between its proceedings and national proceedings, see Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, 
transversal report, section 5. 
152 See also Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 5.3: ‘The admissibility of 
ECB transmitted information as evidence in national proceedings is thus not regulated at the EU level, but 
is left to national law’.  
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specific rules concerning the admissibility and use of ECB-collected evidence in said 
proceedings, with the consequence that the general rules will apply.153  
The analysis of ESMA-collected evidence and its admissibility in national 
punitive administrative proceedings yielded similar results. Article 64(8) EMIR reads as 
follows: ‘ESMA shall refer matters for criminal prosecution to the relevant national 
authorities where, in carrying out its duties under [EMIR], it finds that there are serious 
indications of the possible existence of facts liable to constitute criminal offences …’.154 
Again, ‘relevant national authorities’ to which ESMA shall refer matters for criminal 
prosecution are most likely criminal law authorities. Hence, admissibility of ESMA-
collected evidence in national punitive administrative proceedings falls beyond the scope 
of Article 64(8) EMIR. National reports contain very limited information on the matter, 
and they all mention that no specific rules concerning the admissibility and use of ESMA-
collected evidence in said proceedings exist. Likewise, there is reportedly no case law on 
the (in)admissibility of ESMA-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings.  
Therefore, when it comes to the issue of the OLAF reports’ admissibility in 
national punitive administrative proceedings, it is difficult to draw lessons from the 
experience of the ECB and ESMA. What can be noted is that the two EU bodies have a 
clear obligation to make national competent authorities immediately aware of facts that 
may be considered as having a criminal nature. This should help domestic prosecutors 
both to detect criminal conduct that may be otherwise difficult to discover and to launch 
swift investigations into the matter. As section 5.1 notes, a similar obligation does not 
exist for OLAF – at least formally – and this could create problems in the coordination 
between the Office and national authorities.  
 
DG COMP 
There is also limited information on the admissibility in national punitive administrative 
proceedings of evidence collected by DG COMP, and national reports do not mention 
case law on the inadmissibility of such evidence. Germany and Hungary have however 
specific rules on the matter, while the general principles will apply in the other Member 
States. In Hungary, the admissibility of DG COMP-collected evidence is not 
straightforward. Article 80/C of the Act on the prohibition of unfair market conduct and 
restriction of competition clarifies that the national competition council ‘shall substantiate 
in its reasoning to the resolution the admissibility of [evidence originating from DG 
																																								 																				
153 See sections 1.3 and 1.4 above. It follows that, for instance, the admissibility of ECB-collected evidence 
in Dutch punitive administrative proceedings is subject to the manifest improper criterion (Dutch report, 
section 3.1), while in Hungary that evidence will typically qualify as documentary evidence and will be 
admissible even when national standards of procedural safeguards are higher than EU standards, with the 
usual exception of cases where evidence has been gathered (by the ECB, in this case) illegally (Hungarian 
report, section 3). In France, the admissibility of ECB-collected evidence is likely to depend upon the 
respect of the principles of lawfulness and fairness (French report, section 3.1). In Germany, as the punitive 
proceedings in the field of banking supervision follow the legal framework for regulatory offences, the 
rules that apply to those proceedings will mostly be drawn from the CCP (German report, section 3.1).  
154 The second part of Art 64(8) EMIR includes a rule on ne bis in idem that is not relevant for this study.  
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COMP or a national competition authority of another Member State], by demonstrating 
that the conditions set out in Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 have been met’.155  
In Germany, § 81 of the Act against Restraints of Competition, which is the legal 
basis for sanctions following from infringements of competition law, refers to the Act on 
Regulatory Offences. Hence, the rules of criminal procedure will in principle apply to 
competition proceedings. The Act against Restraints of Competition however includes a 
rule on DG COMP-collected evidence, § 50a, which is very similar to Article 12 of 
Regulation 1/2003.156 The latter is the key provision as for the admissibility of DG 
COMP-collected evidence in national proceedings and differs from the above-mentioned 
rules of the SSM Framework Regulation and EMIR, as it does not provide for any 
reference to criminal law authorities and deals more extensively with the use of evidence 
collected by the Commission.  
In more detail, Article 12(1) provides that the Commission and the national 
competition authorities (NCAs) shall have the power to exchange and use as evidence 
‘any matter of fact or of law, including confidential information’,157 and § 50a(1) of the 
Act against Restraints of Competition provides for a similar rule.158 The German 
rapporteurs clarify that there is however no obligation for national courts to use the 
collected information as evidence. National courts assessing DG COMP-collected 
evidence could for instance exclude it if a substantial violation of fundamental rights has 
occurred in its gathering. At first sight, they argue, this comes close to a ‘double control’, 
since evidence will be evaluated through the lenses both of EU and national standards.159 
Such an approach could therefore be controversial, as the rationale behind Article 
12 of Regulation 1/2003 seems precisely ensuring free circulation of evidence despite 
different national standards, at least vis-à-vis legal persons.160 This can be gleaned from 
recital 16 of the Regulation, which states that exchange of pieces of information and their 
use shall be ensured ‘[n]otwithstanding any national provision to the contrary’.161 Article 
12 of Regulation 1/2003 thus introduces ‘a “hard and fast rule” of mutual admissibility 
of evidence, regardless of the differences between the legal systems … [and] “breaks 
open” any national evidentiary system; “foreign” materials need to be accepted, under the 
conditions provided for in the article’.162 Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that 
this set of rules and principles does not sit entirely at odds with the mentioned ‘double 
control’ that German courts can exercise on DG COMP-collected evidence, since the EU 
																																								 																				
155 See Hungarian report, section 3. 
156 German report, section 3.3. For some remarks on Art 12 of Regulation 1/2003 see also Michiel 
Luchtman, Michele Simonato and John Vervaele, ‘Comparative Analysis’ in Michele Simonato, Michiel 
Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Exchange of Information with EU and National Enforcement 
Authorities: Improving OLAF Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Authorities 
(ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2018) 182–183.  
157 Art 12(1) of Regulation 1/2003.  
158 German report, section 3.3. 
159 ibid. 
160 ibid. As for natural persons, see infra below.  
161 Recital 16 of Regulation 1/2003. See Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, 
section 4.3. 
162 Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 3.2. 
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rule on mutual admissibility of evidence does not cover cases of unlawfully obtained or 
transferred evidence.163 Besides, also the CJEU’s case law seems to allow national courts 
to apply national procedural safeguards in enforcing EU competition law.164 
Article 12(2) of Regulation 1/2003 is also worth mentioning, as it introduces a 
clear purpose limitation clause:165 information exchanged ‘shall only be used in evidence 
for the purpose of applying Articles [101 and 102 TFEU] and in respect of the subject-
matter for which it was collected by the transmitting authority’.166 § 50a(2) of the Act 
against Restraints of Competition is largely based on this provision. Finally, Article 12 of 
Regulation 1/2003 also considers the possibility of using evidence gathered by DG 
COMP to impose sanctions on natural persons but attaches conditions. The reason behind 
the difference between the ‘unfettered’ use of evidence vis-à-vis legal persons and its 
much more limited use regarding natural persons is strictly related to the procedural 
safeguards enjoyed by individuals and companies at the national level. The Preamble of 
Regulation 1/2003 seems indeed to justify the more permissive regime for legal persons 
on the basis of the claimed equivalence between the rights of defence enjoyed by 
undertakings in the various systems, while natural persons may be subject to 
‘substantially different types of sanctions across the various systems’.167 Hence, 
information exchanged in accordance with Article 12(1) of Regulation 1/2003 can be used 
to impose sanctions on natural persons only if: 
a) the law of the transmitting authority provides for sanctions of a similar 
nature with respect to violation of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU;168 this rule is copy-
pasted in § 50a(3) of the Act against Restraints of Competition (first sentence), 
which however adds that such an exclusionary rule does not exclude the use of 
evidence against legal persons (third sentence);169 
b) in the absence of such similar sanctions, ‘the information has been 
collected in a way which respects the same level of protection of the rights of 
defence of natural persons as provided for under the national rules of the receiving 
authority’.170 This is to be found in § 50a(3) of the Act against Restraints of 
																																								 																				
163 Furthermore, evidence would be excluded only in exceptional cases, ie when substantial violations of 
fundamental rights have occurred (German report, section 3.3).  
164 Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 4.3.1, where the authors refer to 
Case C-60/92 Otto BV v Postbank NV, EU:C:1993:876. 
165 See more in Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 4.3.2, which traces 
back the origins of this principle to Case 85/87 Dow Benelux NV v Commission, EU:C:1989:379. See also 
German report, section 3.3; Argyro Karagianni, Mira Scholten and Michele Simonato, ‘EU “Vertical” 
Report. The Exchange of Information Between National and EU Authorities’ in Simonato, Luchtman and 
Vervaele (eds) (n 156) 17.  
166 Art 12(2) of Regulation 1/2003. The second part of this provision also adds that ‘where national 
competition law is applied in the same case and in parallel to Community competition law and does not 
lead to a different outcome, information exchanged under [Art 12] may also be used for the application of 
national competition law’. For a comparison between this wording and that of the second part of § 50a(2) 
of the Act against Restraints of Competition, see German report, section 3.3. 
167 Recital 16 of Regulation 1/2003. 
168 Art 12(3), first indent of Regulation 1/2003.  
169 German report, section 3.3. 
170 Art 12(3), second indent of Regulation 1/2003 (emphasis added). See more in Luchtman, Karagianni 
and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 4.3.3. 
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Competition as well (second sentence). However, on the one hand, the German 
Act does not restate the final clause of Article 12(3) of Regulation 1/2003 
according to which national courts cannot use this information to impose custodial 
sanctions. German law does not indeed provide for custodial sentences for 
regulatory offences.171 On the other hand, the Act against Restraints of 
Competition expressly prohibits using evidence collected by other NCAs in case 
of violation of constitutional rights.172  
 
The provisions above would be difficult to imagine in the context of OLAF and the 
proceedings following its investigations. As noted in the previous Hercule III studies, DG 
COMP and OLAF certainly bear some similarities, yet they are different entities.173 
Hence, when it comes to OLAF, ‘The transfer of information from the national competent 
authorities is not a closed system in which national competent authorities exchange 
information, knowing that the information provided by them is to be kept secret and is 
not to be used for other purposes’.174 OLAF and national administrative, not to mention 
criminal, authorities are not part of a single, closed system as is the case of the European 
Competition Network: ‘Unlike the other authorities, which all have clearly appointed 
national partners to provide assistance in their tasks, there is no real delineation of such 
an inner-circle for OLAF. The competent national authorities and their relationships with 
OLAF are not delineated by the EU level’.175 
The French report also addresses the admissibility of evidence in competition 
proceedings. In this country as well there are no specific rules. The ordinary principles of 
freedom, lawfulness, and fairness of evidence thus apply. In fact, the rules that the 
national competition authority should follow have been referred to as a ‘cocktail of 
rules’.176 In principle, the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure and of the Commercial 
Code should apply, together with some of those of criminal and administrative 
procedures. French courts recently addressed the issue of whether clandestine recordings 
made by an individual should be admissible before the Competition Council.177 The Paris 
Court of Appeal replied in the affirmative, by noting that the procedures before the 
competition authority should be subject to rules of criminal litigation because, inter alia, 
they have a repressive nature. Hence, as criminal case law allows the admissibility of such 
evidence, the Paris Court of Appeal reached the same conclusion for competition 
proceedings in the light of their proximity to the criminal proceedings. However, the 
																																								 																				
171 German report, section 3.3. 
172 ibid. 
173 See also Covolo (n 148) 321–323. 
174 Luchtman, Simonato and Vervaele (n 156) 168 (emphasis added). 
175 ibid 206. See also Vervaele, transversal report, section 6.  
176 French report, section 3.3, which in turn refers to Laurence Idot, ‘Application par les Autorités 
Nationales et Autonomie Procédurale’ (2011) Europe 71.  
177 A similar issue arose in EU competition proceedings. In Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV and Others v 
Commission, EU:T:2016:455, the General Court concluded that, in accordance with the Schenk 
requirements (Schenk v Switzerland App no 10862/84 (ECtHR, 12 July 1988)), the Commission did not 
commit any illegality in using secret recordings in competition proceedings. On this case, see more in 
Vervaele, transversal report, section 5.2.  
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Commercial Chamber and the Plenary Assembly of the Court of Cassation did not 
endorse this approach and argued that, unless the Commercial Code expressly provides 
for the opposite, the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure apply. It follows that ‘the 
recording of a telephone communication made without the author’s knowledge 
constitutes an unfair means by which its production as proof is not admissible’.178  
The French report also touches upon the issue of the LPP, as does the Dutch. After 
all, as noted above, the case law of the CJEU concerning the non-applicability of the LPP 
to in-house lawyers originated precisely in the field of competition law.179 The French 
and Dutch reports highlight that the national LPP is broader than the EU’s. In France, 
emails exchanged between lawyers and clients are secret as long as such emails reflect 
the lawyer’s defence strategy,180 while in the Netherlands the LPP applies to all lawyers 
who are members of the Dutch Bar Association, including in those cases where the Dutch 
competition authority itself investigates a violation of (EU or national) competition 
law.181 In accordance with the AKZO & Akcros judgment,182 however, a broader LPP does 
not come into consideration when the Dutch competition authority supports a 
Commission investigation concerning an infringement of European competition law. At 
any rate, it is uncertain whether evidence collected by DG COMP can be declared 
inadmissible if it was gathered in violation of the Dutch LPP, as the ‘manifest improper 
criterion’ sets a rather high threshold and there is no relevant case law for the time 
being.183 Such a declaration of inadmissibility could also violate Article 12 of Regulation 
1/2003 and the principle of equivalent standards on which it is founded,184 at least when 
Dutch law is not applicable.  
 Finally, the recently adopted Directive (EU) 2019/1 confirms that issues 
connected to evidence are relevant in competition proceedings.185 The Directive aims to 
ensure that NCAs have sufficient resources, independence, and powers to apply Articles 
101 and 102 TFEU effectively.186 Therefore, it lays down some provisions that should 
lead to the harmonisation of NCAs’ procedures and status. Without prejudice to Article 
12 of Regulation 1/2003,187 Article 32 of Directive 2019/1 concerns the ‘Admissibility of 
evidence before national competition authorities’ and obliges Member States to ensure 
																																								 																				
178 French report, section 3.3, where the author however adds that ‘there are signs that a shift [in the case 
law] may occur’ (ibid). 
179 See more in Scholten and Simonato (n 129), especially 38 and 51.  
180 French report, section 3.3.  
181 Dutch report, section 3.3. 
182 Joined Cases T-125/03 and T-253/03, Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros Chemicals v Commission, 
EU:T:2007:297, as confirmed by the CJEU in Case C-550/07 P Akzo Nobel Chemicals and Akcros 
Chemicals v Commission, EU:C:2010:512.  
183 Dutch report, section 3.3. 
184 ‘The rights of defence enjoyed by undertakings in the various systems can be considered as sufficiently 
equivalent’ (Recital 16 of Regulation 1/2003).  
185 Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 to empower 
the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper 
functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L 11/3. 
186 Recital 3 of Directive (EU) 2019/1.  
187 Recital 15 of Directive (EU) 2019/1 reads as follows: ‘The exchange of information between NCAs, and 
the use of such information in evidence for the application of Article 101 or Article 102 TFEU, should be 
carried out pursuant to Article 12 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003’. 
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that ‘the types of proof that are admissible as evidence before a national competition 
authority include documents, oral statements, electronic messages, recordings and all 
other objects containing information, irrespective of the form it takes and the medium on 
which information is stored’.188 The reference to ‘recordings’ is further specified in the 
Preamble, where the EU legislator adds – in essence ‘codifying’ the application of the 
Goldfish principles to proceedings before NCAs189 – that ‘NCAs should be able to 
consider … covert recordings made by natural or legal persons which are not public 
authorities, provided those recordings are not the sole source of evidence’.190  
The provision on admissibility of evidence was included in the Commission’s 
proposal for this Directive and did not undergo significant changes throughout the 
negotiations, nor did the documents of the negotiations show that it was a controversial 
issue.191 As we can read in the explanatory memorandum to the Commission’s proposal, 
in fact, the aim of the above-mentioned provision is mostly to ensure that evidence 
collected by NCAs is admissible independently of the medium in which it is stored.192 
The rule at hand is therefore different from the current rule on admissibility of OLAF 
reports. The Preamble of Directive 2019/1 gives nonetheless a clarification on the notion 
of ‘admissibility’ as such. According to Recital 73 of the Directive, when a given type of 
proof is ‘admissible’, national authorities ‘should be able to consider’193 it in taking their 
decision. This confirms that, as already mentioned above,194 ‘admissibility’ does not 
mean nor imply ‘use’ of the evidence, even when it comes from an EU entity, but can be 
considered equivalent to ‘availability’. In other words, the given piece of evidence should 
be available to national authorities, which would however not be prevented from 
considering it unconvincing and, therefore, search for further evidence.  
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY AND USE OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY (EU OR NATIONAL) 
ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: FOCUS ON 
OLAF 
While the previous section focused on national punitive administrative proceedings, the 
present one will deal with criminal procedures, in which the admissibility of OLAF 
reports becomes crucial. After all, one of the reasons that justifies the EPPO’s 
establishment is precisely the allegedly ineffective follow-up to OLAF investigations, 
																																								 																				
188 Art 32 of Directive (EU) 2019/1. See more in Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal 
report, section 4.3.1. 
189 Case T-54/14 Goldfish BV v European Commission, EU:T:2016:455. For some commentary, see 
Vervaele, transversal report, section 5.2. 
190 Recital 73 of Directive (EU) 2019/1 (emphasis added). 
191 See Art 30 of Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the 
proper functioning of the internal market’ COM(2017) 142 final, 22 March 2017. The issue of admissibility 
of evidence is barely touched upon in the Commission’s Staff Working Documents accompanying this 
proposal. Likewise, Art 30 of the Commission’s Proposal does not appear among the ones discussed during 
the trilogues (see, eg, Council docs 8307/18 and 8879/18). 
192 COM(2017) 142 final (previous n) 19.  
193 Recital 73 of Directive (EU) 2019/1.  
194 Section 3.1 above. 
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which is due, among other causes, to issues connected with the admissibility of evidence 
gathered by this body. The following section introduces the general rules concerning the 
admissibility in criminal proceedings of evidence collected by national administrative 
authorities, while section 4.2 zooms in on the admissibility of evidence gathered by EU 
bodies, especially OLAF. 
 
4.1 Admissibility of evidence collected by national administrative authorities in 
criminal proceedings 
All legal systems under analysis accept that evidence gathered by national administrative 
authorities is admissible in criminal proceedings, and this in principle includes the 
hypotheses where EU administrative bodies share evidence with domestic authorities. In 
countries such as France, Luxembourg, and the UK, such admissibility follows from the 
principle of freedom of proof and in any case requires compliance with the rules on 
evidence set out in national criminal procedural laws. Therefore, in the UK, the admission 
of evidence collected by administrative authorities shall neither adversely affect the 
fairness of the proceedings,195 nor follow a gross violation of national rules and principles 
that would require the staying of the proceedings.196 In Luxembourg, the admissibility of 
that evidence shall respect the above-mentioned criteria of loyalty and usefulness, and 
shall be subject to the adversarial principle (contradictoire).197 In this country, moreover, 
the VAT Administration is obliged by law to transmit to judicial authorities upon request 
relevant pieces of information that may be used within a criminal procedure.198  
Similarly, in France,199 administrative authorities shall transmit to the judicial 
authorities – especially public prosecutors – the elements in their possession that are likely 
to justify criminal proceedings, and more broadly any other useful element to criminal 
courts. Evidence gathered in administrative proceedings can be included in the criminal 
file but, in principle, it does not qualify as an act or document of the procedure; hence it 
cannot be annulled by the criminal court.200 There are however some exceptions, such as 
in the case of administrative tax audit procedure, the regularity of which can be examined 
by the criminal court when such a procedure triggered prosecution. At any rate, even if 
the evidence collected by administrative authorities cannot be annulled, the fairness in 
gathering it can be challenged and may lead to the exclusion of that evidence.201 
By the same token, information lawfully gathered in administrative proceedings 
is admissible in Hungarian criminal procedures, although it will have a weaker probative 
value than evidence collected in accordance with criminal law rules.202 Usually, 
																																								 																				
195 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 78. See UK report, section 4.1. 
196 UK report, section 4.1.  
197 Luxembourg report, sections 1.4 and 4.1.  
198 ibid, section 4.1.  
199 As the general rules on evidence apply, evidence collected by administrative authorities can be admitted 
at trial if its gathering did not violate the principles of lawfulness and fairness (French report, section 4.1).  
200 ibid. See also above, section 2.5.1. 
201 French report, section 4.1. 
202 Hungarian report, section 4, where the rapporteur also notes that ‘as to whether the defendant has 
committed a criminal offence, the courts, the prosecution and the investigating authorities are not bound by 
decisions made or by facts established in administrative proceedings’ (ibid). 
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investigative measures will be repeated (eg witnesses will be heard again) and the 
administrative official who carried out the investigative act can be examined as a witness. 
Hungarian law also includes a specific figure to support investigations, namely that of the 
‘adviser’, who – unlike experts – does not provide analysis but advises the investigating 
and prosecuting authority on how to ‘find, obtain, collect or record evidence’203 or 
clarifies technical issues. Therefore, advisers’ opinions do not constitute evidence as such.  
 In Germany, which builds on the principle of controlled proof (numerus clausus 
of types of evidence), information gathered by administrative authorities can be used as 
evidence in criminal proceedings, in accordance with the general admissibility rules.204 
Hence, objects may be inspected and, as noted also in the Hungarian report, the official 
who carried out the investigative act can be examined as a witness. With few 
exceptions,205 the reading out of administrative documents cannot replace the hearing of 
witnesses, especially in case of tax investigators or auditors who must present the findings 
of their investigations. Likewise, if a report includes questioning of witnesses or suspects, 
it will be necessary to hear them again before the court. In this respect, criminal 
procedural law is more restrictive than the rules of court proceedings in tax and customs 
matters, which allow for the use of reports and other documents without formal 
requirements such as reading them out in a public hearing.206 In addition, the strict rules 
on the – in principle – impossibility of replacing a witness by reading out their previous 
statements also apply to experts, who may have been involved in administrative 
proceedings and who need to be examined by the criminal court. However, experts’ 
opinions do not aim to prove the facts of the case but explain the current state of scientific 
knowledge in a given area.207 
Hearing the administrative official who carried out the investigative measure as a 
witness in a criminal trial is also common in Italy. The Italian rapporteurs note that 
information gathered by national administrative authorities usually takes the form of a 
report, which can therefore be admitted as documentary evidence. The admissibility of 
such evidence is straightforward and also extends to digital documents and data stored 
abroad (if the owner gives his or her consent), although it is forbidden when documents 
concern anonymous information or information about the morality of the parties to the 
proceedings.208 It is currently debated whether documents containing administrative 
authorities’ evaluations are admissible. Furthermore, Italian law provides that if a 
suspicion of crime comes to light during the activities carried out by administrative 
authorities (eg supervision), these authorities shall perform their subsequent investigative 
acts in accordance with the more protective rules of the CCP.209  
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Like in Italy, in the Netherlands evidence gathered by administrative authorities 
usually qualifies as written material, on the admissibility of which in criminal proceedings 
there is no doubt. This comes however with two riders. First, during the monitoring phase 
of an administrative procedure, ie before the sanctioning phase, the individual is obliged 
to cooperate with the administrative authority and the nemo tenetur principle does not 
apply.210 In line with the Saunders case of the ECtHR, self-incriminating statements 
rendered before a reasonable suspicion of a crime has arisen cannot be admitted in Dutch 
criminal trials.211 Although this is not entirely clear for the time being, it seems that they 
can nonetheless be used to start a criminal investigation. In addition, the nemo tenetur 
principle does not cover evidence existing independently of the will of the suspect, eg 
that deriving from the professional administration or computer data.212 
Second, it is unclear what would happen if Dutch administrative authorities, 
during the monitoring or investigatory phase, act unlawfully. According to the Dutch 
CCP, it seems that only irregularities that occurred in criminal pre-trial investigations 
may prevent the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings, while irregularities 
committed by administrative authorities would not affect the admissibility of evidence 
they collected.213 A 2013 decision of the Dutch Supreme Court nonetheless acknowledges 
that evidence can also be excluded in further exceptional circumstances, namely when 
there has been a serious violation of an important rule or principle of procedural criminal 
law. While there is no case law concerning violations that occurred during administrative 
proceedings, the literature argues that evidence unlawfully gathered during administrative 
activities is in principle admissible in criminal proceedings, unless it was 
seized in a way that runs so counter a proper government action that any use is intolerable 
(the ‘manifest improper criterion’), or when the use of the evidence would violate the fair 
trial requirement, or when the proper conduct of procedure has been (severely) violated, 
or when fundamental rights have been infringed in an excessive way.214 
In essence, all national reports make it clear that lawful (and sometimes even potentially 
unlawful) evidence collected by administrative authorities can be used in criminal 
proceedings,215 with several nuances that this section has tried to illuminate. The next 
section aims to analyse how these principles play out in the context of criminal 
proceedings following OLAF investigations.   
																																								 																				
210 Dutch report, section 4.1.  
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4.2 Admissibility of evidence collected by EU bodies, and especially OLAF, in 
criminal proceedings 
None of the seven Member States provides for special rules on admissibility of evidence 
collected by OLAF, ESMA, the ECB, and DG COMP in criminal proceedings. Since the 
rules mentioned in section 4.1 thus apply, OLAF-collected evidence is admissible in these 
proceedings as long as it complies with the requirements discussed above.216  
For instance, in Germany, any evidence contained in a document must be in 
principle read aloud,217 and in Italy and in the Netherlands OLAF reports fall within the 
remit of the CCP’s provision on documentary evidence.218 In Hungary, OLAF reports, 
like those drafted by Hungarian administrative authorities, will be admissible as 
documentary evidence but will have weaker probative value than evidence collected 
according to the criminal procedural rules. OLAF investigative acts will usually be 
repeated in accordance with Hungarian criminal law.219 Some Hungarian experts suggest 
that OLAF officials may in the future be involved in Hungarian criminal proceedings as 
‘advisers’, ie in essence they could be informed of an ongoing investigation by competent 
national authorities, who would then ask for OLAF’s advice on what evidence should be 
collected and in what way.220 The advisers’ legal position is different from that of experts 
in Hungarian criminal procedure, although both are regulated by the criminal procedure 
code. As noted above, advisers do not provide evidence.221 
The French report deals extensively with the admissibility of OLAF-collected 
evidence and shines a light on an issue that is relevant for all Member States, namely 
whether and to what extent national authorities can scrutinise OLAF acts. In particular, 
such scrutiny may be due to differences in procedural safeguards between administrative 
(OLAF) proceedings and national criminal proceedings. Since the 1980s, the Court of 
Justice has ruled that national authorities cannot declare a Union act invalid.222 In Sigma 
Orionis, the Court of Justice dealt with a case where a French court posited that some 
documents used by national authorities in French criminal proceedings, including OLAF 
reports, were invalid due to the fact that French judicial police did not assist OLAF 
investigators.223 The Court of Justice was rather clear in restating its traditional stance: 
‘[T]he EU courts alone have jurisdiction to determine that an act of the European Union 
is invalid … Therefore, irrespective of the findings made by the Indictment Division in 
																																								 																				
216 According to the interviewees contacted by the Hungarian rapporteur, as long as no violation of the 
criminal procedure code has occurred, OLAF-collected evidence would in principle be admissible in 
criminal proceedings – because of the freedom of proof principle – even if it was collected in violation of 
its own rules of procedure (Hungarian report, section 4.5).  
217 German report, section 4.2.  
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219 See section 4.3.2 below.  
220 According to Art 25.1(e) of the ‘Guidelines on Investigation Procedures for OLAF Staff’ (October 2013) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/sites/antifraud/files/gip_en.pdf> accessed 30 May 2019, the OLAF 
investigation unit expert shall provide ‘expert advice where requested by the Member States’.  
221 Hungarian report, section 4.2. 
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its judgment, OLAF’s report continues to be lawful in the EU legal order in so far as it 
has not been invalidated by the EU judicature’.224 The Court thus makes a distinction 
between the validity of the OLAF reports in the EU legal order and the use that national 
courts may make of them in national procedures: 
OLAF’s report continues to be lawful in the EU legal order in so far as it has not been 
invalidated by the EU judicature, without prejudice to any decisions that might be taken 
by the national authorities or courts concerning the use that can be made of such a report 
in proceedings under national law. It follows from … Article 11(2) of Regulation No 
883/2013, that reports drawn up by OLAF may be used in national proceedings to the 
extent that they were drawn up in accordance with the rules and procedures laid down by 
national law. If national law was infringed … the result is that it will not be possible to 
use the report drawn up by OLAF in national proceedings, but that does not affect the 
possibility for the Commission to base its decisions on that document.225 
The French Court of Cassation seems to endorse this distinction as well. In a case decided 
in December 2015, the French Court noted that the lower court (Indictment Chamber of 
the Court of Appeal of Colmar) was wrong in declaring itself incompetent to decide on 
the regularity of OLAF investigative acts that were included (‘versé’) in French criminal 
proceedings, since those acts can be annulled to ensure effective judicial review if they 
have been carried out in violation of fundamental rights.226  
The Court of Appeal had also noted that, in carrying out interviews, ‘OLAF 
investigators … complied with procedural guarantees and proceeded to notifications of 
rights, which are not contrary to the invoked provisions of the Convention [ie Articles 6, 
8 and 13 ECHR], and are in conformity with the Community texts governing that body 
and compatible with the provisions of domestic criminal procedure’.227 This conclusion 
may thus lead one to think that it is unlikely that issues of inadmissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence can be related to the insufficient guarantees ensured by OLAF, as long 
as the Office’s investigative activities comply with Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013.  
In this respect, the Italian rapporteurs first note that, if evidence collected by 
OLAF is documentary in nature, no issues concerning its admissibility arise. But when a 
different kind of evidence is at stake, the lower safeguards surrounding its gathering may 
in principle impair its admissibility in criminal proceedings. However, they highlight that 
no problem has ever come to the fore as to the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence, 
possibly because OLAF Regulation provides for very high procedural standards 
(especially with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination enshrined in Article 9(2) 
of Regulation 883/2013).228 Likewise, the German report notes that so far there is no case 
law on the inadmissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national criminal proceedings. 
It adds that evidence could be in principle excluded if it has been gathered in a way that 
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is incompatible with the standards of German criminal procedural law (eg, protection of 
professional privacy or nemo tenetur).229 Nonetheless, in a way confirming that OLAF 
standards are rather high and thus unlikely to lead to the inadmissibility of OLAF reports 
because of differences with criminal law standards, the German report specifies that 
‘national standards will only be relevant where EU law does not provide for a 
corresponding protection, [eg] by a right to remain silent and to consult with counsel 
(Article 9(2)(2) and (6) of Regulation No 883/2013)…’.230  
Going back to French case law, it is worth noting that the French Court of 
Cassation had already dealt with OLAF reports in another judgment issued in 2013.231 In 
that case, French investigators required OLAF’s assistance in, among other matters, 
identifying links between persons and companies involved in the investigations and using 
computer data seized during searches. The defendants then challenged the validity of 
OLAF reports, yet the Indictment Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Paris rejected their 
claim, clarifying that the requests for assistance sent by national prosecutors to OLAF 
should be considered an exchange of information in accordance with Article 10 of 
Regulation 1073/1999232 (now Article 12 of the OLAF Regulation) and Article 7 of the 
Second Protocol to the PIF Convention233 (now Article 15 of Directive 2017/1371). They 
do not represent, as the defendants were claiming, a delegation to OLAF of investigation 
powers that only police authorities are authorised to exercise.  
Nonetheless, in that case, the information transmitted by OLAF was eventually 
annulled because national investigators had sent the requests to OLAF without prior 
authorisation from the national public prosecutor’s office. As this is a violation of French 
criminal procedure, OLAF reports were annulled and had thus to be removed from the 
file.234 However, the police records signed by OLAF and the searches carried out were 
not annulled, although the presence of OLAF officials had not been duly authorised. As 
it was devoid of any effect, OLAF’s presence could not represent a ground for annulment 
of the search and police records.  
In the frame of the same case, the Court of Cassation rendered another judgment 
in November 2016, where it added that the procedure that led to the OLAF reports 
(subsequently annulled) infringed on the requirement for a fair trial, which is provided 
for by the preliminary Article of the French CCP and Article 6 ECHR, as it ‘creates a real 
																																								 																				
229 German report, section 4.2. By the same token, in Hungary, OLAF-collected evidence would in principle 
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disadvantage to the detriment of the applicants’.235 Furthermore, keeping the OLAF 
report in the case file would represent a violation of Article 174 of the French CCP, which 
prohibits obtaining information against the parties from annulled documents or acts.  
This case also had a transnational component.236 Elements of OLAF reports were 
used in parallel procedures against the same persons in Belgium, where there is a 
provision on the use of evidence gathered abroad that forbids such use when this would 
violate the defendant’s right to a fair trial.237 The Belgian court regarded the French 
decisions as having force of res judicata with respect to the admissibility of OLAF 
evidence and therefore excluded it from the Belgian procedure, as the admission of this 
evidence would undermine the essence of the fairness of the proceedings in Belgium.238 
In sum, in the French case law there is a ‘clear distinction between the nullity of 
the OLAF reports as such – not a matter of criminal jurisdiction – and the nullity of the 
OLAF evidence when used in criminal proceedings’.239 In other words, the OLAF report, 
when the procedure that leads to its adoption violates French law, 
is obviously not annulled as such, but insofar as it constitutes an act of the (French) 
criminal procedure, which implies its exclusion from the file. It cannot be used as a basis 
for decisions by judges or national (investigative or prosecutorial) authorities. The 
annulment also has the effect of depriving all subsequent acts of any merit.240 
As noted above, this seems to chime with the Court of Justice’s stance as recently restated 
in Sigma Orionis.  
Unlike in France, but like in Italy and Germany, the admissibility of evidence 
collected by OLAF has never been denied by Dutch criminal courts. In a case decided in 
2013, a Dutch Criminal Court of First Instance adopted the cautious approach espoused 
by the Customs Chamber of the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam in the above-mentioned 
decision of 2012,241 by stating that OLAF-collected evidence should be set aside only in 
exceptional circumstances.242 In that case, the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation 
Service (FIOD), ie the specialised judicial tax enforcement authority, used reports of an 
OLAF inspection mission as evidence, which the legal person accused challenged 
because, among others, it was not informed of their existence. However, as anticipated, 
The Dutch Court of First Instance emphasised that the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s office 
is ‘dominus litis’ and that the sanction of the inadmissibility of the prosecution under 
Dutch criminal procedure can only be used in the case of very serious infringements of 
the essence of the procedure or other fundamental rights which result in the right of the 
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accused to a fair trial being violated, either intentionally or as a result of serious 
negligence. This was not the case as far as the court was concerned.243 
Hence, as the Dutch rapporteurs argue, should the issue of inadmissibility be brought up 
because of the alleged violation of Dutch procedural rules in the Netherlands, the 
principles discussed above would apply. In other words, OLAF-collected evidence would 
be excluded only in exceptional cases where the breach makes the procedure as a whole 
unfair.244 If evidence has been collected abroad by OLAF and is to be admitted in Dutch 
criminal trials, the principles laid down in the case law of the Dutch Supreme Court on 
evidence collected abroad should come to the fore. Because of the mutual trust among 
States Parties to the ECHR and of the presumption that violations of fundamental rights 
can be challenged in the other Member State in accordance with Article 13 ECHR (right 
to an effective remedy), Dutch courts should only assess whether the use of evidence 
gathered abroad violates Article 6 ECHR. No further rights of suspects and accused 
persons, such as those enshrined in Article 8 ECHR, are taken into account.245 A breach 
of Article 6 ECHR may for instance occur if the nemo tenetur principle is violated, while 
it is likely that Dutch criminal courts will accept evidence coming from a country where 
the LPP principle is less protected than in the Netherlands.246  
 
5. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL 
PROCEEDINGS: PROBLEMS AND PRACTICES 
The last section of the questionnaire circulated among the national rapporteurs concerned 
practices, as well as problems encountered, in dealing with OLAF reports in national 
criminal proceedings. Bearing in mind that both Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 
(OLAF reports) and Article 8(3) of Regulation 2185/96 (on-the-spot checks or 
inspections reports) require OLAF to take account of the national law of the Member 
State concerned,247 it has been first queried whether the Office and national competent 
authorities discuss the requirements for OLAF-collected evidence to be admitted in 
national criminal trials before carrying out joint on-the-spot checks or inspections (section 
5.1). Second, national rapporteurs have discussed whether national authorities repeat 
OLAF investigative acts, and the reasons for such a duplication when it occurs (section 
5.2). Section 5.3 evaluates whether the proposed amendments to the OLAF Regulation 
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tabled by the Commission and the European Parliament can repair some of the current 
shortcomings. Finally, section 5.4 makes some remarks on future EPPO-OLAF 
relationships and their impact on evidentiary issues.   
 
5.1 Exchange of views between OLAF and national criminal law authorities on the 
requirements for admissible evidence 
OLAF Supervisory Committee’s Opinion No 2/17 touches upon, among other matters, 
the exchange of views between OLAF and national authorities concerning the 
admissibility of evidence and the requirements thereof: ‘Early involvement of national 
authorities in earlier stages of an investigation would ensure admissibility of evidence in 
subsequent proceedings and in trials before national courts. The national judicial 
authorities would then not be required to repeat investigative steps already taken by 
OLAF during its investigation’.248 The national rapporteurs, also on the basis of 
interviews with practitioners, have given different answers to the question of whether 
such an exchange of views takes place within their system. OLAF and national competent 
authorities are reported to usually not exchange views on the requirements concerning 
admissibility of evidence in some Member States (Italy, Luxembourg, Germany), while 
they do so in others (Hungary, the Netherlands, and France).  
As for Germany, there is reportedly no need for OLAF and domestic authorities 
to exchange views on the requirements for admissible evidence as the findings of OLAF 
reports would have to be in principle introduced in court by examining the report’s author 
as a witness.249 This is however without prejudice to the assistance that the national 
authorities give OLAF in preparing and carrying out on-the-spot inspections (eg by 
transmitting relevant documents). German officials can be present during the inspection 
but usually do not initiate an administrative investigation under German law; they wait 
for OLAF reports in order to take further action on the basis of OLAF’s findings.250 
The Italian report mentions that discussions on the conditions to be fulfilled to 
ensure OLAF reports’ admissibility in criminal proceedings usually take place within 
OLAF itself, by double-checking such conditions with Italian judicial or law enforcement 
personnel working at OLAF, or at the most by liaising with Eurojust. Hence, OLAF 
officials are usually informed in advance, if not already aware themselves, of the rules 
and procedures to be followed in gathering evidence in Italy. In the past, the Judicial and 
Legal Advice Unit, which was previously known as the ‘OLAF Magistrates Unit’, as it 
was composed of national magistrates, used to give advice on similar matters until it was 
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dismantled in 2012.251 The support of this Unit was highly valued.252 The Italian report 
also mentions that, in most of the cases, OLAF does not carry out on-the-spot checks or 
inspections together with national authorities, so that there seems to be no cases of 
previous discussion between OLAF and national authorities. The Office is indeed 
reported to conduct its own investigations and transmit the investigation reports in 
accordance with Article 11 of Regulation 883/2013.253  
Similarly, it is reported that no previous discussions on admissibility of evidence 
take place in Luxembourg, although for an almost opposite reason. Luxembourgish 
interviewees mentioned that OLAF investigators pay considerable attention to defence 
rights, in part to avoid any risk of inadmissibility of evidence. They reported however 
that the Office usually gets in touch with national authorities (judicial police and public 
prosecutors) in the early phase of its investigations and sometimes transmits the file to 
them, who then continue the investigation. This takeover of investigations by national 
authorities seems to be a way to enhance the evidence’s admissibility and credibility.254 
Reports by Luxembourgish judicial police officers are indeed presumed true unless it is 
proven that the officer falsified the report. Reports by other agents (such as OLAF agents) 
are also admissible, yet their content may be denied simply by proving that facts stated 
therein are not true.255 
The Hungarian interviewees would support a takeover of investigations by 
national authorities as well, as this would raise the probative value of gathered evidence 
and avoid the replication of OLAF activities.256 They also report that during OLAF 
meetings, which take place three to four times a year at the Office of the Prosecutor 
General of Hungary,257 Hungarian authorities usually discuss with OLAF officers the 
necessary requirements for evidence to be admissible in Hungarian criminal 
proceedings.258 Such exchanges of views, as anticipated, also occur in France259 and in 
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the Netherlands. As for the latter, the rapporteurs explain that the Dutch Customs Manual 
requires a Dutch Customs official to be present during OLAF on-the-spot checks. The 
exchange of views between national authorities and the Office usually takes place at the 
end of (rather than during) the joint inspection and the parties mainly discuss how the 
established facts should be formulated in the report. This should help in ensuring the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in Dutch punitive administrative and criminal 
proceedings. The data and materials that are collected during the investigation must then 
be included in an annex, in order to substantiate the findings of the report.260 
Furthermore, the Dutch rapporteurs stress that OLAF is not competent to conduct 
criminal investigations. Hence, if the Dutch official who is present during OLAF 
activities believes that criminal conduct is at stake, the OLAF inspection is halted and a 
specialised customs official is informed (the ‘penalty fraud coordinator/contact official’). 
He or she evaluates whether there is a reasonable suspicion of crime in accordance with 
Dutch law and, if this is the case, the OLAF investigation is normally brought to an end 
and the case is transferred to the Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service (FIOD).261 
The Italian report makes similar remarks: Italian law enforcement authorities cannot 
assist OLAF when a suspicion of crime has arisen, as in these cases the continuation of 
the investigation is bestowed upon national criminal law authorities acting in accordance 
with the rules of the Italian CCP.262 Theoretically, there may also be cases where OLAF 
investigations and national criminal investigations continue in parallel. In this case, 
national competent authorities could be aware of OLAF’s notification and thus join the 
Office in its activities (if they take place in Italy).263 There is however no reported 
exchange of information while OLAF conducts its investigations, as the information is 
collected by OLAF and not jointly by OLAF and Italian authorities, although both are 
present while the act is performed.264 
The issue of whether OLAF should inform national prosecutors of potential 
notitiae criminis is thus slightly different from that of whether OLAF and domestic 
authorities discuss the requirements for the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence 
before (or while) the Office undertakes its investigations, yet it is not less important. The 
European Court of Auditors (ECA) has recently raised some doubts on the effectiveness 
of the coordination between OLAF and national authorities precisely in this respect:  
During our interviews in four Member States, national prosecutors indicated that, in most 
cases, they have no contact with OLAF before receiving the Final Report. They also 
indicated that they would prefer to be informed of any suspected criminal offence much 
earlier than at the end of the OLAF investigation, and that if they were, they would assist 
																																								 																				
260 Dutch report, section 5.1.  
261 ibid, where the rapporteurs also mention that OLAF is informed in advance of this modus operandi.   
262 Italian report, section 5.1.  
263 According to Art 4 of Regulation 2185/86, national authorities shall be notified ‘in good time’ of the 
object, legal basis and purpose of OLAF checks and inspections, to be able to provide all the required help.  
264 Italian report, section 5.1. If OLAF joins an act performed by national authorities (and not the opposite, 
as in the example mentioned in the text), there are no issues of admissibility of evidence, as the act would 
be carried out by national authorities following the rules of the Italian CCP in the presence of OLAF (ibid).  
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OLAF and, where appropriate, start their own criminal investigation in order to avoid 
cases becoming time-barred.265 
An early contact between national authorities and OLAF – especially when suspicions of 
crimes arise – would realistically benefit OLAF investigations and their follow-up at the 
national level,266 yet this does not always take place.267 The current OLAF legal 
framework provides in fact for some rules on information exchange, yet almost none of 
them lays down an obligation for OLAF to inform national authorities.268 For instance, 
Article 3(6) of Regulation 883/2013 provides that OLAF, even before it has decided to 
open an external investigation, may liaise with the competent authorities of the Member 
States concerned and share with them ‘information which suggests that there has been 
fraud, corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the financial interests of the 
Union’.269 Then, if the OLAF Director-General decides not to open an external 
investigation, he or she ‘may without delay send any relevant information to the 
competent authorities of the Member State concerned for action to be taken where 
appropriate’.270 In addition to the possibilities for OLAF to ask for the assistance of 
national authorities during its investigations (eg for taking precautionary measures or 
adopting coercive measures), Article 12 of Regulation 883/2013 also provides that OLAF 
‘may transmit to the competent authorities of the Member States concerned information 
obtained in the course of external investigations in due time to enable them to take 
appropriate action in accordance with their national law’.271 An exception is to be found 
in Regulation 2185/96, according to which OLAF ‘shall report as soon as possible to the 
competent authority of the State within whose territory an on-the-spot check or inspection 
has been performed any fact or suspicion relating to an irregularity which has come to its 
																																								 																				
265 European Court of Auditors (ECA), ‘Fighting Fraud in EU Spending: Action Needed’ Special Report 
No 1 (2019) 40–41. 
266 See also Giulia Lasagni, ‘Cooperazione Amministrativa e Circolazione Probatoria nelle Frodi Doganali 
e Fiscali. Il Ruolo dell’Ufficio Europeo per la Lotta Antifrode (OLAF) alla Luce della Direttiva OEI e del 
Progetto EPPO’ [2015] Diritto Penale Contemporaneo 1, 5–6 
<https://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/upload/1442824408LASAGNI_2015a.pdf> accessed 30 June 2019, 
who underlines that early involvement of national authorities may allow them to conduct, and in a prompt 
way, investigative measures that OLAF could not carry out (eg interception of telecommunications).  
267 For further remarks on the cooperation between OLAF and national authorities see Covolo (n 148) 271–
273.  
268 The second HERCULE III study dealt with the exchange of information (Simonato, Luchtman and 
Vervaele (eds) (n 156)). The ADCRIM study group acknowledged that the distinction between 
‘information’ and ‘evidence’ (on which this study focuses) is sometimes blurred, especially because 
‘information’ collected during OLAF investigations can then become ‘evidence’ in national proceedings.  
269 Art 3(6) of Regulation 883/2013. Art 4(8) of Regulation 883/2013 provides for a similar rule with regard 
to internal investigations: before deciding on the opening of such an investigation, OLAF ‘may’ provide 
the institution, body, office or agency concerned with information that suggests that there has been fraud, 
corruption or any other illegal activity affecting the Union budget; in this case, OLAF ‘shall’ also inform, 
‘where necessary’,	the competent authorities of the Member State concerned (ibid).  
270 Art 5(6) of Regulation 883/2013 (emphasis added).  
271 Art 12(1) of Regulation 883/2013 (emphasis added). When information has been obtained in the course 
of internal investigations, OLAF shall inform national authorities (Art 12(2) of Regulation). See also, with 
respect to the previous OLAF Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999) that provided for almost 
identical rules in that respect, Groussot and Popov (n 145) 606–607; Inghelram, Legal and Institutional 
Aspects (n 145) 108.   
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notice in the course of the on-the-spot check or inspection’.272 As the previous Hercule 
III studies demonstrated, the fragmentation of OLAF’s legal framework does not 
reinforce – but can rather hamper – OLAF’s efficient and coherent action.  
As noted in section 3.4, the rules for the ECB and ESMA are different. The SSM 
Framework Regulation and the EMIR provide that when these EU entities become aware 
of conduct that may have a criminal nature, they shall promptly inform competent 
national authorities. OLAF does not have such an obligation, not least because its 
investigations are of an administrative nature and it may not be clear from the outset 
whether they will end up discovering or dealing with criminal offences. Nonetheless, one 
may wonder whether – along the lines of what has been described, for instance, in the 
Dutch report – the early contacts between OLAF and national authorities should also 
include an OLAF duty to report any potential notitia criminis to national competent 
authorities, in order to agree with them on how to proceed with the case.  
After all, the EPPO Regulation now requires any EU body to report without delay 
to the EPPO any criminal conduct in respect of which the EPPO could exercise its 
competence.273 Since this applies also to OLAF, the Commission suggested introducing 
a new Article in the OLAF Regulation dealing with OLAF’s reporting obligations to the 
EPPO.274 The rationale of this rule seems to be that the EPPO, which will be competent 
to investigate and prosecute PIF crimes, should be able to promptly decide whether it 
should embark upon the investigation of a given case. The same rationale could therefore 
apply with respect to the relationships between OLAF and national authorities, which, 
until the EPPO’s establishment, are competent to investigate and prosecute PIF crimes.275 
Granted, there is a remarkable difference between the two scenarios (reporting to 
the EPPO/reporting to national authorities), for the establishment of the EPPO follows 
precisely from the national prosecutors’ perceived inactivity vis-à-vis PIF crimes. One 
could object that OLAF’s reporting obligation towards domestic authorities would not be 
conducive to the same positive results that one expects from the duty to promptly inform 
the EPPO, as there could be a risk that national authorities will give little priority to 
investigate and prosecute the offences that OLAF believes have been committed. 	
Nonetheless, late contacts between OLAF and domestic authorities turned out to 
yield poor results, on the one hand; on the other, if a substantive amount of OLAF 
recommendations do not have any follow-up because of insufficient evidence, it is worth 
exploring whether the status quo can improve by creating synergies and collaboration 
between OLAF and national authorities at an earlier stage of the investigations.  
 
																																								 																				
272 Art 8(2) of Regulation 2185/96 (emphasis added). 
273 Art 24(1) of the EPPO Regulation.  
274 Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ COM(2018) 338 final, 
23 May 2018, Art 12c.  
275 The situation will not change even after the EPPO will be up and running, for those Member States that 
do not participate in the EPPO. In all the others, early contacts between OLAF and national authorities may 
instead be still necessary with respect to those criminal cases escaping the EPPO’s competence. 
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5.2 Duplication of OLAF activities  
In its recent report, the ECA mentions data in an OLAF study that analysed Member 
States’ follow-up to OLAF’s judicial recommendations issued between January 2008 and 
December 2015.276 Out of 317 recommendations, 169 were dismissed, 94 of which on 
grounds of ‘insufficient evidence’.277 The Commission replied that ‘limitations of 
[OLAF] investigative powers’ and ‘uncertainty of the applicable legislation’278 can at 
times hamper a full collection of evidence. While these are systemic and intrinsic 
weaknesses going beyond the way in which both OLAF officials handle investigations 
and national authorities ensure the follow-up to them, the Commission also mentions, 
among other potential reasons that can lead to the dismissal of cases: the margin left to 
Member States in choosing how to deal with OLAF reports; the political sensitivity of 
some cases; and the fact that OLAF can detect fraud several years after its commission.279  
The Commission also briefly mentions the issue of duplication of OLAF 
investigative acts. In this respect, and building on the above-mentioned OLAF analysis, 
the Commission highlights the shortcomings of Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, 
which ‘is not per se a sufficient legal basis to allow all Member States’ judicial authorities 
to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial. Therefore, in some Member States, after 
receiving the OLAF final report, prosecutors start investigation activities once again in 
order to acquire admissible evidence’.280 This stance of national authorities is contentious, 
as Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 can in fact be a sufficient legal basis for the use 
of OLAF reports as evidence in criminal trials. In principle, indictments and convictions 
can be based only on OLAF report findings.281  
As discussed above, however, this provision is not (as it cannot be) the legal basis 
of an obligation for Member States’ authorities and courts to use OLAF-collected 
evidence and to convict the defendants in the light of such evidence.282 They can indeed 
assess the facts of a case in a different way than OLAF does. The analysis of the follow-
up to OLAF recommendations in the Member States revealed that there might be  
differences of appreciation between OLAF and the national authorities of some Member 
States, as regards evidence. For example when OLAF investigators identified evidence 
																																								 																				
276 OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up to OLAF’s Judicial Recommendations Issued between 
1 January 2008 and 31 December 2015’, Ref Ares(2017)461597 – 27/01/2017 (2017).  
277 ibid 1. These data are also reported in ECA, ‘Fighting Fraud in EU Spending’ (n 265) 39.  
278 Commission, ‘Replies to the Special Report of the European Court of Auditors “Fighting Fraud in EU 
Spending: Action Needed”’ in ECA, ‘Fighting Fraud in EU Spending’ (n 265), para 96 (see also para 100). 
This echoes the OLAF analysis on the follow-up to its recommendations, where we read that ‘limitations 
to [OLAF] investigation powers and to what is practically feasible do not allow the collection of clear 
evidence of a criminal offence’ (OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up’ (n 276) 2).  
279 Commission, ‘Replies to the Special Report’ (previous n), paras 96, 97 and 100. See more in OLAF, 
‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up’ (n 276) 2–4. 
280 Commission, ‘Replies to the Special Report’ (n 278), para 100 (emphasis added). For such a conclusion, 
see OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up’ (n 276) 2, where OLAF adds a remark on the alleged 
attitude of some prosecutors: ‘sometimes prosecutors expect the OLAF report to be a ready-to-use product, 
which does not require any further investigation activity or, when prosecutors cannot use evidence collected 
by OLAF, just requires repeating investigation activities already carried out by OLAF investigators’ (ibid). 
281 See, eg, Italian report, section 5.2; UK report, section 5; Vervaele, transversal report, section 6.  
282 See also, for example, Inghelram, Legal and Institutional Aspects (n 145) 67. 
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of the use of false invoices, prosecutors considered this to be unpaid invoices; when 
investigators found evidence that EU funds had been misappropriated, the prosecutors 
argued that staff had been unpaid due to lack of cash. Another area where differences of 
appreciation appear between OLAF and prosecutors of some Member States is the 
evidence of mens rea.283 
These differences in appreciation may follow from OLAF activities’ flaws or national 
authorities’ mistakes, but could also be justified by different legitimate views on the same 
facts.  
When OLAF activities are replicated for evidence to be admitted and used at trial, 
however, this can arguably be a failure for the European Union, national authorities, and 
individuals. As Ligeti notes, such a duplication runs against the principle of procedural 
economy and, at the same time, obliges the persons who are subject to OLAF 
investigations to bear further investigations – on the same facts – by national authorities. 
In addition, the repetition of investigative acts could not be effective or even possible in 
some circumstances, eg because the suspected person destroyed the relevant evidence. 
This may in turn deter national authorities from providing any judicial follow-up to OLAF 
investigations.284 Further problems are linked with the occasional long duration of OLAF 
investigations; at the end of these investigations, the crimes that are uncovered by the 
Office and that national authorities could (or should) prosecute are sometimes (either 
already or on the brink of being) statute-barred,285 so that a duplication of investigative 
measures would only worsen this state of affairs. 
Among the seven Member States under analysis, it seems that only in Hungary, 
according to the Hungarian experts interviewed in the framework of ADCRIM, are OLAF 
activities repeated for the purposes of criminal proceedings. The Hungarian report is clear 
in this respect: ‘[T]he interviewees stressed that in practice investigative activities of both 
OLAF and that of national authorities are repeated in accordance with the CCP’.286 This 
repetition is justified on two grounds. First, acts carried out by national criminal law 
authorities have higher probative value than evidence collected by other (non-criminal) 
authorities, and this applies both to EU and national administrative authorities.  
Second, according to Hungarian interviewees, OLAF reports are often tainted by 
mistakes or report facts that are based on rumours.287 As an example, they mention the 
case concerning the construction of the Budapest M4 Metro Line. The Hungarian 
government published the OLAF report on its website.288 The figures therein were quite 
alarming, as the impact on the EU Cohesion Fund was estimated to be more than €225 
																																								 																				
283 OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up’ (n 276) 3 (emphasis added). See also ibid 5. 
284 Ligeti (n 23) 28.  
285 OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up’ (n 276) 6; OLAF Supervisory Committee, ‘Opinion 
2/2017’ (n 130), paras 29–31. The OLAF Supervisory Committee extensively analysed the issue of the 
OLAF investigations’ duration in ‘Opinion No 4/2014. Control of the duration of investigations conducted 
by the European Anti-fraud Office’ (2015).  
286 Hungarian report, section 5. 
287 ibid.  
288 OLAF, ‘Final Report – OF/2012/0118/B40’ <www.kormany.hu/download/8/54/f0000/final_report.pdf> 
accessed 30 June 2019.  
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million.289 According to the Hungarian interviewees, OLAF made various mistakes in 
investigating the case. While experts and practitioners sometimes touch upon the issue of 
the OLAF reports’ quality,290 the other rapporteurs of this project did not mention it.291 
In addition, some Hungarian criminal law rules make the admissibility of OLAF-collected 
evidence more difficult. When it comes to the authenticity of documents, for instance, 
handwriting experts can only work with original documents, while OLAF usually 
provides copies of the documents received from the persons under investigation.292  
While Hungary is the only country where there seems to be an established practice 
of repeating OLAF activities, Italy and the United Kingdom have witnessed such 
duplication as well.293 The Italian report mentions two practical reasons for this, while 
highlighting that this repetition is not at all required by law.294 First, national criminal law 
authorities could be, regrettably, unaware of the probative value of OLAF reports.295  
Second, criminal courts and public prosecutors can be interested in delving further 
into elements and circumstances that OLAF could have neglected, and vice versa, since 
OLAF investigations are different in nature and scope from criminal investigations. 
Likewise, in the assessment of the OLAF Regulation carried out by the independent 
consultancy ICF, we read that one of the interviewees explained that issues related to the 
inadmissibility of evidence are connected with ‘the relevance of the evidence given the 
different aims of the investigations – OLAF’s aim is to recover funds, while the national 
competent authority’s aim is to establish the criminal [liability] of an individual’.296 
Hence, when OLAF has interviewed a person who then becomes subject to criminal 
investigations, Italian criminal law authorities examine him or her again.297 When it 
comes to witnesses, public prosecutors decide on a case-by-case basis whether there is a 
																																								 																				
289 ibid.  
290 See, for instance, ECA, ‘Special Report No 1/2005’ (n 252), para 29.  
291 The ICF’s evaluation reported an interview with a national judicial authority that ‘noted that the quality 
and reliability of OLAF’s recommendations and reports are not really an issue in the stakeholder’s national 
proceedings’ (ICF (n 136) 126; emphasis added). The European Parliament suggested amending the OLAF 
Regulation in order to include Art 11(2)(1a), which would require OLAF to ‘take proper internal measures 
to ensure the consistent quality of final reports and recommendations’ (European Parliament, ‘Legislative 
resolution of 16 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European 
Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the 
effectiveness of OLAF investigations (COM(2018)0338 – C8-0214/2018 – 2018/0170(COD))’, 
amendment 84). 
292 Hungarian report, section 5. Covolo notes that, if national law requires the originals for the purpose of 
national procedures while OLAF can only provide copies of documents, this may further impair the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence and require national authorities to repeat OLAF activities 
(Covolo (n 148) 311).  
293 As Vervaele points out by referring to Cases T-492/93 and T-492/93 R Nutral SpA v Commission, 
EU:T:1993:85, it seems that repetition of OLAF (at the time UCLAF) used to occur in Italy already in the 
early 1990s.  
294 Italian report, section 5.2.  
295 In a somehow similar vein, OLAF noted, ‘There are also cases where dismissals appear to be motivated 
by limited knowledge of the rules governing EU funding’ (OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-
Up’ (n 276) 3; see also Commission, ‘Replies to the Special Report’ (n 278), para 100). 
296 ICF (n 136) 126 (emphasis added). 
297 Italian report, section 5.2.  
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need to replicate the interview. For all the other types of evidence, usually OLAF 
investigators who have drafted the report are summoned as witnesses at trial.298  
The UK system takes a similar stance vis-à-vis OLAF reports, as duplication is 
not necessary and, if OLAF-collected evidence is unchallenged, no further evidence 
would be needed to convict the concerned person. The UK rapporteur notes, ‘Typically, 
the more “scientific” the statement (eg forensic document analysis showing the age or 
provenance of a piece of paper), the more likely that it would pass unchallenged, or 
challenged only on “scientific” ground. The more evaluative, the less likely that it would 
pass unchallenged’.299 He also stresses that the problem of the admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence does not really come up with respect to OLAF reports as such but 
rather with regard to the specific items of evidence that are attached to them (witness 
statements, forensic accountancy, etc).300 These items are in principle admissible, but 
there may be exceptions. For instance, if reports contain hearsay evidence, it would be 
necessary to secure the admissibility of that evidence by requiring OLAF officials to 
testify in court. Interviews with suspects would generally be repeated by the domestic 
police before criminal proceedings are brought, since the conditions under which these 
interviews are conducted is regulated by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.301  
The French, Dutch, German, and Luxembourgish reports do not mention cases of 
repetition of investigative acts. The German rapporteurs note that the OLAF investigative 
act (inspection, on-the-spot check, etc) is not repeated as such, rather its findings are 
presented in a different manner. The OLAF report’s author is usually called as a witness 
before the court, as also mentioned by UK and Italian rapporteurs. A specific hypothesis 
of duplication may concern cases where evidence has been obtained by an investigative 
measure that breaches the law and/or the defendant’s fundamental rights. In such cases, 
trial courts will exclude evidence if the information could have been obtained lawfully 
and they can thus repeat the investigative act to obtain that evidence lawfully. This would 
for instance be the case of a suspect who was not properly informed of the right to remain 
silent and to consult with defence counsel. The court could notify the accused of such 
rights and of the inadmissibility of the previous statements as evidence, and then examine 
him or her again to obtain a statement that can be used at trial.302  
As for Luxembourg, the issue of duplication was even brought to the attention of 
national courts. In a case decided in 2015 by the Court of Appeal, the defendant 
complained that the investigative judge limited himself to including the OLAF report in 
the case file without carrying out his own investigations. The Luxembourgish CCP 
requires the investigative judge to conduct investigations by gathering inculpatory (‘à 
																																								 																				
298 ibid. 
299 UK report, section 5. 
300 The fact that the annexes to OLAF reports are rather important with a view to the criminal proceedings, 
since it is indeed in the annexes that OLAF mostly includes (or should include) copies of the documents it 
consulted, recordings of the interviews, etc, has been confirmed by an OLAF investigator interviewed 
within the frame of this project.  
301 UK report, section 5. 
302 German report, section 5.2. However, no cases of duplication due to violations of law or fundamental 
rights have been so far reported to the German AFCOS (Anti-fraud coordination service) (ibid).  
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charge’) and exculpatory (‘à décharge’) evidence, while OLAF allegedly only carried 
out investigations à charge. The pre-trial chamber of the Court of Appeal rejected the 
defendant’s argument by acknowledging that investigative judges can base their decisions 
on OLAF-collected evidence without any need to repeat activities already performed by 
OLAF. In addition, it noticed that OLAF had carried out its investigations à charge and 
à décharge, so that no violation of the right to a fair trial occurred.303  
Luxembourgish interviewees added that, bearing in mind that Luxembourg is a 
monist system, the need not to repeat OLAF investigations also follows from the principle 
of effet utile of EU law. OLAF-collected evidence’s admissibility in criminal proceedings 
does not imply, however, that such evidence is always sufficient to indict or convict the 
suspect.304 National authorities may need further elements to prove the suspect’s criminal 
liability. The Dutch rapporteurs make a similar point: while stating that Dutch law does 
not require the repetition of OLAF activities, they highlight that additional investigative 
activities may be sometimes necessary to reach a decision on the case.305  
A specific example of duplication of investigative activities is when national law 
enforcement authorities involved in OLAF investigations draw a parallel national report. 
The UK, Luxembourgish, Hungarian, and French reports do not mention any example in 
this respect. In Italy, if national authorities participate in OLAF investigative activities, 
they are obliged by law to compile a report. However, this report in principle does not 
contain evidence, as it simply describes the national authorities’ involvement in OLAF 
investigations. At the most, they can require the Office to transmit to them relevant 
information.306 Therefore, this does not qualify as a ‘parallel national report’ in the sense 
that Italian authorities replicate OLAF activities.  
The same goes for Germany and the Netherlands. In the former, a parallel national 
report on inspections under administrative law could serve as a backup but has no 
additional probative value.307 In the Netherlands, national inspectors also draft a report of 
the investigations conducted when they are involved in OLAF cases. Like in Italy, this 
report cannot however be considered a replication of the OLAF report, as it is not an 
autonomous basis for imposing fines.308 This national report includes an overview of the 
investigation and, in the annex, a shadow dossier of the data that OLAF copied. If Dutch 
authorities do not agree with OLAF’s findings, however, they also include their own 
findings in their report. In case of disagreement between Dutch authorities and OLAF, 
the former would not sign the report of the latter, although this has so far never happened 
																																								 																				
303 Pretrial Chamber of the District Court of Appeal, 6 January 2015, decision No 09/15, as reported in the 
Luxembourg report, section 5.2. According to Art 9(1) of Regulation 883/2013, OLAF ‘shall seek evidence 
for and against the person concerned’. 
304 Luxembourg report, section 5.2.  
305 Dutch report, section 5.2. 
306 Italian report, section 5.1. 
307 German report, section 5.1. Since 2012, however, the German AFCOS has not been notified of any case 
where the competent authority drafted a parallel national report (ibid).  
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report, section 5.1).  
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in the Netherlands.309 At a later time, OLAF would then draft a ‘synthesis report’,310 
taking into account the findings mentioned by Dutch officers. In this case, the synthesis 
report is the OLAF report for the purpose of Article 11 of Regulation 883/2013.311 
 
5.3 New rules on OLAF-collected evidence: A solution to the issue of duplication? 
The duplication of OLAF activities is therefore far from being a theoretical problem. A 
distinction can however be drawn between a ‘pathological’ and a ‘physiological’ 
duplication, so to speak. When OLAF activities are repeated because national authorities 
have inadequate knowledge of EU rules, this is certainly a ‘pathological’ duplication, 
which can arguably be repaired only by increasing national authorities’ awareness of EU 
instruments and bodies (eg by means of more training at the national level). 
Likewise, duplication can be considered ‘pathological’ when national authorities 
repeat in practice (almost) all OLAF activities by default. In such a case, one struggles to 
grasp the added value of OLAF, as its investigative activities would at the most qualify 
as elements justifying the opening of national investigations. Among the countries under 
analysis in this study, it seems that only in Hungary is it standard practice that national 
authorities repeat OLAF activities in accordance with the criminal procedure code. This 
is intended to raise the reports’ probative value, as is the case with the reports by 
Hungarian administrative authorities.312 This seems thus an example of the problems that 
can flow from the assimilation principle.  
The suppression of the assimilation clause of Article 11(2) of Regulation 
883/2013 could then increase OLAF activities’ effectiveness. As discussed in both 
transversal reports,313 the Commission tabled a Proposal for the amendment of the OLAF 
Regulation in May 2018, suggesting deletion of the assimilation clause for the 
admissibility of OLAF reports in national administrative proceedings, including punitive 
																																								 																				
309 ibid. Art 8(3) of Regulation 2185/96 and Art 14(6) of the ‘Guidelines on Investigation Procedures’ (n 
220) request the counter-signature by national officials, yet the Dutch rapporteurs note – correctly, in the 
author’s view – that such a signature would not be a precondition for the admissibility of OLAF reports in 
national criminal proceedings. For an opposite stance, see however COM(2010) 382 final (n 215) 23. 
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311 ibid.  
312 There are no elements to link this practice reported in Hungary with the current deficiencies concerning 
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of the Union’s financial interests, however, has recently been brought to the fore by the 2018 Commission 
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principle of loyal cooperation’ (Arts 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(f) of the Proposal). 
313 Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 6.5; Vervaele, transversal report, 
section 7. 
272 F. GiuFFrida 11. Comparative analysis 273
52 
	
ones. The new text suggested by the Commission would read as follows: ‘Upon simple 
verification of their authenticity, [OLAF] reports … shall constitute admissible evidence 
in judicial proceedings of a non-criminal nature before national courts and in 
administrative proceedings in the Member States’.314 According to the Commission’s 
text, the assimilation rule would continue to apply to national criminal proceedings.  
The European Parliament has instead proposed to subject both administrative and 
criminal proceedings to the same new regime and suggested the following amendment:  
Upon simple verification of their authenticity, reports drawn up on that basis including 
all evidence supporting and annexed to these reports shall constitute admissible evidence 
in judicial proceedings before national courts and in administrative proceedings in the 
Member States. The power of the national courts to freely assess the evidence shall not 
be affected by this Regulation.315 
At the time of writing, negotiations are ongoing. One may however wonder whether the 
suppression of the assimilation rule can truly change the status quo. National law will 
continue to regulate national criminal proceedings and, if national courts find that OLAF 
violated national procedural safeguards when gathering evidence, the amendment of the 
admissibility rule would not impair the national courts’ decision not to admit or use OLAF 
reports. Likewise, if national judges need further or more reliable evidence to convict the 
defendant, the amendment of Article 11(2) of the OLAF Regulation will not bring about 
ground-breaking improvements. In fact, some ‘physiological’ duplication seems 
inescapable as long as OLAF remains an administrative authority carrying out activities 
with effects that extend to criminal proceedings. As most national reports mention, while 
in principle OLAF-collected evidence would be sufficient to justify the adoption of a 
conviction decision, this does not seem likely to happen if further evidence is not collected 
(or collected again) by national authorities. This ‘physiological’ duplication is due, inter 
alia, to the different aims and standards between OLAF investigations and national 
criminal investigations. The example of national courts re-examining witnesses or 
suspects is a case in point. After all, the Commission itself is adamant in stating that 
‘Member States’ judiciaries are and should be independent from OLAF. The national 
authorities may therefore reach different conclusions than the ones drawn by OLAF’.316  
While the suppression of the assimilation clause is likely not to change this 
‘physiological’ duplication, it could however help in reducing ‘pathological’ duplication 
by clarifying that, in principle, OLAF-collected evidence can be used by national courts 
for their decisions. In national systems where the inadmissibility of OLAF reports, or the 
repetition of OLAF activities, is justified by the restrictive rules applying to the 
admissibility of evidence gathered by administrative authorities (and therefore to OLAF 
in accordance with the assimilation principle), a rule like that envisaged by the European 
Parliament may represent a step forward.  
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315 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 291), amendment 85.  
316 Commission, ‘Replies to the Special Report’ (n 278), para 97.  
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Against this backdrop, the further question to address is whether it is appropriate 
and legally feasible to remove the assimilation rule also with respect to national criminal 
proceedings. The transversal reports seem to reply in the affirmative.317 However, 
accepting that OLAF reports can be admissible in national criminal proceedings upon 
simple verification of their authenticity calls for clarifications with respect to: a) the legal 
basis of the amended OLAF Regulation; and b) the position of individuals vis-à-vis this 
‘enhanced’ admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in criminal proceedings.  
 
Legal basis 
The ADCRIM project examined whether Article 325 TFEU would be a sufficient and 
adequate legal basis for a provision like that suggested by the European Parliament, which 
would encroach upon national criminal justice systems. Despite some opposition, this 
does seem to be preferred. Article 325 TFEU bears an important difference when 
compared to its ‘predecessor’, namely Article 280 of the Treaty of the European 
Community (TEC). Article 280(4) TEC empowered the Council to adopt measures aimed 
at ensuring a homogenous and effective protection of the common budget, yet at the same 
time clarified that ‘these measures shall not concern the application of national criminal 
law or the national administration of justice’.318 The new wording of Article 325(4) 
TFEU, which requires the European Parliament and the Council to take the necessary 
measures to prevent and curb fraud against the Union’s financial interests, has removed 
this limitation from EU primary law.  
The difference between the two texts sparked debate in the literature, especially 
in the field of substantive criminal law. Some authors even argue that the EU is now 
empowered to adopt, in the PIF sector, regulations laying down the definition of criminal 
offences and sanctions thereof.319 In their view, the new wording of Article 325 TFEU 
and the specificity of EU financial interests would allow the Union to adopt directly 
applicable criminal law instruments. The Commission itself, however, when deciding to 
amend the 1995 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial 
interests,320 tabled a proposal for a directive – rather than a regulation – on fighting fraud 
against the Union’s financial interests by means of criminal law (the so-called ‘PIF 
Directive’), pursuant to Article 325(4) TFEU.321 The fate of the PIF Directive’s legal 
basis is known, as the Council and European Parliament shifted it to Article 83(2) TFEU 
and the Commission decided not to bring the matter before the CJEU, despite its initially 
hinting it might do so.322  
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Be that as it may, Article 325 TFEU would justify the adoption of a recast OLAF 
Regulation providing for the admissibility of OLAF reports also in national criminal 
proceedings, as suggested by the European Parliament. First, while the PIF Directive’s 
legal basis called into question the sensitive relationship between Article 325 TFEU and 
Article 83 TFEU, with the Council and the European Parliament in essence claiming that 
the latter is lex specialis to the former when it comes to the harmonisation of substantive 
criminal law, the same issue would not arise vis-à-vis OLAF. Regulation 883/2013 is 
already based upon Article 325 TFEU and its amended version could not rely on any 
other legal basis. There is no further lex specialis to take into account to enhance the 
OLAF legal framework in general and, in particular, to ensure the admissibility of OLAF 
reports in national criminal proceedings. Article 325 TFEU would suffice.323 Article 
82(2)(a) TFEU, which also concerns evidence in criminal matters, refers to the mutual, 
‘horizontal’, so to speak, admissibility of evidence among Member States, while OLAF-
collected evidence is evidence collected by an EU body that, in a ‘vertical’ way, should 
be admissible in national proceedings. 
Second, a rule like that envisaged by the European Parliament would not fall 
beyond the scope of Article 325 TFEU. Since the previous limitation of Article 280(4) 
TEC has been removed, providing for the admissibility of OLAF reports in national 
criminal proceedings could qualify as a ‘necessary [measure] in the fields of the … fight 
against fraud affecting the financial interests of the Union with a view to affording 
effective and equivalent protection in the Member States’.324 The necessity of this rule to 
strengthen the effective protection of the EU budget arguably flows from the assessment 
of the OLAF Regulation. The Commission acknowledges that ‘the most important factor 
affecting the follow-up to OLAF recommendations identified by the evaluation relates to 
the rules on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national judicial proceedings 
… [I]n some Member States this rule does not sufficiently ensure the effectiveness of 
OLAF’s activities’.325 Furthermore, the rule suggested by the European Parliament would 
ensure an equivalent treatment of OLAF reports throughout the EU, overcoming the 
differences currently flowing from the principle of assimilation. Besides, recent case law 
of the CJEU seems to confirm that criminal procedure – and especially evidentiary-related 
matters – do not escape the field of application of Article 325 TFEU, rather the contrary. 
In Kolev and Dzivev, when examining Article 325 TFEU and its implications, the Court 
acknowledges that the ‘Member States must … ensure that the rules of criminal procedure 
permit effective investigation and prosecution of [PIF] offences’.326 
Third, it is true that these two recent judgments highlight that it is mostly for 
national legislators, rather than the EU, to deal with criminal procedural rules to ensure 
																																								 																				
2017) 249–252. See also Rosaria Sicurella, ‘A Blunt Weapon for the EPPO? Taking the Edge Off the 
Proposed PIF Directive’ in Willem Geelhoed, Leendert H Erkelens and Arjen WH Meij (eds), Shifting 
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323 See more in Vervaele, transversal report, section 3.  
324 Art 325(4) TFEU. 
325 COM(2018) 338 final (n 274) 5 (emphasis added).  
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effective protection of the EU budget,327 yet one should not forget that Article 325 TFEU 
obliges both Member States and the Union	to	counter fraud and any other illegal activities 
affecting the Union’s financial interests.328 In the light of such shared obligation, a rule 
like that suggested by the European Parliament could well be covered by Article 325 
TFEU especially as it would not unhinge the whole national criminal justice system. On 
the contrary, it would concern the limited PIF domain, which is a distinctive field within 
EU law as it relates to the protection of inherently European legal interests pertaining to 
the EU as such (rather than to its Member States).329 It is in this domain that, with the 
establishment of the EPPO, the EU has for the first time been allowed to partake in the 
exercise of traditional national sovereign prerogatives such as those of investigating and 
prosecuting (PIF) crimes. In such a specific and special field, and bearing in mind that 
OLAF is an EU body that is entrusted with the mission of enhancing the protection of the 
Union budget, it should be possible to require Member States to consider admissible the 
findings of its investigations, all the more so since the new Regulation would not (and 
could not) oblige Member States’ courts to base their decision on such evidence. As the 
European Parliament’s text suggests, ‘The power of the national courts to freely assess 
the evidence shall not be affected by this Regulation’.330 This expression is almost a copy-
paste of Article 37(2) of the EPPO Regulation.331  
The rule that the European Parliament puts forward, in fact, does not foresee a 
very different regime compared to that envisaged by the EPPO Regulation. Article 37(1) 
of the latter states, ‘Evidence presented by the prosecutors of the EPPO or the defendant 
to a court shall not be denied admission on the mere ground that the evidence was gathered 
in another Member State or in accordance with the law of another Member State’. The 
aim of Article 37 of the EPPO Regulation is to ensure the ‘horizontal’ admissibility of 
EPPO-collected evidence: if the European Delegated Prosecutor (EDP) carries out the 
investigations in Member State A but the trial takes place eventually in Member State B, 
the courts of Member State B should not deny admission of evidence collected by EDPs 
in Member State A only because this evidence has been gathered abroad. The OLAF 
Regulation, however, aims to bridge the gap in the ‘vertical’ relationship between an EU 
investigative body and national tribunals, in principle within the same Member State. 
While the EPPO Regulation lays down a rule of, so to speak, ‘non-inadmissibility’ 
(evidence collected abroad cannot be denied admission only because of its foreign origin), 
the recast OLAF Regulation would provide for a bolder admissibility rule (OLAF reports 
shall be admissible). In both cases, however, the EU texts leave untouched the powers of 
national courts to assess EPPO- or OLAF-collected evidence. As a consequence, they 
remain free to consider this evidence unreliable or insufficient to lead to a conviction, and 
could thus need to adopt further measures or require further investigations. In addition, 
especially in systems building on the principle of discretionary prosecution, the 
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admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence may not be convincing enough for national 
authorities to justify further investigations and prosecutions.  
The new suggested wording of Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 – in the 
European Parliament’s version – would have the merit of clarifying that OLAF-collected 
evidence will have to be admitted in criminal proceedings, even if national rules on 
admissibility of evidence gathered by national administrative authorities are scarce or 
altogether non-existent.332 The suggested provision appropriately specifies that it is not 
only the reports as such, but also all evidence supporting, and attached to, them that 
should be admissible. The UK report has for instance mentioned that national authorities 
usually assess the admissibility of the various elements supporting OLAF reports rather 
than that of the reports as such.333  
In other words, the new rule would at least ensure that OLAF-collected evidence 
will be ‘available’ to national criminal courts (ie admissible in criminal proceedings). As 
discussed above, the Preamble of Directive 2019/1 on the powers of national competition 
authorities clarifies that, when a given type of proof is ‘admissible’, this means that 
national authorities ‘should be able to consider’334 it in view of their decisions. The same 
goes for OLAF-collected evidence in accordance with the new rule on admissibility as 
couched by the European Parliament: national courts will be in a position to consider this 
evidence when taking a decision, but would not be automatically bound by it.  
 
Position of individuals vis-à-vis the new suggested rules on OLAF-collected evidence 
Once it is established that the new suggested rule on the admissibility of OLAF reports 
in criminal proceedings would fall within the remit of Article 325 TFEU,335 it is to be 
questioned whether higher procedural safeguards should underlie the enhanced 
admissibility of these reports. One of the objections to the European Parliament’s 
proposal for an amended OLAF Regulation is indeed that, by ensuring the de iure 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in criminal proceedings, there is a serious risk 
that even evidence collected unlawfully or in violation of fundamental rights should be 
permitted entry into the case file. Therefore, procedural safeguards should be 
strengthened as well.336 The safeguards listed in Regulation 883/2013 are overall rather 
robust when compared with the usual ones surrounding administrative investigations in 
																																								 																				
332 The European Parliament would also require the national courts to notify to OLAF ‘any rejection of 
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the Member States, yet there are still some shortcomings from a criminal law 
perspective.337  
In the light of settled CJEU case law, individuals can only challenge the validity 
(or, more specifically, the usability) of OLAF reports before national courts.338 The 
European Parliament suggested bridging this gap by introducing an ad hoc provision in 
the OLAF Regulation. Article 11a of the amended OLAF Regulation would provide the 
following:  
Any person concerned may bring an action against the Commission for annulment of the 
investigation report transmitted to the national authorities or to the institutions under 
Article 11(3) on the grounds of lack of competence, infringement of an essential 
procedural requirement, infringement of the Treaties, including violation of the Charter, 
or misuse of powers.339 
This rule would strengthen the position of individuals vis-à-vis OLAF-collected evidence. 
The control by the CJEU would ensure the validity of OLAF reports and that fundamental 
rights as enshrined in the Charter have not been violated during OLAF investigations. 
Assuming this rule is approved and that, in a given case, the CJEU will confirm that 
OLAF reports are valid, it is however unclear whether national courts would still be able 
to assess OLAF-collected evidence. On the one hand, the CJEU’s jurisdiction over OLAF 
activities could be considered exclusive. On the other, national courts could still examine 
OLAF reports in the light of the relevant rules of national law and especially potentially 
higher national standards.340 This may not sit well with the Melloni principles, notably if 
the CJEU will have found that OLAF has not violated any right of the Charter. 
If OLAF reports, albeit ‘validated’ by the CJEU, will lack reliability or credibility 
in the eyes of a national judge, he or she would still be free to search for further evidence, 
as one can glean from the last sentence of the provision suggested by the European 
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Parliament: ‘[T]he power of the national courts to freely assess the evidence shall not be 
affected’.341 Again, as the de iure admissibility of OLAF reports would not entail their 
automatic use in national proceedings, the positive outcome of a possible judicial review 
by the CJEU would not imply that national courts are deprived of their power to assess 
OLAF-collected evidence. The difference with the current scenario would however be 
that individuals affected by OLAF activities could challenge the reports before the CJEU 
and trigger an early control on the OLAF’s respect of EU law, including fundamental 
rights as enshrined in the Charter. Should the Court find that OLAF reports are invalid, 
they will be declared null and void in the EU legal order and could neither be used in any 
Member State nor justify any further measure based on them.  
Further enhancement of procedural safeguards may also follow from the creation 
of the so-called ‘Controller of procedural guarantees’, which the European Parliament has 
suggested establishing. The Controller should be competent to decide on complaints 
concerning alleged OLAF violations of procedural safeguards.342 The idea of setting up 
this body dates back to 2013, when the OLAF Supervisory Committee called for the 
setting up of a ‘transparent and stable internal procedure for dealing with individual 
complaints’.343 In 2014, the Commission suggested establishing a ‘Controller of 
procedural guarantees’,344 but the Member States opposed this idea.345 The Controller 
could strengthen the protection of the rights of individuals involved in OLAF 
investigations, yet it is debatable whether it would deliver positive results in practice. It 
ought indeed to be noted that, in the literature, the added value of such a body is disputed, 
as it would represent ‘an additional layer of non-binding control’.346 The OLAF 
Supervisory Committee itself seems to be critical of the Controller in a more recent 
opinion, which calls for ‘finding ways to exercise the right to effective judicial control by 
placing [the task of monitoring OLAF’s compliance with procedural guarantees and 
duration of investigations] under the jurisdiction of a truly judicial body, either at national 
or EU level’.347 Should the negotiators agree on the Court’s jurisdiction over OLAF 
reports, the establishment of the Controller could be sidelined, as the judicial review by 
the CJEU would suffice to ensure an adequate control of OLAF’s respect for procedural 
safeguards. This would be all the more true if another of the European Parliament’s 
proposals is agreed upon, namely that of reinforcing the internal legality check that OLAF 
carries out on its reports before transmitting them to national authorities. With a view to 
strengthening the protection of individual rights – and somehow ‘recreating’ the previous 
Magistrates Unit – the European Parliament requires such a legality check to be entrusted 
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to ‘experts in law and investigative procedures who are qualified to hold judicial office 
in a Member State’.348  
Finally, the European Parliament suggests introducing a further key procedural 
safeguard that is currently missing in the OLAF framework, namely the right of access to 
the file.349 Article 9(5a), in the European Parliament’s version, would read as follows: 
For cases where the Office recommends a judicial follow-up, and without prejudice to the 
confidentiality rights of whistle-blowers and informants, the person concerned shall have 
access to the report drawn up by the Office under Article 11 following its investigation, 
and to any relevant documents, to the extent that they relate to that person and if, where 
applicable, neither the EPPO nor the national judicial authorities object within a period 
of six months. An authorisation by the competent judicial authority may also be granted 
before this period has expired.350 
If agreed, this provision could strengthen the procedural safeguards of individuals subject 
to OLAF investigations, and consequently reduce the issues (potentially) concerning the 
admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence.  
Therefore, the European Parliament’s proposal tries to enhance both aspects of 
OLAF activities. As for the law enforcement aspect, it suggests putting admissibility in 
administrative proceedings on a par with that in criminal proceedings.351 This would not 
be prohibited under Article 325 TFEU but should go hand in hand with the enhancement 
of procedural safeguards. Hence, the European Parliament calls for the strengthening of 
the individuals’ position vis-à-vis OLAF activities, and the heed it pays to the defence 
aspect is also reflected in its amendments concerning the EPPO-OLAF future 
relationships, as discussed in the section below.352  
 
5.4 A few remarks on the future OLAF-EPPO relationships and their impact on 
evidence gathering  
The principle guiding the future EPPO-OLAF relationship is that OLAF shall not conduct 
investigations when the EPPO is already dealing with the same facts.353 According to 
Article 101(3)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, however, the EPPO may ‘request OLAF,	in 
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accordance with OLAF’s mandate, to support or complement the EPPO’s activity’354 by, 
among other actions, ‘conducting administrative investigations’.355 Bearing in mind that 
they may be requested ‘in the course of an investigation by the EPPO’,356 it is not entirely 
clear what would be the nature of these OLAF investigations, especially those ‘in support’ 
of EPPO investigations. As Weyembergh and Brière note, the Regulation ‘entertains 
some sort of “constructive ambiguity” around the notion of OLAF’s supporting and 
complementing the work of the EPPO’.357 The way the above-mentioned provision is 
couched seems to imply that OLAF may become – at least on an ad hoc basis and for the 
Member States participating in the EPPO – a sort of police judiciaire of the EPPO,358 
although the negotiators had clearly ruled out such transformation of OLAF.359 
The risk looming large in this scenario is that the EPPO may delegate tasks to 
OLAF with the ‘aim of circumventing’360 the EPPO Regulation rules on procedural 
safeguards. As noted above, safeguards provided for by the OLAF Regulation are high 
but not entirely aligned with the more protective ones to be found in national criminal 
legislation (or even in national constitutions). The EPPO may therefore be tempted to 
‘outsource’ some of its investigative activities to OLAF, which will conduct 
administrative investigations – with lower safeguards – to gather evidence that the EPPO 
itself can use at a later stage. As Kuhl notes,  
A great challenge for EPPO efficiency … results from the criminal investigation and 
enforcement function of OLAF (at the request and at the service of the EPPO) … This 
function … should … be subject to specific instructions and legal control by the EPPO, 
and in accordance with a specific set of rules that require compliance with criminal 
judicial standards and guarantees.361 
It is thus to be welcomed that the European Parliament has taken stock of the issue by 
requiring that, where OLAF performs supporting or complementary measures at the 
EPPO’s request, ‘the EPPO may instruct the Office to apply higher standards of 
fundamental rights, procedural guarantees and data protection than provided for in [the 
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relation between the EPPO and OLAF is envisaged as a relation between two autonomous bodies. In this 
context, OLAF is still supporting the EPPO’s work, but in a more “subsidiary manner”, and OLAF keeps 
its own margin of manoeuvre’ (Weyembergh and Brière (n 352) 21).  
360 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 291), amendment 110.  
361 Lothar Kuhl, ‘The European Public Prosecutor’s Office – More Effective, Equivalent, and Independent 
Criminal Prosecution against Fraud?’ (2017) eucrim 135, 141 (emphasis added). For similar views, see Petr 
Klement, ‘OLAF at the Gates of Criminal Law’ (2017) eucrim 196, 198–199; Jan Inghelram, ‘EPPO, OLAF 
and CJEU – A Brief Look at Their Interplay’ [2019] 2 ECA Journal (Fraud and Corruption. Ethics and 
Integrity) 70, who notes that the ‘purely operational link’ enshrined in Art 101 of the EPPO Regulation 
‘hides a more fundamental discussion on adequate control of OLAF’ (ibid 71).  
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OLAF] Regulation’.362 In the absence of such instructions, the provisions of the EPPO 
Regulation on procedural safeguards and data protection ‘shall apply mutatis mutandis to 
measures’363 performed by OLAF. As we can read in the European Parliament’s 2019 
resolution, this provision aims to ‘protect the admissibility of evidence as well as 
fundamental rights and procedural guarantees’.364  
This provision confirms the praiseworthy attention that the European Parliament 
pays to the procedural safeguards of individuals involved in OLAF investigations. At the 
same time, it seems to build upon the view of OLAF as the EPPO’s police judiciaire: 
when the EPPO requests OLAF to conduct investigations, such investigations should be 
in the criminal law domain. While this may be appropriate if OLAF investigations aim to 
‘support’ the EPPO’s investigations, it may be more contentious when OLAF conducts 
administrative investigations to ‘complement’ the EPPO’s activity. One could perhaps 
think of situations where the EPPO is aware of some aspects of the case escaping its own 
remit (eg disciplinary consequences) and that OLAF could better carry out during EPPO 
investigations to promptly tackle the non-criminal aspect of the conduct under 
investigation.  
A further connected question concerns the status of the evidence gathered by 
OLAF while conducting administrative investigations upon the EPPO’s request. It ought 
indeed to be remembered that OLAF- and EPPO-collected evidence have different status. 
When cases have a purely national dimension, EPPO-collected evidence will be admitted 
in national proceedings according to the ordinary rules of criminal procedure, ie the same 
rules apply to national non-PIF criminal investigations.365 After all, the European 
Delegated Prosecutors – who will form the linchpin of EPPO investigations – are national 
prosecutors carrying out their activities on the basis (mostly) of national law, under the 
direction of the EPPO’s Central Office (Permanent Chamber and Supervising European 
Prosecutor). As for OLAF, the rule on the admissibility of its reports is mostly thought to 
apply in national cases. As per the text of current Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, 
OLAF conducts administrative investigations in a given Member State, taking into 
account its national law, and the Office’s reports shall be considered equivalent to those 
of assimilable national administrative authorities.  
When the case has a cross-border dimension, the above-mentioned ‘prohibition 
of non-inadmissibility’ regulates the status of EPPO-collected evidence in the Member 
State where evidence needs to be used.366 As for OLAF, it is not entirely clear whether 
Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 also applies when OLAF reports are to be used in 
Member States other than the one(s) where OLAF conducted its investigations. If OLAF 
																																								 																				
362 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 291), amendment 110 (emphasis 
added). 
363 ibid. 
364 ibid. 
365 In the EPPO Regulation, there is no rule on the admissibility of evidence collected by the EPPO in cases 
that do not involve a cross-border element. Therefore, in accordance with Art 5(3) of the EPPO Regulation 
(‘… National law shall apply to the extent that a matter is not regulated by this Regulation …’), the ordinary 
rules of national criminal procedure apply.  
366 Art 37 of the EPPO Regulation. 
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carries out its activities in Member State A, taking into account the legislation of this 
country, it is unclear whether the assimilation principle also applies when authorities from 
Member State B wish to rely on that OLAF report.367 It might be said to apply according 
to Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, which states that OLAF reports ‘shall constitute 
admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings of the Member State in 
which their use proves necessary’,368 which could therefore be a different Member State 
from the one where OLAF conducted its investigations. 
In the light of the above, therefore, it remains to be seen to which of the two sets 
of rules OLAF reports will be subject when OLAF conducts investigations upon the 
EPPO’s request. On the one hand, one may think that OLAF reports could not be 
considered, or equated to, EPPO-collected evidence. The EPPO can require OLAF to 
support or complement ongoing investigations by conducting administrative 
investigations ‘in accordance with OLAF’s mandate’369 but cannot ‘delegate’ to OLAF 
responsibilities that should be carried out (usually by national police) in accordance with 
the code of criminal procedure. On the other hand, as noted, the ambiguous provisions on 
the EPPO-OLAF relationships may lead one to think that OLAF may become – on an ad 
hoc basis – a sort of police judiciaire of the EPPO. In the latter scenario, if OLAF-
collected evidence will eventually be subject to the rules on EPPO-collected evidence, 
the respect of criminal procedural safeguards by OLAF will be all the more necessary.  
  
6. CONCLUSION  
The analysis of rules, case law, and practices of seven Member States has confirmed what 
could be called a postulate of EU integration, namely that criminal justice systems are 
(still) rather different throughout the EU. However, this study brought to light not only 
their differences but also their similarities. Especially in the wake of the establishment of 
the EPPO, an increasingly more ‘European’ approach to criminal law matters is required.  
The ADCRIM project has focused on a very specific yet critical aspect of national 
systems, namely the admissibility of evidence, including that gathered by OLAF, in 
national procedures. The study addressed both punitive administrative and criminal 
proceedings, focusing on the latter.370 All the differences notwithstanding, it emerged that 
OLAF-collected evidence – and more precisely its reports and the annexes to them – are 
in principle admissible in each of the Member States under analysis, both in punitive 
administrative and criminal proceedings.  
It has been queried whether the other EU bodies with which the previous Hercule 
III studies compared OLAF (the ECB, ESMA, DG COMP) could provide useful guidance 
																																								 																				
367 Art 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 focuses mostly on the rules of the Member State concerned by OLAF 
activities: ‘In drawing up such reports and recommendations, account shall be taken of the national law of 
the Member State concerned. Reports drawn up on that basis shall constitute admissible evidence in 
administrative or judicial proceedings…’ (emphasis added). 
368 ibid (emphasis added).  
369 Art 101(3) of the EPPO Regulation.  
370 The following concluding remarks thus concern the admissibility of OLAF reports in national criminal 
proceedings, unless otherwise specified.  
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to examine the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence. The answer turned out to be 
overall negative, as national legislation and case law concerning these entities have not 
revealed relevant practices or lessons from which OLAF could learn. The reason for this 
seems to be found in the different natures of these bodies and their different relationships 
with the national criminal justice systems. ESMA and ECB legal frameworks, for 
instance, do not provide for any rule concerning the admissibility of evidence gathered 
by them in national proceedings. Regulation 1/2003 on competition law provides instead 
for some rules concerning the ‘migration’ of evidence from the EU to the national level. 
However, the applicability of such rules to OLAF would be contentious. DG COMP and 
its partners (NCAs or national courts) are part of a ‘closed system’, which is regulated 
almost entirely by EU law. OLAF’s ‘partners’ are instead national prosecuting authorities 
and, most important, national criminal courts – all of them acting in accordance with 
national criminal law rather than with the EU rules.  
Comparison with other EU bodies, however, provides food for thought from three 
different perspectives. First, as the transversal report on ‘EU Administrative 
Investigations and the Use of Their Results as Evidence in National Punitive Proceedings’ 
notes, EU admissibility rules – such as Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003 or Article 11(2) 
of Regulation 883/2013 – have the merit of ‘breaking open’371 national laws: “‘foreign’ 
materials need to be accepted’,372 under the conditions provided for in EU law. 
Furthermore, these provisions help to ‘do away with the issue of diverging standards’ and 
‘ensure that evidentiary laws come within the scope of the Charter and the jurisdiction of 
the CJEU’.373 Whatever these rules provide for, the Charter should be the pole star of EU 
and national activities and the Court of Justice’s case law may help in ensuring coherence 
and consistency in the EU legal order.374 
Second, the ECB and ESMA legal frameworks require the two bodies, when they 
become aware of potentially criminal conduct, to promptly inform competent national 
(criminal law) authorities, either directly (ESMA) or indirectly (the ECB informs central 
banks, which should pass the information on to public prosecutors). The study of the 
OLAF legal framework and some national reports show that this obligation does not apply 
to OLAF, at least not always. The issue at hand has been discussed within the framework 
of the analysis concerning contacts between OLAF and national authorities during the 
Office’s investigations. It emerged that OLAF does not always contact national 
authorities before conducting investigative measures in the Member States, although such 
contact would help to ensure that OLAF complies with national procedural requirements 
with a view to the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings. Thus sometimes 
national authorities are only informed of OLAF investigations the moment they receive 
OLAF reports. Yet late contacts have turned out to be detrimental to the effectiveness of 
national investigations that follow OLAF’s: if national authorities only become aware of 
the facts OLAF investigated when the Office brings its investigations to an end and 
																																								 																				
371 Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, section 3.2. 
372 ibid.  
373 ibid. 
374 ibid, section 7.  
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transmits the report, domestic prosecutors may need to repeat acts carried out by OLAF 
to ensure respect for procedural requirements and standards for admissible evidence. 
Furthermore, PIF crimes could be almost or already time-barred. A timelier 
communication between OLAF and national authorities seems therefore desirable.  
Third, Directive 2019/1 concerning the powers of national competition authorities 
deals expressly with the issue of admissibility of evidence gathered by NCAs and 
transmitted to other NCAs. Although these provisions concern the ‘horizontal’ 
relationship between NCAs, while the OLAF Regulation addresses the ‘vertical’ 
admissibility in national proceedings of evidence collected by an EU body, they confirm 
that when EU law touches upon admissibility it refers to the ‘ability to consider’375 
evidence. In other words, admissibility does not and could not mean (mandatory) use of 
evidence, as the national reports confirm. Where national judges find that OLAF activities 
have violated fundamental safeguards, they are reluctant to rely on OLAF reports. 
Likewise, it could also happen that national authorities find OLAF reports of insufficient 
quality or do not share OLAF’s views, and therefore search for further evidence to adopt 
their decisions. Some national reports note that OLAF investigations have different aims 
than do national criminal investigations, so the repetition of some OLAF activities may 
be ‘physiological’. National authorities, for instance, may be interested in asking 
witnesses or suspects different questions than those that OLAF posed during its 
investigations. Risks of ‘physiological’ duplication are inherently related to the nature of 
OLAF as an administrative authority carrying out activities with effects that extend to 
criminal proceedings. Furthermore, in several Member States, national courts can and do 
use OLAF findings after the OLAF official who drafted the report is heard as a witness, 
since this is usually how the outcomes of administrative inquiries are channelled in 
criminal proceedings. However, this would not even be a case of true repetition of the 
investigative act previously carried out by OLAF; rather its findings would simply be 
presented in a different manner.376 Duplication of OLAF activities can nonetheless be 
also ‘pathological’, eg because national authorities ignore the probative value attached to 
OLAF reports by Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 or because almost all OLAF 
activities are repeated by default.  
Against this background, the amendment of the OLAF Regulation would not 
change the status quo in a radical way with respect to the hypotheses of ‘physiological’ 
duplication of OLAF’s activities. It could however represent an opportunity to repair at 
least some of the existing shortcomings. In particular, the proposal of the European 
Parliament to ensure admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in all national punitive 
proceedings (OLAF reports ‘shall constitute admissible evidence in judicial proceedings 
before national courts’)377 could create a level playing field among Member States, 
leaving behind the fragmentation created by the assimilation rule. There seems to be no 
tenable objection to Article 325(4) TFEU justifying a measure like the one suggested by 
the European Parliament. In all Member States, OLAF reports could then be available to 
																																								 																				
375 Recital 73 of Directive 2019/1.  
376 German report, section 5.2. 
377 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 291), amendment 85.  
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national courts, upon simple verification of their authenticity and without any further 
complexity following from the assimilation principle.   
Strengthening the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in criminal 
proceedings should go hand in hand with the enhancement of safeguards and guarantees 
for individuals concerned by OLAF investigations. In this respect, the European 
Parliament’s proposal tackles some of the issues that Regulation 883/2013 and the 
CJEU’s case law leave open, such as the right of access to the OLAF file and judicial 
review of OLAF reports by the CJEU. The European Parliament also resuscitates the idea 
of a ‘controller of procedural safeguards’ within OLAF, although the establishment of 
this body may be redundant if the CJEU will eventually be entrusted with control over 
the validity of OLAF reports.  
Deciding on the safeguards that OLAF shall respect in the course of its 
investigations is a crucial, albeit not the only,378 factor that influences the admissibility of 
OLAF-collected evidence in national criminal proceedings. This and other studies have 
confirmed that the procedural safeguards listed in Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013 are 
overall rather robust when compared with the usual safeguards for administrative 
investigations in the Member States, yet there are still some shortcomings from a criminal 
law perspective. A previous study by Ligeti, for instance, stressed the importance of the 
right of access to the case file and argued that ‘several aspects of the rights contained in 
Art. 9 should … be further detailed such as the threshold to invoke the privilege against 
self-incrimination, the minimum information to be provided to the interviewee and the 
regime for carrying out digital forensic operations’.379  
Such a position is often met with some resistance by practitioners at the national 
and EU level, who consider subjecting OLAF investigations to criminal law standards 
disproportionate, since the Office does not have criminal law powers. However, as 
OLAF’s added value comes to light when the results of its investigations can be (and are) 
used in criminal proceedings, it may be worth considering whether the safeguards 
currently provided for by the OLAF Regulation should be further strengthened. In 
principle, the higher the standards OLAF is called on to respect during its investigations, 
the fewer the obstacles to OLAF-collected evidence being admitted and used in national 
criminal procedures.  
EU law already contemplates some harmonisation of the procedural safeguards of 
persons involved in criminal proceedings. The Directives on procedural safeguards that 
the EU legislator has adopted in the aftermath of the Lisbon Treaty do not apply to OLAF 
investigations, which do not qualify as criminal investigations, yet there is some overlap. 
For instance, Article 7 of Directive 2016/343 lays down the nemo tenetur principle, which 
is also enshrined, albeit in a more limited way, in Article 9(2) of Regulation 883/2013.380 
As these Directives crystallise the minimum protection that should be ensured to persons 
involved in criminal proceedings throughout the EU, they could represent a benchmark 
																																								 																				
378 Ligeti (n 23) 7. 
379 ibid. 
380 See Luchtman, Karagianni and Bovend’Eerdt, transversal report, sections 2.2 and 3.5. See also Ligeti (n 
23) 12–13. 
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for the evaluation of the admissibility of OLAF reports by national authorities. In other 
words, one way to enhance such admissibility and to ensure consistency throughout the 
EU would be to require national courts to assess whether OLAF respected the minimum 
safeguards laid down in those Directives. Should this be the case, OLAF reports should 
be admissible in national criminal proceedings, and national courts should not refuse to 
take them into account on the basis of potentially higher national standards. This would 
represent a sort of ‘codification’ of the Melloni principles and would arguably strengthen 
the effectiveness of OLAF’s activities. As the Directives provide only for minimum 
standards that are worded in a rather general way, the intervention of the CJEU may be 
at times necessary to help national courts clarify the scope of the Directives’ provisions 
and thus whether OLAF violated the rights provided therein.  
The link between admissibility of evidence and procedural safeguards is of the 
essence also for future EPPO-OLAF relationships, which in any case require clarification. 
On the one hand, OLAF is to be independent from the EPPO and there should be no 
duplication of investigations. On the other hand, however, Article 101(3)(c) of the EPPO 
Regulation seems to hint at a situation where the EPPO could somehow end up delegating 
to OLAF investigative activities aimed at collecting evidence that the EPPO intends to 
use in national proceedings. If this is the right understanding of the provision at hand, the 
full respect of criminal law rules and guarantees by OLAF is imperative, as the European 
Parliament rightly suggests: it would be untenable to allow OLAF to be – in essence – the 
police judiciaire of the EPPO and to comply at the same time with rules affording 
individuals less protection than those provided for by criminal procedural law. This would 
however require, in the long run, further thought regarding OLAF’s future nature and 
identity, which will arguably exceed the administrative law domain. 
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12. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
K. Ligeti and F. Giuffrida 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
ADCRIM is the third of a cycle of Hercule III research projects examining potential 
improvements of OLAF’s legal framework. The project draws insights by making a 
comparison with three other EU entities involved in the enforcement of EU law, namely 
the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Securities and Markets Authority 
(ESMA), and the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition (DG 
COMP). Coordinated by Utrecht University, the first two studies dealt with, respectively, 
investigatory powers and procedural safeguards,1 and exchange of information between 
the above EU bodies and national enforcement authorities.2 ADCRIM was coordinated 
by the University of Luxembourg and tackled the admissibility of evidence collected by 
OLAF in national punitive administrative and criminal proceedings, with a stronger focus 
on the criminal law setting.  
OLAF’s mission is to ‘step up the fight against fraud, corruption and any other 
illegal activity’3 affecting the Union budget. Despite its nature as an administrative body, 
OLAF is very close to the criminal law domain. In particular, legal and/or practical issues 
arise when evidence collected by OLAF according to the rules and standards of 
administrative procedure ‘migrates’ to criminal proceedings. The starting point of our 
analysis is, therefore, Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, according to which:  
In drawing up such reports and recommendations [ie reports and recommendations 
adopted upon completion of an OLAF investigation],4 account shall be taken of the 
																																								 																				
1 Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Investigatory Powers and Procedural Safeguards: Improving 
OLAF’s Legislative Framework through a Comparison with Other EU Law Enforcement Authorities 
(ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2017). 
2 Michele Simonato, Michiel Luchtman and John Vervaele (eds), Exchange of Information with EU and 
National Enforcement Authorities: Improving OLAF Legislative Framework through a Comparison with 
Other EU Authorities (ECN/ESMA/ECB) (Utrecht University 2018). 
3 Art 1 of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 883/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 
September 2013 concerning investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) [2013] 
OJ L 248/1.  
4 Art 11(1) of Regulation 883/2013 states:  
On completion of an investigation by the Office, a report shall be drawn up, under the authority of the 
Director-General. That report shall give an account of the legal basis for the investigation, the procedural 
steps followed, the facts established and their preliminary classification in law, the estimated financial 
impact of the facts established, the respect of the procedural guarantees in accordance with Article 9 
and the conclusions of the investigation. 
The report shall be accompanied by recommendations of the Director-General on whether or not action 
should be taken. Those recommendations shall, where appropriate, indicate any disciplinary, 
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national law of the Member State concerned. Reports drawn up on that basis shall 
constitute admissible evidence in administrative or judicial proceedings of the Member 
State in which their use proves necessary, in the same way and under the same conditions 
as administrative reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. They shall be 
subject to the same evaluation rules as those applicable to administrative reports drawn 
up by national administrative inspectors and shall have the same evidentiary value as such 
reports. 
This provision, which replaces the analogous rule of Regulation 1073/1999 (repealed by 
Regulation 883/2013) and which is worded in a very similar fashion as Article 8(3) of 
Regulation 2185/96 on OLAF on-the-spot checks and inspections, has three key 
components. First, it requires OLAF to draft its reports by taking into account national 
law. Second, it provides for an assimilation rule, ie OLAF reports shall be considered – 
for the purposes of admissibility in national proceedings and assessing their evidentiary 
value – as if they were reports drawn up by national administrative inspectors. Third, such 
reports can be used in national ‘administrative or judicial proceedings’, which include 
administrative proceedings, criminal proceedings, and the in-between category of 
punitive administrative proceedings. The latter refers to proceedings aiming to issue 
administrative sanctions that would qualify as having a criminal nature according to the 
Engel criteria set out by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR),5 which the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) recently endorsed.6 
The application of Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, and of its predecessors, 
turned out to be unsatisfactory. The Commission itself, when tabling a Proposal for the 
amendment of the OLAF Regulation, acknowledged that  
the most important factor affecting the follow-up to OLAF recommendations … relates 
to the rules on the admissibility of OLAF-collected evidence in national judicial 
proceedings. … in some Member States [the assimilation rule] does not sufficiently 
ensure the effectiveness of OLAF’s activities.7  
According to OLAF’s own analysis of the follow-up to OLAF recommendations between 
2008 and 2015, about half of these recommendations (169 out of 317) did not lead to any 
proceedings at the national level, and the most common reason for the dismissal of cases 
was ‘insufficient evidence’8 (94 out of 169 dismissals). The same analysis revealed that  
																																								 																				
administrative, financial and/or judicial action by the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies and by 
the competent authorities of the Member States concerned, and shall specify in particular the estimated 
amounts to be recovered, as well as the preliminary classification in law of the facts established. 
5 Engel and Others v The Netherlands Apps nos 5100/71; 5101/71; 5102/71; 5354/72; 5370/72 (ECtHR, 8 
June 1976). 
6 See, for instance, Case C-489/10 Bonda, EU:C:2012:319; Case C-524/15 Menci, EU:C:2018:197. 
7 Commission, ‘Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations’ COM(2018) 338 final, 
23 May 2018, 5.  
8 OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up to OLAF’s Judicial Recommendations Issued between 1 
January 2008 and 31 December 2015’, Ref Ares(2017)461597 – 27/01/2017 (2017) 1. 
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Member States’ authorities repeatedly take the view that art. 11§2 of Regulation 
883/20132 is not always a sufficient legal basis to allow Member States’ judicial 
authorities to use OLAF reports as evidence in trial. Therefore, in numerous Member 
States, after receiving the OLAF final report, prosecutors perform investigation activities 
again in order to acquire admissible evidence.9  
Such duplication is detrimental both to individuals, who are subject to multiple 
investigations (by OLAF and by national authorities) based on the same facts, and to the 
EU, as the (often complex and long) OLAF investigations are in essence considered to 
merely justify the opening of national investigations into the same facts.10 Furthermore, 
repetition of investigative acts could at times not be possible or effective (eg because the 
suspected person destroyed the relevant evidence) and prolongs the time elapsed since 
the commission of potential crimes, increasing the risks of their becoming statute-barred 
before any final decision can be taken.  
Against this backdrop, the ADCRIM project studied how the rule enshrined in 
Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 plays out in seven national systems (France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom),11 and 
whether and to what extent duplication occurs. The outcomes of this study have been 
summarised in the comparative report, which has also examined whether the suggested 
amendments to the OLAF Regulation, proposed by the Commission in May 2018 and by 
the European Parliament in April 2019,12 could repair some existing shortcomings. On 
this basis, we have come up with policy recommendations to strengthen the admissibility 
of OLAF final reports in criminal proceedings. These recommendations are grouped into 
recommendations that do not require a legislative change (best practice 
recommendations) and proposals for legislative amendments. 
  
I. PROPOSED BEST PRACTICES  
 
RECOMMENDATION NO 1: Ensure there is enough expertise within OLAF 
itself, or if need be by liaising with national authorities, Eurojust and/or the 
EPPO, to take adequately into account national law when drafting OLAF 
reports 
Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 and Article 8(3) of Regulation 2185/96 require 
OLAF to take account of the national law of the Member State concerned when drafting 
the final OLAF report or the on-the-spot checks and inspections report. This obligation 
																																								 																				
9 ibid 2. 
10 Katalin Ligeti, ‘The Protection of the Procedural Rights of Persons Concerned by OLAF Administrative 
Investigations and the Admissibility of OLAF Final Reports as Criminal Evidence’ (Study for the European 
Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control 2017) 27–28. 
11 Any reference to the UK should be understood as referring to the English and Welsh legal system. 
12 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 883/2013 concerning 
investigations conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) as regards cooperation with the 
European Public Prosecutor’s Office and the effectiveness of OLAF investigations (COM(2018)0338 – C8-
0214/2018 – 2018/0170(COD))’. 
290 K. ligeti and F. giuFFrida 12. Policy recommendations 291
4 
	
remains unchanged in the text of the Commission’s Proposal for an amended OLAF 
Regulation and in the European Parliament’s resolution of April 2019.13 Especially in a 
context where the principle of assimilation applies, it is crucial that OLAF pays adequate 
attention to national rules. Even if and when the principle will be set aside,14 OLAF cannot 
shy away from considering national law when drafting its reports, which are to be 
eventually used by national courts acting in accordance with national law.  
Within OLAF, the Judicial and Legal Advice Unit, which was also known as the 
‘Magistrates Unit’ since it was composed of national magistrates, gave advice to OLAF 
officials on national law concerning evidentiary issues until it was dismantled in 2012. 
As its support was highly valued, it would be appropriate to give further thought to 
whether such a unit should be reintroduced, as the European Parliament seems to suggest 
when it requires the internal OLAF legality check to be entrusted to ‘experts in law and 
investigative  procedures who are qualified to hold judicial office in a Member State’.15 
Having the necessary ‘in-house’ expertise for each of the 28 Member States would indeed 
represent an added value for OLAF activities, as it could help to increase the quality of 
its reports and their compliance with national requirements, thus reducing the risks of 
duplication of investigative activities. As an alternative, OLAF should explore the 
possibility to consult, when needed, with national Desks at Eurojust, or, in the future, with 
the competent European Delegated Prosecutor or European Prosecutor of the Member 
State where it carries out its investigations. OLAF could also get in touch with competent 
national authorities, as further explained below. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION NO 2: Ensure that the investigative measures carried out 
by the Office (interviews, inspections, forensic analysis, etc) are adequately 
documented in OLAF final reports and especially in their annexes  
Some national reports noted that, in practice, admissibility issues in national criminal 
proceedings do not arise vis-à-vis OLAF reports as such but rather with respect to the 
annexes to these reports. It is indeed in the annexes that OLAF mostly includes (or should 
include) copies of the documents it consulted, interview recordings, findings of forensic 
analysis or inspections, etc. Therefore, to increase the probative value of OLAF-collected 
evidence, adequate attention should also be paid to these annexes and their quality, as 
they are of the essence for national investigations and prosecutions.  
 
 
 
 
																																								 																				
13 cf COM(2018) 338 final, Art 1(10)(b), which however adds to the current text that account should be 
taken also of the relevant provisions of Union law. There are no amendments to this provision in the 
European Parliament’s resolution of April 2019. 
14 See section 5.3 of the comparative report. 
15 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 12), amendment 135.  
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RECOMMENDATION NO 3: More training at the national level on EU rules and 
procedures to fight PIF crimes is needed 
A certain degree of what could be called ‘physiological’ duplication seems inherent to 
how OLAF works and its nature as an administrative body whose actions have criminal 
law ramifications. However, the comparative report also brought to light cases of, so to 
say, ‘pathological’ duplication of OLAF investigative activities. A glaring example is 
when national authorities repeat OLAF activities because they are unaware of EU legal 
instruments and principles regulating the matter, as some interviewees contacted in the 
framework of this study reported. In this respect, increasing national authorities’ 
knowledge of, and familiarity with, EU rules, bodies, and instruments for fighting PIF 
crimes, eg by more specific training on these matters, could repair the current situation. 
 
 
II. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS  
 
RECOMMENDATION NO 4: Enhance contacts between OLAF and national 
competent authorities at the beginning of OLAF investigations, by 
considering the introduction of an obligation for OLAF to promptly inform 
these authorities before the Office carries out investigative measures at the 
national level and/or when it becomes aware of cases having potential 
criminal law implications   
The national reports have demonstrated that sometimes OLAF and national authorities do 
not have any contact until the moment OLAF transmits its final reports and 
recommendations in accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013.16 The OLAF 
Supervisory Committee’s Opinion No 2/17 touches upon the issue as well, calling for an 
‘[e]arly involvement of national authorities in earlier stages of an investigation’.17 We 
share this view, because early contacts would allow both OLAF and competent domestic 
authorities to plan their activities accordingly.  
Especially if OLAF promptly informs national authorities before carrying out 
investigative measures at the national level, they not only could advise OLAF on rules 
for ensuring admissibility of evidence, as noted above, but also embark on intrusive 
investigative measures that OLAF could not undertake, if specific pieces of evidence must 
be secured. The early involvement of national authorities could also help to solve some 
time-related problems plaguing OLAF investigations and their follow-up. Fraud and other 
activities affecting the EU budget are often difficult to discover in the first place, and 
complex to investigate in the second. Hence, when OLAF completes its investigations 
and transmits its reports in accordance with Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013, the 
crimes at hand are sometimes already, or on the brink of being, statute-barred.18 Early 
																																								 																				
16 See comparative report, section 5.1. 
17 OLAF Supervisory Committee, ‘Opinion 2/2017 Accompanying the Commission Evaluation report on 
the application of Regulation (EU) of the European Parliament and of the Council No 883/2013 (Article 
19)’ (2017), para 48.  
18  OLAF, ‘Analysis on Member States Follow-Up’ (n 8) 6.  
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contacts between OLAF and national authorities could therefore allow them to coordinate 
their activities in a better way.  
The introduction of an OLAF obligation to promptly report to national authorities 
cases having (potential) criminal law implications could also be considered. The current 
OLAF legal framework provides for some rules on information exchange, yet almost 
none of them lays down an obligation for OLAF to inform domestic authorities of cases 
where a criminal offence seems to have been discovered.19 The ECB and ESMA legal 
frameworks require instead that these two bodies, when they become aware of potentially 
criminal conduct, promptly inform competent domestic (criminal law) authorities, either 
directly (ESMA) or indirectly (the ECB informs central banks, which should then pass 
the information on to public prosecutors). For the above-mentioned reasons, and despite 
the clear differences in mission and powers between these two bodies and OLAF, it would 
not be inconceivable to apply similar rules to the latter as well.  
Furthermore, the EPPO Regulation now requires that OLAF – as well any other 
EU institution, body, office and agency – report without undue delay to the EPPO any 
potential case falling within the competence of the European prosecution authority.20 
Since the EPPO will be competent to investigate and prosecute PIF crimes, it should be 
able to promptly decide whether to embark upon the investigation of a given case as soon 
as there is a suspicion that a PIF offence has been committed. The same rationale could 
therefore apply with respect to the relationships between OLAF and national authorities, 
which are currently competent to investigate and prosecute PIF crimes as well. After all, 
late contacts between OLAF and national authorities have turned out to yield poor results 
and it would be thus worth exploring whether the status quo may improve by creating 
synergies and collaboration between OLAF and national authorities at an earlier stage. 
Even when the EPPO will have started its activities, such early contacts would be needed, 
at least in the Member States that do not participate in the EPPO; in all others, they are 
also likely to be needed with respect to criminal cases beyond the EPPO’s competence. 
 
 
RECOMMENDATION NO 5: Replace the assimilation clause with a rule 
providing for the admissibility of OLAF reports as such, clarifying that 
national courts will still have the power to freely assess OLAF-collected 
evidence; at the same time, higher procedural safeguards should be ensured 
or, alternatively, the option of subjecting the admissibility of OLAF reports 
to the respect of the minimum standards laid down in the Directives on 
procedural safeguards can be explored 
The Commission and the European Parliament intend to remove the assimilation principle 
from the OLAF Regulation, which is convenient, since the ADCRIM project confirmed 
																																								 																				
19 See more in comparative report, section 5.1. 
20 Art 24(1) of the Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced 
cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s office (‘the EPPO’) [2017] OJ L 
28/1.  
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that the principle can lead to unsatisfactory results. The Commission would however keep 
it for national criminal proceedings, while the European Parliament would not make any 
distinction between criminal and administrative procedures. The European Parliament 
suggests replacing Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 with the following provision:  
Upon simple verification of their authenticity, reports drawn up on that basis including 
all evidence supporting and annexed to these reports shall constitute admissible evidence 
in judicial proceedings before national courts and in administrative proceedings in the 
Member States. The power of the national courts to freely assess the evidence shall not 
be affected by this Regulation.21 
This proposed wording of Article 11(2) of Regulation 883/2013 would have the merit of 
clarifying that OLAF reports and the annexes thereto will have to be admitted as such in 
national criminal proceedings, even if national provisions on admissibility of evidence 
gathered by national administrative authorities are unclear or altogether non-existent. It 
goes without saying that the question remains as to whether such a new provision will be 
truly able to improve the current situation, as it will have to apply in a context where there 
is no harmonisation of national rules on criminal proceedings. If each national court 
continues to follow its own code of criminal procedure and to exercise the powers 
bestowed upon it by non-harmonised national legislation, the possibility that even an 
amended OLAF Regulation will not solve most of the problems related to OLAF-
collected evidence looms large. Yet the fact that the admissibility of OLAF-collected 
evidence will no longer depend on the rules applying to comparable national 
administrative authorities, but only on the reports’ authenticity that domestic competent 
authorities will have to verify, would arguably represent a step forward.  
While the Commission and the European Parliament agree on the removal of the 
assimilation rule for administrative proceedings, the issue becomes less straightforward 
when it comes to encroaching upon criminal justice systems. In section 5.3 of the 
comparative report, it has been argued that Article 325(4) TFEU would not be an obstacle 
to the adoption of a text as that suggested by the European Parliament. However, while 
this change in the OLAF legal framework would not be contentious as far as its legal basis 
is concerned, it should go hand in hand with two further amendments. 
a) First, it is to be welcomed that the European Parliament suggests specifying 
that – along the lines of Article 37 of the EPPO Regulation – national courts remain free 
to assess OLAF-collected evidence. The study of the seven national systems 
demonstrated that some of the issues connected with OLAF reports do not concern the 
admissibility as such, but rather the use that national prosecutors and courts make (or do 
not make) of these reports. In other words, even when OLAF reports are admissible, 
which in national criminal proceedings they usually are, domestic authorities could still 
need to search for further evidence or even to repeat some of the investigative activities 
previously carried out by the Office.22 As some national reports noted, OLAF 
investigations have indeed different aims and standards than national criminal 
																																								 																				
21 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 12), amendment 85.  
22 See more in section 5 of the comparative report.  
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investigations, so that in some cases there is no real alternative to carrying out further, or 
even repeating, investigative activities (eg reinterrogating the suspects and asking them 
new questions that OLAF did not pose). These risks of, so to speak, ‘physiological’ 
duplication are inherently related to the nature of OLAF as an administrative authority 
carrying out investigations with effects that extend to criminal proceedings, and there 
seems to be little room to entirely avoid them in the future if the nature itself of OLAF 
will not change.  
The European Parliament’s proposal could however improve the status quo, as it 
would create, on the one hand, a level playing field among Member States, leaving behind 
the complexities and fragmentation following from the assimilation rule. On the other 
hand, by specifying that national courts would remain free to assess OLAF-collected 
evidence along the lines of the similar EPPO Regulation provision, it would clarify that 
‘admissibility’ of OLAF reports means that a national court will have the ‘ability to 
consider’23 them when taking its decisions. It will be eventually for this court to decide 
on the reliability and usefulness of the reports, taking into account the principles of effet 
utile of EU law and of sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), the obligation to protect 
the Union budget (Article 325 TFEU), and, last but not least, fundamental principles and 
standards of national criminal procedure. 
b) The ‘upgrade’ of OLAF reports’ admissibility calls indeed for the 
enhancement of procedural safeguards. Those listed in Article 9 of Regulation 883/2013 
are overall rather robust when compared to the usual ones applying to administrative 
investigations, yet there are still some shortcomings when one looks at them through the 
lens of criminal law. It is therefore to be welcomed that the European Parliament, while 
providing for a stronger admissibility rule in criminal proceedings, suggests bridging 
some existing gaps in the OLAF legal framework regarding the position of individuals 
concerned by the Office’s investigations. The European Parliament would introduce a 
provision on the right of access to the case file and another on the jurisdiction of the Court 
of Justice to review OLAF reports.24 As argued in a previous study, the right of access to 
the file is of the essence, especially with a view to criminal proceedings, as only timely 
access to the file allows the effective exercise of defence rights and ensures equality of 
arms.25 Likewise, the rule on judicial review would be beneficial to persons concerned by 
OLAF activities, as it would allow the CJEU to control the validity of OLAF reports and 
OLAF’s compliance with EU fundamental rights during investigations. The European 
Parliament also suggests introducing a body that the Commission proposed a few years 
ago, the ‘Controller of procedural guarantees’. If the provision on the Court of Justice is 
agreed upon, however, the creation of this further body may be redundant, as respecting 
procedural guarantees may be arguably better controlled by the combination of OLAF 
internal and CJEU external review.   
																																								 																				
23 Recital 73 of Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
to empower the competition authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure 
the proper functioning of the internal market [2019] OJ L 11/3. 
24 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 12), amendments 75 and 94.  
25 See more in Ligeti (n 10) 16–18. 
296 K. ligeti and F. giuFFrida 12. Policy recommendations 297
9 
	
 Another option to consider to ensure the admissibility of OLAF reports and 
avoid that national courts refuse to use them because of alleged differences with national 
safeguards would be to establish a link between OLAF activities and the Directives on 
procedural safeguards in criminal proceedings. Since these Directives crystallise the 
minimum protection that should be ensured to persons involved in criminal proceedings 
throughout the EU, they could represent a benchmark for the evaluation of the 
admissibility of OLAF reports by national authorities. In other words, OLAF’s legal 
framework could be amended in a way that requires national courts to assess whether 
OLAF investigations respected the minimum safeguards laid down in the Directives. 
Should this be the case, OLAF reports should be admissible in national criminal 
proceedings, and national courts could not refuse to take them into account on the basis 
of potentially higher national standards. This would represent a sort of ‘codification’ of 
the Melloni principles and would arguably strengthen the effectiveness of OLAF’s 
activities.  
 
 
RECOMMENDATION NO 6: Clarify the relationships between OLAF and the 
EPPO, especially with respect to the ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary’ 
role of OLAF envisaged by Article 101(3) of the EPPO Regulation; ensure 
that, in any case, EPPO does not ‘outsource’ its investigations to OLAF to the 
detriment of the individuals’ safeguards 
When the EPPO is dealing with a case, in principle OLAF should not open any parallel 
administrative investigations into the same facts. When the EPPO decides instead not to 
take on board a given case, it could refer the case to OLAF if there is still room for 
administrative follow-up or recovery.26 What can be gleaned from these provisions is that 
OLAF and the EPPO will be distinct bodies with different mandates which should 
coordinate their activities to avoid duplication.27 Nothing however suggests that – as 
things stand now – OLAF will become the police judiciaire of the EPPO. While there 
was some discussion about this hypothesis before the creation of the EPPO, the 
negotiators have clearly ruled out such a transformation of OLAF. 
Nonetheless, according to Article 101(3)(c) of the EPPO Regulation, the EPPO, 
in the course of its investigations, may request OLAF to support or complement its 
activity by conducting administrative investigations.28 The scope of this provision is not 
entirely clear. If the EPPO can request OLAF to conduct administrative investigations in 
‘support’ of its own, one would be inclined to think that the outcome of OLAF’s activities 
will eventually be used by the EPPO in the framework of criminal investigations, as if 
OLAF were, on an ad hoc basis, the EPPO’s police arm. The risk looming large in this 
scenario is that the EPPO may delegate tasks to OLAF with the ‘aim of circumventing’29 
the EPPO Regulation rules on procedural safeguards. If this is the right understanding of 
																																								 																				
26 Recitals 103 and 105, and Art 101(2) of the EPPO Regulation. 
27 See Recital 103.  
28 Art 101(3)(c) of the EPPO Regulation.  
29 European Parliament, ‘Legislative resolution of 16 April 2019’ (n 12), amendment 110.  
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the provision at hand, the full respect of criminal law rules and guarantees by OLAF is 
imperative, as the European Parliament rightly suggests: it would be untenable to allow 
OLAF to be – in essence – the police judiciaire of the EPPO and to comply at the same 
time with rules affording individuals less protection than those provided for by criminal 
procedural law. 
 
 
  
 
298 Questionnaire for national rapporteurs
 
ANNEX I 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NATIONAL RAPPORTEURS 
 
 
 
 
 
1. GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
 
1.1 What is the function of admissibility rules in your national administrative law? 
 
1.2 What is the function of admissibility rules in your national criminal procedural law? 
 
1.3 Can the decision on admissibility be subject to review? And what is the scope of this 
review? 
 
1.4 Is your system of proof free or controlled?1 
 
1.5 May evidence declared inadmissible in the context of non-criminal proceedings 
(administrative proceedings) subsequently be admitted and used in criminal proceedings? 
 
1.6 May evidence declared inadmissible in criminal proceedings subsequently be 
admitted and used in non-criminal administrative proceedings? 
 
2. ADMISSIBILITY OF OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
 
2.1 Do the rules of administrative law and procedure in your national system apply to the 
admissibility of ‘OLAF-collected evidence’ in punitive administrative proceedings? 
Could you specify the general rules? Are there any specific provisions related to OLAF-
collected evidence?  
 
2.2 Could you provide an overview of your national case law on the admissibility of 
OLAF-collected evidence in punitive administrative proceedings?  
 
																																								 																				
1 Controlled systems are intended as systems adopting a numerus clausus of means of proof (evidence), 
therefore excluding ‘atypical’ means. 
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2.2.1 Could you provide us with any case(s) in which the OLAF-collected 
evidence was expressly declared inadmissible? Please state in respect of each cited 
case the relevant grounds for inadmissibility. 
 
2.2.2 Are you aware of any case(s) in which the admissibility of the OLAF-
collected evidence was denied due to the sui generis nature of OLAF (i.e. where 
it was not possible to establish an equivalence between the mandate and functions 
of OLAF and a national administrative authority)? 
 
2.3 Based on your knowledge of national legislation, jurisprudence and practice do higher 
national standards in relation to procedural safeguards impact the admissibility of OLAF-
collected evidence?  
 
2.4 How can the concerned person in an OLAF investigation challenge evidence which 
was allegedly obtained in violation of EU rules on investigatory powers and procedural 
safeguards?2 Is there an ex officio control at national level in your legal system? 
 
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY ECB, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL PUNITIVE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
 
3.1: ECB 
 
3.1.1 Do the rules of administrative law and procedure in your national system apply to 
the admissibility of evidence collected and transmitted by ECB according to Article 136 
SSM Framework Regulation in punitive administrative proceedings? Could you specify 
the general rules? Are there any specific provisions related to evidence collected 
according to Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation? 
 
3.1.2 Could you provide us with any significant case(s) in which the evidence collected 
and transmitted according to Article 136 SSM Framework Regulation was expressly 
declared inadmissible? Please state in respect of each cited case the relevant grounds for 
inadmissibility. 
																																								 																				
2 Please refer to the powers and safeguards identified in the first Hercule III study. Powers: production 
orders, interviews, on-site inspections, access to traffic and telecommunication data. Safeguards: legal 
professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, access to a lawyer. 
BOX 1 
Example: according to the CJEU case law in competition matters, in-house lawyers 
are not covered by legal professional privilege (LPP). What happens if national law 
accords such a privilege also to in-house lawyers? 
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3.1.3 Based on your knowledge of national legislation, jurisprudence and practice do 
higher national standards in relation to procedural safeguards impact the admissibility of 
ECB-collected evidence? (see also box under question 2.3) 
 
3.1.4 How can the concerned person challenge evidence which was allegedly obtained in 
violation of EU rules on investigatory powers and procedural safeguards?3 And can there 
be an ex officio control? 
 
3.2 ESMA 
 
3.2.1 Do the rules of administrative law and procedure in your national system apply to 
the admissibility of evidence collected and transmitted by ESMA according to Article 
64(8) EMIR to national punitive administrative proceedings? Could you specify the 
general rules? Are there any specific provisions related to evidence collected according 
to Article 64(8) EMIR? 
 
3.2.2 Could you provide us with any significant case(s) in which the ESMA-collected 
evidence was expressly declared inadmissible in national punitive administrative 
proceedings? Please state in respect of each cited case the relevant grounds for 
inadmissibility. 
 
3.2.3 Based on your knowledge of national legislation, jurisprudence and practice do 
higher national standards in relation to procedural safeguards impact the admissibility of 
ESMA-collected evidence? (see also box under question 2.3) 
 
3.2.4 How can the concerned person challenge evidence which was allegedly obtained in 
violation of EU rules on investigatory powers and procedural safeguards?4 And can there 
be an ex officio control? 
 
3.3 DG Competition 
 
3.3.1 Do the rules of administrative law and procedure in your national system apply to 
the admissibility of evidence collected and transmitted by DG COMP according to Article 
12 of Regulation 1/2003 to national punitive administrative proceedings? Could you 
specify the general rules? Are there any specific provisions related to evidence collected 
and transmitted according to Article 12 of Regulation 1/2003? 
																																								 																				
3 Please, refer to the powers and safeguards identified in the first Hercule III study. Powers: production 
orders, interviews, on-site inspections, access to traffic and telecommunication data. Safeguards: legal 
professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, access to a lawyer. 
4 Please, refer to the powers and safeguards identified in the first Hercule III study. Powers: production 
orders, interviews, on-site inspections, access to traffic and telecommunication data. Safeguards: legal 
professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, access to a lawyer. 
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3.3.2 Could you provide us with any significant case(s) in which DG COMP-collected 
evidence was expressly declared inadmissible in national punitive administrative 
proceedings? Please state in respect of each cited case the relevant grounds for 
inadmissibility. 
 
3.3.3 Based on your knowledge of national legislation and jurisprudence do higher 
national standards in relation to procedural safeguards impact the admissibility of DG 
COMP-collected evidence? (see also box under question 2.3) 
 
3.3.4 How can the concerned person challenge evidence which was allegedly obtained in 
violation of EU rules on investigatory powers and procedural safeguards?5 And can there 
be an ex officio control? 
 
4. ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY OLAF, ESMA AND DG COMP 
IN NATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 
 
4.1 Does your system generally allow for the admissibility of information gathered by 
national administrative authorities as evidence in criminal proceedings? 
 
4.1.1 If yes, could you please explain under which conditions? If not, please 
explain the reasons. 
 
4.1.2 Is the admissibility of information gathered by national administrative 
authorities regulated by a general provision in your code of criminal procedure? 
Or is the admissibility provided by sectoral rules?  
 
4.1.2.1 In the latter case, does your system lay down special rules on the 
admissibility in criminal proceedings of information collected by the 
ECB/ESMA/DG COMP and their respective National Competent Authorities 
(NCAs) or OLAF? 
 
4.2 Regarding its admissibility in criminal proceedings, is there any distinction between 
information collected by administrative authorities in the context of their ordinary 
regulatory or supervisory activities and information gathered by the same authorities in  
the context of administrative investigations into alleged regulatory breaches? 
																																								 																				
5 Please, refer to the powers and safeguards identified in the first Hercule III study. Powers: production 
orders, interviews, on-site inspections, access to traffic and telecommunication data. Safeguards: legal 
professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, access to a lawyer. 
 
4.3 For the purposes of their admissibility in criminal proceedings, is there any distinction 
between the types of evidence collected by the ECB/ESMA/DG COMP and their 
respective National Competent Authorities (NCAs) or OLAF (business records, 
documents, interviews, digital forensic operations)? 
 
4.4 Based on your knowledge of national legislation, jurisprudence and practice, do 
higher national standards in relation to procedural guarantees impact the admissibility of 
evidence collected by ECB/ESMA/DG Competition and OLAF in national criminal 
proceedings? (see also box under question 2.3) 
 
4.5 How can the concerned person challenge evidence which was allegedly obtained in 
violation of EU rules on investigatory powers and procedural safeguards?6 And can there 
be an ex officio control? 
 
5. FOCUS: OLAF-COLLECTED EVIDENCE AND ADMISSIBILITY IN 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS  
 
5.1 (requires interviews): Are the requirements for the prospective admissibility of the 
report in criminal proceedings discussed with OLAF before proceeding to a joint on-the-
spot check or inspection?  
 
5.1.1 When a joint on-the-spot check or inspection with OLAF is conducted, does 
your national authority proceed to draft a parallel national report on the 
inspection? 
 
5.2 (requires interviews): Are investigative activities already performed by OLAF 
repeated according to the relevant national provision in the code of criminal procedure? 
In the affirmative case, could you provide us with your opinion on the reasons justifying 
this practice? 
																																								 																				
6 Please, refer to the powers and safeguards identified in the first Hercule III study. Powers: production 
orders, interviews, on-site inspections, access to traffic and telecommunication data. Safeguards: legal 
professional privilege, privilege against self-incrimination, access to the lawyer. 
BOX 2 
Example: The ECB constantly supervises the financial institutions falling under the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) regime and information, which may also 
include evidence of a potential violation, is provided on a day to day basis from the 
supervised entities to the supervisor. In this context, legal safeguards may operate 
differently from the cases where the ECB performs an administrative investigation. 
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5.2.1 Of the investigative activities performed by OLAF (on-the-spot checks, 
interviews, digital forensics operations), which are more frequently repeated 
according to national provisions? 
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